

# Hindu Theology in Early Modern South Asia

*The Rise of Devotionalism and  
the Politics of Genealogy*

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## *List of Abbreviations (The Edition Used)*

ABiU	<i>Amṛtabindu Upaniṣad</i> (Madhavananda 1968)
AiU	<i>Aitareya Upaniṣad</i> (Olivelle 1998)
AnuVyā	<i>Anuvyākhyāna</i> of Madhva (1999b)
ĀPra	<i>Ātmaprakāśa</i> of Śrīdhara (1986)
AVe	<i>Atharva Veda</i> (Roth & Whitney 1856)
BhāABo	<i>Bhāvārthabodhinī</i> of Śrīdhara (1983)
BhaGi	<i>Bhagavadgītā</i>
BhakSa	<i>Bhaktisandarbhā</i> of Jīva (1986)
BhāPu	<i>Bhāgavata Purāṇa</i> (Vyāsa 1983)
BhaRaASi	<i>Bhaktirasāmṛtasindhu</i> of Rūpa (2003)
BhaSa	<i>Bhagavatsandarbhā</i> of Jīva (1986)
BhāSa	<i>Bhāgavatasandarbhā</i> of Jīva (1986)
BhāSaA	<i>Bhāgavatasandarbhānūvāda</i> (Hindi) of Haridāsa śāstrī (Jīva 1986)
BhāTāNi	<i>Bhāgavatātātparyanirṇaya</i> of Madhva (1980, 1999d)
BraAPu	<i>Brahmāṇḍa Purāṇa</i> (Sarma 1983)
BraPu	<i>Brahma Purāṇa</i> (Schreiner & Sönnen 1987)
BraSa	<i>Brahmasaṃhitā</i> (Haridās 1981)
BraSū	<i>Brahmasūtras</i> <sup>1</sup> ( <i>Uttaramīmāṃsāsūtras</i> )
BraSūBhā (Ma)	<i>Brahmasūtrabhāṣya</i> of Madhva (1999a)
BraSūBhā (Śa)	<i>Brahmasūtrabhāṣya</i> of Śaṅkara (1917)
BraTa	<i>Brahmatarka</i> (One of the untraceable works cited by Madhva)
BrĀU	<i>Brhadāranyaka Upaniṣad</i> (Olivelle 1998)
BrĀUBhā	<i>Brhadāranyakopaniṣadbhāṣya</i> of Śaṅkara (2000)
BrGauTa	<i>Brhadgautamiyatantra</i>
CaiBhā	<i>Caitanyabhāgavata</i> of Vṛndāvanadāsa Dāsa (1998–2005)
CaiCaA	<i>Caitanyacaritāmṛta</i> of Kṛṣṇadāsa Kavirāja (2000)
CaiCaUNā	<i>Caitanyacandrodayanāṭaka</i> of Kavi Karṇapūra (1966)
CaŚloBhā	<i>Catuṣśloki bhāgavata</i> (BhāPu 2.9.32–35)
ChāU	<i>Chāndogya Upaniṣad</i> (Olivelle 1998)
conj.	conjecture
CūU	<i>Cūlikā Upaniṣad</i>
em.	emendation
GaPu	<i>Garuḍa Purāṇa</i> (Bhaṭṭācārya 1964)

<sup>1</sup> In this book, I use the numbering of the *sūtras* in the GoBhā as the standard. See Appendix II for the list of correspondence between the numberings of the *sūtras* in the BraSūBhā (Ma), the BraSūBhā (Śa), the ŚrīBhā, and the GoBhā. However, when I cite passages in Sanskrit from the BraSūBhā (Ma), the BraSūBhā (Śa), and the ŚrīBhā in the footnotes, the *sūtra* numbers relate to each text.

GauGaUDi	<i>Gauragaṇoddeśadīpikā</i> (Kavi 2004)
GiBhū	<i>Ġitābhūṣaṇa</i> of Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa (1956)
GoBhāA (B)	A Bengali translation of the GoBhā (Baladeva 1968)
GoBhāA (H)	<i>Govindabhāṣyānūvāda</i> (Hindi) of Kṛṣṇa Dāsa (Baladeva 1953)
GoTāU	<i>Gopālatāpanī Upaniṣad</i> (Sastri 1979a)
GoBhā	<i>Govindabhāṣya</i> of Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa (1953 [M], 1968 [K])
HaBhaVi	<i>Haribhaktivilāsa</i> of Gopāla Bhaṭṭa (1986)
JaiSū	<i>Jaiminīsūtras (Pūrvamīmāṃsāsūtras)</i>
KaiU	<i>Kaivalya Upaniṣad</i> (Madhavananda 1968)
KaU	<i>Kāṭha Upaniṣad</i> (Olivelle 1998)
KāVṛ	<i>Kāṣikāvṛtti</i> of Jayāditya and Vāmana (Sharma 1969–1985)
KeU	<i>Kena Upaniṣad</i> (Olivelle 1998)
KraSa	<i>Kramasandarbhā</i> of Jīva (1965)
KṛSa	<i>Kṛṣṇasandarbhā</i> of Jīva (1986)
KūPu	<i>Kūrma Purāṇa</i> (1983)
LaBhāA	<i>Laghubhāgavatāmṛta</i> of Rūpa (2007)
LiPu	<i>Līṅga Purāṇa</i> (1857)
MaBhā	<i>Mahābhārata</i>
MaBhāTāNi	<i>Mahābhāratatātparyanirṇaya</i> of Madhva (1999c)
MāPu	<i>Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa</i> (1901)
MaSmṛ	<i>Manusmṛti</i> (Olivelle 2009)
MuU	<i>Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad</i> (Olivelle 1998)
NāPaRā	<i>Nāradapañcarātra</i> (Vijñānānanda 1997)
NāPu	<i>Nārada Purāṇa</i> (1984)
NyāMa	<i>Nyāyamañjalī</i> of Bhaṭṭa Jayantha (1982–1984)
om.	omission
PaADhaSa	<i>Padārthadharmasaṅgraha</i> of Praśastapāda (1984)
PaPu	<i>Padma Purāṇa</i> (1984)
PaRaVa	<i>Padaratnāvalī</i> of Vijayadhva (1965)
PaSa	<i>Paramātmāsandarbhā</i> of Jīva (1986)
PraRaVa	<i>Prameyaratnāvalī</i> of Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa (2003)
PraU	<i>Praśna Upaniṣad</i> (Olivelle 1998)
PrīSa	<i>Prītīsandarbhā</i> of Jīva (1986)
ṚVe	<i>Ṛg Veda</i> (Aufrecht 1877)
SāADa	<i>Sārārthadarśinī</i> of Viśvanātha (1965)
ŚaBhā	<i>Śabarabhāṣya</i> of Śabara (1977)
SāKā	<i>Sāṅkhyakārikā</i> of Īśvara Kṛṣṇa (1970)
SaSa	<i>Sarvasaṃvādinī</i> of Jīva (1966)
SāSū	<i>Sāṅkhyasūtras</i> of Kapila (Sinha 1915)
ŚiPu	<i>Śiva Purāṇa</i> (1895–1896)
SiRa	<i>Siddhāntaratna</i> of Baladeva (1966)
SkaPu	<i>Skanda Purāṇa</i> (1986–1989)
ŚrīBhā	<i>Śrībhāṣya</i> of Rāmānuja (1967)
SūṬi	<i>Sūktmā Ṭikā</i> of Baladeva (Baladeva 1968)
SuU	<i>Subāla Upaniṣad</i>
ŚveU	<i>Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad</i> (Olivelle 1998)

TaiĀ	<i>Taittirīya Āraṇyaka</i> (Mahādevaśāstrī & Rangācārya 1985)
TaiBrā	<i>Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa</i> (Mahādevaśāstrī 1908–1921)
TaiU	<i>Taittirīya Upaniṣad</i> (Olivelle 1998)
TaPra	<i>Tattvaparakāśikā</i> by Jayatīrtha (1997–2002)
TaSa	<i>Tattvasandarbha</i> by Jīva (1986)
TaSaṅ	<i>Tattvasaṅkhyāna</i> of Madhva (2005a)
UNiMa	<i>Ujjvalanīlamanī</i> of Rūpa (1985)
VaiSū	<i>Vaiśeṣikasūtras</i> of Kaṇāda (1961)
VaPu	<i>Varāha Purāṇa</i> (Gupta 1981)
VeSā	<i>Vedāntasāra</i> of Sadānanda (1911)
VeSyā	<i>Vedāntasyamantaka</i> of Rādhādāmodhara (1972)
ViPu	<i>Viṣṇupurāṇa</i> (Vyāsa 1986)
ViSaNa	<i>Viṣṇusahasranāma</i>
ViTaVi	<i>Viṣṇutattvavinirṇaya</i> of Madhva (1991)



## *A Note on Transliteration and Translation*

For the spelling of individual names used throughout this book, I follow Monika Horstmann (2009: x):

Die Umschrift folgt bei Sanskrit-Begriffen den üblichen Regeln. Bei Namen von Personen, die selbst auf Sanskrit schrieben oder der vorwiegend sanskritisch sich gebenden Kultur zuzuordnen sind, wurde ebenfalls die Sanskrit-Umschrift benutzt. Bengalische Eigennamen erscheinen in sanskritischer Transkription, weil die bengalistische Fachliteratur dies überwiegend so hält. Personennamen wurden im Übrigen nach dem Zeugnis von Dokumenten der Zeit verwendet. Daher wurden die Namen der Kachvāḥ-Herrscher nicht sanskritisiert.

Therefore, Jaisingh II, for example, is spelled as such, instead of Jayasimha II. In terms of transliteration of Sanskrit texts, please see the section on methodology.

As for translation, the content of a square bracket [abc] indicates what I supply and the content of a curly bracket {abc} indicates the Sanskrit words the commentators are referring to. When an author cites only a part of a text, and when I translate the rest of the text which is referred to by the author but not cited, my translation is put into parentheses (abc).



## Introduction

The first half of the eighteenth century was a volatile period in North India. As the reign of the Mughal empire declined, various local powers, such as the Marathas, increased their independence and competed against each other for their sovereignty. The Kachvāhās, led by Sawai Jaisingh II (1688–1743), was one of these regional powers, which successfully gained regional dominance over the Mughals and certain Hindu rulers.

Jaisingh II founded the city of Jaipur and made it one of the richest cities in North India. His remarkable success was based on his innovative strategies such as family alliances with the Mughals and other Rājput clans, tax policies, and discourse which emphasized the moral aspect of his rule. This included both the performance of ancient Vedic sacrifices and an interventionist approach toward the domestic life of his subjects. Through these, Jaisingh II successfully presented himself as *dharmarāja*, and thereby justified his rule.

Through his interventionist approach to his subjects' life, Jaisingh II controlled not only domestic issues but also religious matters, which were traditionally considered to be the realm of the Brāhmaṇas, the priestly class in society. In domestic matters, he punished thieves and criminals, and forced people to adhere strictly to the rules of the social division (*varṇa*). In the same manner, he regulated religious practitioners engaged in illicit activities, and demanded that various religious groups clarify their lineage, and thereby prove their authenticity. Numerous religious groups which flourished in Jaipur tried to conform with the king's demand in order to maintain his royal support.

The Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavas were one group competing for the king's favor. Their belief system, however, had three grave issues: (1) lack of clear *sampradāya* affiliation; (2) lack of an independent commentary on the *Brahmasūtras*; (3) the simultaneous worship of Rādhā and Kṛṣṇa, who, according to the Gauḍīyas, were not married. By focusing on the works of Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa, a Gauḍīya theologian in the eighteenth century, the current work contributes to the following four interrelated topics: (1) genealogical studies; (2) the study of early modern South Asia; (3) Purāṇic studies; and (4) the study of Vedānta as theology.

## 0.1. GENEALOGICAL STUDIES

Genealogy is a narrative through which one constructs one's past. When I introduce myself as an Oxford graduate rather than a graduate from a Japanese college, there is a certain underlying motivation. Thus, presenting one's genealogy is a way to manipulate the present and future by reconstructing one's significant past. That this manipulation of the past can yield concrete and sometimes disastrous effects is obvious when, for example, we think of the history of imperial Japan. Emperor Hirohito was believed to have been the living God because it was taught that he was the direct descendant of the sun goddess Amaterasu. The idea of uninterrupted succession (万世一系) from the goddess to the emperor was emphasized to portray the emperor's divine authority and thereby to justify Japanese military imperialism in Asia. Now we know, however, that the idea of the uninterrupted succession of the Japanese imperial family was dogma put forward by Shinto nationalists rather than a historical fact.

This 'politics of genealogy' was not at all a unique phenomenon in the Far East. One observes similar examples in the royal histories of South Asia. It was common practice for the kings to claim their descent from divine or charismatic figures in order that their subjects might accept their own extraordinary status. Thus, the Buddhist dynasties in the Himalayan and Sinhalese regions claimed their royal descents from the Buddha and the Śākya clan (Deeg 2011). The Mughals claimed their descent from illustrious figures such as Chingīś Khān and Tīmūr, and in this way they emphasized their Central Asian origin (Lefèvre 2011). The Kachvāḥas, a Rājput clan in North India and one of the key players in the current study, claimed their descent from Rāma, the righteous divine king of the *Rāmāyana*.

The creation of genealogical representation is by no means a passive description of the past. Rather, it is a conscious reconstruction of the significant past with the intention to enhance and legitimize one's authority, be it religious or political, in the contemporary social context. When a genealogist includes certain kings in the dynastic genealogy or removes others from it, he is implicitly communicating a certain message by emphasizing or de-emphasizing a part of the dynastic history. Thus, the theme of genealogy is an important element in understanding history since 'it must be acknowledged that there could be various reasons for presenting a certain ancestry in a particular way, in addition to the possible reason that that is how the ancestry actually was' (Brodbeck & Hegarty 2011: 10).

The topic of genealogy in South Asia, however, has received relatively little attention in recent years. To fill this gap, a project funded by the Arts and Humanities Research Council entitled 'The History of Genealogy, the Genealogy of History: Family and the Narrative Construction of the Significant Past in Early South Asia' (The Cardiff Genealogy Project) was conducted at Cardiff University in Wales from 2008 to 2011. The project focused on Vyāsa's



*Mahābhārata*, Vālmīki's *Rāmāyaṇa*, and Kalhaṇa's *Rājatarāṅgiṇī* to explore the role of genealogical narratives in early South Asia (Brodbeck & Hegarty 2011: 13–14). While the Cardiff Genealogy Project focused on the late- and the post-Vedic periods, the current study looks at the early modern period in South Asia. Focusing on the concept of religious tradition or *sampradāya*, I argue that the genealogical narratives also played a significant role in the identity formation of religious adherents in early modern South Asia.

For example, the Daśanāmīs, the Śaiva group of renunciants, belong to four *maṭhas* located in Dvārakā, Jyōsimāṭh, Puri, and Śringerī. The pontiffs of the four institutions are called Śaṅkarācāryas, and they claim that their religious lineages can be traced back to Ādi-Śaṅkara. However, Matthew Clark's research on the Daśanāmīs shows that there is little evidence that these *maṭhas* were formed before the sixteenth or seventeenth centuries (Clark 2006: 1–2). In the case of Vaiṣṇava traditions, the idea that there exist four normative *sampradāyas* headed by four divine figures, namely, Śrī, Rudra, Brahmā, and Sanaka, seems to have gained currency only in the sixteenth century. It appears, then, that the phenomenon of creating one's identity in terms of religious genealogy began in the early modern era.

The religious groups in early modern South Asia actively engaged in the politics of genealogy because the claim for their divine origin was inextricably connected to the salvific efficacy of the group. The greater dispensation of mercy one can claim, the higher the probability of attracting supporters of various kinds. As differing religious groups competed for access to three important but limited resources, namely, devotees and disciples, pilgrimage routes and pilgrimage centers, and political patronage (Burghart 1978: 126), it was crucial for their survival that they engage in the politics of genealogy, and thereby claim that their group possessed the highest possible soteriological value. Thus, 'every genealogy is a record of a strategy in which the sect has reinterpreted its past in order to compete more effectively for the three limited resources which are necessary for its survival in the present' (Burghart 1978: 127). By examining the Gauḍīya theology, genealogy, and historical background, this study demonstrates that the Gauḍīyas were active participants in the politics of genealogy.

## 0.2. EARLY MODERN SOUTH ASIA

Baladeva lived in early modern North India.<sup>1</sup> In the colonial discourse, South Asia in the late medieval to the early modern period is sometimes described as 'the dark age' in comparison to the vibrant 'renaissance' of the nineteenth

<sup>1</sup> He was born sometime in the beginning of the eighteenth century, and died in 1793.

century.<sup>2</sup> A typical view of early modern South Asia as a ‘dark age’ can be found in *Modern Religious Movements in India* by J. N. Farquhar:

When the [nineteenth] century dawned, Hindus were in a pitifully backward condition. Their subjugation by the Muhammadans about 1200 A.D. had been a very serious trampling under foot; and, while reasonable rule of the Mughals had given them a breathing-space, the terrific convulsions of the eighteenth century had more than undone all that had been recovered. Learning had almost ceased; ordinary education scarcely existed; spiritual religion was to be met only in the quietest places; and a coarse idolatry with cruel and immoral rites held all the great centers of population. (1915: 3)

For Farquhar, a Protestant missionary, Christianity and Western rational thinking were to replace the dead Hindu religio-intellectual culture of the pre-colonial India that had been adorned by superstition, immorality, and idolatry.

Hindus did not necessarily embrace this Christianizing/Westernizing program. Nonetheless, many of the *Bhadralokas*, the Western-educated Hindus influential in nineteenth-century India, also agreed that the medieval Hindu religiosity must be reformed. The most famous example in this regard is the nineteenth-century Bengal Renaissance Movement. David Kopf argues that the spirit of this reform movement was to replace the degraded Purāṇic tradition of the dark Middle Ages with the pristine Vedic/Upaniṣadic tradition of the golden Classical Age (1969: 280–289). This mentality of rejecting the immediate past (the Middle Ages) by the authority of the remote past (the Classical Ages) was parallel to the European Renaissance of the fourteenth to the sixteenth centuries. To what extent this parallel is viable is another question. The point is that not only Christian Westerners but also many influential Hindus in the nineteenth century perceived that the religious culture of early modern India had almost disappeared, and must be reformed and revived.

A recent research project, ‘Sanskrit Knowledge Systems on the Eve of Colonialism’ run by Sheldon Pollock, Christopher Minkowski, and other leading Sanskrit scholars, however, reveals that early modern South Asia from 1550 to 1750 was one of the most productive periods in the intellectual history of India.<sup>3</sup> Pollock writes:

<sup>2</sup> Clothey (2006: 135–160) uses the term ‘late medieval’ to denote the period roughly corresponding to 1200 CE–1700 CE. Flood (1996: 21) uses the term ‘medieval’ to denote 500 CE–1500 CE. Kulke and Rothermund (2004: 109–195) use the term ‘early medieval’ to denote 600 CE–1200 CE, ‘late medieval’ 1200 CE–1700 CE. In this book I use the term ‘medieval’ to denote the period roughly stretching 500 CE–1500 CE, ‘early medieval’ 500 CE–1200 CE, ‘late medieval’ 1200 CE–1500 CE, ‘early modern’ 1500–1700 CE.

<sup>3</sup> For more information on the project, see <<http://dsal.uchicago.edu/sanskrit/index.html>>

These two centuries [i.e. 1550 AD–1750 AD] witnessed a flowering of intellectual life characterized by, among other features, an increase in the production of texts across disciplines, the rise of a new (or newly reinvigorated) interdisciplinarity, and the introduction of important new discursive practices and conceptual categories. This dynamism lasted until the consolidation of colonial power [...]. (2002: 431)

This flourishing of Sanskrit culture in early modern South Asia, however, has been neglected in the scholarly works so far. In this regard, Pollock writes, ‘This new vitality is everywhere evident, but it has hardly been recognized in the scholarship, let alone explained’ (2002: 435).

This project, however, covers only eight disciplines as its areas of research. These are *vyākaraṇa*, *mīmāṃsā*, *nyāya*, *dharmasāstra*, *alaukikāśāstra*, *āyurveda*, *jyotiṣa*, and *prayoga*. Thus, this project excludes Vedānta as a scope of study. In this regard I argue that the Sanskrit literatures in the area of Vedāntic discourse should also be seen as a part of this flourishing cultural productivity of the early modern period. For example, Pollock points out that the early modern South Asian authors may be characterized as ‘innovative traditionalists’, meaning that they were interested in drawing on the authority of the authors of the remote past when discussing the topics of the recent past. This characteristic is shared with Baladeva, in his attempt to draw on the authority of Mādhva Vedānta (a remote past) in order to establish the authority of Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇava Vedānta (a recent past). Thus, through my research on Gauḍīya authors, I hope to contribute to the study of early modern South Asian literature in the area of Vedānta.

In this context, whether the history of South Asia from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century should be termed ‘late medieval’ or ‘early modern’ is problematic. In fact, through recent scholarship there has been a great shift in our understanding of eighteenth-century India (cf. Alavi 2002; Marshall 2003), which has led scholars to question the very adequacy of dividing ‘medieval’ from ‘modern’. For example, David Washbrook (2006: 212) writes, ‘Recent revisionist interpretations of Indian economic history have gone a long way towards breaking down the distinctiveness of the colonial relationship, and re-situating India in a “continuous” context of global history stretching from the late medieval period to today.’ In her study of the history of Jaipur in the eighteenth century, Fatima Imam also states:

There is no doubt that these scholars have successfully dismantled the myth that the eighteenth century was a period of chaos and confusion through their work about Mughal successor states. The thrust of their argument is that British colonialism did not precipitate a fundamental change in Indian history; rather colonialism was the continuation of the transition process started by the regional rulers during the eighteenth century. (Imam 2008: 25)

Nonetheless, since the current research is in dialogue with the project led by Pollock, who terms this period ‘early modern’ (cf. Pollock 2002, 2004, 2011), I adopt his terminological usage.

### 0.3. PURĀṆIC STUDIES

Apart from portraying the pre-colonial India as the dark Middle Ages, the Renaissance mentality in nineteenth-century India denigrated the Purāṇic tradition. This was partly due to the view of Hinduism presented by the British Orientalists. Influenced by the Enlightenment and the Romantic view of India, they esteemed Vedic/Upaniṣadic Hinduism as the pure form of religion. At the same time, they rejected popular Purāṇic tradition as a corruption of the pristine Vedic/Upaniṣadic past (Halbfass 1988: 197).

Among the British Orientalists, Max Müller particularly set the tone. For him, the true essence of India was to be found in the *R̥g Veda*, the Upaniṣads, and the Vedāntic texts. He saw Vedic India as the origin of religion, with concepts superior to those of the Greeks, Romans, and Jews. At the same time, according to Müller, later development of the Purāṇic tradition was ‘intellectually bankrupt, a kind of rubbish’ (Neufeldt 1989: 34) that overlaid the great Vedic India. Other prominent Orientalists shared a similar view. H. T. Colebrooke believed that the true Hinduism in the Vedas pointed to the unity of the deities, and any polytheistic tendency found in it should be considered as a later corruption. H. H. Wilson thought that the original Vedic Hinduism was superseded by idolatry, the apex of which is the *Purāṇas*. Wilson saw the *Purāṇas* as ‘contradictory and as assigning reality to that which was meant to be essentially metaphorical and mystical’ (Neufeldt 1989: 35). Monier Monier-Williams made a threefold distinction of India’s religious development, namely the Vedic period, the Upaniṣadic period, and the Purāṇic period, and saw the Upaniṣads as the core of Brahmanism, containing a level of philosophy that was comparable to Christianity. Again, he saw the Purāṇic traditions such as Śaivism, Vaiṣṇavism, and Śāktism as degradations of Upaniṣadic Brahmanism.

Though not as explicit, the perception of the Purāṇic tradition as something lower than the Vedic tradition persisted in Western academia during the twentieth century. For example, while holding his position as the Spalding Professor of Eastern Religions and Ethics at the University of Oxford, R. C. Zaehner wrote:

The Epics and the *Purāṇas* are the great store-houses of devotional Hinduism, and they mark the end of the ‘classical’ period in which Sanskrit remained the language of holy writ. Official Hinduism, with the *Veda* as its sacred book and sole source of infallible wisdom, had become increasingly identified with the caste

system, itself originated and buttressed by the highest caste, the Brāhmanas, and it was only the three 'twice-born' classes that had access to this saving wisdom. The lowest class, the Śūdras, were forbidden all access to the Veda, as were also women and, of course, outcastes. It was, then, largely to satisfy the needs of these religiously disenfranchised persons that purely devotional religion developed in the *Smṛti* literature, for this, since it did not share the absolute sanctity of the Veda, was open to all and, together with it, the message of God's love for all men irrespective of caste differences. (1962: 12)

His descriptions, such as 'the message of God's love for all men', sound positive. Still, the origin of the Purāṇic tradition is connected to the downfall of 'official' Hinduism with the 'sacred' Vedas, the downfall which happened as a result of the caste system controlled by the Brāhmaṇas. What is implicit in Zaehner's description is the persistence of the nineteenth-century view which contrasts the pristine Vedic past against the degraded Purāṇic present. In this regard Klaus Klostermaier observes: 'Western scholarship has for a long time played down the importance of *Itihāsa-Purāṇa* [...]' (2007: 59).

Fortunately, the nineteenth-century Orientalist view of the Purāṇic tradition is finally in decline in twenty-first century Western scholarship. Velcheru Narayana Rao writes: 'The complementarity of the Vedas and the Purāṇas is crucial for an understanding of the text culture of Brāhmaṇic Hinduism [...]' (2004: 98). He also corrects the view that the *Purāṇas* were meant only for 'the religiously disenfranchised':

It is generally stated that the *Purāṇas* are meant for the benefit of women and Śūdras who are not eligible to receive instruction from the Vedas. However, the popularity of the *Purāṇas* suggests that these texts were read/listened to by all Hindus, including the highest caste Brāhmaṇas. (2004: 103)

In fact, in the early modern period, the *Purāṇas* ceased to be a mere supplement to the Vedas. Rather, their authority superseded that of the Vedas. Discussing the works of Nīlakaṇṭha in the seventeenth century, Christopher Minkowski states: 'In the historically changed context, it is the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*, which had grown so influential in Nīlakaṇṭha's era, that can bolster the Vedas, and not the other way around' (2005: 431).

The Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavas played a significant role in this reversal of hierarchy. In this context, Ravi Gupta describes the contribution of Jīva, a founding father of Gauḍīya theology:

Jīva Gosvāmī is a pace-setter and early protagonist of this *Śruti-Smṛti* reversal process. By establishing the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* as the scripture par excellence in the *Tattva-sandarbhā*, and using the *Purāṇa* as the sole basis of his entire system, Jīva effectively subordinates all scriptural knowledge to the *Bhāgavata*. (2007: 116)

This book demonstrates how this reversal of hierarchy happened between the *Purāṇas* and Vedānta. The third chapter of the book demonstrates how Jīva

constructs his theology based on the BhāPu and the ViPu. Then, in the fourth chapter, it will be shown how Baladeva constructed his Vedānta based on Jīva's Purāṇic theology. Therefore, in the case of Baladeva's GoBhā, it is the *Purāṇas* which are explained by the Vedas, and not the other way around. Through an examination of Gauḍīya theologies of Jīva and Baladeva, I wish to suggest that a unique feature of Vedānta in this period is the reversal of hierarchy between the *Śrutis* and the *Smṛtis*.

#### 0.4. HINDU THEOLOGY

There is an emerging field of study called Hindu theology. While many works on South Asian intellectual thoughts call Vedānta 'philosophy',<sup>4</sup> some contemporary authors argue that theology, rather than philosophy, is a more appropriate category.<sup>5</sup> I agree with the general ethos of this argument, and I view the current study on Vedānta within the category of Hindu theology. The term theology, however, comes with a rich history which has various shades of meaning. Moreover, by the last century the discipline came to contain many branches, such as systematic theology, historical theology, biblical theology, moral theology, philosophical theology, practical theology, and mystical theology (Ford 2005: 65).

Since there are varying definitions of theology, in this section I clarify the use of the term in this book. I classify various definitions of theology into three, namely, theology as God-talk, theology as scriptural exegesis, and theology as insider discourse. I define the object of my study, that is, Vedānta, as Hindu theology within these three meanings. At the same time, my own approach to the study of Hindu theology will be phenomenological. That is, I consciously refrain from making my own judgment concerning the truth claim of the subject of my study.

#### Theology as God-talk

Perhaps the most obvious meaning of theology is defined by the object of inquiry, that is, god(s) or God. Theology is a study (*-logia*) about god (*theos*). Historically speaking, the discipline of theology was developed primarily in the Christian context: 'The Greek word *theologia* meant an account of the gods,

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Agrawal 2001, Hamilton 2001, Hiriyanna 2005, Potter 1998. See Edelmann (2013: 430) for more references.

<sup>5</sup> Clooney (2003: 448) gives a historical background as to why philosophy, rather than theology, became the favored category to describe schools of thought in South Asia.

and it was taken over by the early Christian church to refer to the biblical account of God's relationship to humanity' (Ford 2005: 63). Theistic Vedānta propounded by thinkers such as Rāmānuja, Madhva, Jīva, and Baladeva seems to fit in this category well since one of the main topics of their inquiry is Viṣṇu or Kṛṣṇa, whom they understand to be the ultimate reality, the creator and the controller of the universe.

John Carman's use of the term theology in his work *The Theology of Rāmānuja: An Essay in Interreligious Understanding*, seems to exemplify the meaning of the term in this sense. While he does not give his definition of the term, it is clear from his writing that what he understands as theology is intellectual and systematic deliberation about God. He says that the focus of his work is on 'Rāmānuja's conception of God' (Carman 1974: 11). Concerning the use of the term 'God' in the Hindu context, he writes: 'There seems to me no doubt that the English term that brings Christians the closest to what Rāmānuja had in mind is the single word God' (Carman 1974: 10–11).

Sanskrit terms such as *bhagavān* (the glorious one), *paremeśvara* (the supreme Lord), and *parabrahman* (supreme Brahman) are used in the context of theistic Vedānta to designate the highest personal being called Viṣṇu. These designations correspond well with the term God used in the Christian context. Of course, we should be aware of the crucial differences between the Christian conceptions of God and those of theistic Vedānta. One of the notable differences is that some of the Vaiṣṇava thinkers such as Rāmānuja, Jīva, and Baladeva argue that Viṣṇu is not only the controller of the universe but also its material basis. The idea of God as the material foundation of the universe is rather alien to Christianity. Nevertheless, given the understanding of Viṣṇu in Vaiṣṇava Vedānta, it seems reasonable to apply the term theology in this context. An important implication to be aware of in this regard is that Hindu theology, in the first sense of the term, probably does not include Advaita Vedānta. Since the school does not accept any personhood in its conception of the ultimate reality the tradition can be regarded as atheistic.<sup>6</sup>

## Theology as Scriptural Exegesis

Theology in the second sense of the term refers to the science of scriptural exegesis. Theology in this sense is fundamentally rooted in the revealed scriptures such as the Bible. Thomas Aquinas, for example, understood

<sup>6</sup> However, we should not forget that atheistic arguments against theism became the primary object of refutation for the theistic Vedānta. In this sense, as the opponents of theistic Vedānta, atheistic traditions such as Advaita Vedānta, Buddhism, and Jainism contributed to its development. For an example of study of Buddhist arguments against theism in classical India, see Patil 2009.

theology as ‘the rational elucidation of revealed truth’ (Ward 1994: 1). For him, theology ‘begins from Divine revelation, which is to be found in the Holy Scriptures’ (Ward 1994: 3). One of the distinctive characteristics of Christian theology, therefore, is its commitment to the text which the tradition considers to be divinely revealed. Theology in this sense is different from philosophy which, in a modern sense of the term, requires no commitment to any *a priori* principle.

When theology is defined in the first sense of the term, that is, when we understand it as a systematic deliberation about God, Hindu theology can, besides Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta, include schools of thought such as Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, and Yoga (Dasti 2012: 32–34). What sets Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta apart from schools such as Nyāya, however, is that they are rooted in scriptural exegesis.<sup>7</sup> Therefore, it seems reasonable to see Vedānta as theology in the second sense of the term. In the case of Vedānta, its goal is to articulate a coherent system of thought based on the core revealed texts called the *Prasthānatrayī*, which refers to the Upaniṣads, the *Brahmasūtras*, and the *Bhagavadgītā*.

Vedānta’s commitment to the revealed scriptures is observable in BraSū 1.1.3 *śāstrayonitvāt*. As we see later, many Vedāntists interpret this *sūtra* to mean ‘Brahman is the one whose source {*yoni*} of understanding is the scriptures {*śāstra*}.’ Based on this *sūtra*, authors such as Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja argue that the revealed scriptures such as the Upaniṣads are the only means of knowing the ultimate reality. Thus, when it comes to Brahman, Vedānta says that other means of knowledge such as perception and inference do not constitute the final epistemological authority.

For example, in his commentary on this *sūtra*, Baladeva cites a verse attributed to the KūPu: “Without any contradiction of an earlier [sentence] and a later one, what would be the desired meaning here?” Reasoning such as this is [called] logic {*tarka*}. However, groundless logic {*śuṣkatarka*} should be abandoned.<sup>8</sup> According to this verse, the use of reasoning is justified when it is employed to make sense of the scriptures. However, free exercise of reasoning without any scriptural reference is, at least in the context of knowing Brahman, something to be rejected. The kind of reasoning referred to by the term *tarka* in the verse corresponds to what Francis Clooney calls ‘theological reasoning’: ‘Reasoning carried forward without regard for authoritative religious sources needs to be distinguished from reasoning marked by attention to

<sup>7</sup> For this reason Dasti (2012) calls Vedānta revealed theology in contrast to Nyāyā, which he calls rational theology.

<sup>8</sup> GoBhā 1.1.3: *pūrvāparāvirodhena ko ’rtho ’trābhīmato bhavet / ityādyam ūhanam tarkaḥ śuṣkatarkaṃ tu varjayet // ityādiśruteḥ /*



scripture and other religious authorities; the latter is theological reasoning' (2003: 449).<sup>9</sup>

When we understand Vedānta as theology according to the second meaning, one of the significant implications is that Advaita Vedānta can be now included in Hindu theology, as Clooney argues: 'Advaita is at its core an exegetical system, and therefore is heir to the ritual exegesis of the older Mimamsa school [...] it is closer to "theology" than "philosophy", and closer to "scriptural theology" than "philosophical theology"' (1993: 14–15). Since Advaita Vedānta is a school committed to the understanding of the *Prasthānatrayī* texts, it is theological 'even if an outstanding feature of theology, its focus on the "study of God", is absent' (Clooney 1993: 26).<sup>10</sup>

### Theology as Insider Discourse

The third sense of theology I shall discuss is based on Saint Anselm's principle 'faith seeking understanding'. In this sense of the term, theology is defined primarily by the nature of the agent who studies theology, that is, a theologian: '[T]heology is an inquiry carried on by believers who allow their belief to remain an explicit and influential factor in their research, analysis and writing' (Clooney 1993: 4). I believe it is relatively unproblematic to say that Vedāntists such as Baladeva were theologians. As I shall demonstrate, Baladeva was a Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇava who wrote his works in order to defend his tradition. Therefore, the object of my research is Hindu theology in the sense that those Vedāntists studied here were insiders writing for their respective traditions.

Clooney, for example, suggests the establishment of Hindu theology in the third sense of the term: 'When Hindu reasoning is studied by Hindus and others who are genuinely interested in learning religiously from Hindu thought, the recognition of "Hindu theology" seems a timely step [...]' (Clooney 2003: 449). Hindu theology in this context is done by contemporary scholars who identify themselves as Hindu theologians. This type of scholarship is seen, for example, in *Meditation Revolution: A History and Theology of*

<sup>9</sup> The term *tarka*, however, can be used to refer to philosophical reasoning. Following Vasudeva Shastri Abhyankar, Clooney (2003: 457–460) calls *manana* theological reasoning, *tarka* philosophical.

<sup>10</sup> Clooney (2003: 452) suggests seven topics which can be seen as theological: 'a) the nature of a sufficient world cause, world maker; b) whether God is one or many; c) divine embodiment; d) the problem of evil; e) the nature and time of liberation; f) the appeal to revelation; g) "ignorance" as a theological category'.

*the Siddha Yoga Lineage*. In this edited volume authors such as Paul E. Muller-Ortega (1997) discuss the tradition of Siddha Yoga as insiders. An example in the context of Buddhist Studies is *Buddhist Theology: Critical Reflections by Contemporary Buddhist Scholars* edited by John Makransky and Roger Jackson (2000). In this work, the authors are contemporary Buddhist scholars who also identify themselves as Buddhists.

As Jonathan Edelmann points out, there is also a need for Hindu theologians for the Hindu communities. As the number of the Hindu diaspora increases, there is an increasing need for theologians trained in the tradition, who can articulate and represent the tradition to the wider audience: 'Hinduism frequently lacks this go-to source—although it is needed—because there is no recognized and defined category called the Hindu theologian' (Edelmann 2013: 435).

While I recognize the need for and the validity of Hindu theologians for both academic and communal reasons, this book does not take a theological approach for the following two reasons. The first reason is simply that I was not trained as a theologian, nor was I trained by Hindu theologians. I have been trained in the discipline of religious studies or history of religions, which takes a phenomenological approach to the study of religious traditions. I trained at various academic institutions in the West, and most of my teachers were not believing Hindus.

The second and perhaps more substantial reason is connected to the question of *adhikāra*, or qualification. In various Hindu traditions, a study of certain subjects is not open to everyone. According to the laws of Manu, for example, only the Brāhmaṇas are allowed to teach the Vedas.<sup>11</sup> If we accept Manu's authority, then certainly I am not eligible to write authoritatively on the Vedas, nor on Vedānta that is based on the Vedas. Vedāntists also insist upon students' qualification. Śaṅkara, for example, says anyone who wishes to study Vedānta should have the following four qualities: (1) distinguishing what is eternal and what is transient; (2) being indifferent to enjoying the result of work in this world and the next; (3) accomplished at practicing calmness and sense-control; (4) the state of being desirous of liberation.<sup>12</sup> While I may possess some of these qualities in some ways, I certainly do not claim to fulfill all of them. A more troubling question: Even if I did possess these qualities in a satisfactory manner, who is going to certify my qualification in the study of Vedānta? Based on the above-mentioned two reasons I do not approach the study of Hindu theology from a theological perspective. That is, I do not engage in what Edelmann calls second-order theology (2013:

<sup>11</sup> MaSmṛ 1.88: *adhyāpanam adhyayanam yajanam yājānam tathā / dānam pratigrahaṃ caiva brāhmaṇānām akalpayat //*

<sup>12</sup> BraSūBhā (Śa) 1.1.1: *nityānityavastuvivekaḥ, ihāmutrārthabhogavirāgaḥ, śamadamādisādhanaśaṃpat, mumukṣutvaṃ ca /*

457–458). Rather, I approach it from the perspective of history of South Asian intellectual thought.

In conclusion, I understand Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇava Vedānta, the object of my current study, to be theological in all the three senses of the term discussed. It is (1) a discussion about God or Kṛṣṇa, (2) a tradition of scriptural exegesis, and (3) written by the Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇava theologians such as Jīva and Baladeva. At the same time, my own approach to the object of study is phenomenological rather than theological in the sense that I am not concerned about making any judgment on the truth claims made by those Vedāntists.

### 0.5. INTRODUCING BALADEVA: A THEOLOGIAN ON TRIAL

No historical data on Baladeva's youth is available. According to Adrian P. Burton, the earliest historical record we know of Baladeva is dated 1741, and he died in 1793. In this section, Baladeva's life is briefly sketched over three phases: (I) his birth in Orissa to his meeting with Viśvanātha Cakravartī in Vṛndāvana; (II) his contributions in the Jaipur dispute; (III) his life as the leader of the Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavas. Due to the lack of a historical account, the first two phases of Baladeva's life will be presented based on hagiographical accounts.

#### (I) *From Orissa to Vṛndāvana*

Baladeva was probably born around 1700 AD at a village near Remuṇā in the Baleśvara district of Orissa.<sup>13</sup> He was said to have been born to a Vaiśya family. However, as we shall see below, there is a possibility that he came from a Brāhmaṇa family. He is said to have left his home at an early age, and studied grammar, rhetoric, and logic with the scholars living on the bank of the Cilkāhrada. After finishing preliminary studies, Baladeva traveled to Mysore, Kārṇāṭaka, and joined the followers of Madhva. There, he studied the Vedānta systems of Śaṅkara and Madhva, even taking *sannyāsa* from the Mādhva tradition.<sup>14</sup> After mastering Mādhva Vedānta and taking *sannyāsa*, he visited holy places, defeating local scholars with his knowledge of Vedānta.

After traveling for some time, Baladeva settled down at a Mādhva monastery in Puri. There, while engaging in discussions with the local scholars

<sup>13</sup> Burton says that since Baladeva died in 1793 AD, most probably he could not have been born before 1700 AD (2000: 83). Elkman also suggests the same date (1986: 25).

<sup>14</sup> However, Dāsa says that Baladeva joined a Mādhva monastery at Puri (n.d.: 45).

Baladeva met a Kānyakubja Brāhmaṇa named Rādhādāmodara Dāsa,<sup>15</sup> the leader of the Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavas in that area. Baladeva was so impressed with Jīva's *Ṣaṭsandarbhas* he learnt from Rādhādāmodara that he eventually converted to Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavism, accepting Rādhādāmodara as his guru. Since Baladeva was already initiated into the Mādhva tradition, his initiation by Rādhādāmodara was done informally. In this regard it may be said Baladeva maintained his formal affiliation with the Mādhva tradition, though he became theologically affiliated with Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavism.

After some time Baladeva left for Navadvīpa, to visit the birthplace of Caitanya. There it was suggested he go to Vṛndāvana to study with Viśvanātha Cakravartī, the leader of the Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavas at that time. Following the suggestion, he went to Vṛndāvana and studied the BhāPu with Viśvanātha. He also studied other devotional literature (*rasaśāstras*) with another scholar called Pītāmbara Dāsa. Thus he quickly became acquainted with various aspects of Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavism.

## (II) The Jaipur Dispute

Traditional accounts hold that a religious dispute occurred in Jaipur some time after Baladeva's arrival in Vṛndāvana. As we will examine in greater detail later, it is important to understand the nature of the dispute since it is said that Baladeva wrote his GoBhā in the context of this.

To put it briefly, the king of Jaipur, Jaisingh II (1688–1743) came from the Kachvāhā family, which maintained a long-standing relationship with the Gauḍīyas. While he wished to support the Gauḍīyas, the following three points seemed particularly problematic to the king, who wanted to promote the harmony between various Vaiṣṇava sects as well as his image as *dharmarāja* 'the righteous king': (i) Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavism was not connected to any of the four legitimate Vaiṣṇava traditions (Rāmānuja, Madhva, Viṣṇu Svāmī, and Nimbārka); (ii) the Gauḍīyas did not have an independent commentary on the BraSū which could justify their own beliefs and practices; (iii) the Gauḍīyas worshipped Rādhā and Kṛṣṇa together, despite the fact that she is another's wife (*parakīyā*). In order to maintain king's support, the Gauḍīyas were obliged to satisfy him on these points. As a result, the Gauḍīyas in Vṛndāvana sent Baladeva to Jaipur to deal with the issue.

After Baladeva's arrival, a religious assembly was held by the king, in which Baladeva had to defend the Gauḍīya tradition. First he was questioned over

<sup>15</sup> The lineage of Rādhādāmodara is as follows: Nityānanda—Gauridāsa Paṇḍita—Hṛdaya Caitanya—Śyāmānanda—Rasikānanda Murāri—Nayanānanda Deva Gosvāmī—Rādhādāmodara Dāsa (Dāsa n.d.: 43, Elkman 1986: 48).

which of the four Vaiṣṇava traditions Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavism belonged to. Baladeva answered that it belonged to the Mādhva tradition. This was credible since Baladeva himself maintained a formal affiliation with the Mādhvas. However, Baladeva was further challenged by the point that if the Gauḍīyas had followed the BraSū commentary according to the Mādhva tradition, they should not have worshipped Kṛṣṇa prior to Nārāyaṇa, nor Kṛṣṇa and Rādhā together. If the Gauḍīyas were theologically different from the Mādhvas, they should have produced an independent commentary on the BraSū which they had not done. Thus Baladeva was put into a situation where he had no choice but to write a new commentary on the BraSū if he were to defend Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavism.

Baladeva then received permission from the king to leave the assembly for a time in order to write a new commentary on the BraSū, which would defend Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇava worship of Rādhā–Kṛṣṇa. It is said that Baladeva wrote the commentary within a very short period of time,<sup>16</sup> following the instructions of Govinda, who appeared in his dream.<sup>17</sup> With his new commentary, Baladeva went back to the assembly, and successfully defended the Gauḍīya tradition. Thus he was given the title ‘Vidyābhūṣaṇa’, meaning ‘one who is ornamented by knowledge’.

Various hagiographical accounts relate this dramatic event as one occurrence in which Baladeva heroically solved all the issues single-handedly. As it will be shown later, however, Adrian Burton suggests it is more likely that various religious conferences were held at Jaisingh’s court over the period of his rule where the above-mentioned points were discussed separately. Therefore, he argues that the image of ‘the debate’ was created as a result of conglomerating several individual disputes. Burton’s research is well grounded and I accept his argument. Nonetheless, the point I wish to highlight in this section is that the Gauḍīyas in the eighteenth century were forced to face the above-mentioned issues, and the GoBhā was created as their response to the demand made by the king and other Vaiṣṇava groups.

### (III) *As the Leader of the Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavas*

Having emerged victorious in the Jaipur dispute, Baladeva went back to Vṛndāvana, and became the leader of the Caitanya community after the

<sup>16</sup> There are different traditional accounts as to how long Baladeva took to finish writing the GoBhā: a few days (Dāsa n.d.: 48); eighteen days (Narang 1984: 7); one month (Wright and Wright 1993: 170).

<sup>17</sup> Baladeva ends his GoBhā as follows:  
*vidyārūpaṁ bhūṣaṇaṁ me pradāya khyātiṁ ninye tena yo mām udāraḥ /*  
*śrīgovindahḥ svapnanirdiṣṭābhāṣyo rādhābandhurāṅgaḥ sa jīyāt //* GoBhā 4.4.22.  
 ‘May glorious Govinda be victorious, who taught the commentary [i.e. the GoBhā] in [my] dream, whose body is pleasing to Rādhā, the gracious one who brought fame to me by bestowing on me an ornament in the form of knowledge.’

demise of Viśvanātha.<sup>18</sup> According to Burton, the earliest historical data about Baladeva relates to 1741 AD, when Jaisingh II visited Vṛndāvana and met Baladeva there. By this time, Baladeva seems to have already become an authoritative figure in the Gauḍīya community. For example, a letter sent to Jaisingh II in 1742 AD describes Baladeva as being responsible for the Govindadeva temple in Vṛndāvana (Burton 2000: 85). Around 1751 AD the Rādhā-śyāmasundara temple in Jaipur came to be known as the ‘Vidyābhūṣaṇa Mandir’, indicating that Baladeva was a well-known figure. Also, a document dated 1755 AD describes Mādhvasingh, the king of Jaipur at that time, receiving Baladeva as the representative of the Govindadeva temple in Vṛndāvana (Burton 2000: 90). All these suggest that in his middle age, Baladeva became an authority in the Gauḍīya tradition. According to a document in the Jaipur State Archives, it is recorded Baladeva passed away in 1793 AD (Burton 2000: 97).

### The Class of Baladeva

As for the class (*varṇa*) from which Baladeva hailed, I have encountered two opinions. Akṣaya Kumāra Sharmā, a Gauḍīya author in the twentieth century, argues that Baladeva was a Brāhmaṇa. The view that he was a non-Brāhmaṇa is proposed by Bhaktivinoda Ṭhākura, a nineteenth-century Gauḍīya author. There has been a discussion on this point by two contemporary academics, Neal Delmonico who supports Sharmā,<sup>19</sup> and David Buchta who defends the plausibility of Bhaktivinoda’s position.<sup>20</sup> In his journal *Sajjanatoṣaṇī* Bhaktivinoda says that Baladeva was born into the lineage of Khaṇḍāītas.<sup>21</sup> In the secondary literature on Baladeva the Khaṇḍāītas are understood to belong to the Vaiśya class.<sup>22</sup> However, the name Khaṇḍāīta seems to suggest some affinity with the Kṣatriya class,<sup>23</sup> although, according to Herman Kulke, Khaṇḍāīta or Khaṇḍāyata are more like tribal chiefs than Hindu kings.<sup>24</sup>

<sup>18</sup> Based on his manuscript research, Burton (2000: 22) concludes that Viśvanātha must have died sometime between 1713 AD and 1742 AD.

<sup>19</sup> Delmonico (2003, 2005).

<sup>20</sup> Buchta (2004: 211–218).

<sup>21</sup> ‘*baladeva uḍḍiśyāra kona pradeśe khaṇḍāīta vaṁśe janmagrahaṇa karata [...]*’ Bhaktivinoda (1898: 1–2). I thank Dr. Fakir Mohan Das for pointing out this information. I also thank Lucian Wong (University of Oxford) for finding the actual reference.

<sup>22</sup> E.g. Dasgupta (1949: Vol. 4, 438); Elkman (1986: 25); Narang (1984: 1–2); Wright and Wright (1993: 158).

<sup>23</sup> According to *Samsad Bengali–English Dictionary*, ‘khaṇḍā’ means sword, khaṇḍāī ‘swordsmen’. Biswas (2000: 271).

<sup>24</sup> Kulke (1976: 405).

According to Akio Tanabe, Khaṇḍāitas dominate the population of the coastal area in contemporary Orissa, and they exercise considerable political and economic influence.<sup>25</sup> All these points suggest that the Khaṇḍāitas are non-Brāhmaṇas who possess considerable local political power. In addition, in Fakir Mohan Das's view the distinction between Khaṇḍāitas and Brāhmaṇas in Orissa is not substantial.<sup>26</sup>

As we shall see in chapter four, Baladeva wrote extensively on Vedānta. The issue at stake, then, is whether a non-Brāhmaṇa (either Kṣatriya or Vaiśya) could have written on the subject. *Manusmṛti* 1.88–90, for example, describes the duties of the three upper classes, stating that although all of them are allowed to study the Vedas (*adhyayana*), only the Brāhmaṇas are assigned to teach them (*adhyāpana*).<sup>27</sup> Accordingly, Madhva emphatically forbade open access to learning Vedānta.<sup>28</sup> As a result, traditionally only male Brāhmaṇas were allowed to receive the kind of training which would eventually enable them to take up the position of teaching. According to anthropological research on contemporary Mādhvas, all the pontiffs of the *Aṣṭa Maṭhas* (eight monasteries) of Udupi, which are the centers of the Mādhva tradition, are male Brāhmaṇas, and only young Mādhvas who hail from the same class can succeed them.<sup>29</sup> All the Mādhva gurus in Udupi are also Brāhmaṇas, be they renunciators (*sannyāsī*) or householders (*grhastha*).<sup>30</sup> Baladeva was thoroughly familiar with Mādhva Vedānta, and as a *sannyāsī* he was a representative of the Mādhva tradition. Given these points, I find it more likely that Baladeva was a Brāhmaṇa. However, if the Khaṇḍāitas in Orissa indeed possessed an influential social status comparable to that of the Brāhmaṇas, it might have been possible that the Mādhvas accepted Baladeva as an exception. We should also remember that the state of the matter at the present time is only indicative and not conclusive of how these issues were handled at the time of Madhva or of Baladeva.

<sup>25</sup> Tanabe (2010: 43–44).

<sup>26</sup> At a personal meeting in Oxford on July 26, 2010. Kulke (1976: 402) says that the Kṣatriya kings in Orissa traditionally claimed a high status as the guardians of Jagannātha. Sinha (1993: 98) reports that in a survey the Kṣatriyas in Orissa claimed their close social status to the Brāhmaṇas. For a detailed account on caste negotiations in Orissa, see Pati (2001). I owe these references to Dr. Ferdinando Sardella (University of Stockholm).

<sup>27</sup> *adhyāpanam adhyayanam yajanam yājanam tathā /  
dānam pratigrahaṃ caiva brāhmaṇānām akalpayat //*  
*prajānām rakṣaṇam dānam ijjādhyayanam eva ca /*  
*viśayeṣv aprasaktiś ca kṣatriyasya samāsataḥ //*  
*paśūnām rakṣaṇam dānam ijjādhyayanam eva ca /*  
*vaṇikpatham kusidam ca vaiśyasya kṛṣim eva ca //*

<sup>28</sup> Sarma (2005: 33).

<sup>29</sup> Hebbar (2005: 154).

<sup>30</sup> Rao (2002: 88).

## 0.6. METHODOLOGY

The first two chapters of the book are, for the most part, based on information available in the secondary literature, whereas the latter two chapters are mainly based on the primary sources in Sanskrit. In the latter two chapters, I employ a philological method to reconstruct the texts. Strictly speaking, all the Sanskrit texts cited in this book are my reconstructions in the sense that I am responsible for their reproduction. Nonetheless, I exercise my philological judgment more actively in reconstructing the texts of Jīva and Baladeva, which require editorial comments.

In the third chapter, the text of Jīva's KraSa commentary is based on Kṛṣṇaśaṅkara Śāstrī's edition (Jīva 1965). However, since there are noteworthy parallels found in Haridāsa Śāstrī's edition of the BhaSa (Jīva 1986), I recorded significant variants. In the fourth chapter, the text of the GoBhā is reconstructed based on the editions of Kṛṣṇadāsa (Baladeva 1953) and of Bhakti-śrīrūpasiddhānti Gosvāmi (Baladeva 1968). When I find significant variants, I record both readings and add notations.

For example, suppose I want to quote the sentence 'I love Sanskrit' which appears in a text that has two editions. Edition A records 'I love Sanskrit', whereas in edition B the sentence reads 'I loves Sanskrit'. The '-s' in the verb 'loves' in edition B is incorrect. Therefore, I present the text as 'I love ([love] A; loves B) Sanskrit'—the variant readings are recorded in the round brackets. The reading I adopt is shown in the square brackets with the letter 'A' to indicate the edition in which this particular reading appears. The rejected reading is recorded after the semicolon with the letter 'B' to indicate the other edition. In the process of reconstructing the texts cited in the book I occasionally employ emendation, which is indicated by the abbreviation 'em.'.

I consider the texts of the KraSa and the GoBhā I reconstruct in this book as critical editions in the sense that they are created as a result of exercising my philological judgment. Since the terms 'philology' and 'critical edition' may be ambiguous to some readers, I shall present my understanding of them. Following Harunaga Isaacson (2007), I define philology as 'the art of distinguishing probable from possible'. What is meant by the term 'probable' is the meaning of a word or a sentence, which was *probably* meant by the author. Or to be more precise, it is the meaning of a word or a sentence, which a philologist hypothetically suggests as that which was meant by the author. What is signified by the term 'possible' is the theoretically possible range of meaning of a word or a sentence. The range of 'probable' meanings is necessarily smaller than that of 'possible'. The work of a philologist is to carefully select probable meanings out of possible meanings based on her knowledge of the culture and the language in which the text is written.



Applying the art of distinguishing probable from possible, the critic thus creates her own edition of the text. With slight modifications, I accept Isaacson's definition of the term 'critical edition':

A critical edition is one which presents the reader's hypothesis as to some state of a text (usually but not necessarily its form as originally composed by an author), and accompanies this with a so-called 'critical apparatus' presenting accurately and thoroughly the evidence both for and against this hypothesis. (Isaacson 2007)

Two points need to be noted concerning this definition. First, a critical edition is a hypothesis. A philologist never claims that her edition and the urtext are the same. She merely makes an *attempt* to reconstruct the urtext. Second, the fact that her philological judgment is hypothetical does not mean that it is groundless. A philological judgment is controlled by available variant readings, grammatical rules, the literary convention, and so on. A philologist is aware of the hypothetical nature of her edition. Therefore, she provides variant readings in critical apparatus and invites other readers to participate in the creation of the text.

#### ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Section 0.5. (I) is based on Buchta 2007: 85–86, Dāsa n.d.: 44–46, Elkman 1986: 25–26, Narang 1984: 1–4, Wright and Wright 1993: 158–165.

Section 0.5. (II) is based on Dāsa n.d.: 46–49, Elkman 1986: 26–29, Narang 1984: 5–7, Wright and Wright 1993: 168–172.

Section 0.5. 'The Class of Baladeva' is largely based on a section in my forthcoming article: Okita (2014).



## Historical Background

Richard King in his *Orientalism and Religion*, argues for the importance of recognizing the interrelatedness of culture and political power:

I wish to argue that both philosophy and the history of ideas should take more seriously not only the social location of the concepts under examination but also their involvement in a wider cultural field of power relations, or what has become known as ‘politics of knowledge’. In particular, I wish to argue for an awareness of mutual imbrication of religion, culture and power as categories. [...] Power is not mere material conditions without cultural trace since there is no power in the abstract—power, indeed, is constituted in particular cultural forms. What is required, therefore, is an approach that avoids materialist reductionism (which denies culture) or culturalist reductionism (which denies power) with a renewed emphasis upon the mutual imbrication of the two. (1999: 1)

To fully appreciate the significance of the production of the GoBhā, it is essential to recognize the social-political condition in which it was formed. In eighteenth-century Northern India, various religious sects flourished, competing with each other for their own survival:

[...] the various Hindu sects acquired access to three important resources: devotees and disciples, pilgrimage routes and pilgrimage centers, and political patronage. The availability of these resources was limited. Although some ascetic sects were founded in the outerlying regions of the sub-continent, nearly all of them, like the Ramanandi sect, eventually spread to the Ganges basin where, given the number of sects operating on that territory, the competition for these three limited resources was very intense. (Burghart 1978: 126)

In this competitive circumstance, achieving royal patronage was crucial for the survival of a sect:

As the ‘Lord of the Land’ (*bhūpati*) the King was the most significant donor of land in alms within the kingdom. The various ascetic sects fought both military and yogic battles against one another in order to obtain royal patronage. (Burghart 1978: 126–277)

A religiously competitive circumstance, similar to the situation of the Ganges basin, was arising in Jaipur as well. In the eighteenth century, various Vaiṣṇava sects existed in Jaipur, each striving to gain the royal patronage of the Rājput king Jaisingh II by proving the authenticity of their own sect. In this context, the authenticity of the Gauḍīya tradition was also challenged as we saw in the Introduction. Therefore, although the king was personally in favor of the Gauḍīya tradition, he needed some proof to convince the public of the authenticity of the tradition. Several religious conferences were held to deal with the issues. The GoBhā was produced as a result of these conferences, and it effectively established the authority of the Gauḍīya tradition since it: (1) affiliated the Gauḍīyas with the Mādhvas; (2) supplied the Gauḍīyas' own commentary on the BraSū; and (3) explained that Rādhā and Kṛṣṇa are ontologically non-different and, therefore, their relationship does not pose any moral problem. In this way the production of the GoBhā played a crucial role in the survival of the Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇava community in the midst of a religiously competitive culture.

To understand the religio-political climate in which these religious conferences were held, the first section of this chapter briefly traces the history of the Kachvāhās, highlighting the role they played in the Mughal Empire. Then the second section discusses a long-standing relationship between the Kachvāhās and the Gauḍīyas, as well as the religious policies of Jaisingh II. Finally, the third section discusses in some detail the contents of the disputes that arose at Jaisingh II's court.

### 1.1. THE KACHVĀHĀS: THE BUILDERS OF THE MUGHAL EMPIRE

Jaisingh II (b.1688–, r.1700–1743) was born into the lineage of the Kachvāhās, a Rājput clan of East Rajasthan (Amber/Jaipur). During Jaisingh II's reign, Jaipur became one of the largest and richest states in pre-colonial northern India (Imam 2008: 83). Behind this prominence lay a long history of the distinguished careers of the Kachvāhā kings.

From the time of Akbar, the Kachvāhās played a decisive role in the founding of the Mughal Empire. When Humayun died in 1556 and his son Akbar inherited the empire, he was only thirteen years old. After Islam Shah died in 1554, Humayun had returned to Delhi from his exile in Persia (Sarkar 2009: 33). Humayun's position in Delhi, however, was far from stable. There were many contestants against the Mughal regime but Humayun died before he could deal with these adverse elements. In order to lay a firm foundation in Delhi, therefore, Akbar had to subdue Afghan invaders, rebellious Rājputs in Rajasthan, Malik Ambar in

Deccan, and contesting Muslim rulers in Bihar, Bengal, and Orissa. As the right-hand men of Akbar, the Kachvāhā kings such as Bhagavāndās (r. 1573–1589) and his son Mānsingh (b.1530–, r.1589–1614) were at the front line in the many imperial campaigns against those opposing powers.

Although the Kachvāhās existed long before the Mughal period, it is only after they came in contact with the Mughals that their history ‘emerges from the delusive mists of oral tradition and bardic exaggeration, into the clear light of authentic contemporary record’ (Sarkar 2009: 29). Bhārmal (r.1548–1574) was the first Kachvāhā king Akbar came in contact with. When Bhārmal was harassed by Muhammad Sharfuddin Husain, Akbar’s governor of Mewat, he pleaded for Akbar’s protection. Akbar consented to Bhārmal’s request. To strengthen the Kachvāhā tie with the imperial family, Bhārmal then offered his eldest daughter in marriage to Akbar, which he also accepted. Akbar’s marriage at Sambhar in February 1562 with Bhārmal’s daughter, who later became the mother of the next Mughal emperor Jahangir, was a turning point in the history of the Kachvāhā dynasty. Through this marriage, ‘a smaller principality of Amber attained sudden prominence’ (Pilania 2002: 1) at the imperial court. After the marriage, Bhārmal’s son Bhagavāndās and his grandson Mānsingh joined the Mughal imperial army. By bringing the Rājput daughters into the royal family and by engaging the Rājputs in the imperial service, Akbar practically emerged as their leader (Kulke and Rothermund 2004: 200).

Recognizing the importance of accepting his Hindu subjects, Akbar took the initiative in promoting Hindu–Muslim integration. In 1563, he remitted the taxation on Hindu pilgrims (Sarkar 2009: 38). In 1564, Akbar abolished *jizya*, the poll tax which Muslim rulers imposed on all non-Muslim subjects (Kulke and Rothermund 2004: 200, Sarkar 2009: 38). These liberal policies were effective in gaining the Hindus’ loyalty. Akbar’s integration policy bore fruit since the Kachvāhā Rājputs turned out to be ‘the bravest and most devoted “war-band” for his personal defence in every battle’ (Sarkar 2009: 39). Thus, through military supplies and marital relations, the Rājputs occupied a prominent place in the Mughal polity.

After the Mughal conquest of Jodhpur, the capital of Marwar in 1563 (Sarkar 2009: 40), Mewar remained the only Rājput state independent of the Mughal regime. Though Pratapsingh, the Mewar king, was encouraged by Bhagavāndās and Mānsingh to submit to Akbar, he kept postponing his visit to the imperial court. Finally, Akbar lost patience and ordered Mānsingh to bring Pratapsingh into submission. The Battle of Haldighat ensued in 1576 and Mānsingh defeated Pratapsingh (Sarkar 2009: 42–58). This then, was the beginning of Mānsingh’s long career as one of the pillars of Akbar’s reign.

In 1580, Mizrā Muhammad Hakim, the ruler of Kabul and Akbar’s brother, invaded Punjab. Mānsingh was transferred to defend the region, and defeated

Shadman Beg, a trusted general in Hakim's army. When Hakim retreated back to Kabul, Mānsingh accompanied Akbar for his march to the Afghan capital. After Hakim's submission, Akbar returned to Delhi and the Afghan region was entrusted to Mānsingh. Till his transfer to Bihar in 1588, Mānsingh maintained the Mughal rule over Afghanistan and Kashmir, the north-west frontier of the empire (Sarkar 2009: 59–69).

Hakim's attempt in 1580 to usurp Akbar was part of a conspiracy by Akbar's officers in Bihar and Bengal. Akbar sent Mānsingh to Bihar in 1588, to solidify the Mughal rule in the region. Mānsingh, together with his son Jagatsingh, successfully subdued the rebel leaders. Then Mānsingh advanced to north Orissa in 1590 to subdue Qutlu Khan Lohoni, the Afghan king of the region. After the death of Qutlu, his son Nasir submitted himself to Māgsingh. Despite these successes the rebel elements kept rising up, and Mānsingh continued his efforts to control Bihar, Bengal, and Orissa till the end of Akbar's reign. In recognition of Mānsingh's long-standing service and dedication to the empire, Akbar in 1605, just before his death, made him the Commander of Seven Thousand,<sup>1</sup> a title unprecedented for anyone outside imperial family members. He also conferred on him the title of Mīzrā Rājā, which suggested Akbar considered Mānsingh to be his kinsman (Sarkar 2009: 70–83). Indeed, Mānsingh became so influential that after Akbar's death, his son Jahangir's main concern was how to counterbalance this Hindu general's power at the court (Alam and Subrahmanyam 2012: 129–133).

After succeeding Akbar, Jahangir sent Mānsingh back to Bengal first, then to Bihar. In 1608/9, however, Jahangir sent Mānsingh to join his mission in Deccan to subdue Malik Ambar of the Ahmadnagar kingdom. The Mughal army could not gain a decisive victory in Deccan, and Mānsingh died peacefully while he was stationed at the region in 1614 (Sarkar 2009: 83–90).

After Mānsingh's death, his son Bhāvsingh succeeded the chieftainship of the Kachvāhā clan. He soon died, however, in 1621. Then Jaisingh I, Mānsingh's great-grandson ascended to the throne. Like his great-grandfather, Jaisingh I played a major role in the building of the Mughal Empire. In 1623, Jahangir sent Jaisingh I to Deccan, where he joined the empire's endless war with Malik Ambar. When Jahangir died and Shah Jahan succeeded to the imperial throne in 1627, Khan Jahan, Jahangir's chief commander in Deccan, rebelled against Shah Jahan. Jaisingh I was engaged in Shah Jahan's pursuit of Khan Jahan till the general was killed in 1631. Soon afterwards Jaisingh I rejoined the Mughal mission in Deccan till he was transferred to Afghanistan in 1638. There he protected the north-western border of the

<sup>1</sup> This means he became a commander of seven thousand cavalries.

empire till 1644. In 1639, Jaisingh I received the title of *Mīzrā Rājā* from Shah Jahan, the title *Mānsingh* also received. Then he was briefly reposted to Deccan to protect the region till 1647. However, he was soon brought back to Afghanistan as the Persian king Shah Abbas II conquered the fort of Qandahar in 1649. Jaisingh I joined the Mughal campaigns for reclaiming the fort till 1653 when the attempts ended without success (Sarkar 2009: 91–104).

When Shah Jahan fell ill in 1657, his three sons, Shuja in Bengal, Aurangzeb in Deccan, and Murad in Gujarat, rebelled against him and Dara Shukoh, Shah Jahan's eldest son who stayed with him in Delhi. Jaisingh I was sent by Shah Jahan to Bengal and subdued Shuja in the Battle of Bahadurpur in 1658. However, in the same year Aurangzeb defeated Dara at Samugarh, so Jaisingh I accepted Aurangzeb as the new emperor and submitted himself to him (Sarkar 2009: 106–109).

Then came the last achievement of Jaisingh I. In 1664, Aurangzeb ordered him to lead the Mughal army against the Maratha leader *Śivājī* and the Bijapur king. Jaisingh I quickly triumphed and when *Śivājī* surrendered in 1665, Jaisingh I was made a commander of seven thousand troops, the highest possible honor for anyone outside the imperial family. This success, however, was tarnished when *Śivājī*, who was imprisoned in Agra under the surveillance of *Rāmsingh*, the son of Jaisingh I, escaped in 1666. In the meantime Jaisingh I remained in Deccan and continued to win victories over the Bijapur king. However, his last campaign was unsuccessful and he died in Burhanpur in 1667 (Sarkar 2009: 116–135).

*Rāmsingh* succeeded to the *Kachvāhā* throne in 1667, and was immediately sent to Bengal to subdue the Ahoms in Assam. He stayed at the Assam border till 1676 without much success. Then he was sent to Afghanistan to guard the Khyber Pass against the Afghan rebel tribes. He stayed there for some time till he was transferred to Kohat, where he died in 1688. *Rāmsingh's* grandson, *Bishansingh*, then was given the title of *Rājā*. He was posted to the Mathura district to suppress the Jat rebels in the present-day Bharatpur area. He stayed there till 1696 and gained some success. However, he was unable to bring the Jats to complete submission. Then he was transferred to Afghanistan where he died in 1699 (Sarkar 2009: 137–147).

With the death of *Bishansingh* came the accession of Jaisingh II in 1700, who would eventually found the city of Jaipur. He was immediately summoned by Aurangzeb to join the Mughal campaign in Deccan. Jaisingh II joined the Mughal contingent in 1701, which was engaged in the siege of Khelna at that time. He fought under the leadership of a Mughal prince Bidar Bhakt, and Khelna fell in 1702. Jaisingh II continued to serve the imperial army under Bidar Bhakt till Aurangzeb's death in 1707 (Sarkar 2009: 148–153).

When Aurangzeb died, a war of succession ensued. Jaisingh II followed Bidar Bhakt who fought for his father Azam Shah. It was, however, Bahadur Shah I, Azam Shah's rival, who emerged victorious. Since Vijaysingh, Jaisingh's younger brother, had served Bahadur Shah I, after the accession, in 1708, Bahadur Shah I gave the Kachvāhā throne to Vijaysingh. Being removed from the throne, Jaisingh II, together with the Marwar leader Ajitsingh and the Mahārāṇā of Mewar, rebelled against the emperor. Bahadur Shah I made truce with two Rājput leaders in 1710, which continued throughout the rest of his reign and during the short reign of Jahandar Shah in 1712 (Sarkar 2009: 153–155). By the time Aurangzeb died in 1707, the empire was in decline. Bahadur Shah, who succeeded Aurangzeb, could not restore its past glory:

In 1707, the weakness of the Empire had become visible, and numerous conflicts flared up, which contributed to the widening of the cracks in the imperial edifice. This produced opportunities for dissidence and the open assertion of power on the part of regional chiefs [...]. (Horstmann 1999: 17)

As a result, starting from early eighteenth century, the Zamindars in Bengal and Bihar, and the regional rulers such as Afghans, Jats, Rājputs, and Sikhs gradually began to assert their political wills and became less compliant with the Mughal regime (Imam 2008: 11).

When Farrukhsiyar ascended to the Mughal throne in 1713, Jaisingh II was put in charge of Malwa, to block the Maratha raids into the city. Jaisingh II was in charge of Malwa till 1717. In 1716, Jaisingh II launched a campaign against the Jats, whom his father Bishansingh had also tried to subdue. Despite the disturbances caused by court politics and the change of the imperial ruler, Jaisingh II persisted, and during the reign of Muhammad Shah he gained a decisive victory over the Jats in 1722. Jaisingh II then was again appointed as the governor of Malwar between 1729 to 1730, and 1732 to 1737. By then the Marathas had renewed their strength and vigorously invaded Mughal territory. Although the Mughals attempted to drive out the Marathas from Rājput territory, they did not succeed. Eventually the emperor gave the governorship of Malwar to Balaji Rao, the Maratha leader at that time (Sarkar 2009: 155–177).

This brief description of the Kachvāhā dynasty from the time of Bhagavāndās to Jaisingh II shows that the Kachvāhās were an integral part of Mughal history. Being surrounded by the rebellious elements in Afghanistan, Deccan, Rajasthan, Bihar, Bengal, and Orissa, the Mughal emperors had to heavily depend on the military power supplied by the Kachvāhā rulers. Thus, some of the Kachvāhā rulers such as Mānsingh, Jaisingh I, and Jaisingh II were the highest-ranking officers at the imperial court. Their role in the empire was so decisive that these three Kachvāhā kings received the title of Mīzrā Rājā, indicating that the emperors considered them to be equal to their kinsmen.



## 1.2. THE TALE OF GOVINDADEVA: THE KACHVĀHĀS AND THE GAUḌĪYAS

Prior to Jaisingh II, the Kachvāhās already had significant contact with the Gauḍīyas. The Kachvāhās' long-standing relationship with the Gauḍīyas is best symbolized in the intriguing history of the image of Govindadeva. He was first worshipped by Rūpa Gosvāmī in Vṛndāvana during Mānsingh's reign, and eventually became the Kachvāhās' family deity in Jaipur during Jaisingh II's reign.

The Kachvāhās had a significant connection with the Gauḍīyas at the time of Mānsingh, who was the Rājā of Amber from 1589 to 1614, and was the highest-ranking Hindu officer in the Mughal court. Mānsingh was connected to the Gauḍīyas through his father Bhāgavāndās (r.1574–1589). Bhāgavāndās is said to have been initiated by a Gauḍīya follower called Ramray (Entwistle 1987: 149–150, 160). It is also said that Mānsingh was significantly influenced by Raghunātha Bhaṭṭa, who was one of the six Gosvāmīs of the Gauḍīya movement (Pilania 2002: 129). Due to the influence of these two, Mānsingh constructed the magnificent temple in Vṛndāvana for Govindadeva, the image which was worshipped by Rūpa. Rūpa discovered the image of Govindadeva around 1534, and built the first temple for the image in 1535



Fig. 1.1 The image of Govindadeva at the Rādhā-Govinda Mandir, Jaipur.

(Nath 1996: 161). The construction of the second temple for Govindadeva by Mānsingh seems to have begun around 1576, to commemorate his victory over the Mewar king Pratapsingh in the Battle of Haldighat. The construction was completed in 1590 (Nath 1996: 163) when Mānsingh was at the height of his power. Thus, the image of Govindadeva became the symbol of Kachvāhā glory (Horstmann 1999: 7).

The Mughal emperor Akbar also supported Rūpa's worship. The Govindadeva temple and other Vaiṣṇava temples are recorded to have received revenue grants from Akbar for the first time in 1565 (Mukherjee and Habib 1988: 235–236). Akbar supported Mānsingh's construction of the second and grander temple of Govindadeva as well, and 'this theatre of Hindu-Muslim collaboration at the imperial level made possible, among other things, the largest temple in all India that was ever designed as a single structure' (Hawley 2010: 236–237). This imperial support was motivated by Akbar's desire to incorporate Bengal into the Mughal regime. As shown earlier in this chapter, Mānsingh exercised military and administrative control over East India from Bihar over Bengal to Orissa during his governorship of those regions from 1588 to 1606. Therefore, the construction of the Govindadeva temple can be seen as a combined effort of the Mughal Empire and the Kachvāhā family to gain greater control over Bengal by accommodating the Gauḍīya tradition, which was popular in that region (Horstmann 2009: 6–7). The Gauḍīyas on their part skillfully dealt with the Mughal and the Kachvāhā patronages. As a result, 'Soon after the death of the six Gosvāmīs, the big temples of the Gauḍīya sect accumulated so much land and wealth that each of their custodians attained the status of a zamindar' (Mukherjee 1980: 16).

The relationship between the Kachvāhās and the Gauḍīyas became closer in 1633, when Shah Jahan put Jaisingh I in direct charge of the Govindadeva temple. As a consequence of this arrangement, henceforth it became the Kachvāhā kings' responsibility to control the grant revenue and to appoint the custodian (*adhikārī*) of the temple (Mukherjee and Habib 1989: 290). It was then only natural that Govindadeva and the accompanying images were moved from Vṇdāvana to the Kachvāhā territory when Aurangzeb started to persecute the Hindus on religious grounds.

In general, Akbar's successors had maintained his accommodative attitude toward their Hindu subjects. Their relationship, however, gradually turned sour after Aurangzeb took the throne in 1658. Unlike his predecessors, Aurangzeb preferred the empire to be strictly ruled according to *Shari'a*, and he did not share Akbar's religiously liberal mood. Although he continued cooperating with the Hindus politically, Aurangzeb implemented more religiously conservative and exclusive policies, and cancelled some policies promoted by Akbar for the sake of Hindu tolerance. This, of course, negatively affected Hindu-Muslim relations throughout the empire. For example, in 1665 Aurangzeb banned the celebrations of Holi and Diwali, arguably the

two most popular festivals among the Hindus. In 1669, he ordered the demolition of Hindu schools and temples. Finally, in 1670, he reinstituted the *jizya* tax which was much hated by the Hindus (Kulke and Rothermund 2004: 211) and had been abolished by Akbar.

The exodus of Govindadeva and the accompanying images from Vṛndāvana begun around 1669, during the reign of Rāmsingh, in order to protect the images from the iconoclasm ordered by Aurangzeb. The images gradually migrated toward the capital of the Kachvāhā kingdom till they settled in Jaipur. According to Radha Govinda Nath, the images were first brought to Kāmām in 1671, then to Ajñātavāsa around 1675, to Khavā around 1700, to Govindapura around 1707, to Kanaka Vṛndāvana in 1713. Finally, when the new city of Jaipur was established in 1727, the images were moved there (Nath 1996: 161).

Thus, the Kachvāhā attachment to the image of Govindadeva had been maintained since the time of Mānsingh in the late sixteenth century. However, it was during the reign of Jaisingh II that Govindadeva obtained the most prominent position in the Kachvāhā dynasty. An important transformation occurred in 1713, when Jaisingh II transformed Govindadeva from one of the important images for the Kachvāhās into the family deity, by constructing a garden called Kanaka Vṛndāvana, located between Amber and Jaipur, and moving the image there (Horstmann 1999: 18–19).

In 1739, the image of Govindadeva was finally moved to a temple within the palace compound of Jaipur (Bahura 1996: 206). There Govindadeva went through yet another significant transformation. In 1740, Jaisingh II ordered that all title-holders in the Kachvāhā court should pay tax for the maintenance of Govindadeva and its custodians. Horstmann explains the significance of this taxation:

With this grant the relationship between the Kachavāhās and the temple assumed a new dimension, for GD [Govindadeva] was now raised to the status of an object of veneration and financial obligation of the entire state and its office-holders. GD was now no longer merely a family deity of the Kachavāhās but a public religious symbol of the state [...]. (Horstmann 1999: 25)

For Jaisingh II then, Govindadeva was a symbol of Kachvāhā glory. By locating the image right at the center of his reign both geographically and politically, Jaisingh II attempted to project himself as the Hindu king, who would uphold *dharma* in the Mughal regime, which was increasingly disintegrating and becoming religiously hostile to the Hindus: ‘The symbol of Kachavāhā power, thus taken to the patrimonial land of the dynasty, also marked the growing assertiveness of the Rājputs in the face of declining Mughal power’ (Horstmann 1999: 8).

As Jaisingh II put Govindadeva in a prominent position in the Kachvāhā polity, the social status of the Gauḍīyas, the custodians of the image, rose as well. There is no evidence that Jaisingh II was initiated into the Gauḍīya

tradition (Burton 2000: 101), and the king continued to support other religious traditions (Horstmann 1999: 7). However, his preference for the Gauḍīya tradition over others was obvious:

[S]ince the time of Jai Singh II Govindadeva has superseded Sītārāma in the heart of the rulers and in certain ceremonies of the court . . . [O]n the evening of the coronation he [i.e. the custodian of Govindadeva] becomes the most prominent Vaiṣṇava of the kingdom: the new Mahārājā first renders obeisance to Govindadeva, then to the tutelary goddesses of his territory and clan and only then presents himself at the temple of Sītārāma. (Clémentin-Ojha 1997: 57, translated and cited in Horstmann 1999: 7)

Images of Sītārāma had been the family deities of the Kachvāhās, since they claimed their descents from Kuśa, one of the twin sons of Rāma (Horstmann 2009: 5). The custodians of Sītārāma were the Rāmānandīs, the followers of Svāmī Rāmānanda who lived in the fourteenth century (Burghart 1978: 121). The Kachvāhā connection with the Rāmānandīs began during the reign of Prithīrāj (Pṛthvīrāja; r. 1503–1527), the great-grandfather of Mānsingh. Prithīrāj is said to have been a devotee of a Nāthayogī at Galtā. However, when a Rāmānandī ascetic by the name of Kṛṣṇadāsa Payohārī defeated the Nāthayogī in a yogic battle, the king became Kṛṣṇadāsa's disciple (Burghart 1978: 127). Kṛṣṇadāsa gave the king the images of Sītārāma, and since then they had become the Kachvāhā family deities and the Rāmānandīs their custodians (Horstmann 2009: 4–5, Sarkar 2009: 30).

As Govindadeva and the Gauḍīyas were suddenly given such prominence during the reign of Jaisingh II, it was only natural that other Vaiṣṇava groups such as the Rāmānandīs, who were competing for the royal patronage, felt threatened:

From the last decades of the seventeenth century, the powerful Vaiṣṇava groups from the area of Braj had moved westward in order to protect their deities from desecration and thereby themselves from ruin. This disturbed the balance of religious power in the Kachavāhā state. The newly arrived groups were accommodated in the religious system of the state and thereby threatened the rank of the hitherto leading groups. (Horstmann 2006: 20)

The prominence given to the Gauḍīyas required some justification in terms of the authority and the authenticity of the tradition. The religious disputes in relation to the Gauḍīyas arose at the court of Jaisingh II in this context.

### 1.3. JAISINGH II'S MORAL DISCOURSE

The religious disputes at the Kachvāhā court, in which the Gauḍīyas, including Baladeva, were involved, need to be understood in the broader political

contexts of the declining Mughal Empire and of the deliberate attempt on the side of Jaisingh II to portray himself as a *dharmic* king. For Jaisingh II, this moralizing discourse was a way to legitimize and strengthen his authority as the leader of the Rājputs and as the undisputed ruler of the Jaipur state (Imam 2008: 14, 22).

Aurangzeb's intolerant policies toward his Hindu subjects, together with the decline of the Mughal Empire, bred contempt and uncooperative attitudes among the Rājputs:

The weakening of imperial power was therefore followed, not by a revival under some other leaders, but by a release of elemental forces. As respect for the empire waned, willingness to compromise and let live waned too. Concession and attitudes on the part of the emperors which formerly would have been greeted with gratitude and hailed as masterstrokes now met with no response and finally with contempt [...] The Rājputs no longer felt themselves to be partners in the empire and though some states like Jaipur continued as allies they no longer did so with enthusiasm. (Spear 1990: 70–72)

After Aurangzeb's death in 1707, the empire declined rapidly. The lack of unity among its Hindu subjects was one of the major reasons. Though Jaisingh II remained loyal to the Mughal court, he consciously distanced himself from the image of himself as part of the Mughal aristocracy. Rather, he emphasized the image of being a Hindu king in his own right. For example, after the death of Bahadur Shah in 1712, Jaisingh II received the title of *Mīzrā Rājā*, which symbolically expresses a kinship with the Mughal emperor. The same title was given to Mānsingh and Jaisingh I, the two most glorious predecessors of Jaisingh II, and it was an exceptional honor for a Hindu subject to receive it. However, Jaisingh II did not use this title at all in the documents issued by him, since using such a title would go against the image of an independent Hindu king. After 1716, Jaisingh II also stopped using the seal paying allegiance to the Mughal emperor. In 1727, he started using a seal which paid allegiance to *Sītārāma*, the family deities of the Kachvāhās (Horstmann 2009: 18). In this way, during the time of Jaisingh II the Jaipur state became independent without openly rebelling against the Mughal emperors (Imam 2008: 28).

In relation to the declining Mughals, Jaisingh II asserted his authority through the process of what Horstmann calls Brahmanization:

[T]he regional powers became increasingly Brahmanised in the process of articulating their growing independence from the Mughal empire, which was losing its hold over those regional powers [...] The process of Brahmanisation was especially prominent in Maharashtra, where Śivāji had appointed Brahmins to legitimise him as warrior-king, that is, as Kshatriya, by crafting for him the appropriate rituals of royal consecration [...] The particular Brahmanisation, however, that set in Maharashtra as elsewhere, made also an impact on Rajasthan,

for Maharashtra served as a prestigious model and the service of Brahman families was accordingly avidly sought as an avenue to heightened self-assertion. (Horstmann 2006: 7)

As the protector of *dharma* and the maintainer of the Brahmanical orthodoxy, Jaisingh II actively promoted various social-religious reforms. In order to firmly establish his authority as a *dharmic* king, he implemented various policies.

First, Jaisingh II took advantage of his prominent position at the imperial court and influenced the Mughal emperors to abolish the unpopular taxation policies imposed on non-Muslim subjects. According to Imam, perhaps this was 'the most significant factor that legitimized Sawai Jai Singh as the rightful ruler for his subjects and established his credibility amongst his contemporaries' (2008: 35). In 1720, he persuaded Muhammad Shah to abolish *jizya* permanently. The *jizya* taxation was first abolished by Akbar in 1564 but was reimposed by Aurangzeb in 1670. Farrukhsiar abolished it briefly after 1713 but he re-established it in 1717. In 1728, Jaisingh II managed to remove the tax imposed on pilgrims to Gayā. In 1730, he requested the emperor to remove the tax imposed on the Hindus who bathed in certain holy places (Entwistle 1987: 190, Imam 2008: 28–29). On the recommendation from Jaisingh II, the tax on *Bhadar* was abolished, which was a ritual practiced among the Hindus when an elder member of the family died (Imam 2008: 35).

Second, he performed various Vedic sacrifices such as *sarvamedha*, *puruṣamedha*, *aśvamedha*, *vājapeya*, and *rājasūya*. The revival of these ancient sacrifices portrayed him as the protector of the Brāhmaṇical orthodoxy, and it seems to have significantly impressed his contemporaries (Imam 2008: 31, Pilania 2002: 14, 132, fn. 143).

Third, Jaisingh II tried to promote moral/ethical values among his subjects by strictly adhering to the system of the fourfold division of the society and individual lives (*caturvarṇāśrama*). He was particularly concerned about restraining so-called religious mendicants (*vairāgīs*) and laid out the rules that they needed to follow. For example, the untouchables were not allowed to become their disciples. If the ascetics came from the twice-born (*dvija*) classes, they had to maintain their sacred thread. The chief priest among the renunciants had to be a Brāhmaṇa. They were forbidden to bear arms except for the Dādūpanthīs. The ascetics were forbidden to keep women or have relations with them (Imam 2008: 34). If they were engaged in illicit activities with women, the king ordered them to marry. For those ascetics who did not maintain celibacy, Jaisingh II even established a village called Vairāgyapura ('The city of ascetics') near Mathura in 1727, and induced them to get married and to lead a life as a householder (Entwistle 1987: 191, Pilania 2002: 151). Jaisingh II also checked the Rāmānandīs' practice of *madhuropāsana*, or the worship of the Lord's erotic pastime. In this practice the Rāmānandīs

meditated upon the amorous interactions between Sītā and Rāma. The king was concerned about the negative effects on the Vaiṣṇava monks who were supposed to be celibates (Pilania 2002: 118). From these examples, we understand why he was similarly concerned about the Gauḍīya worship of Rādhā and Kṛṣṇa. The king was worried that the extramarital relationship between Rādhā and Kṛṣṇa as well as the Gauḍīya emphasis on this might encourage immoral practices among believers.

Fourth, the state authority represented by Jaisingh II was deeply involved in the everyday lives of the subjects and punished those who broke the law since, according to Imam, ‘The legitimization of power was accomplished not through coercion or military threat, but by being effective rulers who could protect their subject’s lives and properties’ (Imam 2008: 203). Theft, robbery, and highway looting were considered serious crimes, and severe measures were taken to deal with them. Thieves, for example, were repeatedly fined even after the stolen items had been returned. It seems the city officials patrolled markets continuously, in order to catch thieves red-handed, and fined even those who were merely accused of stealing. In this way the officials observed the subjects’ activities closely and secured stability and security in trade and commerce. According to Imam, other activities considered criminal offences included: cow slaughter, killing or injuring animals, drinking or selling liquor, gambling, snide remarks, verbal or physical abuse, hurting people even unknowingly, making false accusations, bringing false witnesses, lying to government officials, tampering with or destroying official documents, non-payment of taxes, unlawful possession of government property, unauthorized employment. Those who committed offences were, for the most part, either fined or incarcerated (Imam 2008: 199–220). Through the logic of protecting and promoting moral righteousness, the Jaipur state authority was able to intervene in the delicate matters of family, gender, caste, and the sexuality of women as well. Accordingly, the state authority punished those engaged in illicit relationships, adultery, extramarital affairs, rape, sexual misconduct, sexual harassment, any kind of abortion, domestic violence, and intercaste marriage (Imam 2008: 223–256). These measures to take tight control over the everyday lives of his subjects under the name of protecting *dharma* was, for Jaisingh II, a way to increase the legitimacy of his rule.

#### 1.4. RELIGIOUS DISPUTES AT THE COURT OF JAISINGH II

Jaisingh II’s moralizing discourse was extended to the religious community as well. As various new *bhakti* movements arose in early modern North India,

the king was concerned about the unorthodox nature of some of these groups. The new *bhakti* communities included Dādūpanthīs Gauḍīyas, Haridāsīs, Nimbārkīs, Puṣṭimārgīs, Rāmānandīs, and Rādhāvallabhas. As a part of his attempt to promote Brahmanical orthodoxy, he was not willing to tolerate anything he deemed unorthodox or against *dharma*:

Sawai Jai Singh was a hearty supporter of smārta dharma, the highest nurturer of scholars of the Veda and shastras, and a partisan of the ancient paramparas. He conceived that traditional Hindu dharma, as represented by the four sampradāyas, was being harmed by the independent position of the new bhakti communities and especially by their 'revolutionary' attitudes toward ancient beliefs. (Mital 1968: 422, translated and cited in Hastings 2002: 92)

Thus, Jaisingh II was eager to regulate and control the activities of the new *bhakti* movements. The *bhakti* communities, for their part, were also eager to comply with his policy since they were competing for the royal patronage. These two factors, namely the king's moralizing discourse and the competition among the new *bhakti* communities led to the religious disputes in which the Gauḍīyas were involved. Religious debates and conferences were quite common during Jaisingh II's reign, and references to these occasions can be found not only in Gauḍīya sources but also in documents belonging to Rāmānandīs, Rādhāvallabhas, and Haridāsīs (Entwistle 1987: 191–194).

In relation to the dispute in which Baladeva had been involved, Haridāsa Dāsa, a Gauḍīya author in the twentieth century, gives the following account:

When, in Śrīla Viśvanātha Cakravartī's final years, news reached Vṇḍāvana that the Bengalis performing service at the temples in Jaipur, being considered 'without legitimate lineage' (*asampradāyī*), were removed from their service, then Baladeva, by the order of Viśvanātha, went to Jaipur with Kṛṣṇadeva Sārvabhauma, and defeated the opposing groups in debate. Then he re-established the seat of the Bengalis in the mountainous region called Galtā and established the sacred image of Vijaya Gopāla. Even today, this sacred image is shining in the temple there. At that time, by the merciful command of Govinda-deva, he composed *Govindabhāṣya*, and brought glory to the Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavas. (Dāsa 1957: 1292)<sup>2</sup>

According to this account, the cause of the dispute was the lack of proper lineage among the Gauḍīyas. That is to say, the Gauḍīyas did not belong to the established four Vaiṣṇava *sampradāyas*. The key players in the dispute are said to have been both Kṛṣṇadeva and Baladeva, two disciples of Viśvanātha. Finally, the account says that Baladeva wrote the *Govindabhāṣya* to settle the dispute.

<sup>2</sup> I thank David Buchta and Lucian Wong for their help in translating this Bengali text.



There are many versions of the story concerning the dispute at the court of Jaisingh II. In some versions, Kṛṣṇadeva or Baladeva only is portrayed as the main player in the dispute (Burton 2000: 104–105). The cause of the dispute varies as well. According to Gopal Bahura (1976: 66) and Sushil De (1961: 22), the dispute arose because the Gauḍīyas did not have any independent *Brahmasūtra* commentary. According to Mital (1961: 67), the cause of the dispute was due to Kṛṣṇa's extramarital relationship with Rādhā. Yet Majumdar (1969: 269) says the dispute arose as the Gauḍīyas wanted to eat in a separate line from other Vaiṣṇava groups when *prasāda* was distributed in the temple.

Whereas most accounts talk about the occurrence of a single dispute, Burton points out that there was more than one religious dispute, in which some of the above-mentioned issues were dealt with separately. Burton, therefore, discusses four controversies related to the Gauḍīyas, namely, those concerning: (1) the extramarital relationship between Rādhā and Kṛṣṇa, (2) the lack of *sampradāya* affiliation, (3) the lack of *Brahmasūtra* commentary, and (4) Rūpa Kavirāja's philosophy.

The religious conference concerning the nature of Kṛṣṇa's relationship with Rādhā occurred at Jaisingh II's court in 1719 (Roy 1985: 84–87). Another assembly concerning the *sampradāya* affiliation seems to have occurred around 1723 after Jaisingh became the governor of Agra (Mital 1968: 423). It is uncertain if and when a theological debate was held concerning the Gauḍīyas' lack of *Brahmasūtra* commentary. However, we do know that Baladeva was involved in this controversy since Baladeva wrote for Jaisingh II a work called *Brahmasūtrakarikabhāṣya*, which is an extremely short commentary on the *Brahmasūtras*. One of the manuscripts of this work is dated 1730 (Burton 2000: 116). Finally, Rūpa Kavirāja's philosophy was rejected at a Jaipur theological council in 1732 (Burton 2000: 110). As Burton suggests, it seems that these separate debates were bundled together by the posterior authors and were put forward as *the* Jaipur dispute. In what follows, the contents of the first three issues mentioned above are each discussed separately.<sup>3</sup>

#### 1.4.1. Kṛṣṇa's Relationship with Rādhā

Given Jaisingh II's strong moralizing policy described earlier in this chapter, it is only natural that the king was disturbed about Kṛṣṇa's extramarital relationship with Rādhā as described in the BhāPu and taught in Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavism:

[A]nother scholastic conflict which related also to principles of orthodox conduct [...] was the debate about the status of the wives of the cowherds of Braj, the *gopīs*, vis-à-vis Kṛṣṇa. [...] Jaisingh could not allow his envisaged state deity to be outside the pale of orthodox Vaiṣṇavism. (Horstmann 2006: 22)

<sup>3</sup> As for the forth issue on Rūpa Kavirāja, See Okita 2014: 104–111.

Burton suggests that this account of the disputes could be a reflection of the *parakīyā-svakīyā* conference which Jaisingh II held in 1719 AD (2000: 111). The Gauḍīya tradition explains Rādhā's relation to Kṛṣṇa as both unmarried (*parakīyā*) and married (*svakīyā*). On the level of *līlā*, or pastime, Rādhā in Vṛṇḍāvana is married to another cowherd man. Therefore, Rādhā and Kṛṣṇa are unmarried. On the absolute level or the level of ontology, however, they are considered as married because Rādhā is energy (*śakti*) and Kṛṣṇa is the energy-possessor (*śaktiman*). Therefore, they are said to be simultaneously married and unmarried.

Unfortunately, this explanation given by Jīva was interpreted in various ways, and did not settle the controversy:<sup>4</sup> 'Jīva Gosvāmī hatte hierzu eine Position eingenommen, die er selbst—mithilfe einer von anderen später vielfach zitierten und interpretierten salvatorischen Klausel—uneindeutig gelassen hatte' (Horstmann 2009: 75). Being concerned about the moral effect of gods having extramarital relations, Jaisingh II insisted that their relationship was *svakīyā* only. He even sent Kṛṣṇadeva, who seems to have been Baladeva's predecessor at Jaisingh's court, to Bengal to discuss the topic in the court of Jafar Khān. However, his *svakīyā* theory was eventually rejected (Burton 2000: 114). As will be shown in the fourth chapter, this *parakīyā-svakīyā* controversy motivated Baladeva to explain the relationship between Rādhā and Kṛṣṇa by incorporating the Mādhva concept of *viśeṣa* into the Gauḍīya system.

### 1.4.2. Lack of *Sampradāya* Affiliation

As a part of his attempt to regulate newly arising *bhakti* movements, Jaisingh II forced them to declare their affiliation with one of the four Vaiṣṇava traditions which he considered legitimate. By the time of Jaisingh II, the idea of four legitimate Vaiṣṇava traditions was widely accepted. For example, Bahura (1976: 66) cites the following untraceable verse in his work:

The traditions are four, and the fifth is not known. Indeed the learned people ascertained [so] precisely, based on the statements of the *Padma Purāṇa*.<sup>5</sup>

These four *sampradāyas* and their founders are listed in the following verses attributed to the *Padma Purāṇa*. Baladeva cites them in his *Prameyaratnāvalī*:

Those mantras which are devoid of [their connections with] traditions, are considered fruitless. Therefore, in the age of quarrel, there will be four traditions.

The four Vaiṣṇavas, [namely] Śrī, Brahmā, Rudra, Sanaka, are purifying the earth. In the age of *Kali*, they will certainly appear from Puruṣottama in Orissa.

<sup>4</sup> For a detailed analysis of Jīva's position on this issue, see Brzezinski 1997.

<sup>5</sup> *sampradāyāś catvāraḥ pañcamo naiva vidyate /  
pādmoktavacanenaiva nirṇītaṃ pañḍitaiḥ kila //*

Śrī chose Rāmānuja, Brahmā [chose] Madhvācārya, Rudra [chose] Viṣṇu Svāmī [and] the four Sanas [chose] Nimbāditya.<sup>6</sup>

For Jaisingh, therefore, the four legitimate Vaiṣṇava traditions are those initiated by Rāmānuja (the Śrī *sampradāya*), Madhva (the Brahmā *sampradāya*), Viṣṇu Svāmī (the Rudra *sampradāya*), and Nimbārka (the Sanaka *sampradāya*).

The historical origin of the idea of the four Vaiṣṇava *sampradāya* is unclear. The obscurity of the idea is also suggested by the fact that these verses cited by Baladeva are not found in the *Padma Purāṇa* currently available. However, we do know that the idea of legitimate Vaiṣṇava *sampradāyas* was circulating before Jaisingh II's time. Gadādhara, a Vallabhite author from the sixteenth century, wrote the *Sampradāyapradīpikā*, in which he connects the newly arising Vallabha movement with an older tradition attributed to Viṣṇu Svāmī (Hawley 2011: 166). Writing in the late sixteenth century, Rāmānandī author Nābhādāsa, in his *Bhaktmāl*, mentions Rāmānuja, Madhva, Viṣṇu Svāmī, and Nimbārka as the founders of four Vaiṣṇava traditions, and traces Svāmī Rāmānanda's lineage back to Rāmānuja (Burghart 1978: 129).

In response to Jaisingh II's religious policy, the Vallabhas declared their affiliation to be with that of Viṣṇu Svāmī, and the Gauḍīyas with that of Madhva (Hastings 2002: 96). Prior to Jaisingh II's reign, the Rāmānandīs affiliated themselves with the Śrī *sampradāya* of Rāmānuja. However, during his reign, the Rāmānandīs took the place of the Śrī *sampradāya* and they came to be recognized as one of the four Vaiṣṇava *sampradāyas* alongside those belonging to Madhva, Nimbārka, and Viṣṇu Svāmī (Burghart 1978: 130–131). This example points to the fluidity of the notion of the four *sampradāyas*.

As for the followers of Svāmī Haridāsa, the ascetics aligned themselves with the Nimbārka *sampradāya* whereas the householders chose Viṣṇu Svāmī (Haynes 1974: 120–124). Those who did not comply with the royal policy had to face the consequences. According to Rādhāvallabha sources, for example, Rūpa Lāla, the representative of the tradition, refused to affiliate his tradition with any of the four accepted *sampradāyas*. As a result, Jaisingh II persecuted Rūpa Lāla and his family, and they were forced to leave Vṛndāvana (Burton 2000: 119, Hastings 2002: 97–98, Mital 1968: 422–423). Rūpa Lāla's case shows that compliance with the royal order was a matter of survival for the new *bhakti* movements thriving in North India.

<sup>6</sup> *sampradāyavihinā ye mantrāste viphalā matāḥ  
ataḥ kalau bhaviṣyanti catvāraḥ sampradāyinaḥ /  
śrībrahmarudrasanakā vaiṣṇavāḥ kṣitipāvanāḥ  
catvāraste kalau bhāvyā hyutkale puruṣottamāt //  
rāmānujaṃ śrīḥ svīcakre madhvācāryaṃ caturmukhaḥ /  
śrīviṣṇusvāmināṃ rudro nimbādityaṃ catuḥṣanaḥ //*

### 1.4.3. Lack of the *Brahmasūtra* Commentary

Prior to Baladeva, the Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavas did not produce their own commentary on the BraSū. This is because Caitanya claimed that the BhāPu is the natural and the most authoritative commentary on the BraSū, and there was no point in producing a separate commentary. In this section, we will briefly look into the origin and the development of Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇava Vedānta, paying attention to the significance of the BhāPu in this context.

Kṛṣṇa Caitanya (1486–1533), the inaugurator of the Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇava tradition, claimed that the BhāPu is the most natural and authoritative commentary of the BraSū. In the hagiographical account of Caitanya's life written by Kṛṣṇadāsa Kavirāja (1496–??), there is a description of his discussion on Vedānta with Prakāśānanda Sarasvatī, an Advaita *Sannyāsī*. Asked to explain the primary meanings of the BraSū, Caitanya said:

The meanings of the *Vyāsa-sūtras* [*Brahmasūtras*] are profound, for Vyāsa was Bhagavān. No *jīva* can know the meaning of his *sūtras*, and thus he has explained his own *sūtras* himself. For if the maker of *sūtras* himself explains them, then people know their basic meaning. The meaning which is in the *praṇava*, that is in the *gāyatrī*; and that meaning has been expanded in the four *ślokas*. Those four *ślokas* Īśvara spoke to Brahmā, and Brahmā instructed Nārada in them. Nārada told that meaning to Vyāsa, and when he heard it, Veda-vyāsa concluded, 'This meaning is in the form of an explanation of my [*Brahma*-] *sūtras*; let me make the *Śrī Bhāgavata* [the BhāPu] as the true form of the commentary on the *sūtras*.' The four Vedas and the *upaniṣads*—as many as there are, Vyāsa expounded upon their meanings. And in those *sūtras*, the Vedic matters that were discussed prompted the *ślokas* in the *Bhāgavata*. Thus the *Śrī Bhāgavata* is the commentary on the *sūtras*; thus the *ślokas* of the *Bhāgavata* and of the *upaniṣads* have the same meaning.<sup>7</sup>

According to this description, Caitanya explains that the BhāPu is the natural commentary of the BraSū because the author of the Vedas, Vyāsa himself, accepted the BhāPu as such. Therefore, unlike other Vedāntists such as Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, and Madhva, who established their own schools by writing commentaries on the BraSū, Caitanya did not write such a commentary. This tradition was followed by his followers as well.

Jīva Gosvāmī (1517 *terminus ad quem*–1608 *terminus a quo*) was the one who laid the theological foundation of the Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇava tradition. Apart from the eight verses called *Śikṣāṣṭaka*, Caitanya did not leave any writings of his own. Instead, he instructed two brothers, Rūpa and Sanātana, to formulate the Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇava theology. Jīva was a nephew of Rūpa and Sanātana, and

<sup>7</sup> CaiCaA: 2.25.75–84, trans. Dimock.

having been directly instructed by these two uncles, he became one of the most prolific writers in the history of Indian philosophy.

Jīva studied grammar, logic, and Vedānta at Vārāṇasī. Elkman points out that his familiarity with Vedānta is obvious in his SaSa, in which he refers to Madhva, Rāmānuja, Śaṅkara, and Vācaspati (1986: 22). Nonetheless, apart from his commentary on the first five verses of the BraSū in his PaSa, Jīva did not write his own commentary on the BraSū. Jīva's view on this matter is observed in the TaSa. In the work, he hierarchizes different ways of knowing (*pramāṇa*), and argues that the BhāPu has the highest epistemological value. As evidence, he cites the following verse attributed to the GaPu:

This blessed *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* is the meaning of the *Brahma-sūtras*, which clarify [the meaning of] the *Mahābhārata*, whose nature is a commentary on the *Gāyatrī* mantra, and it expands the meaning of the Vedas. Its nature is the *Sāma* [Veda] among the *Purāṇas*, and it is directly spoken by the Lord. (Elkman 1986: 97)<sup>8</sup>

This verse points out that the BhāPu explains the BraSū. Thus, following Caitanya's teaching, Jīva did not write his own commentary on the BraSū. Besides the issue of *sampradāya* affiliation, the Gauḍīyas in the eighteenth century were faced with the problems concerning the absence of their own BraSū commentary and the extramarital relationship between Rādhā and Kṛṣṇa. Jaisingh II was interested in accumulating commentaries on the BraSū according to the different traditions. He possessed a private collection of these commentaries, and one of them is dated 1730 AD. This shows he was concerned that each tradition maintained its authenticity not only by its *sampradāya* affiliation but also by providing its own commentary on the BraSū:

[I]n the course of the debates at Jaisingh's court the credentials of the sects concerned were examined. Were they factual or fabricated? What were the proofs? In the process, sects felt increasingly obliged to relate in commentaries of their own to the three kinds of texts that were authoritative to the Smārtas for whom Śaṅkara as commentator of those texts, namely *Upaniṣads*, the *Brahmasūtras* and the *Bhagavadgītā*, was the model. It is obvious here that thereby the Vaiṣṇavas were examined on the proofstone of the Smārtas. (Horstmann 2006: 21)

Personally attached to the Gauḍīya tradition, the king must have come to worry about its lack of the commentary on the BraSū. At the king's request, Baladeva seems to have submitted a work called the *Brahmasūtrakārikābhāṣya*. This

<sup>8</sup> TaSa Anuccheda 21: *garūḍe ca [...]*  
*artho 'yaṁ brahmasūtrāṇāṁ bhāratārthavinirṇayaḥ //*  
*gāyatrībhāṣyārūpo 'sau vedārthaparibṛṃhitaḥ //*  
*purāṇānāṁ sāmārūpaḥ sākṣād bhagavatoditaḥ //*  
*[...] śrībhāgavatābhīdhaḥ //* iti /

work is different from the GoBhā. It appears to have been submitted only to the king, and was not circulated among any followers. Burton suggests that the *Kārikābhāṣya* was earlier than the GoBhā because: (1) the former is much simpler than the latter, and (2) had the GoBhā been composed while the king was alive, he would have had it in his private collection. Since the GoBhā was not found there, Burton suggests that it was produced some time after the king passed away (2000: 116–118).

## The Genealogy of the Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavas

Before examining the specific issues concerning the Gauḍīyas' *sampradāya* affiliation, it is illuminating to pay attention to the idea of affiliation, and to the idea of teacher–disciple succession (*paramparā*) which is inextricably related to this. In the context of South Asian religious traditions, a practitioner may accept and maintain a formal affiliation with a particular tradition for the sake of social, economical, and political advantages. Therefore, the formal affiliation of the practitioner with the tradition does not necessarily indicate a theological affiliation with. In other words, the formal affiliation and the theological affiliation of the practitioner must be clearly distinguished.

The differences between a formal affiliation and a theological affiliation can be further illuminated in relation to two types of gurus, namely, *dikṣā* and *śikṣā*. These can be translated as 'initiation' and 'instruction' respectively.<sup>1</sup> A *dikṣā* guru is the one who ritually initiates a prospective student into his tradition by giving him a *mantra* or a ritual formula dedicated to the tradition's tutelary deity. The *dikṣā* guru himself received the formula from his *dikṣā* guru. In this way, the line of succession can be traced back for many generations. This line traced through *dikṣā* gurus constitutes what is called *paramparā* or disciplic succession (Broo 2003: 100). More often than not, divine figures such as Rāma, Brahmā, Lakṣmī, are believed to have initiated the succession by imparting a *mantra*, and this is why a *mantra* is believed to possess salvific power. For this reason, a *mantra* is not revealed to outsiders and is 'jealously guarded' (Burghart 1978: 125) within a tradition. A formal affiliation corresponds to a student's membership in his tradition through *dikṣā* or initiation.

In contrast, a *śikṣā* guru instructs a student and provides him with scriptural knowledge. He is the one who gives detailed information about worship and how to conduct religious practices (Broo 2003: 96). A student's *śikṣā* guru may or may not be the same as his *dikṣā* guru. If he is the same, this student's connection to a tradition through religious instruction will correspond to a

<sup>1</sup> This is not to be confused with *Śikṣā* in the sense of phonetics, which is an ancillary science of the Vedas.

theological affiliation. My argument is that a student might claim to be formally affiliated to tradition A through *dīkṣā* but in practice might follow the religious instructions of tradition B through *śikṣā*. There can be many reasons for this double affiliation. Historically speaking, one of the major reasons for this phenomenon seems to be that it is sometimes considered advantageous to affiliate oneself with an alternative tradition, which is perceived to be more established than one's own. This is what I call 'politics of genealogy'.

Two examples may be given in this context. The first example is the integration of the Nāgās, the naked warrior ascetics, to the Advaitin monastic order in medieval India. Matthew James Clark argues that the Daśanāmī order of the Advaitins, which according to the tradition was founded by Śaṅkara in the eighth century, was most probably formed only in the late sixteenth to the seventeenth century. This was a result of the integration of the two distinct traditions, namely the tantric Nāgās and the monastic Advaitins (Clark 2006: 170).

Clark points out that the philological examinations done by scholars such as A. J. Alston and Paul Hacker indicate that Śaṅkara was most probably a Vaiṣṇava, and definitely not a Śaiva (Clark 2006: 161–164). And Śaṅkara's identity as an incarnation of Śiva was later manufactured by the hagiographers (Clark 2006: 169). Thus, the Nāgās and the Advaitins were two theologically distinct groups. If so, why were these two groups integrated? Clark suggests that the *Maṭhāmnāyas*, short Sanskrit texts which integrate these two distinct groups, were manufactured in the late sixteenth and the seventeenth century due to social, political, and economical reasons:

[S]ome evidence has been presented to show that there was a very fertile context for the development of and identity for an orthodox Hindu order. By the middle of the seventeenth century in north and south-central India, there was harassment of Hindu *sannyāsi*-s and *yogī*-s; the heightened power and prestige of *pīl*-s and *dargāh*-s with their proud and remunerative lineages; a more orthodox regime at Delhi perceived by many as essentially hostile towards Hindus; and importantly, large roving bands of militant *nāgā-sannyāsi*-s with what seems to have been a non-orthodox Tantric background. The notion of ten names seems first to be attested around the end of the sixteenth century, around the time of the formation of the first militant *akhārā*-s. It is suggested that it was in this context that the *Maṭhāmnāya*-s emerged as an ideological response to the *sannyāsi*-s' social and political situation. The *Maṭhāmnāya*-s built onto the notion of Śaṅkara as a śaiva who conquered the four corners of India with Vedānta, with the claim that Śaṅkara also founded of an order of ascetics, who consequently became united under an orthodox Hindu umbrella. The Daśanāmī order amalgamated lineages of militant Girīs, Purīs and Bhāratīs, with other monastic lineages, producing the compound order of 'Tīrtha, Āśrama, Vana, Araṇya, Giri, Parvata, Sāgarā, Sarasvatī, Bhāratī and Purī'. (Clark 2006: 246)



Under Aurangzeb's militant regime, which emphasized Islamic orthodoxy, the Advaitins and the Nāgās seemed to have mutually benefited through the integration. The Advaitins would benefit from the military strength of the Nāgās. In return, the Advaitins could offer the prestige of belonging to the tradition of Śaṅkara, who had become by that time the glorious hero of Indian orthodoxy. Thus, Clark demonstrates an example in which two theologically distinct groups became affiliated due to non-theological reasons, that is, social, political, and economical reasons.

The second example that shows the difference between a theological affiliation and a formal affiliation comes from the historical development of the Rāmānandīs. As mentioned in Chapter 1, Svāmī Rāmānanda, in the fourteenth century, is believed to be the founder of the Rāmānandī sect. The sect has been historically important as saints such as Tulsīdāsa, Mīrā Bāī, and Kabīr are said to have belonged to this tradition. Despite the historical significance of the tradition, however, it is relatively unknown who Rāmānanda was and how he established his school (Burghart 1978: 121).

In this regard, by comparing the four different genealogies of Rāmānanda, Burghart shows how the Rāmānandīs played the politics of genealogy. According to the *Rāmārcanapaddhati* written in the early fifteenth century, Rāmānanda belonged to the Śrī *sampradāya* of Rāmānuja since 'it was more advantageous for the Rāmānandīs to profit from the established reputation of the Sri sect and the Sri monastic facilities at the pilgrimage centers' (Burghart 1978: 133). The *Bhaktmāl* written in the late sixteenth century similarly traces Rāmānanda's lineage back to Rāmānuja. What is novel in the *Bhaktmāl* is that the Śrī *sampradāya* is set within the scheme of the four Vaiṣṇava schools.

The same scheme persisted in the early eighteenth century, during Jaisingh II's reign. However, the Rāmānandī *sampradāya* replaced the Śrī *sampradāya* as one of the four (Burghart 1978: 130). Finally, in the early twentieth century the Rāmānandīs declared their independence by tracing Rāmānanda's lineage back to Rāma without going through Rāmānuja (Burghart 1978: 133). It appears then that the Rāmānandīs formally affiliated themselves with the older and more established Śrī *sampradāya* while the Rāmānandī school was still young in the fifteenth and the sixteenth centuries. However, the formal affiliation with the Śrī *sampradāya* was given up after the eighteenth century. This is most likely because the Rāmānandīs were firmly established in North India by then, and they did not require such a formal affiliation any longer. We can observe in this case how the Rāmānandīs utilized their formal affiliation with the Śrī *sampradāya* for their own benefit.

Going back to the disputes which happened in Jaipur, Baladeva is said to have presented a list of disciplic succession in the Gauḍīya tradition, which connects Caitanya with Madhva. This list has become the locus of much controversy. As stated in the Introduction, however, my argument in this regard is that this Mādhva connection with the Gauḍīya tradition was a formal

one rather than theological. In other words, Baladeva made a formal connection with the Mādhva tradition for the sake of social, political, and economical advantages even though the Gauḍīya tradition is theologically independent of Mādhva Vedānta. In what follows, the formal connection between the Gauḍīyas and the Mādhvas is examined. In this connection, I will point out that: (1) the formal affiliation of Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavism with the Mādhva tradition already existed prior to Baladeva, and it was not his invention; (2) it is doubtful if there was any substantial theological connection between Caitanya and the Mādhva tradition.

## 2.1. CAITANYA'S LINEAGE

### 2.1.1. Formal Affiliation: The *Guruparamparā* Lists

There are scholars, such as S. K. De and A. K. Majumdar, who suggest that Baladeva invented the formal affiliation of the Gauḍīyas with the Mādhvas. In this section, I shall examine the lists of Caitanya's *guruparamparā*, and suggest that the formal affiliation between the Gauḍīyas and the Mādhvas existed prior to Baladeva.

During the Jaipur disputes, the *sampradāya* or the sectarian affiliation of Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavism was one of major controversy. In late medieval times, it was widely accepted that a sectarian affiliation with one of the four Vaiṣṇava schools, namely, Śrī, Brahmā, Rudra, and Sanaka, was a necessary condition for any sect to be accepted as authoritative:

In the process and in order to create clearer criteria of orthodox and non-orthodox practice, there was enforced a principle according to which only religious groups with orthodox credentials would be reckoned among the 'four Vaiṣṇava sects' and accordingly recognised by the state. The principle of the 'four Vaisnava sects' had been operational in Rajasthan at least since the beginning of the seventeenth century. (Horstmann 2006: 20–21)

This belief is, for example, expressed in the two verses attributed to the PaPu:

Those *mantras*, which are devoid of [their connections with] traditions, are considered fruitless. Therefore, in the age of quarrel, there will be four *sampradāya* leaders. The four Vaiṣṇavas, [namely] Śrī, Brahmā, Rudra, Sanaka, are purifying the earth. In the age of *Kali*, they will certainly appear from Puruṣot-tama in Orissa. Śrī chose Rāmānuja, Brahma [chose] Madhvācārya, Rudra [chose] Viṣṇu Svāmī, [and] four Sanas [chose] Nimbāditya.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> *sampradāyavihīnā ye mantrāste viphalā matāḥ /  
ataḥ kalau bhaviṣyanti catvāraḥ sampradāyinaḥ //*

In medieval South Asia where various devotional movements flourished, there were more than four groups which claimed to be the Vaiṣṇavas.<sup>3</sup> However, because of the idea of the four established Vaiṣṇava groups, any Vaiṣṇava sects which did not maintain a formal connection with these four traditions were considered illegitimate. Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavism could not be accepted as the fifth tradition, independent of the four accepted ones. It was said, “The traditions are four, and the fifth is not known. Indeed the learned people ascertained [so] precisely based on the statements of the *Padma Purāṇa*.<sup>4</sup>

It was in this context that Baladeva claimed the Gauḍīya affiliation with the Mādhva tradition by presenting the list of disciplic succession (*guruparaṁ-parā*), which connects Caitanya with Madhva. The list in his PraRaVa is as follows:

There [in relation to the four recognized traditions], our disciplic succession is as follows: We praise the single succession of (1) Śrī Kṛṣṇa, (2) Brahmā, (3) Devarṣi [Nārada], (4) Bādarāyaṇa, (5) Madhva, (6) Padmanābha, (7) Nṛhari, (8) Mādhava, (9) Akṣobhya, (10) Jayatīrtha, (11) Jñānasindhu, (12) Dayānidhi, (13) Vidyānidhi, (14) Rājendra, (15) Jayadharman, (16) Puruṣottama, (17) Brahmanya, (18) Vyāsātīrtha. Then, with devotion [we worship] (19) Lakṣmīpati, (20) Mādhavendra Purī, and his disciples (21) Īśvara [Purī], Advaita, and Nityānanda, who were all world-teachers. We revere (22) Caitanya, a disciple of Īśvara [Purī], who rescued the world by giving the love of Kṛṣṇa.<sup>5</sup>

Like many other lists of disciplic succession, the line of Caitanya’s teachers is traced back to Kṛṣṇa, God himself, to ensure the soteriological efficacy of the tradition. In this list, the line of teaching from Kṛṣṇa to Brahmā is connected to Madhva, the founder of the Mādhva or Dvaita school of Vedānta. Then the succession of the Dvaita teachers goes up to Lakṣmīpati. This Lakṣmīpati in

*śrībrahmarudrasanakā vaiṣṇavāḥ kṣitipāvanāḥ  
catvāras te kalau bhāvyā hy utkale puruṣottamāt //*  
*rāmānujaṁ śrīḥ svicakre madhvācāryaṁ caturmukhaḥ /*  
*śrīviṣṇusvāmināṁ rudro nimbādityaṁ catuḥsanaḥ //* (PraRaVa 4a–b).

<sup>3</sup> See Clark 2006: 271–273 for a list of various Vaiṣṇava sects existing in contemporary Uttara Pradesh.

<sup>4</sup> *Sampradāyāś catvāraḥ pañcamo naiva vidyate /*  
*pādmoktavacanenaiva nirṇītaṁ paṇḍitaiḥ kila //* (Bahura 1976: 66).

<sup>5</sup> *tatra svaguruparaṁparā yathā*  
*śrīkṛṣṇabrahmadevarṣibādarāyaṇasaṁjñakān /*  
*śrīmadhvaśrīpadmanābhaśrīmannṛharimādhavān //*  
*akṣobhyaḥjayatīrthaśrījñānasindhudayānidhīm /*  
*śrīvidyānidhirājendrajayadharman kramādvayam //*  
*puruṣottamabrahmanyavyāsātīrthāś ca saṁstumah /*  
*tato lakṣmīpatiṁ śrīmanmādhavendraṁ ca bhaktitah //*  
*tacchiṣyān śrīśvarādvaitanīyānandān jagadgurūn //*  
*devamīśvaraśiṣyaṁ śrīcaitanyaṁ ca bhajāmahe /*  
*śrīkṛṣṇapremadānena yena nistāritaṁ jagat //*  
(PraRaVa 4c: My own translation based on Delmonico 2013: 105 and Baladeva 1912, Appendix II, 4).

turn is connected to Mādhavendra Purī, the guru's guru (*paramaguru*) of Caitanya. Based on this list, the Gauḍīya tradition is sometimes called the Brahmā–Mādhva–Gauḍīya *sampradāya*.<sup>6</sup>

Baladeva is not the first person to create a list of succession which connects Caitanya to Madhva. The earliest list of such kind is found in Kavi Karṇapūra's sixteenth-century GauGaUDī. In the final verse of the work, it is mentioned that the work was composed in 1576 CE (*śaka* 1498).<sup>7</sup> According to the work, the lineage of Caitanya's predecessors is as follows:

- (1) Kṛṣṇa (*paravyomeśvara*), (2) Brahmā, (3) Nārada, (4) Vyāsa, (5) Madhva, (6) Padmanābha, (7) Narahari, (8) Mādhava, (9) Akṣobhya, (10) Jayatīrtha, (11) Jñānasindhu, (12) Mahānidhi, (13) Vidyānidhi, (14) Rājendra, (15) Jayadharmā, (16) Puruṣottama, (17) Vyāsātīrtha, (18) Lakṣmīpati, (19) Mādhavendra (Purī), (20) Īśvara Purī, (21) Kṛṣṇa Caitanya (*gaura*).<sup>8</sup>

This list is almost identical with the one found in Baladeva's PraRaVa. One of the differences in this list is Brahmanya, who is Vyāsātīrtha's teacher in the

<sup>6</sup> For example, see Rosen 1988: xii.

<sup>7</sup> GauGaUDī 215: *śake vasugrahamite manunaiva yukte grantho 'yam āvirabhavat [ . . . ] /*

<sup>8</sup> The list of the disciplic succession is cited in the GauGaUDī 21–25:

*prādurbhūtāḥ kaliyuge catvāraḥ sampradāyikāḥ /*  
*śrībrahmarudrasanakāḥ pādme yathā smṛtāḥ //*  
*ataḥ kalau bhaviṣyanti catvāraḥ sampradāyinaḥ /*  
*śrībrahmarudrasanakā vaiṣṇavāḥ kṣitipāvanāḥ //*21//  
*tatra mādhvī sampradāyaḥ prastavād atra likhyate /*  
*paravyomeśvarasyāsic chiṣyo brahmā jagatpatīḥ //*  
*tasya śiṣyo nārado 'bhūd vyāsaḥ tasyāpa śiṣyatām /*  
*śuko vyāsasya śiṣyatvaṁ prāpto jñānāvarodhatāt //*  
*tasya śiṣyāḥ praśiṣyāś ca bahavo bhūtale sthitāḥ /*  
*vyāsāl labdhakṛṣṇadīkṣo madhvācāryo mahāyasaḥ //*  
*cakre vedān vibhajyāsau saṁhitām śatadūṣaṇīm /*  
*nirguṇād brahmaṇo yatra saṁnyasya pariṣkriyā //*  
*tasya śiṣyo 'bhavat padmanābhācāryo mahāśayaḥ /*  
*tasya śiṣyo naraharis tacchiṣyo mādhavadvijāḥ //*  
*akṣobhyas tasya śiṣyo 'bhūt tacchiṣyo jayatīrthakāḥ /*  
*tasya śiṣyo jñānasindhus tasya śiṣyo mahānidhiḥ //*  
*vidyānidhis tasya śiṣyo rājendras tasya sevakāḥ /*  
*jayadharmamunis tasya śiṣyo yadgaṇamadhyatāḥ //*  
*śrīmadviṣṇupurī yas tu bhaktiratnāvalīkṛtīḥ /*  
*jayadharmasya śiṣyo 'bhūd brāhmaṇaḥ puruṣottamaḥ //*  
*vyāsātīrthas tasya śiṣyo yaś cakre viṣṇusaṁhitām /*  
*śrīmān lakṣmīpatis tasya śiṣyo bhaktirasāśrayaḥ //*  
*tasya śiṣyo mādhavendro yaddharṇo 'yaṁ pravartitaḥ /*  
*kalpavṛkṣasyāvātāro vrajadhāmani tiṣṭhitaḥ /*  
*prītapreyovatsalatojvalākhyaphaladhārīnaḥ //*22//  
*tasya śiṣyo 'bhavac chrīmān īśvarākhyapurīyatīḥ //*  
*kalayāmāsa śṛṅgāraṁ yaḥ śṛṅgāraphalātmakāḥ //*23//  
*advaitaḥ kalayāmāsa dāsyasākhye phale ubhe /*  
*śrīmān raṅgapurī hy eṣa vātsalye yaḥ samāśritaḥ //*24//  
*īśvarākhyapurīm gaura urarīkṛtya gaurave /*  
*jagad āplāvayāmāsa prākṛtāprākṛtātmakam //*25//

PraRaVa, is missing. Kavi Karṇapūra was a poet and a son of Śivānanda Sena, a disciple of Caitanya. According to Rai Sahib Dinesh Candra Sen he was born in 1526 AD (1995: 206).

Various scholars express their doubts concerning the authenticity of the list in the GauGaUDī. Some of them also suggest that the list is a later interpolation during Baladeva's time. I shall address three arguments against the list's authenticity. These arguments are based on: (1) Caitanya's formal affiliation with the Advaitins; (2) Mādhavendra's 'Purī' title; (3) the text's internal disjunction. In this regard, my current view is as follows. First, I accept the possibility that the list is a later interpolation. However, I also argue that a thorough manuscript research is required to make the interpolation hypothesis convincing. Second, even if the list were a later interpolation, I maintain that the tradition of Caitanya's formal affiliation with the Mādhvas predates Baladeva.

### (1) Caitanya's formal affiliation with the Advaitins

De points out that in another of Kavi Karṇapūra's works called the *Caitanya-candrodayanātaka*, he describes Caitanya as an Advaitin renouncer:

Advaita: What is this pastime you are performing? You have accepted the fourth *āśrama*, which is extremely dear to the Advaitins.

Bhagavān [Caitanya]: (laughing) Advaita, do you think I am not an Advaitin? The difference in Him and you is due to forms and characteristics [only].<sup>9</sup>

Kavi Karṇapūra portrays Caitanya as an Advaitin. Therefore, quoting this section of the CaiCaUNā, De suggests that the *guruparamparā* list in the GauGaUDī, which connects Caitanya with Madhva, cannot be authentic (1961: 14).

De's argument, however, is faulty. Just after the section which De quotes, Kavi Karṇapūra makes Caitanya say that the only reason he took an Advaitin *sannyāsa* was for the sake of devoting himself more to Kṛṣṇa, and he has nothing to do with the theology of Advaita. In the drama, Advaita also accepts that Caitanya taking *sannyāsa* was not because of his theological affiliation with the Advaitins:

Bhagavān [i.e. Caitanya]: Please understand the truth. Without renouncing everything, there is no worshipping of the Lord of [my] life. Therefore I have made

<sup>9</sup> CaiCaUNā 5.21:

**advaita:**

*keyaṃ līlā vyaraci bhavatā yo 'yam advaitabhājām  
atyanteṣṭas tam adhrta bhavān āśramaṃ ya tūriyam /*

**bhagavān** (vihasya):

*bho advaita smara kim u vayaṃ hanta nādvaitabhājo  
bhedaś tasmīṃs tvayi ca yad iyaṃ rūpato liṅgataś ca //21//*

renunciation. What is the use of the speech of the Advaitins? This *daṇḍa* is best for the animal of [my] mind, which is very powerful. Thus I have accepted a *daṇḍa* without differentiating [myself from the Advaitins].

Advaita: All this is a deception only. This is just to explain the names [of Viṣṇu as described in the *Viṣṇusarasranāma* 75] such as ‘One who accepts *sannyāsa*, peaceful, calm, the refuge for devotion and peace.’<sup>10</sup>

Kavi Karṇapūra’s view is clearly expressed. For him, Caitanya’s acceptance of an Advaita *sannyāsa* was a mere pretence. Therefore, Kavi Karṇapūra’s Cai-CaUNā cannot be the reason to doubt the authenticity of the list of the disciplic succession in the GauGaUDī.

Besides this internal reason, B.N.K. Sharma points out that De’s argument has no force since, externally speaking, *sannyāsīs* in both the Advaita and the Mādhva traditions share the same feature:

Madhva himself received orders from Acyutaprekṣa, who for all practical purposes represented an Advaitic order, so far as outward appearances went. It might also be remembered that the Ekadaṇḍī order is common to both the Śaṅkara and Madhva Sapradaḥ, while other Vaiṣṇava orders differ from them. The point, therefore, stressed by some Bengali writes against the Mādhva affiliation of Caitanya, on the ground that Caitanya took what they call ‘Māyāvāda-Sannyāsa’, (meaning Ekadaṇḍī order), is, thus, of no force. (2000: 525)

Based on these internal and external reasons, De’s argument against the GauGaUDī’s authenticity can be rejected.

## (2) Mādhavendra’s ‘Purī’ title

In the GauGaUDī’s list, Mādhavendra Purī is a crucial figure who connects Caitanya to the Mādhva tradition. Many scholars accept that his title ‘Purī’ suggests his formal affiliation with the Advaita tradition. Mādhavendra’s formal affiliation with the Mādhva tradition is doubted since the Mādhva *sannyāsīs* always take the title ‘Tīrtha’, and not ‘Purī’ (De 1961: 16, Kapoor 1976: 40, Sharma 2000: 525). In this regard, Farquhar points out the Mādhva *sannyāsīs* in the later development of the tradition accepted titles such as ‘Purī’ and ‘Bhārati’ (1920: 304). De rejects this suggestion because this idea is based

<sup>10</sup> CaiCaUNā 5.22:

**bhagavān:**

*tattvato ’vadhārayantu /  
vinā sarvatyāgam bhavati bhajanaṁ na hy asupater  
iti tyāgo’smābhiḥ kṛta iva kim advaitakathayā /  
ayaṁ daṇḍo bhūyān prabalaraso mānasapaśor  
itīvāhaṁ daṇḍagrahaṇam aviśeṣād akaravam //22//*

**advaita:**

*sarvam idaṁ pratāraṇam eva / kintu, ’sannyāsakṛc chamaḥ śānto  
niṣṭhāśāntiparāyaṇaḥ’ itiādināmnāṁ niruktyartham evaitat /*

on the presupposition that people such as Mādhavendra Purī, Viṣṇu Purī, Īśvara Purī, and Keśava Bhāratī were Mādhva ascetics (1961: 16).

The strongest argument which supports Mādhavendra Purī's formal affiliation with the Mādhvas comes from a Vallabhite source. According to the *Do Sau Bāvan Vaiṣṇava ki Vārtā* attributed to Vallabha's grandson Gokulanātha, Mādhavendra was a *sannyāsī* of the Mādhva *sampradāya* (Elkman 1986: 35). According to J. G. Shah (1969: 343), Gokulanātha lived from 1552 to 1641. If that is the case, we need to accept that despite the 'Purī' title, there was a tradition of connecting Mādhavendra with the Mādhvas since at least the first half of the seventeenth century. Furthermore, as Elkman points out, the fact that this information comes from a Vallabhite source makes the connection more credible:

For one thing the Vallabhas had nothing to gain by making such a claim since, due to Vallabha's real or supposed connection with the Rudra *sampradāya* of Viṣṇusvāmin, and also because of his *Brahmasūtra* commentary, the Vallabhācārins did not face the same sectarian problems as did Caitanya's followers. (Elkman 1986: 37)

In other words, unlike the case for the Gauḍīyas in the eighteenth century, there was no benefit for the Vallabhites in the seventeenth century to claim Mādhavendra's formal affiliation with the Mādhvas. Consequently, it is difficult to argue that Mādhavendra's affiliation with the Mādhvas as found in Gokulanātha's work is a later interpolation. Gokulanātha's account of Mādhavendra still does not explain why he had the 'Purī' title, not the 'Tīrtha' title which was normal for the Mādhvas. What it does suggest, however, is that even if the list in the GauGaUDī was a later interpolation, the tradition of affiliating Mādhavendra Purī with the Mādhvas existed in the seventeenth century and this predates Baladeva.

### (3) *The Text's Internal Disjunction*

Jack Hawley (2013) doubts the authenticity of the *guruparamparā* list in the GauGaUDī on account of internal disjunction, and he suggests the list is a later interpolation. Hawley gives the following arguments: the terms used in the list, namely, *prīta*, *preya*, *vatsala*, and *ujjala* suggest Rūpa Gosvāmī's influence, which is not observed in other writings of Kavi Karṇapūra (Hawley 2013: 119); structurally speaking, the list can be removed and the text still makes perfect sense (2013: 120); the list connecting Caitanya to Madhva is oversized in comparison with other verses in the work (2013: 120); while the list seems to be aware of the standard idea of the four *sampradāyas* as articulated by

Nābhādāsa, the rest of the GauGaUDī does not conform to that scheme (2013: 121). Based on these observations Hawley argues that the list is a later interpolation. At the same time, he acknowledges that the *Bhaktamāla* written by a Dādūpanthī Rāghavadāsa in 1660 connects Caitanya to Madhva (2013: 125), which suggests widespread recognition of the Mādhva–Gauḍīya connection before Baladeva’s time.

While Hawley presents the strongest arguments for the later interpolation of the list, I still find it difficult to accept his thesis. As Rebecca Manring points out, ‘An exhaustive study of every extant manuscript of the text would need to be made’ (1989: 22). To prove that the list is a later interpolation, the most effective way would be to find a manuscript of the text which is without the *guruparamparā* list. Unless such a manuscript is found, any arguments against the list’s authenticity remain inconclusive.

Moreover, referring to Prabhat Mukherjee’s work, Elkman points out that the tradition of connecting Mādhavendra with the Mādhva *sampradāya* existed in Orissa too. Possibly the earliest instance is found in Acyutānanda Dāsa’s *Bhaktijñānabrahmayoga*. In this work, Acyutānanda provides the following *guruparamparā* list:

- (1) Nārāyaṇa, (2) Brahmā, (3) Nārada, (4) Madhva, (5) Padmanābha, (6) Mādhavendra, (7) Keśava Bhārati, (8) Caitanya. (Elkman 1986: 34)

In comparison to the lists in the GauGaUDī and in the PraRaVa, this list omits many teachers in the lineage. Nevertheless, the list supports Caitanya’s formal affiliation with the Brahmā–Mādhva *sampradāya* via Mādhavendra. This list is remarkable also because Mādhavendra and Keśava Bhārati, two *sannyāsīs* with Advaita titles (Purī, Bhārati) are put under the Mādhva *sampradāya*. Since Acyutānanda is said to have been Caitanya’s close companion, this list could have been written as early as the mid-sixteenth century. If that is the case, it suggests that the tradition of connecting Mādhavendra with the Mādhva tradition may predate Kavi Karṇapūra’s GauGaUDī.

In addition, within the Gauḍīya tradition there are numerous other works after Kavi Karṇapūra’s GauGaUDī and before Baladeva’s PraRaVa which connect Caitanya with Madhva. These works are: Narahari Cakravartin’s *Bhaktiratnākara* (eighteenth century); Viśvanātha Cakravartin’s *Gauragaṇas-varūpatattvacandrikā* (seventeenth to eighteenth centuries); Manohara Dāsa’s *Anurāgavallī*; Gopāla guru’s *Padya*; Lāla Dāsa’s *Bhaktamāla* (Kapoor 1976: 39).<sup>11</sup> In view of all these, while I accept the possibility of the list being an interpolation, I believe it is safe to suggest that a formal affiliation with the Mādhva tradition with Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavism existed prior to Baladeva.

<sup>11</sup> Kapoor mentions Devakinandana’s *Bṛhadvaiṣṇavabandanā* as one of the texts mentioning Caitanya’s genealogical connection with the Mādhvas. However, the text does not discuss the topic at hand. I owe this information to Dr. Lutjeharms.



### 2.1.2. Theological Affiliation

It has become clear that the tradition of formally affiliating Caitanya to Mādhva through the *guruparamparā* lists existed prior to Baladeva. Previously, however, we have suggested that, in the context of South Asian religious traditions, a formal affiliation is not necessarily accompanied by a theological affiliation. Therefore, in this section we will examine the theological affiliation of (1) Mādhavendra Purī, (2) his disciples, and (3) Caitanya. Based on this, I shall conclude that the Gauḍīya affiliation with the Mādhva tradition is best seen as formal rather than theological, since the theological affiliation of Caitanya and his predecessors is not at all clear.

#### (1) Mādhavendra Purī

In terms of a formal affiliation, the tradition of affiliating Mādhavendra with the Mādhva tradition existed at least from the sixteenth century, as we have seen earlier in this chapter. Yet some scholars argue that he was formally affiliated to the Advaita tradition because of his title ‘Purī’. Whether Mādhavendra was formally affiliated to the Advaita tradition or not, a discussion regarding his ‘Purī’ title does not tell us his theological affiliation.

The Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavas usually see Mādhavendra as the originator of the ecstatic love of Kṛṣṇa (*kṛṣṇapremabhakti*) for which Caitanya became so famous. Thus, Kṛṣṇadāsa Kavirāja, a hagiographer of Caitanya, writes: ‘Glory to Śrī Mādhava Purī, the stream of *Kṛṣṇaprema*; he was the first sprout of the wishing-tree of *bhakti* [ . . . ].’<sup>12</sup> Caitanya’s *sannyāsa* guru Keśava Bhāratī and her close associates such as Nityānanda and Advaita were all said to have been disciples of Mādhavendra. Thus, the connection between Mādhavendra and Caitanya is clear and significant.

Sen writes that Mādhavendra was born around 1400. Mādhavendra is said to have been a wandering ascetic. He is also credited with the discovery of the Gopāla deity in Vṛndāvana. Based on the record that states Mādhavendra brought two priests from Bengal to worship the Gopāla deity in Vṛndāvana, Sen suggests that he himself must have been from Bengal (1995: 207).<sup>13</sup>

As the Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavas see Mādhavendra as the first proponent of the ecstatic love of Kṛṣṇa, the theological affiliation of Mādhavendra is of vital significance in determining the *sampradāya* of Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavism. Based on the analysis of the poems attributed to Mādhavendra, Friedhelm Hardy (1974) argues that Āḷvārs’ poems may have influenced Mādhavendra. Thus, he suggests a possible theological connection between South Indian Śrī

<sup>12</sup> CaiCaA 1.9.8, trans. Dimock.

<sup>13</sup> Manring (2006: 35), however, suggests that he was probably from South India.

Vaiṣṇavism and Mādhavendra. However, the evidence Hardy provides does not seem to be enough to determine Mādhavendra's theological affiliation. Consequently, this remains unclear.

## (2) *The Disciples of Mādhavendra Purī*

Caitanya's *dikṣā* guru Īśvara Purī, *sannyāsa* guru Keśava Bhāratī, and many of his close associates were the disciples of Mādhavendra. Again, however, their theological affiliation is unclear. Here, we will examine the theological affiliation of (a) Īśvara Purī, (b) Keśava Bhāratī, and (c) Viṣṇu Purī.

### (a) Īśvara Purī

Īśvara Purī was Caitanya's *dikṣā* guru. He was born of a Brāhmaṇa called Śyāmasundara Ācārya around 1436 AD. He is said to have become associated with the Mādhva tradition and was initiated by Mādhavendra Purī (Sen 1995: 209). If Mādhavendra was the first 'sprout' of *Kṛṣṇaprema*, Kṛṣṇadāsa Kavirāja says that that 'sprout was nourished, in the form of Śrī Īśvara Purī'.<sup>14</sup> In 1508, Caitanya, then Nimāi, went to Gayā to perform a Śraddhā ceremony for his deceased father. There he met Īśvara Purī and was initiated by him with a ten-syllabled Gopāla *mantra* (Elkman 1986: 4). According to Kṛṣṇadāsa, Caitanya manifested *prema* after receiving this *dikṣā*.<sup>15</sup>

The theological affiliation of Īśvara Purī is particularly important in determining Caitanya's *sampradāya*, because a *mantra*, a secret formula given by the *dikṣā* guru, is what guarantees that a disciple belongs to a particular tradition. Despite its significance, the theological affiliation of Īśvara Purī is uncertain. Because of his title 'Purī', Sharma doubts this affiliation is with the Mādhva tradition (1981: 525). However, as we have been arguing in general, and as we have seen specifically in the case of Mādhavendra, a practitioner's formal and theological affiliations must be distinguished. Therefore, having the 'Purī' title does not necessarily indicate Īśvara Purī's theological affiliation or non-affiliation with either the Advaita tradition or the Mādhva one.

### (b) Keśava Bhāratī

Keśava Bhāratī was the *sannyāsa* guru of Caitanya. He was born in the early fifteenth century, and known as Kalinātha Ācārya before he took *sannyāsa*. He lived in Navadvīpa, the birthplace of Caitanya (Sen 1995: 210). Kṛṣṇadāsa Kavirāja lists him as one of Mādhavendra's disciples (Stewart 2010: 53). However, Elkman doubts this on the ground that he has a different *sannyāsa* title to that of Mādhavendra (1986: 7).

<sup>14</sup> CaiCaA 1.9.8, trans. Dimock.

<sup>15</sup> CaiCaA 1.17.8.

Hardy suggests that Keśava Bhāratī was an Advaitin *sannyāsī* based on two reasons. One is that the title ‘Bhāratī’, like ‘Purī’, is usually associated with the Advaita tradition, not with the Mādhvas. Another reason is to do with him giving the *sannyāsa* initiation to Caitanya. Hardy points out that in Kavi Kṛṣṇapūra’s *CaiCaUNā*, Keśava Bhāratī is said to have imparted a *mahāvākya* to Caitanya (Hardy 1974: 27). Since this is an Advaitic practice, Hardy suggests that Keśava Bhāratī had a theological affiliation with the Advaitins.<sup>16</sup>

Steven Rosen, however, points out a discussion which suggests that Keśava’s theological affiliation was with Vaiṣṇavism, not Advaitism:

Some scholars say that Keshava Bharati had already converted to Vaishnavism by the time of Mahaprabhu[Caitanya]’s initiation. As evidence, they cite statements from *Chaitanya Bhagavat*, where Mahaprabhu asked Keshava Bharati whether the path of knowledge (*gyan*) is superior to the path of devotion (*bhakti*). Bharati answered that *bhakti* is supreme. A true impersonalist [Advaitin] would have answered that the path of knowledge is superior. Also, it is stated that Keshava Bharati engaged in chanting and dancing with the Lord, which was abhorrent to members of the Shankarite school. (1988: 63)

Rosen’s statement implies that though his ‘Bhāratī’ title and his imparting *mahāvākya* to Caitanya may indicate Keśava’s formal affiliation with the Advaita tradition, he may indeed have been theologically affiliated with Vaiṣṇavism. This possibility is further supported by the fact that he is said to have been Mādhavendra’s disciple (Stewart 2010: 53). However, it is still uncertain as to whether or not he was theologically affiliated with the Mādhva tradition in particular.

### (c) Viṣṇu Purī

Viṣṇu Purī, the author of the *Bhaktiratnāvalī*,<sup>17</sup> was another disciple of Mādhavendra.<sup>18</sup> Besides this, not much is known about him.<sup>19</sup> Since the influence of Śrīdhara Svāmī on the *Bhaktiratnāvalī* is clear, De suggests that Viṣṇu Purī was of the same trend as Śrīdhara Svāmī who is considered to be a devotionally oriented Advaitin (1961: 18–19). That is to say, De thinks that Viṣṇu Purī was theologically affiliated with the Advaita tradition.

Śrīdhara Svāmī’s influence on the *Bhaktiratnāvalī*, however, does not constitute evidence for Viṣṇu Purī’s theological affiliation with the Advaita tradition. As we shall see in the following section, Caitanya clearly rejects Advaita Vedānta from the theological point of view. At the same time, however, Caitanya accepted the authority Śrīdhara as the best commentator of the

<sup>16</sup> For a detailed discussion on Caitanya’s *sannyāsa* initiation, see Elkman 1986: 5–8.

<sup>17</sup> *CaiCaA* 1.9.11–12.

<sup>18</sup> However, Sharma suggests that he was a teacher of Mādhavendra Purī (1981: 526).

<sup>19</sup> For a discussion on Viṣṇu Purī’s date, see Ray 1938–1939.

BhāPu.<sup>20</sup> This example implies that the influence of Śrīdhara on Viṣṇu Purī does not necessarily indicate his theological affiliation with Advaita Vedānta. In conclusion, we can observe that there is no clear evidence which testifies to the theological affiliation of Mādhavendra's disciples to a particular tradition.

### (3) Caitanya

Finally, we examine the theological affiliation of Caitanya. Since Caitanya himself did not leave any theological writings,<sup>21</sup> we have to resort to his hagiographies in judging his theological affiliation. In this section, based on his hagiographical accounts, we will examine Caitanya's attitude toward (1) the Advaita tradition, (2) the Mādhva tradition, and (3) Śrī Vaiṣṇavism. Here again we will see that Caitanya does not seem to be theologically affiliated to any of these traditions. Thus, Caitanya's theological affiliation is also uncertain.

#### (1) Caitanya and the Advaita School

There are indications of Caitanya's formal affiliation with the Advaita school. When Caitanya met Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma, a famous Advaitin *sannyāsī* in Purī, Sārvabhauma inquired about the *sampradāya* of Caitanya. Then, Caitanya's associates informed Sārvabhauma that Caitanya was a *sannyāsī* belonging to the Bhārati order.<sup>22</sup> Also, in a meeting with Rāmānanda Rāya, Caitanya described himself as a *māyāvādīsannyāsī*.<sup>23</sup>

However, as we have already seen, according to Kavi Karṇapūra's CaiCaUNā, Caitanya's affiliation with Advaitism was merely superficial. There are several other examples which indicate that Caitanya was not theologically affiliated with the Advaita school. Once, on his way to Vṛndāvana from Purī, Caitanya stopped at Vārāṇasī. There, due to his performance of singing and dancing, he was accused by Advaitin *sannyāsīs* of being an emotionalist who did not understand the proper duty of a *sannyāsī*. But Caitanya dismissed the accusation.<sup>24</sup> Also during his visit, Caitanya rejected Śaṅkara's understanding of the BraSū.<sup>25</sup> These incidents indicate that Caitanya did not accept Advaitism theologically.

Besides, there are indications that Caitanya's acceptance of an Advaita *sannyāsa* was based on pragmatic reasons. We have already seen that, according to the CaiCaUNā, Caitanya took a *sannyāsa* so that he could further devote himself to Viṣṇu. There are also other intentions found in his hagiographies: to avoid opposition from people,<sup>26</sup> to save people by making them

<sup>20</sup> CaiCaA 3.7.116-121.

<sup>21</sup> He is said to have left only one devotional song called the *Śikṣāṣṭaka*.

<sup>22</sup> CaiCaA 2.6.68-72.

<sup>23</sup> CaiCaA 2.8.42.

<sup>24</sup> CaiCaA 1.7.38-42.

<sup>25</sup> CaiCaA 1.7.101-139.

<sup>26</sup> CaiBhā 2.26.

respect him,<sup>27</sup> and so on. With regard to his relation to the Advaita school, therefore, it may be concluded that even though Caitanya may have had a formal affiliation by joining the Bhārati order, he did not have a theological affiliation.

### (2) Caitanya and the Mādhva tradition

There is one incident which suggests Caitanya may have had neither formal nor theological affiliations with the Mādhva tradition. In his tour to South India, Caitanya met some Mādhvas. In his conversation with them, he recognized the Mādhvas as belonging to a different sect by referring to their tradition as ‘your *sampradāya*’. Furthermore, in the same conversation, Caitanya at least partially rejects the teachings of the Mādhvas.<sup>28</sup> Even though this incident does not exclude the possibility that Caitanya may have accepted some elements of the Mādhva tradition, as far as Caitanya’s hagiographies are concerned there is no positive evidence that he had a theological affiliation with the Mādhvas.

### (3) Caitanya and Śrī Vaiṣṇavism

Judging from hagiographical accounts, Caitanya does not seem to be theologically affiliated to Śrī Vaiṣṇavism either. There is an event during his tour to South India which implies this. In Shri Rangam, Caitanya was invited by Venkaṭa Bhaṭṭa, the head priest of the Raṅganātha temple, to stay at his home during the four-month rainy season. In his conversation with Venkaṭa, Caitanya mentioned the superiority of the *gopīs*<sup>29</sup> to Lakṣmī,<sup>30</sup> and Kṛṣṇa to Nārāyaṇa. First, Caitanya explained that the reason why Lakṣmī could not associate with Kṛṣṇa despite her desire was because she did not follow the manner of *gopīs*.<sup>31</sup> Then Caitanya claimed that Kṛṣṇa is the Lord Himself (*svayaṁ bhagavān*), the source of all other incarnations, including Nārāyaṇa.<sup>32</sup>

<sup>27</sup> CaiCaA 1.17.264. Prior to his taking *sannyāsa* some people disrespected him without recognizing his saintliness. Since offending a holy person would have a negative effect on them, Caitanya took *sannyāsa* so that people would not disrespect him out of ignorance.

<sup>28</sup> CaiCaA 2.9.236-244.

<sup>29</sup> Kṛṣṇa’s favorite cowherd girls in Vṛndāvana.

<sup>30</sup> The consort of Nārāyaṇa or Viṣṇu.

<sup>31</sup> CaiCaA 2.9.112-125.

<sup>32</sup> CaiCaA 2.9.127-136. In his conversation with Venkaṭa Bhaṭṭa, Caitanya says Nārāyaṇa is the *vilāsamūrti* of Kṛṣṇa (*kṛṣṇera vilāsamūrti śrīnārāyaṇa*), suggesting that Nārāyaṇa manifests from Kṛṣṇa. Caitanya also quotes BhāPu 1.3.28, where the description of Kṛṣṇa as ‘the Lord Himself’ (*svayaṁ bhagavān*) appears:

*ete cāmśakalāḥ pūṁsaḥ kṛṣṇas tu bhagavān svayaṁ /  
indrārivyākulaṁ lokaṁ mṛdayanti yuge yuge //*

‘These [incarnations mentioned so far] and [other incarnations not mentioned] are the portions and the small portions of the primordial person [i.e. Viṣṇu]. However, Kṛṣṇa is the Lord Himself. Age after age they cause delight to people who are troubled by the enemy of Indra [i.e. Asura].’

Later Gauḍīya authors such as Rūpa, Jiva, and Baladeva use this verse to argue for the supremacy of Kṛṣṇa over Nārāyaṇa.

Again, though this event does not exclude the possibility that Caitanya may have accepted elements of Śrī Vaiṣṇavism, we cannot theologically affiliate Caitanya with Śrī Vaiṣṇavism based on the hagiographical accounts. As a conclusion, we may state that from Caitanya's hagiographies, we do not know for certain what his theological affiliation was.

We have examined the theological affiliation of Mādhavendra, his disciples, and Caitanya. It has become clear, I hope, that the available documents are not clear about the theological affiliation of these figures. Therefore, it may be suggested that the Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇava affiliation with the Mādhva tradition, which seems to have existed at least from the sixteenth century, is formal but not theological.

## 2.2. BALADEVA: A MĀDHVA OR A GAUḌĪYA?

There has been controversy among modern scholars regarding the identity of Baladeva, and his intention in writing the GoBhā. To become acquainted with this controversy, a brief survey of different views on Baladeva and his GoBhā is presented in this section.

Scholarly views on Baladeva and his GoBhā can be categorized into three. The first view considers Baladeva as a Mādhva. The second and the third view both see Baladeva as a Gauḍīya. The difference is that, according to the second view, any Mādhva influence found in Baladeva's works was written prior to his conversion to Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavism. Thus, this view rejects any possibility that Baladeva employed the Mādhva concepts as a Gauḍīya author. In contrast, the third view accepts the possibility that Baladeva may have used the Mādhva concepts in the service of Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇava Vedānta.

### 2.2.1. Baladeva as a Mādhva

The first view sees Baladeva as a Mādhva, and suggests that the connection between the Mādhva tradition and Caitanya became apparent, or was even manufactured, through him. This view is held by scholars such as B. N. K. Sharma, Sushil Kumar De, Edward C. Dimock, and Stuart Elkman.

B. N. K. Sharma, one of the foremost scholars on Mādhva Vedānta, considers Baladeva as a Mādhva follower rather than a Caitanya follower. He says there is virtually no theological difference between Baladeva's thought and that of Madhva:

These facts are sufficient to establish that Baladeva is virtually in agreement with Madhva on all the fundamental points of his system. That is why we find him

proclaiming his loyalty to Madhva and affirming the historical and spiritual descent of the Caitanya sampradāya from Madhva, *without any hesitation or mental reservation, not only in the Prameyaratnāvalī, but also in his Siddhāntaratna* [...] which is an introduction to his *Govinda-Bhāṣya* [...] This should suffice to place his allegiance to Madhva sampradāya *beyond question*. (Sharma 1981: 596)

Thus, Sharma quite emphatically says that Baladeva was indeed a Mādhva follower.

In his *Early History of the Vaisnava Faith and Movement in Bengal*, which is often seen as one of the most authoritative scholarly presentations of Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavism, Sushil Kumar De expresses his view that Caitanya most probably belonged to Śaṅkara's Daśanāmī order, and the Mādhva affiliation with the Gauḍīya tradition was manufactured by Baladeva, a Madhva follower, in the eighteenth century:

[...] the theory of Mādhva affiliation is to be found in a list of guru-paramparā given at the commencement of Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa's *Govinda-bhāṣya* [...] and in his *Prameya-ratnāvalī* [...] there can be no doubt that the list was made up for the occasion mainly from hearsay or imagination [...] [Baladeva's] pro-Mādhva tendencies is confirmed by his learned writings. Even if his *Govinda-bhāṣya* shows independence, he has entirely given himself up to Madhvaism in his *Prameya-ratnāvalī* [...] On the other hand, the indications are strong that Chaitanya formally belonged to the Daśanāmī order of Śaṅkara Saṃnyāsins [...]. (1961: 15)

Further, De writes:

It is only when we come to Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa that Mādhva-affiliation is distinctly and authoritatively claimed. [...] Madhvaism could not have proved congenial to the extremely emotional and erotic predilections of Bengal Vaiṣṇavism, and it is very doubtful if it ever had any influence on the thought and practice of Caitanyaism; but now an authoritative declaration was made, which was hardly consistent with its earlier tradition and which hardly affected its essential doctrines in its subsequent history. (1961: 22)

De believes the Mādhva tradition is quite different from the 'extremely emotional' and 'erotic' tradition of Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavism. Nonetheless, the affiliation between the two traditions was 'declared' by Baladeva, the affiliation which, prior to Baladeva, 'was hitherto of no importance'.

Another scholarly authority on Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavism, Edward C. Dimock, seems to follow De's view. Having identified Baladeva as a Madhva follower (1963: 107, fn. 4), he writes:

Claims have been made that [...] the most significant figure of the Bengal movement, Caitanya (1486–1533) himself, belonged to the school of the great South Indian dualistic philosopher Madhva. This, however, was probably not the

case. It was probably not until the relatively late (eighteenth-century) philosopher Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa that such a relationship between the Bengal and Mādhva schools became established; Caitanya himself, it is almost certain, was a member of a Śaṅkara *advaita* order of *saṁnyāsins*. (1963: 107)

Dimock accepts the view that the Mādhva affiliation with the Gauḍīya tradition ‘became established’ by the hand of Baladeva.

Stuart Elkman suggests that not only was Baladeva a Madhva follower but he also made a conscious endeavor to further the Mādhva influence over Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavism:

[...] Baladeva’s explicit statements regarding Madhva in the *Prameyaratnāvalī*, his great reliance on Madhva’s *Brahmasūtra* commentary in his *Govindabhāṣya*, and the various *maṅgala* verses to Madhva with which Baladeva opens most of his works all testify to his extreme regard for Madhva and the doctrines of his school. Also, the fact that Baladeva prefaces his *guruparamparā* with verses restricting the number of authentic *sampradāyas* to four indicates that he had no intention of establishing the Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavas as an independent *sampradāya*. In fact, far from feeling compelled to declare the Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavas affiliated with the Mādhvas by the circumstances in Jaipur, Baladeva probably saw the situation as a golden opportunity to make certain claims which were perfectly consistent with his own beliefs and philosophical standpoint, and to have those claims wield an influence over the Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇava community which otherwise might not have been possible. (Elkman 1986: 42)

Elkman further says, ‘As the Mādhvas were then almost entirely restricted to South India, it is more likely that Baladeva wanted to establish the Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavas as the North Indian representatives of Madhva’s *Brahma sampradāya* [...]’ (1986: 47). Thus, according to Elkman Baladeva was an opportunist from the Mādhva tradition who sought to extend the Mādhva influence over the Northern Vaiṣṇavas by manipulating the *sampradāya* controversy which occurred in Jaipur.

### 2.2.2. Baladeva as a Gauḍīya (1)

The second view sees Baladeva as a Gauḍīya, and refuses to accept any Mādhva influence on him. This view holds that any Mādhva elements in Baladeva’s work were written prior to his conversion to Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavism.

Radha Govinda Nath, a Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇava scholar of the early twentieth century, holds such a view. He suggests that since, according to the Gauḍīya tradition Caitanya was the Lord Himself, His followers form a tradition independent from that of the Mādhva:

[...] Śrī Kṛṣṇa Caitanya, who is the Supreme Godhead Himself (*svayaṁ bhagavān*), is the propagator of the *sampradāya* and his associates only are the gurus of



the *sampradāya*, not anyone else. [...] it is clear that Śrīman Mahāprabhu himself is the propagator of the 'Gauḍīya sampradāya'. Therefore it is indeed appropriate to call it the 'Caitanya sampradāya' [as opposed to 'the Madhva sampradāya']. (Nath 2000: 22–3)

Nath rejects the idea that Baladeva, as a Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇava, produced his works with Mādhva elements. Ravi M. Gupta summarizes Nath's position:

Radha Govinda Nath [...] is unwilling to concede that Baladeva was in any significant way influenced by the Madhva *sampradāya*. He regards the *guru-paramparā* at the beginning of the *Prameyaratnāvalī* as an interpolation. In order to account for the obvious Madhva connection in the *Prameyaratnāvalī*, Nath asserts that Baladeva wrote the work before he converted to Caitanya Vaiṣṇavism [...] Nath's reasoning is simple: Baladeva was a follower of Caitanya. But views of Madhva and Caitanya differ in significant ways [...] therefore Baladeva [...] could not possibly have aligned himself with Madhva's lineage. (Gupta 2005: 45)

The PraRaVa is a short work by Baladeva, which he wrote as a brief summary of the GoBhā. As discussed in chapter two, section 1.1, in the work he gives a list of teacher–disciple succession (*guruparamparā*) which connects Caitanya with the Mādhva tradition. Nath suggests that (1) the Gauḍīya tradition is independent of the Mādhva tradition, and (2) Baladeva was a Gauḍīya. Therefore, his view is that any Mādhva influences in Baladeva's works are either interpolation or are from the period before Baladeva's conversion.<sup>33</sup>

### 2.2.3. Baladeva as a Gauḍīya (2)

The third view also holds that Baladeva was a Gauḍīya. It, however, accepts the possibility that Baladeva employed elements of Mādhva Vedānta as a Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇava.

Surendranath Dasgupta recognizes the Mādhva influence in Baladeva's work:

The concept of *viśeṣa* in this sense was first introduced by Madhva; Baladeva borrowed the idea from him in interpreting the relation of God to His powers and qualities. This interpretation is entirely different from the view of Jīva and others who preceded Baladeva; we have already seen how Jīva interpreted the situation merely by the doctrine of the supra-logical nature of God's powers and the supra-logical nature of the difference and identity of power and the possessor of power, or of the quality and the substance. Baladeva, by introducing the concept of *viśeṣa*, tried to explain more clearly the exact nature of supra-logicity (*acin-tyatva*) in this case [...]. (1932–1954: Vol. 4, 441–442)

<sup>33</sup> Gupta 2005 gives a comprehensive summary of varying views concerning Baladeva's PraRaVa.

Dasgupta argues that Baladeva adopted Mādhva concepts for the sake of presenting Jīva's doctrine in a more clarified manner. He affirms that even though the Mādhva influence on Baladeva's GoBhā is clear, Baladeva was, first and foremost, faithful to the Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇava theology:

If one compares the account they give of Vaiṣṇava philosophy in the *Bhāgavata-sandarbha* [by Jīva] with that given in Baladeva's *Govinda-bhāṣya* and *Siddhānta-ratna*, one finds that, though the fundamental principles are the same, yet many new elements were introduced by Baladeva into the Gauḍīya school of thought under the influence of Madhva, and on account of his personal predilections. (1932–1954: Vol. 4, 417)

Dasgupta accepts that Baladeva adopted elements from the Mādhva tradition. At the same time, however, Dasgupta sees that Baladeva fundamentally follows Jīva's Gauḍīya theology.

O. B. L. Kapoor holds a similar view. While accepting the Mādhva influence on Baladeva's GoBhā, he sees the work as a product of a faithful development of Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavism: 'The learned commentary, which is really an improvement in many respects on the previous commentaries, was accepted and Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavism was duly recognized as an independent doctrine' (1977: 38).

David Buchta suggests it is more appropriate to see that Baladeva claimed the Gauḍīya affiliation with the Mādhvas out of contextual necessity:

Undoubtedly, Baladeva was influenced by his early training with Madhva, but not in any exclusive or unique way. I propose that it would be more accurate to see this deference to Madhva not so much as the sustained prominent influence of Baladeva's early Mādhva affiliation, but as the influence of the religious climate of Jaipur and the reforms of religious society coming from Jaisingh. That Baladeva's close following of Mādhva exegesis is mostly restricted to a few 'public' contexts supports the idea that this was at least in part a political maneuver to save the Gauḍīya Vaishnava *sampradāya*. (2007: 89)

We have briefly summarized three perceptions of Baladeva and his works. My position is closest to the third option. There is no doubt that Baladeva employed the Mādhva elements in his Vedāntic discourses, as Sharma and others point out. I suggest, however, that this does not necessarily indicate he was a Mādhva. Rather, through the process of conceptual adaptation, Baladeva was consciously employing the Mādhva elements for the sake of constructing Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇava Vedānta.

The process of conceptual adaptation is a technique in which a concept in one system is adopted and interpreted in such a way that it is effectively used in constructing the system of another. One such example is the identification of Jesus with a Greek philosophical concept 'the Word (Logos)' in John 1:14.<sup>34</sup>

<sup>34</sup> 'And the Word became flesh and lived among us, and we have seen his glory, the glory as of a father's only son,—full of grace and truth.'

The identification of the person of Jesus with the concept in Greek philosophy did not indicate that these early Christians became the followers of Greek philosophy. Rather, they were adopting and transforming the concept of Greek philosophy in such a way that it would give credibility and intelligibility to their own system of belief.

I suggest that Baladeva in a similar manner consciously utilized the Mādhva terminologies in order to give credibility to the Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇava Vedānta, which he was trying to establish. This work aims at substantiating this claim by a close textual examination of the GoBhā.

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## *Bhāgavata* Theologies in Comparison

In Chapter 2 I pointed out that (1) it is necessary to differentiate between a formal and theological affiliation, that (2) a formal affiliation between the Mādhva and Gauḍīya traditions already existed prior to Baladeva, and that (3) despite the formal affiliation declared by the Gauḍīya writers the theological affiliation of Mādhavendra Purī, his disciples, and Caitanya is unclear.

Since hagiographical accounts do not tell us clearly about Caitanya's theological affiliation and since Caitanya did not leave any theological writings, the theological relationship between the Gauḍīyas and the Mādhvas has to be examined based on the writings of the Gosvāmīs of Vṛndāvana, such as Rūpa, Sanātana, and Jīva. For this purpose, in this chapter I conduct a comparative study of Madhva, Vijayadhvaja, Śrīdhara, and Jīva based on their commentaries on the *Catuḥśloki bhāgavata* (BhāPu 2.9.32–35).<sup>1</sup>

### 3.1. THE CATUḤŚLOKIBHĀGAVATA: THE BHĀGAVATA PURĀṆA IN FOUR VERSES

As discussed, Caitanya claimed that the BhāPu was the most authoritative and natural commentary on the BraSū because he accepted that BhāPu was written by Vyāsa, who is said to have been the author of the BraSū. As described in CaiCa 2.25.75–84 Caitanya explained to Prakāśānanda Sarasvatī that the Lord first revealed the BhāPu to Brahmā in the form of BhāPu 2.9.32–35, known as the *Catuḥśloki bhāgavata*. Caitanya says that Vyāsa wrote down the revelation as the BhāPu, accepting it as the best explanation of *praṇava*, the *gāyatri* mantra, as well as the BraSū.

<sup>1</sup> All the translation in this chapter is mine unless otherwise stated. For the Sanskrit texts I use Madhva 1999d, Madhva 1980, Vijayadhvaja 1965, Śrīdhara 1983, and Jīva 1965. When the variants are found, the reading in Madhva 1999d is indicated by P, and Madhva 1980 by G. For Jīva's commentary I record the parallels found in Jīva 1986.

Śrīdhara was the first to identify these four verses as the original revelation. Caitanya follows him since he accepts Śrīdhara as the best commentator on the BhāPu.<sup>2</sup> This identification of the four verses as the original revelation is found in Śrīdhara's commentary on BhāPu 2.9.43: '[Brahmā] spoke in detail [to Nārada] what the Lord spoke [to him] briefly in four verses in which the topics expressed as ten characteristics are known.'<sup>3</sup> The BhāPu is the most fundamental scripture for the Gauḍīya tradition, and according to Śrīdhara, the CaśloBhā can be seen as the *Purāṇa*'s original revelation. Therefore, studying the commentaries on these crucial verses would reveal important theological differences among the commentators.<sup>4</sup> Through this comparative study it will be shown that Jīva's commentary is unique enough that he should be considered theologically independent from Śrīdhara and from Madhva, although there are certain overlaps. Before going into a textual examination, however, I shall first discuss the identities of the four commentaries and their interrelations.

(a) *Madhva's Bhāgavatatātparyanirṇaya*  
and *Vijayadhva's Padaratnāvali*

Madhva's commentary on the BhāPu is called the *Bhāgavatatātparyanirṇaya*. The BhāPu was one of the scriptures that caused Madhva to reject Advaita Vedānta.<sup>5</sup> As a result, Madhva refutes Advaitic interpretation of the BhāPu in his BhāTāNi. In TaSa *Anuccheda* 24, Jīva describes this 'conversion' of Madhva, from Advaita to Vaiṣṇavism, and subsequent contribution in the form of the BhāTāNi:

<sup>2</sup> A traditional saying describes Śrīdhara as follows:

*vyāso vetti śuko vetti rājā vetti na vetti vā /*

*śrīdharaḥ sakalaṃ vetti śrīṇṣīṃhaprasādataḥ //*

'Vyāsa knows, Śukadeva knows, the king [i.e. Parīkṣit] may or may not know. Śrīdhara knows everything by the favor of glorious Nṛsiṃha.' This verse echoes CaiCaA *Madhya* 24.313:

*ahaṃ vedmi śuko vetti vyāso vetti na vetti vā /*

*bhaktiā bhāgavataṃ grāhyaṃ na buddhiā na ca tīkayā //*

'I [i.e. Śiva] know, Śukadeva knows, and Vyāsa may or may not know the *Bhāgavata*. It can be understood neither by intellect nor by commentary but by devotion only.'

<sup>3</sup> *bhāgavatā catuḥślokyā saṃkṣepeṇa proktaṃ vistareṇa prāha /*

*daśalakṣaṇāni lakṣaṇīyā arthā vidyante yasmins tat //*

<sup>4</sup> Sheridan (1994: 65-66) points out that in relation to Śrīdhara, an investigation of four areas would be beneficial: (1) Śrīdhara's relation to the Madhva school; (2) his relation to the Advaita school; (3) his relation to the Bengal Vaiṣṇava school; (4) an internal study of his commentary on the BhāPu. Gupta (2007: 65-84) made his contribution concerning the third area. In this chapter, I explore the first and third areas suggested by Sheridan.

<sup>5</sup> Glasenapp (1992: 22): 'Apparently, while reading *Bhāgavata-Purāṇa* and other holy works, doubt came to his mind about the correctness of Advaita-theory. This finally made him give it up completely and put up his own system.'

Tradition has it that after seeing this same *Bhāgavata*, the revered Madhvācārya embraced the views of the Vaiṣṇavas, even though himself a direct disciple of Śaṅkara; and fearing that other Vaiṣṇavas might fall under the influence of commentaries written by Śaṅkara's other disciples, such as Puṇyāraṇya etc., wrote a different *tātparya* pointing out the true path: thus is it described by the Sātvatas. (Elkman 1986: 111–112)<sup>6</sup>

Based on Madhva's own writings, it is also evident that the BhāPu is an important scripture for him. For example, he describes it as the 'fifth Veda' (*purāṇam bhāgavatam caiva pañcamo veda ucyate*) (Mesquita 2000: 131).

Madhva's BhāTāNi is not a full commentary on the BhāPu. As Jīva describes, Madhva's aim is to refute Advaitic interpretations of the BhāPu put forward by Citsukha, Puṇyāraṇya, and others. Therefore, Madhva comments on those verses which, according to his judgment, are susceptible to such an interpretation: '[Madhva's] object is to reconcile all the seeming contradictions of the text and bring out the essentially theistic and transcendental realism of the *Purāṇa*, that appears, here and there, to be pushed into the background by a monistic note' (Sharma 2000: 129). Of all the commentaries on the BhāPu examined in this chapter, Madhva's commentary appears to be the oldest. The dates of the four commentators are as follows: Madhva 1238–1317 (Sharma 2000: 79); Śrīdhara 1327–1353 or 1378–1414 (Rath 2006: 29); Vijayadhvaṇya 1410–1450 (Sharma 2000: 456); Jīva 1517 (*terminus ad quem*)–1608 (*terminus a quo*) (Gupta 2007: 10–11).

Since Madhva's commentary is brief and somewhat terse, consisting mostly of quotations from various sources, it is helpful to look at Vijayadhvaṇya, the commentator *par excellence* on the BhāPu according to the system of Mādhva Vedānta: 'Vijayadhvaṇya is best known to the followers of Madhva by his voluminous commentary on the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*, called *Padaratnāvalī* [...] The *Padaratnāvalī* is the earliest, complete, and standard c. [i.e. commentary] of the Dvaita school on the *Bhāgavata*' (Sharma 2000: 457). Vijayadhvaṇya's work follows Madhva's BhāTāNi very closely (Sharma 2000: 458). Furthermore, comparing Vijayadhvaṇya's commentary with that of Jīva makes it evident that Jīva follows Śrīdhara more closely than Madhva.

### (b) Śrīdhara's Bhāvārthabodhinī

If we accept the dates of Madhva and Vijayadhvaṇya as given by Sharma, it appears that the Mādhva tradition had firmly established its interpretation of the BhāPu before the advent of Caitanya. Nonetheless, according to the

<sup>6</sup> *yad eva kila dr̥ṣṭvā śrīmadhvācāryacaranair vaiṣṇavāntarāṇām tacchīṣyāntara-puṇyāraṇyā-dīrītikavyākhyāpraveśaśaṅkayā tatra tātparyāntaram likhadbhīr vartmopadeśaḥ kṛta iti ca sātvatā varṇayanti /*

CaiCaA, Caitanya accepted Śrīdhara's BhāABo as the best commentary on the BhāPu. Jīva also depends more on Śrīdhara's commentary than on that of Madhva, even though he does acknowledge Madhva's contribution. Discussing the sources of Jīva's Vedānta, Gupta writes: 'Of all his sources, Jīva Gosvāmī makes the most profuse use of Śrīdhara Svāmī. Quotations from his commentary on the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* [...] are ubiquitous in the *Bhāgavatasandarbhā*' (Gupta 2007: 65). This exclusive dependence on Śrīdhara's commentary constitutes evidence indicating the theological distance between Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavism and the Mādhva *saṃpradāya*.

Sheridan describes the significance of Śrīdhara's BhāABo: 'His commentary on the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*, however, is very important because of the significance of the *Bhāgavata*, because it is the earliest extant full commentary, and because Śrīdhara's commentary had great authority for the later Vaiṣṇava tradition' (Sheridan 1994: 48).

It is commonly accepted that Śrīdhara belonged to the tradition of Śaṅkara (Gupta 2007: 67, Rath 2006: 29, Sharma 2000: 527, Sheridan 1994: 48). However, Śrīdhara's BhāPu commentary reveals that the theological system he follows is not strictly in accordance with that of Advaita Vedānta. Sharma points out that Śrīdhara's commentary differs from the Advaitic interpretations of the BhāPu, as is criticized by Madhva:

The evidence furnished by Madhva in his *B.T.* [i.e. BhāTāNi] shows that he was contending with powerfully established Advaitic commentaries on the *Purāṇa* [...] That it was not Śrīdhara Svāmī is clear from a careful comparison of passages. The Advaitic interpretation of Śrīdhara, are, for one thing, different from those assailed by Madhva. Secondly, Śrīdhara himself, is not so obdurately monistic in the interpretation of passages, which on Madhva's showing, appear to have been monistically interpreted by certain leading Advaitic commentators. (2000: 128–129)

The same applies in relation to Vijayadhva:

[T]here are more than fifteen places in the *Padaratnāvalī* where Advaitic interpretations of verses are quoted and severely criticized. But only in two or three stray cases do these quotations agree even remotely with Śrīdhara's interpretations of those verses. In most places, he differs fundamentally in spirit and letters, from Advaitic interpretations referred to by Vijayadhva. (Sharma 2000: 459)

Based on his examination of Śrīdhara's commentary on BhāPu 1.1.1 and 2.9.32–35 (i.e. the CaŚloBhā), Sheridan also concludes that Śrīdhara's theological stance differs from Advaita Vedānta:

The fact that Śrīdhara does not give these texts a *nirviśeṣādvaita* interpretation highlights the diversity and variety within the Śaṅkara *saṃpradāya* in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. To this extent Śrīdhara is moving toward the



original import of the *Bhāgavata* which can be seen as a sort of qualified non-dualism. (1994: 65)

Śrīdhara thus seems to move away from a strictly Advaitic viewpoint. At the same time, however, his system is not dualistic enough to be accepted wholeheartedly by Jīva. While accepting Śrīdhara, not Madhva or Vijayadhva, as the best commentator on the BhāPu, Jīva nevertheless distances himself from Śrīdhara's commentary in the places where he feels he goes too far to the Advaita side. This complex relationship is well expressed in Jīva's TaSa 27:

Our interpretation of the words of the *Bhāgavata*, representing a kind of *bhāṣya*, will be written in accordance with the views of the great Vaiṣṇava, the revered Śrīdhara Svāmin, only when they conform to the strict Vaiṣṇava standpoint, since his writings are interspersed with the doctrines of Advaita so that an appreciation for the greatness of *bhagavat* may be awakened in the Advaitins who nowadays pervade the central regions etc. (Elkman 1986: 119)<sup>7</sup>

Observing Jīva's attitude toward Śrīdhara, Gupta (2007: 80) says:

When Śrīdhara's Advaitic tendencies create difficulties for Vaiṣṇava dualism, Jīva finds ways of supporting his interpretation and still maintaining a Vaiṣṇava standpoint [...] This is true of Jīva's relationship with Śrīdhara in general—when he sees a potentially problematic point, Jīva makes a serious effort to agree with Śrīdhara and remain faithful to his interpretation, and yet not compromise on Vaiṣṇava loyalties. In the process, Jīva extends Śrīdhara's ideas beyond the latter's intention, creating a multi-faceted and sophisticated theological edifice.

This complex relation between Śrīdhara and Jīva will be pointed out during the examination of their commentaries on the CaśloBhā later in this chapter.

### (c) Jīva's Kramasandarbhā

Besides his *magnum opus*, the *Bhāgavatasandarbhā*, which may be characterized as a thematic treatise on the BhāPu, Jīva has also written a running commentary on the *Purāṇa* called the *Kramasandarbhā*. Given the observations made by Brzezinski (1990: 20) and Gupta (2007: 11) that the BhāSa was one of the early works of Jīva, and also based on what Jīva writes in the KṛSa,<sup>8</sup>

<sup>7</sup> *bhāṣyarūpā tadvyākhyā tu samprati madhyadesādau vyāptān advaitavādino nūnam bhagavanmahimānam avagāhayitum tadvādena karburitalipinām paramavaiṣṇavānām śrīdharasvāmīcarānām śuddhavaṣṭasiddhāntānugatā cet tarhi yathāvad eva vilikhyate /*

<sup>8</sup> The Vṛndavana edition of KṛSa *Anuccheda* 145 has the following statement: *viśeṣavyākhyā ca kramasandarbhā darśayisyate /* 'Furthermore, an explanation of *viśeṣa* will be shown in the *Kramasandarbhā*.' The future suffix *iṣ* in the verb *darśayisyate* suggests that the KraSa was written after the KṛSa. One could argue that the fact that Jīva mentions the name of the KraSa indicates that it was written before the KṛSa. However, Jīva's usage of the future tense and the past tense in other places seems to indicate that this was not the case. For example, referring to the KṛSa (the fourth book of the BhāSa) in the BhaSa (the second book of the BhāSa), Jīva uses

it is more likely that the KraSa was written after the BhāSa than the other way around.<sup>9</sup>

As Gupta points out, Jīva tries his best to be faithful to Śrīdhara's BhāABo since Caitanya accepted it as the best commentary on the BhāPu. At the same time, the very fact that Jīva writes a separate commentary implies the following two points: (1) Jīva does not accept everything Śrīdhara writes; (2) in some cases, Jīva has more to say than Śrīdhara does. In fact, in his KraSa on the CaŚloBhā, Jīva shows his intention to follow Śrīdhara. However, the length of his commentary, in comparison with Śrīdhara's, suggests that Jīva develops a much more elaborate theology based on these four verses than Śrīdhara.

In relation to Madhva, Jīva was aware of his works, as can be seen from his statement in TaSa *Anuccheda* 28:

The Śruti texts which will be quoted from Madhva will be the *Caturvedaśikhā* etc.; the Purāṇic texts will include those portions of Purāṇas, such as the Garuḍa, etc., which are no longer available; the Saṃhitās will include the *Mahāsaṃhitā* etc.; and the Tantras will include the *Tantrabhāgavata* and *Brahmatarka* etc. (Elkman 1986: 121)<sup>10</sup>

Given the controversial nature of the works cited by Madhva, Jīva's acceptance thereof is significant. These quotes are found only in Madhva's works and cannot be found anywhere else. As a result, the authenticity of these quotes was seriously questioned by the followers of other schools. A prominent thirteenth-century scholar, Viśiṣṭādvaitin Vedāntadeśika, who was a contemporary of Madhva, was the first to raise an objection. Then the famous Advaitin Appayya Dīkṣita (sixteenth century) thoroughly denounced the authority of these quotations in his polemic work called the *Madhvantra-mukhamardana* ('Crushing the Face of Madhva's System') (Mesquita 2000: 27–33). Furthermore, these quotes, especially those attributed to the *Brahmatarka*, contain many of the doctrines peculiar to Mādhva Vedānta (Mesquita 2000: 91–92). That is to say, if one rejects the authenticity of these quotes, Madhva's entire system would be severely damaged.<sup>11</sup> Therefore, Jīva's acceptance of Madhva's untraceable quotes suggests that (1) Jīva acknowledges

the future tense: *tad idaṃ tu śrīkṛṣṇasandarbhhe viśiṣya sthāpayiṣyāmaḥ* / (BhāSa *Anuccheda* 28). However, when he refers to the same fourth *Sandarbhā* in the PriSa (the sixth book of the BhāSa), he uses the past tense: *tattvopadeśasya vāstavam arthāntaram tu śrīkṛṣṇasandarbhhe darśitam asti* / (PriSa *Anuccheda* 244).

<sup>9</sup> If this is the case, it can be concluded that most of his KraSa commentary on the CaŚloBhā is borrowed from his earlier works, namely the BhaSa and the BhakSa since there are considerable overlaps among those three texts.

<sup>10</sup> *tatra taduddhṛtā śrutiś caturvedaśikhādyā, purāṇaṃ ca gāruḍādīnāṃ samprati sarvatrā-pracaradrūpaṃ aṃśādikam / saṃhitā ca mahāsaṃhitādikā tantraṃ ca tantrabhāgavatādikam brahmatarkādikam iti jñeyam //*

<sup>11</sup> For detailed discussions on this point, please refer to Mesquita 2000 and Okita 2011.

Madhva's authority when he quotes these verses; (2) Jīva has a positive attitude toward Mādhva's system of Vedānta, which is built on these quotations.

However, this positive attitude does not guarantee that Jīva follows Madhva faithfully, as Vijayadhvaja does. In general, Jīva follows Śrīdhara's commentary much more closely than Madhva's. As far as Jīva's commentary on the CaśloBhā is concerned, he does not quote anything from Madhva. Therefore, the following claim made by Sharma seems to overemphasize Madhva's influence on Jīva:

Jīva says in so many words, that he would follow the lead of Śrīdhara Svāmin, ONLY so far as it would *be in keeping with the principles of genuine Vaiṣṇavism of the Śuddha-Vaiṣṇava type* [...] The term 'Śuddha-Vaiṣṇava' is traditionally applied to the system of Madhva as distinguished from that of Rāmānuja and others (Sharma 2000: 528).

As will be shown in my examination of the four commentaries on the CaśloBhā, Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇava Vedānta, according to Jīva, is theologically distinct from the Mādhva system.

### 3.2. THE CONTEXT OF THE CATUḤŚLOKIBHĀGAVATA

The BhāPu, second book, chapter nine, relates the following story as the background of the *Catuḥśloki bhāgavata*, that is, BhāPu 2.9.32–35. Before the creation of the universe, Brahmā was born on a lotus flower stemming from the navel of Garbhodakaśāyī Viṣṇu. Brahmā tried to trace the origin of the lotus on which he was sitting, but he was not successful. While contemplating the matter of creation, he heard the sixteenth and the twenty-first syllables of the Sanskrit alphabets, namely, *ta* and *pa*, which, in combination, mean an injunction, 'You should perform austerity.'<sup>12</sup> He looked for the speaker of the injunction, but he was again unsuccessful. Subsequently, he sat down on the lotus and engaged in performing austerity in the form of meditation. After Brahmā had meditated for a thousand years,<sup>13</sup> Viṣṇu, in His four-armed form, along with His associates, appeared.<sup>14</sup> He praised Brahmā for his performance of austerity and gave him a boon: to ask whatever he desired. In response,

<sup>12</sup> The word *tapa* can be a noun meaning 'heat, warmth'. However, Śrīdhara says that the word is to be taken as imperative, second person singular of the verb root *√tap*. He also explains that Brahmā heard this word twice: *tac ca dvir gaditaṁ tapa tapeti / loṇmadhyapuruṣaikavacanā* / (BhāABho 2.9.6).

<sup>13</sup> BhāPu 2.9.8.

<sup>14</sup> However, Jīva argues in his commentary on the fourth verse of the CaśloBā that the person who appeared to Brahmā was not four-armed Viṣṇu but two-armed Kṛṣṇa in the form of a cowherd.

Brahmā asked the following four questions. According to Joshi, these four questions correspond to BhāPu 2.9.25–28:

- (1) What is the nature of your subtle and gross form?
  - (2) How can I understand the nature of your *Māyā*, *Yogamāyā* and their effects?
  - (3) How do you play in the universe covered by *Māyā* and *Yogamāyā*?
  - (4) What is that action by which I will not be bound while creating the universe?
- (Joshi 1974: 27–28)<sup>15</sup>

Viṣṇu replied to this question in seven verses, i.e. BhāPu 2.9.30–36, which includes the CaŚloBhā.<sup>16</sup> In BhāPu 2.9.30, the Lord says that He will answer Brahmā's questions in terms of knowledge (*jñāna*), realization (*vijñāna*), secret (*rahasya*), and auxiliary (*tadaṅga*).<sup>17</sup> These four points correspond to verses 32 to 35. In verse 31, the Lord says that these four points are revealed to Brahmā through His favor (*madanugrahāt*). Therefore, it is clear that what He says in the following four verses is to be understood as a revelation by Viṣṇu to Brahmā in the form of His favor.

### 3.3. THE FIRST VERSE (BHĀGAVATA PURĀṆA 2.9.32)

The Lord speaks the first verse of the CaŚloBhā as follows:

*aham evāsam evāgre nānyad yat sadasatparam /  
paścād ahaṁ tvam etac ca yo 'vaśiṣyeta so 'smi aham // 32 //*

It was I who indeed existed in the beginning since nothing else is beyond existence and non-existence. Afterwards, I am you and this universe. He who remains, that is also I.

Based on the commentaries, this verse is interpreted as follows. According to Madhva and Vijayadhvaja:

<sup>15</sup> *tathāpi nāthamānasya nātha nāthaya nāthitam /  
parāvare yathā rūpejānīyāṁ te tv arūpiṇaḥ //  
yathātmatmāyayogena nānāśaktyupabṛṁhitam /  
vilumpan viśṛjan grhṇan bibhrad ātmānam ātmanā //  
krīḍasya moghasaṅkalpa ūṛṇanābhir yathornute //  
tathā tadviṣayāṁ dhehi manīṣāṁ mayi mādharma //  
bhagavacchikṣitam ahaṁ karavāṇi hy atandritaḥ //  
nehamānaḥ prajāsarṅgaṁ badhyeyaṁ yadanugrahāt //*

<sup>16</sup> Therefore in Vallabha's *Subodhinī*, he argues that BhāPu 2.9.30–36 should be taken as one section, constituting the *Saptasloki bhāgavata*. In contrast, Śrīdhara, Jīva, Viśvanātha, and Śuka-deva take 2.9.32–35 to be the real answer to Brahmā's four questions (Joshi 1934: 26–27).

<sup>17</sup> *jñānaṁ paramaguhyam me yad vijñānasamanvitam /  
sarahasyaṁ tadaṅgaṁ ca grhāṇa gaditam mayā //*

Before creation, it was I who existed, along with time, *prakṛti* and so on, which are distinct [from Me] and which are dependent [on Me]. After creation, it is I who exist, and you and this universe [are dependent on Me].

According to Śrīdhara:

Before creation it was I who existed, not the other [i.e. *pradhāna*], which is the cause of both subtle and gross [creation]. After creation only I exist. This universe is also I. Again at the time of dissolution only I remain.

According to Jīva:

Before creation it was I who existed along with My associates, shining with these characteristics which you see now. Brahman, which is beyond cause and effect is not different from Me. After creation, it is I who exist as the Lord in Vaikuṇṭha and as the inner controller within creation. This universe is also I. After [dissolution] it is I who remain.

Each commentary is examined in detail below.

### (a) *Madhva and Vijayadhva*

Śrīdhara was the first to designate BhāPu 2.9.32–35 as the CaŚloBhā. While Madhva does not particularly group these four verses together, he does comment on them. This indicates that Madhva felt that these verses can be (mis-)interpreted in an Advaitic manner and, therefore, a dualistic explanation should be given so that such a (mis-)understanding will not occur.

A cornerstone of the Mādhva system is its emphasis on the Lord's independence and the dependence of everything else on the Lord:

The independence of Brahman is the most vital point in Madhva's conception of God. The twin principles of 'Svatantra' and 'Paratantra' constitute the pith of his philosophy. It is to this central ontological concept of his philosophy that the traditional name 'Dvaita' given to his system has reference. [...] Madhva has gone beyond all other Indian thinkers in emphasizing the absolute independence and unutterable majesty of Brahman. (Sharma 1986a: 323)

We observe this Dvaita Vedānta's characteristic in Madhva's commentary on BhāPu 2.9.32. Commenting on the word *param*, Madhva starts his commentary by saying, '[the living entity and *prakṛti*] are not independent {*param*}'.<sup>18</sup> Indeed, the word *param* is the only word Madhva directly comments on. The rest of his commentary on this verse is a long citation from the BraTa. In contrast, Vijayadhva's commentary follows the verse more closely:

<sup>18</sup> *param svatantram na /*

[The Lord] speaks a particular instruction about knowledge, by the statement beginning with *aham*. Before creation {*agre*}, it was I who existed {*aham evāsam*} and also time, *prakṛti* and so on {*sadasat*} existed because of the word *ca*.<sup>19</sup> Nonetheless, at the time of dissolution, time, action, and so on, which were separate from the Lord, were not independent {*param*} but rather, they were indeed dependent on Me [i.e. the Lord] because [they were] covered by *māyā*. After creation {*paścāt*}, at the time of continued existence, however, I {the second *aham*} and {the second *ca*} the universe {*etat*} existed. [The Lord] states the result by the statement beginning with ‘who’ {*yaḥ*}.<sup>20</sup>

This initial section of Vijayadhvaja’s commentary on BhāPu 2.9.32, especially his gloss on the word *param*, reflects Madhva’s commentary. Since Madhva does not comment on all the words in the verse, it seems one of Vijayadhvaja’s tasks is to fill in the gap left by Madhva, and thereby to make the relationship between the verse and Madhva’s commentary more explicit.

In general, the BhāTāNi consists mainly of quotations, either untraceable or genuine. Most of Madhva’s commentary on verse 32 is a very long prose quotation attributed to the BraTa, which, according to Mesquita, is one of the untraceable works cited by Madhva. Therein it is said:

[The living entity and *prakṛti*] are dependent on Viṣṇu before creation [of the universe] and in the exactly same way after dissolution [of the universe]. [This dependence] is understood because of His [i.e. Viṣṇu’s] particular existence and action and so on.<sup>21</sup>

In this citation, taken from the BraTa, the main point which Madhva tries to establish is that the living entity and *prakṛti* are always dependent on the Lord. First, the BraTa says that the living entity and *prakṛti* are dependent on the Lord before and after creation. As cited above, Vijayadhvaja explains that this is so because they are covered by *māyā* before and after creation. Vijayadhvaja describes the state of the living entity and *prakṛti* only at the time of dissolution (*pralaye*). It should be noted, however, that this time of dissolution is simultaneously both *before* and after creation since another creation will occur after the dissolution of a current creation.

<sup>19</sup> For the first two *pādas* of BhāPu 2.9.32, Madhva 1999d and Vyāsa 1965 record: *aham evāsam evāgre nānyad yat sadasat param* /. However, Vijayadhvaja follows a different version with *ca* at the end of the first *pāda*: *aham evāsam evāgre ca nānyad yat sadasat param* /. This is recorded in Madhva 1980.

<sup>20</sup> *jñānopadeśaparakāram āha ‘aham’ iti / agre sṛṣṭeḥ prāg aham evāsam caśabdāt sadasat āsīt kālaprakṛtyādikam abhūt / tathāpi pralaye yat kālakarmādikam anyad harer bhinnam abhūt tat param svatantram nāsīt* ([*nāsīt*] em. Isaacson; *nāsam*) *kiṃtu* ([*kiṃtu*] em. Isaacson; *kiṃca*) *māyāvṛtatvena madadhīnam evābhūt / paścāt sṛṣṭyanantaram sthitikāle tv aham etaj jagac cāsam āsīt / phalitam āha ‘ya’ iti /*

<sup>21</sup> *viṣṇor adhīnam prāk sṛṣṭes tathaiva ca layād anu / asya sattvapravṛttyādiviśeṣeṇādhigamyate /*

After describing the state of the living entity and *prakṛti* before and after creation, the BraTa goes on to discuss their relation to the Lord during creation. It says that even though they seem to be independent during creation this is not the case:

At the time of continued existence [i.e. after creation and before dissolution], however, [the living entity and *prakṛti*] are somehow independent on account of delusion in intelligence (*buddhi*).<sup>22</sup> Even though [independence] is being recognized, we should understand that [the living entity and *prakṛti*] are never [independent] because of it [i.e. because the living entity and *prakṛti* are dependent on Viṣṇu before and after creation].<sup>23</sup>

Vijayadhvaja explains that Madhva's statement is in response to a *prima facie* view, according to which the living entity and *prakṛti* are independent before and after creation since their independence is observed during creation: 'Someone may say that this universe has independence before creation and after dissolution since at the time of continued existence, independence [of the universe] is perceived, saying "I am the enjoyer, I am the doer" [...].'<sup>24</sup> Elaborating on the BraTa, Vijayadhvaja says that the *prima facie* view is rejected since the perception of independence of the living entity and *prakṛti* during creation is rooted in the delusion of the intelligence.<sup>25</sup> The BraTa also gives its own reasoning:

For, [the creation and the dissolution of the living entity and *prakṛti*] are not out of [their] desire, saying 'I will be born. I will die.' Because of this [dependence on Viṣṇu], this universe exists out of the Lord's desire during the continued existence as well.<sup>26</sup>

Birth and death are not according to the will of the living entity and *prakṛti*. Therefore, they are not independent of Viṣṇu's will even during creation. Citing BṛĀU 1.4.1, the BraTa concludes that the universe and living entity

<sup>22</sup> The term *buddhi* here seems to have a technical sense used in Classical Sāṃkhya cosmology. In the Sāṃkhya scheme, *prakṛti* (also called *mūlaprakṛti* or *pradhāna*), evolves into the material world when *puruṣa*, the pure spirit, comes into its proximity. The first stage of this evolutionary process is called *buddhi* or *mahat*, from which *ahaṃkāra* evolves. Therefore, the term *buddhi* in the compound *buddhimohataḥ* denotes cosmic consciousness in relation to *prakṛti*, whereas it denotes intelligence in relation to the living entity. In the translation I use *buddhi* to denote its cosmic sense. For a concise summary chart of the Sāṃkhya evolutionary scheme, see Burley 2007: 180.

<sup>23</sup> *svātantryaṃ sthitikāle tu kathaṅcid buddhimohataḥ /  
pratīyamānam api tu tasmān naiveti gamyatām /*

<sup>24</sup> *sthitikāle 'bhoktā 'ham kartā 'ham' iti svātantryapratīteḥ sṛṣṭeḥ prāk layānantaram cāsyā  
jagataḥ svātantryaṃ syād [...]*

<sup>25</sup> *tatpratīteḥ buddhimohamūlatvāt /*

<sup>26</sup> *"janiṣye 'ham' layiṣye 'ham'" iti na hy abhisandhitaḥ /  
ato jīvanam apy etad bhaved iśābhisandhitaḥ /*

are not independent since they are bound by time, the effect of previous action, and so on:

Because of this, with regard to the difference of natures [between the Lord and the universe], a *Śruti* passage, saying ‘This universe is indeed the Self’, explains that [this universe] is like [the Self] but [a self] which is incompetent and not really existing because of its [i.e. the universe’s] dependence on the Lord. For, at that time [i.e. during the continued existence], the living entities, time, action, and so on, also exist. Otherwise, how can there be a re-creation, which is in accordance with previous actions?<sup>27</sup>

After this long citation from the BraTa, Madhva again states that everything other than Viṣṇu is not independent: ‘And you [i.e. Brahṁā, to whom Viṣṇu is speaking] and this universe {*tvam etat ca*} are not supreme {*param*}. [That is, they are] not independent.’<sup>28</sup>

Analyzing Madhva’s and Vijayadhvaja’s commentaries, we observe the following points. First, Madhva’s emphasis is on the independence of Viṣṇu and the dependence of everything else on Him. This confirms Sharma’s statement concerning the characteristics of Mādhva Vedānta. Second, Madhva’s argument is based on a citation from the BraTa, which makes up the most of Madhva’s commentary on BhāPu 2.9.32. This confirms Mesquita’s observation that many of Madhva’s unique teachings are based on untraceable citations (2000: 92). Third, both inference,<sup>29</sup> and scriptural citation,<sup>30</sup> are used within the quotation, which indicates that the BraTa is neither *Śruti* nor *Smṛti*, but the work of a later author. Fourth, Vijayadhvaja tries to connect Madhva’s commentary more closely with the BhāPu verse. Fifth, Vijayadhvaja, not hesitating to comment on or cite the BraTa, gives detailed notes on Madhva’s commentary. This is quite different from the commentaries of Śrīdhara and Jīva.

### (b) Śrīdhara

In contrast to Madhva, Śrīdhara in his commentary follows the BhāPu verse quite closely:

It was I {*aḥam*} who existed before creation {*agre*}, not {*na*} the other {*anyat*} [i.e. *pradhāna*], which {*yat*} is the cause {*param*} of both gross and subtle [*creation*]. At that time [i.e. before creation], it [i.e. *pradhāna*] also was inwardly just in Me

<sup>27</sup> *ataḥ svarūpabhede ’pi hy ’ātmaivedam’* (BrĀU 1.4.1) *iti śrutiḥ / vadaty asyeśatantratvād ’yathā ’śaktas tv asann’ iti / vidyante hi tadā jivāḥ kālakarmādikāṃ tathā / kvānyathā hi punaḥ sṛṣṭiḥ pūrvakarmānusāriṇi* // BrĀU 1.4.1: *ātmaivedam agra āsīt puruṣavidhaḥ /*

<sup>28</sup> *tvam etac ca paraṃ na bhavati / svatantraṃ na //*

<sup>29</sup> Madhva’s inferential argument is that the living entity and *prakṛti* are not independent during creation because their birth and death are not according to their will.

<sup>30</sup> BrĀU 1.4.1.



because of dissolution. And at that time I alone {*eva*} existed {*āsam*} and I did not {*na*} create the other {*anyat*} [i.e. *pradhāna*]. Immediately after {*paścād*} creation too, only I exist. This universe {*etat*} is also I. He who remains {*avaśiṣyeta*} at the time of dissolution is again I only. By this, it comes down to say that I am complete because of beginninglessness and endlessness and because there exists nothing beside Myself.<sup>31</sup>

As previously pointed out, Madhva and Vijayadhva emphasize a sharp distinction between Viṣṇu, who is independent, and the living entity and the world, which are dependent on Viṣṇu. In contrast, Śrīdhara's commentary sounds more monistic in that his emphasis is on the unity of all that exists. For example, Vijayadhva analyzes *sadasat* and *param* separately and says that *prakṛti*, time and so on {*sadasat*}, which are separate {*anyat*} from the Lord, are not {*na*} independent {*param*}.<sup>32</sup>

Śrīdhara, however, takes *sadasatparam* as one compound. He analyzes what is denoted by the word 'I' {*aham*} to be one with that which {*yat*} is the cause {*param*} of the gross {*sat*} and subtle {*asat*} creation. Śrīdhara further says that *prakṛti*, which is the cause of subtle and gross creation, is concealed within what is denoted by the word 'I' before creation. Therefore, only 'I' exists in the beginning. Even after creation, there is only 'I' since the universe and 'I' are identical. This acceptance of the oneness between 'I', who is Viṣṇu, and the universe is diametrically opposed to Madhva's dualism. After the dissolution, there is again 'I' only, since the universe merges into 'I'. Śrīdhara's emphasis is that Viṣṇu is complete (*paripūrṇa*) since it is only Viṣṇu who exists before, during, and after creation.

Śrīdhara's emphasis on the unity of all that exists certainly sounds Advaitic. However, it must be pointed out that his Advaita is closer to Rāmānuja's nondualism of the one with qualities (*viśiṣṭādvaita*) than Śaṅkara's puremonism (*kevalādvaita*).<sup>33</sup> According to Śaṅkara, this universe is a result of

<sup>31</sup> *aham evāgre sṛṣṭeḥ pūrvam āsam sthitaḥ, nānyat kiñcit, yat sat sthūlam asat sūkṣmaṁ param tayoh kāraṇaṁ pradhānam / tasyāpy antarmukhatayā tadā mayy eva linatvāt / aham ca tadā āsam eva kevalaṁ na cānyad akaravam / paścāt sṛṣṭe anantaram apy aham evāsmi / yad etad viśvaṁ tad apy aham asmi / pralaye yo 'vaśiṣyeta so 'py aham eva / anena cānādyanantatvād advitīyatvāc ca paripūrṇo 'ham ity uktam bhavati //*

<sup>32</sup> *agre sṛṣṭeḥ prāg aham evāsam caśabdāt sadasat āsit kālaprakṛtyādikam abhūt / tathāpi pralaye yat kālakarmādikam anyad harer bhinnam abhūt tat param svatantraṁ nāsit [ . . . ]*

<sup>33</sup> My translation of the term *viśiṣṭādvaita* is based on Lipner's: the nonduality of qualified being(s) (1986: 47); the nonduality of qualified or differentiated beings (1986: 142). Lipner (1986: 174, fn. 34) refers to Van Buitenen (1956: 1, fn. 1):

[T]he term is often incorrectly interpreted as a karmadhāraya comp. 'qualified, modified non-dualism'; but it is a tatpuruṣa: *viśiṣṭasyādvaitam*, or, as Venkaṭanātha (Nyāyasiddhānta-jana, quoted by Kuppuswami in Srinivasachari, Finite Self) puts it, *viśiṣṭasya viśiṣṭarūpam advaitam* 'monism of the differenced, unity of the universe's spiritual and non-spiritual substances with and in God whom they modify by constituting His body'.

I thank Dr. Hirst and Dr. Killingley for pointing out these references.

superimposition by ignorance (*avidyā*) on Brahman,<sup>34</sup> and the relationship between the universe and Brahman is neither one nor distinct but inexpressible (*anirvacanīya*).<sup>35</sup> Furthermore, from the ultimate perspective, the universe is nonexistent. As far as Śrīdhara's commentary on verse 32 is concerned, he does not agree at all with Śaṅkara. Rather, he states that this universe *is* Viṣṇu.<sup>36</sup> If Viṣṇu is complete and the universe is one with Him, it cannot be said that the universe is ultimately nonexistent. Furthermore, according to Śrīdhara, the universe in its subtle and gross forms is concealed within Viṣṇu before and after creation. This explanation is close to Rāmānuja's famous body–soul analogy,<sup>37</sup> according to which the living entity and *prakṛti*, which consist of the body of Viṣṇu, become cognitively indistinct from Viṣṇu before and after creation.<sup>38</sup>

### (c) *Jīva*

In contrast to Madhva and Śrīdhara, Jīva's commentary on the CaśloBhā is far more extensive. His elaborateness indicates that Jīva considers these four verses to be a cornerstone of Gauḍīya Vedānta. This is natural since, in his TaSa, he argues that, even more so than the Vedas, the BhāPu is the most authoritative scripture. Besides, if we accept Śrīdhara's view, the CaśloBhā is the original revelation of the *Purāṇa*. Therefore, for Jīva, the centrality of these verses cannot be overemphasized. In his commentary Jīva often follows Śrīdhara, sometimes even directly quoting him. When he diverges from Śrīdhara, he tries to reconcile his interpretation with Śrīdhara's, arguing that these two views are not contradictory: a type of justification he does not make in relation to Madhva. It is clear that, unlike Vijayadhva, Jīva does not feel obliged to follow Madhva's commentary.

One way, however, in which Jīva distinguishes himself from Śrīdhara, is his strong rejection of absolute monism (*kevalādvaitavāda*) and of the view that Brahman is without characteristics (*nirviśeṣavāda*). In contrast to Madhva, Śrīdhara, in his commentary on verse 32, emphasizes the unity of all existence. Though his view of the universe is different from that of Śaṅkara, the idea that Viṣṇu is identical with the universe can be taken in a monistic manner. Moreover, the verse uses the word 'I (*aham*)' three times, which echoes one

<sup>34</sup> Śaṅkara uses the expression *avidyākṛta* 'made by ignorance' to describe the universe. I thank Dr. Hirst for this information. Cf. BraSūBhā (Śa) 1.3.1: *na kāryaprapaṅcaviśiṣṭo vicitra ātmā vijñeyah / kiṃ tarhi, avidyākṛtaṃ kāryaprapaṅcaṃ vidyayā pravilāpayantaḥ tam evaikam āyatanabhūtaṃ ātmānaṃ jānatha ekarasam iti /*

<sup>35</sup> For detailed discussions on the term *anirvacanīya*, see for example Alston 1980, Comans 2000: 215–283, Hacker 1995, Hirst 2005: 89–115.

<sup>36</sup> *yad etad viśvaṃ tad apy aham asmi /*

<sup>37</sup> In this book I use 'self' and 'soul' interchangeably as translations for the word *ātman*.

<sup>38</sup> See the ŚrīBhā on the *Prakṛtyadhikarana*.

of Advaita Vedānta's great statements (*mahāvākya*), '*ahaṃ brahmāsmi* (I am Brahman)'. Since Śrīdhara's commentary is vulnerable to an Advaitic interpretation, Jīva begins his commentary emphasizing that the 'I' in verse 32 is the Lord and not the living entity, and this Lord is not Brahman without characteristics:

Here [in the verse], what is expressed by the word 'I' is its speaker, who certainly has a form, but not Brahman without particularities since [Brahman without any particularities] is not its object [i.e. the object of the word 'I']. [And] since if, on the other hand, [the statement] was supposed to be about the knowledge of the self, it would have been proper to say only 'It is you who are' just as [the statement] 'That you are' [is used in the ChāU in the context of the knowledge of the self].<sup>39</sup>

Jīva first points out that what is denoted by the word 'I', namely Viṣṇu, is with characteristics (*saviśeṣa*), since something without characteristics cannot be denoted by words. Jīva then says that this 'I' cannot refer to the living entity, since if that were the case, the second personal pronoun 'you (*tvam*)' should have been used. Since verse 32 is spoken by the Lord to Brahmā, the person referred to by the first person pronoun 'I (*ahaṃ*)' must be the Lord, not any living being. Jīva cites *tat tvam asi* as an example of knowledge about the individual self (*ātmaññāna*), which is distinct from knowledge about the Lord (*bhagavajññāna*).<sup>40</sup> It is clear that Jīva presupposes a fundamental distinction between Viṣṇu and the individual living being.

It is noteworthy that, to substantiate his point, Jīva cites an Advaita Vedānta *mahāvākya* from the ChāU, *tat tvam asi*. For Śaṅkara, this statement is a major source proving the oneness of Brahman and the living entity. In this context, however, Jīva cites the statement to substantiate the opposite point, namely, that Brahman is distinct from the living entity. Jīva's point is simply that what is taught in the CaŚloBhā is knowledge about the Lord (*bhagavajññāna*), not about the individual self (*ātmaññāna*). Indeed, in Jīva's commentary on this verse, he repeats four times that what is taught in the verse is only knowledge about the Lord (*bhagavajññānam eva kathitam/upadiṣṭam*). The use of an emphatic particle *eva* also suggests that it is very important for Jīva

<sup>39</sup> [...] *atrāhaṃśabdena tadvaktā mūrta evocyate, na tu nirviśeṣaṃ brahma tadaviṣayatvād / ātmajññānatātparyakatve tu 'tat tvam asi' itivat tvam evāśir ity eva vaktum upayuktatvāt /* Professor Isaacson points out that the combination of *tu* and ending a sentence with a word in the ablative case is not the best Sanskrit. It should be either '*ātmaññānatātparyakatve tu* [...]  
*upayujyate / upayuktam*' or '*ātmaññānatātparyakatve* [...] *upayuktatvāt*'.

<sup>40</sup> Jīva takes a different stance to Madhva, who famously interprets the statement to be '*āt tat tvam asi* (You are not that)'. As a conclusion, Jīva's interpretation seems to be closest to that of Rāmānuja. He takes the sentence to be *tat tvam asi*, but unlike Śaṅkara, he argues that what is denoted by the word *tat* and *tvam* cannot be completely identical (Chari 2002: 81–83).

that ‘knowledge about the Lord (*bhagavajjñāna*)’ is *not* the same as ‘knowledge about the individual self (*ātmajñāna*)’. Thus, Jīva rejects two of the fundamental doctrines of Advaita Vedānta, namely, that Brahman is without characteristics and that Brahman is one with the living entity.

After clarifying that Brahman is with characteristics and is distinct from the living entity, Jīva explains that, in verse 32a, ‘It was I who was indeed in the beginning (*aham evāsam evāgre*)’ is a statement that points to the singular existence of Viṣṇu before and after creation:

And therefore, this is the meaning [of the verse ‘It was I who was indeed in the beginning’]: He who is manifesting to you at this moment, whose lovely form is most mind-captivating, [that person] indeed is I, who was indeed in the beginning, [that is,] even at the time of a great dissolution.<sup>41</sup>

Whereas Madhva emphasizes the dependence of all existence on Viṣṇu, Śrīdhara emphasizes that only Viṣṇu exists before, after, and during creation. Thus, Jīva follows Śrīdhara more closely. What is unique, however, is that Jīva describes the form of the Lord as ‘most mind-captivating (*paramamanohara*)’. This emphasis on the Lord’s charm is unique to the Gauḍīya tradition and stands in contrast to the Mādhva tradition in which Viṣṇu’s sovereignty is emphasized. Whereas Madhva conveys a sharp dichotomy or distance between the Lord and the living entity, the Gauḍīya school emphasizes the intimacy between them.

This becomes clear when Jīva says that the word ‘I’ in verse 32 includes His abode Vaikuṇṭha as well as His eternal associates:

Hence, just by the [same] word ‘I’, [we] understand Vaikuṇṭha, His associates and so on as well since [they are] His subsidiary parts. [This is] like [a statement] ‘There goes the king’. And thus we understand that they [i.e. Vaikuṇṭha and His associates] exist [eternally] just like Him.<sup>42</sup>

According to Jīva, certain individual selves, namely the Lord’s associates in Vaikuṇṭha, are the Lord’s subsidiary parts (*tadupāṅga*). Even though Jīva does not accept the oneness of Brahman and the living entity, as shown earlier in this section, he explains the relationship between Brahman and the living entity as something much more intimate and organically intertwined than is described in the Mādhva system. Jīva supports his view by providing an example. When we say ‘There goes the king’, we understand not only the king but also his palanquin, retinue, and so on, although they are not explicitly mentioned. In the same way, Jīva argues, when the Lord says ‘I was’, it is to be

<sup>41</sup> *tataś cāyam arthaḥ—samprati bhavantaṁ prati prādurbhavann asau paramamanoharaś-rīviṅgraho ’ham evāgre mahāpralaya-kāle ’py āsam eva /*

<sup>42</sup> *ato vaikuṇṭhatatpārsadādīnām api tadupāṅgatvād ahaṁpadenaiva grahaṇam ’rājāsau prayāti’ itivat / tatas teṣāṁ ca tadvad eva sthitir bodhyate /*

understood that His retinue and abode also existed.<sup>43</sup> Apart from this example, Jīva gives three scriptural references to support his point. The last of these, attributed to the SkaPu,<sup>44</sup> says: ‘Therefore, He only is imperishable, omnipresent, and undecaying in the entire world. Neither do His devotees perish when there is a great calamity of dissolution.’<sup>45</sup> One may observe that whereas Madhva and Śrīdhara emphasize the independence and the singularity of Viṣṇu respectively, Jīva points to Viṣṇu’s communal nature in that His associates exist always with Him even before and after creation.

A question may arise at this point. If the Lord is *always* with His associates, what do they do when there is no creation? Are they engaged in some kind of activities even before and after creation when there is no universe? According to Jīva, when the Lord says in verse 32, ‘[I] certainly existed [in the beginning] {*āsam eva*}’, this verb ‘to exist (√as)’ not only indicates His existence before and after creation, but also suggests that He is engaged in His own inner pastime (*svāntaraṅgalīlā*) with His associates in Vaikuṇṭha even when He is not engaged in any activities in relation to creation:

Or else, from this very [expression] ‘[It is I who] was indeed {*āsam eva*}’, [the following may be understood]. [By the expression *āsam eva*,] other activities such as creation are excluded, which are within the range of knowledge for the people such as Brahmā, who are outside [the pastime of the Lord]. However, [the expression *āsam eva*] does not exclude [the activities] of His pastime also, which is within Himself.<sup>46</sup>

Again, Jīva draws on an analogy of a king to illustrate this point: ‘This is just like when it is said, “That king is not presently performing any duty”, only the duty related to the kingdom is being set aside but not [the activities] such as sleeping and eating.’<sup>47</sup> When there is no creation, it is simply that the Lord is not engaged in any activity in relation to creation. However, this does not mean that He statically exists without any engagement. Even when there is no

<sup>43</sup> This example seems to have been a common idea. It is quoted twice in Śaṅkara’s BraSūBhā 1.1.1: *tasmin pradhāne jijñāsākarmaṇi parigrhīte, yair jijñāsitair vinā brahma jijñāsitaṃ na bhavati, tāny arthākṣiptāny eveti na prthaksūtrayitavyāni / yathā ‘rājāsau gacchati’ ityukte saparivārasya rājño gamanam uktaṃ bhavati, tadvat / 1.1.4: kartavyavidhyānanupraveṣe tu vastumātrakathane hānopādānāsambhavāt ‘saptadvipā vasumatī’ ‘rājāsau gacchati’ ityādivākya-vad vedāntavākyaṇām ānarthakyam eva syāt / Rāmaśāraka’s Bālapriyā [A commentary on Ānandavardhana’s Dhvanyāloka] 1.5: kenāpi sambandhenānyonyasambandhiṣu pradhānasya yad anyajñāpanaṃ tad upalakṣaṇaṃ; yathā rājāsau gacchatiṭy atra rājā parivārasyopalakṣakaḥ /*

<sup>44</sup> The other two quotations are BhāPu 2.8.10 and 3.7.37.

<sup>45</sup> *na cyavante ‘pi ([‘pi] KraSa; hi BhaSa) yadbhaktā mahatyāṃ pralayāpadi / ato ‘cyuto ‘khile loke sa ekah sarvago ‘vyayaḥ //*

<sup>46</sup> *ata eva yad vā ‘āsam eva’ iti brahmādibahirjanajñānagocarasyaṣṭyādilakṣaṇakriyāntarasyaiva vyāvṛttiḥ, na tu svāntaraṅgalīlāyā api /* Note that Brahmā is excluded from the inner circle of the Lord—this could be a possible difference from Madhva.

<sup>47</sup> *yathā ‘adhunā ‘sau rājā kāryaṃ na kiñcit karoti’ ityukte rājasambandhikāryam ([rājya-] BhaSa; rāja- KraSa) eva niśidhyate na tu śayanabhojanādikam apīti tadvat /*

creation, the Lord is constantly engaged in His eternal pastime (*līlā*) in His own abode. This aspect of pastime, along with his communal understanding of the word 'I (*aham*)', is another of Jīva's unique contributions, which neither Madhva nor Śrīdhara discusses in their commentaries on the verse.

After explaining a meaning of the phrase *āsam eva*, Jīva offers another interpretation. Whereas in the first explanation, Jīva suggests that the verb *āsam* is based on the root  $\sqrt{as}$ , which means 'to exist', in the second interpretation Jīva takes the verbal root  $\sqrt{as}$  to mean 'to shine':

Or else, [it is said] 'The verbal root  $\sqrt{as}$  means to go, to shine, to receive.' From this, [we can also understand that the word] *āsam* [means that] 'I existed even in the beginning, certainly shining with these characteristics which you see now'. Thus, just [the ideas, such as that the Lord has] no form and so on are specifically rejected.<sup>48</sup>

According to Jīva, the first *pāda* of verse 32 can mean that the Lord was shining even before creation. What is more, Jīva says that the Lord was not only shining, but He was shining with characteristics such as Him having a particular form and so on, in the same way as He appeared before Brahmā (*bhavatā dr̥śyamānair viśeṣair*). Jīva says that this further refutes the Advaita doctrine of Brahman without characteristics. Jīva then attempts to support his point by citing BrĀU 4.1.1, which says 'In the beginning this world was the Self only, having a human form.'<sup>49</sup>

At this point, Jīva deals with a possible objection from the Advaita perspective. The opponent may argue that the scriptures say that Brahman is without characteristics.<sup>50</sup> According to Jīva, the Lord answers this objection in the second *pāda* of verse 32, *nānyad yat sadasatparam*: 'To this [the Lord] says "*nānyad yat sadasatparam*". [This means that] Brahman, which {*yat*} is beyond {*param*} effect {*sat*} and cause {*asat*} is not different {*nānyat*} from Me [i.e. the Lord].'<sup>51</sup> The point here, according to Jīva, is that Kṛṣṇa, the speaker of the four verses, who appears in His attractive form, is identical to Brahman without characteristics. Following Śrīdhara, Jīva also takes *sadasatparam* to be one compound. However, Jīva does not follow Śrīdhara entirely. Whereas Śrīdhara interprets the compound to mean '*pradhāna*, which is the cause {*param*} of gross {*sat*} and subtle {*asat*}',<sup>52</sup> Jīva interprets the compound to mean 'Brahman which is beyond {*param*} effect {*sat*} and cause {*asat*}'. This

<sup>48</sup> *yad vā 'asa gatidīptyādāneṣu' (Dhātupāṭha 1.934) ity asmāt āsam sāmpratam bhavatā dr̥śyamānair viśeṣair ebhir ([ebhir] BhaSa; abhir KraSa) agre 'pi virājamāna evātiṣṭham iti nīrākāratvādikasyaiva viśeṣato vyāvṛttiḥ /*

<sup>49</sup> *ātmaivedam agra āsit puruṣavidha /*

<sup>50</sup> *nanu ([nanu] BhaSa; na tu KraSa) 'kvacin nirviśeṣam eva brahmāsīd' (??) iti śrūyate*

<sup>51</sup> *tatrāha 'nānyad yat sadasatparam' iti ([tatrāha 'nānyad yat sadasatparam'] BhaSa; tatrāha KraSa) / sat kāryam asat kāraṇam tayoḥ param yad brahma tan na matto 'nyat /*

<sup>52</sup> *yat sat sthūlam asat sūkṣmaṁ param tayoḥ kāraṇam pradhānam /*

is one example in which Jīva differs exegetically with Śrīdhara. Jīva goes on to elaborate that although the Lord is with characteristics, He can be seen as Brahman without characteristics as well:

Either in a person with certain qualification or in a scripture [*kvacit* in the quotation], who/which is not able to understand the characteristics that are [Nārāyaṇa's] nature, [to such a person or in such a scripture] I myself, who is this one [i.e. Brahman], manifest without characteristics. This is the meaning. Or else, [it means that] at that time [i.e. the time prior to creation], in creation, [I manifest] with the form only of consciousness, which is without characteristics since the specificities are absent. In Vaiṣṇava, however, [I manifest] with the form of the Lord, which is with characteristics. Because of [these two states], both types of scriptural statements are separately established.<sup>53</sup>

In this way Jīva accommodates the Advaitic notion of attributeless Brahman. However, it is clear that Jīva considers such an understanding as a lower level of realization. For him, the Lord in His eternal abode is always with characteristics, and those who are qualified always see Him in that way. Jīva quotes BhaGī 14.27a to substantiate his point that Kṛṣṇa is the foundation of impersonal Brahman.<sup>54</sup> Therefore, Jīva argues, that knowledge of the Lord is most confidential, as the Lord Himself said in BhāPu 2.9.30a.<sup>55</sup>

After explaining how the Lord exists before and after creation, Jīva then discusses how the Lord exists during creation. According to Jīva, *paścād aham* explains that the Lord exists during creation also, in His own abode as well as within creation:

'Even after creation {*paścād*} it is I {*aham*} who do exist, but with the form of the Lord and so on in Vaiṣṇava [and] with the form of the inner controller and so on in creation.' This is what one should supply [to *paścād aham*].<sup>56</sup>

Jīva's predecessors do not elaborate on these two ways in which the Lord exists, namely as the Lord Himself and as the inner controller. However, that Jīva *tries* to follow Śrīdhara becomes clear in his interpretation of verse 32c: *paścād aham yad etad ca*. Śrīdhara says that after creation {*paścāt*}, the Lord alone exists, and this universe {*etad*} is also the Lord {*aham*}.<sup>57</sup> As shown above, this oneness of the universe with the Lord sharply separates Śrīdhara

<sup>53</sup> *kvacid adhikāriṇi śāstre vā svarūpabhūtaviśeṣavyutpattiyasamarthe* ([asamarthe] BhaSa; āsamarthe KraSa) so 'yam aham eva nirviśeṣatayā pratibhāṁity arthaḥ / yad vā tadāniṁ prapañce viśeṣābhāvān nirviśeṣacinmātrākāreṇa vaiṣṇave tu saviśeṣabhagavadrūpeṇeti śāstrad-vayavyavasthā /

<sup>54</sup> *brahmaṇo hi pratiṣṭhāham*

<sup>55</sup> *jñānam paramaguhyam*

<sup>56</sup> *paścāt sṛṣṭer anantaram apy aham evāsam* ([evāsam] KraSa; evāsmi BhaSa) *eva, vaiṣṇave tu* ([vaiṣṇave tu] KraSa; vaiṣṇaveṣu BhaSa) *bhagavadādyākāreṇa prapañceṣv antaryāmyādyākāreṇeti śeṣaḥ /*

<sup>57</sup> *paścāt sṛṣṭer anantaram apy aham evāsmi / yad etad viśvaṁ tad apy aham asmi /*

from the two Dvaita commentators. On this particular point, Jīva almost copies Śrīdhara: '[That] which is this universe, even that is I [i.e. the Lord] only.'<sup>58</sup> This means that it has the nature of Me since it is not different from Me.'<sup>59</sup> This acceptance of the oneness of the universe with the Lord separates Jīva from the Dvaita position. This is because Jīva holds the view that the universe is the Lord's external energy (*bahiraṅgaśakti*), and the energy (*śakti*) and the possessor of the energy (*śaktiman*) are one with each other on one level. However, like Rāmānuja, who also holds the view that Brahman is the material cause of the universe, Jīva is careful to point out that although the Lord is one with the universe, the Lord is, at the same time, beyond the universe, and therefore He is not influenced by the impurities of material existence. This asymmetrical unity between the Lord and the universe is sometimes articulated as 'paradoxical difference and non-difference (*acintyabhedābheda*)'.<sup>60</sup> At this point, Jīva cites BhāPu 2.7.50 to illustrate this asymmetrical unity:

O son [i.e. Nārada], this Lord, the creator of the universe, [about whom] you have been taught, is both the cause and the effect [of the universe], which are non-different from Hari, [and yet] who is different [from the universe].<sup>61</sup>

This verse expresses that the Lord is both non-different and different from the universe.

<sup>58</sup> This is copied from Śrīdhara's commentary on the same verse: *yad etad viśvaṃ tad apy aham asmi /*

<sup>59</sup> *yad etad viśvaṃ tad apy aham eva madananyatvān madātmakam evety arthaḥ /*

<sup>60</sup> I render *acintya* 'paradoxical', following Graheli (2007: 183–184): 'The solution elaborated by Caitanya and his followers is "paradoxical difference and non-difference" (*acintyabhedābheda*). Paradoxical, and not inconceivable, because they do not negate conceivability altogether, rather they deny the possibility of conceivability by means of humanly instruments of knowledge, i.e. perception and inference: "Only the Veda, whose language is ultra-mundane, is a means of knowledge for us who desire to know that thing which is beyond everything, the support of everything, not conceivable by anyone and having a marvellous nature" (TSan 10). In short, *acintyabhedābheda* is the mind-boggling coexistence of two contradictory qualities in the person of God. This doctrine stands as an axiomatic key of interpretation of most tenets in Gauḍiya religion.'

<sup>61</sup> *so 'yaṃ te 'bhīhitas tāta bhagavān viśvabhāvanah /*

*saṃsena harer nānyad anyasmāt sad asac ca yat //*

*anyasmāt modifies harer. Śrīdhara: adhyāyatrayasyārtham upasamharati / so 'yaṃ te saṃsena saṃkṣepenābhīhitaḥ / tam evāha / sad asat kāryaṃ kāraṇaṃ ca harer anyan na bhavati / nanu hares tadavyatireke tadgatavikāraprasaṅgaḥ syāt / na / anyasmāt kāraṇabhūto hariḥ kāryād vyatirikta ity arthaḥ //*

Jīva: *so 'yam iti / so 'yam saṃsena saṃkṣepenābhīhitaḥ / katham / tatasthalakṣaṇaivy āha / sat kāryaṃ sthūlam aśuddhajīvajagadākhyāṃ cetanācetanāṃ vastu asat kāraṇaṃ sūkṣmaṃ śuddhajīvapradhānākhyāṃ cidacidvastu ca yat, tat sarvaṃ harer anyan na bhavati sūkṣmasya tacchaktirūpatvāt, sthūlasya tatkāryarūpatvāt iti bhāvaḥ / jagatas tadanyatve 'pi śuddhasya tasya taddoṣasāṅkaryāṃ nāstīty āha anyasmād iti //*



In conclusion, the main differences among the four commentaries may be summarized in the chart below:

<i>Theological</i>	
Madhva/ Vijayadhvaja	- The independence of Viṣṇu and the dependence of everything else on Him.
Śrīdhara	- The unity of all that exists. - This universe is Viṣṇu
Jīva	- Strong rejection of the <i>kevalādvaitavāda</i> and the <i>nirviśeṣavāda</i> . - Emphasis on the Lord's charm, and intimacy between the Lord and the living entity. - The Lord's communal nature. - The Lord is always engaged in His pastime ( <i>līlā</i> ) - The Lord is the foundation of impersonal Brahman. - The identification of the universe with the Lord (following Śrīdhara).
<i>Exegetical</i>	
Madhva/ Vijayadhvaja	- <i>sadasat param</i> : 'prakṛti, time and so on { <i>sadasat</i> }, which is separate { <i>anyat</i> } from the Lord, is not { <i>na</i> } independent { <i>param</i> }'.
Śrīdhara	- <i>sadasatparam</i> : 'the cause { <i>param</i> } of the subtle and gross [creations] { <i>sadasat</i> '.
Jīva	- <i>sadasatparam</i> : 'Brahman which is beyond { <i>param</i> } the effect { <i>sat</i> } and the cause { <i>asat</i> }'. - BhāPu 2.9.32 explains knowledge ( <i>jñāna</i> ) mentioned in the BhāPu 2.9.30. - The interpretation of the word <i>aham</i> .
<i>Stylistic</i>	
Madhva/ Vijayadhvaja	- Madhva's commentary mainly consists of citations including untraceable ones. - Vijayadhvaja accepts Madhva's untraceable citations.
Śrīdhara	- Relatively short.
Jīva	- Jīva's commentary on the CaŚloBhā is much more extensive, in contrast to the ones by Madhva and Śrīdhara.

Jīva's commentary is much longer and more elaborate than those of his predecessors. This reflects his view that the BhāPu is central to Gauḍīya theology. On the one hand, Jīva is strongly against two doctrines of Advaita Vedānta, namely the oneness of Brahman with the living entity and the view that Brahman is without specificities. This places Jīva theologically closer to Madhva than to Śrīdhara since Madhva is famous for his rejection of Advaita Vedānta. On the other hand, exegetically speaking, Jīva follows Śrīdhara more closely and almost entirely neglects Madhva's commentary. One example of this is his identification of the universe with the Lord. On this point, Jīva is theologically closer to Śrīdhara than he is to Madhva. Still, although comparatively speaking Jīva's commentary is closer to Śrīdhara's than to Madhva's, he

sometimes diverges from Śrīdhara as well. An example of this is his interpretation of the obscure compound *sadasatparam*. Finally, Jīva's distinct contributions include his emphases on the Lord's charm, on His communal nature, on the aspect of pastime (*līlā*), and the view that the Lord is the foundation of impersonal Brahman.

### 3.4. THE SECOND VERSE (BHĀGAVATA PURĀṆA 2.9.33)

After explaining Himself in the first verse, the Lord speaks about *māyā* in the second verse of the CaŚloBhā:

*ṛte 'rthaṃ yat pratīyeta na pratīyeta cātmani /  
tad vidyād ātmano māyāṃ yathābhāso yathā tamaḥ // 33 //*

That which is perceived without meaning, and that which is not perceived within the self, know that to be *māyā* of the self, which is like a reflection, and like darkness.

According to Madhva and Vijayadhvaṇa, this verse means:

That which is cognized as if meaningful and which is not cognized as meaningful in relation to the supreme Self, know that to be My *māyā*, which metaphorically refers to the living entity and *mūlaprakṛti*.

According to Śrīdhara:

Even though without real content, that due to which something inexpressible is cognized in the substrate, and that due to which even what is real is not cognized in the substrate, you should know that to be *māyā* of Myself. It is like the appearance of two moons and it is like darkness such as *Rāhu*.

According to Jīva:

The object whose cognition is outside of Me, and yet whose cognition is not possible without resting on Me, know that to be the energy called *māyā* of Mine, which is two-fold i.e. *jīvamāyā* and *guṇamāyā*.

We shall examine each commentary below.

#### (a) Madhva and Vijayadhvaṇa

In his commentary on the second verse, Madhva again emphasizes the Lord's transcendence, that He is never influenced by the living entity or *prakṛti*. Citing an anonymous verse, Madhva explains that *māyā* metaphorically refers to *prakṛti* and the living entity: 'For, primarily, the energy of Viṣṇu indeed is referred to by the word *māyā*. However, metaphorically, it is *prakṛti* and the

living entity, which are indeed referred to [by the word *māyā*].<sup>62</sup> Madhva does not attribute this verse to any source but simply says ‘and it is said (*iti ca*)’. This suggests that the verse was most probably written by Madhva himself to support his particular view (Mesquita 2000: 32).

Two points should be noted regarding Madhva’s understanding of *māyā*. First, Madhva primarily (*mukhyatas*) understands *māyā* to mean the energy of Viṣṇu (*viṣṇuśakti*). This implies that *māyā* is real since it belongs to Viṣṇu, who is real. This is different from the Advaitic understanding of *māyā*, in which *māyā* is understood to be neither real nor unreal, but inexpressible (*anirvacaniya*). Second, Madhva differentiates the primary (*mukhya*) and metaphorical (*upacāra*) meanings of the word *māyā*. According to Madhva, Viṣṇu’s energy, the living entity, and *prakṛti* are all in different categories. As will be seen later, however, Jīva does not make such a differentiation but accepts the living entity and *prakṛti* to be identical with the energies of Viṣṇu.

According to Madhva, the first two *pādas* of the second verse of the CaśloBhā explain that the Lord has nothing to achieve through the living entity and *prakṛti*, which are expressed by the word *māyā*:

[*Māyā* is] perceived as if having a purpose. And [it is] not perceived as having a purpose in relation to the Supreme Self. Without any purpose [*artham*]. For, the Lord’s purpose is not with the living entity and *prakṛti*.<sup>63</sup>

The meaning of the last sentence is slightly obscure. Here, Vijayadhvaja’s gloss is helpful: ‘without [*rte*] purpose [*artha*] for Me, the one whose desire is fulfilled [...]’.<sup>64</sup> According to Vijayadhvaja, when Madhva writes that the Lord has no purpose with the living entity and *prakṛti*, his point is that there is nothing for the Lord to achieve in relation to the living entity and *prakṛti* since the desire of the Lord is always fulfilled.

Then Madhva somewhat abruptly says that the living entity is described in the fourth *pāda* as ‘like a reflection’.<sup>65</sup> Madhva, however, does not clarify what he means by this statement. Nor does he elaborate what is meant by the latter half of the fourth *pāda*, *yāthā tamaḥ*. Vijayadhvaja fills in these gaps in Madhva’s commentary by saying:

It is said *māyā* is the living entity, which is My reflection [*ābhāsa*], never being perceived truly [*yathā*] in relation to reality, and [*māyā*] truly [*yathā*] is *mūla-prakṛti* [*tamaḥ*], which is the cause of decay.<sup>66</sup>

<sup>62</sup> *mukhyato viṣṇuśaktir hi māyāśabdena bhāṇyate / upacāratas tu prakṛtir jivaś caiva hi bhāṇyate //*

<sup>63</sup> *arthavād iva pratīyate / na ca paramātmāny arthavat pratīyate / arthaṃ prayojanam rte / na hi jivaprakṛtibhyām īśvarasyārthaḥ /*

<sup>64</sup> *āptakāmasya mamārthaṃ prayojanam rte [...] /*

<sup>65</sup> *yathābhāso jivah /*

<sup>66</sup> *yathā yathārthatvenaiva satyatvenaiva pratīyamāna ābhāso mama pratibimbabhūto jīvo yathā yathārthatvenaiva tamo glānihetur mūlaprakṛtiś ca māyety ucyate /*

Vijayadhvaja points to Madhva's *bimbapratibimbha* theory when he says that the living entity is like a reflection.<sup>67</sup> Vijayadhvaja also clarifies that *prakṛti* is meant by the word *tamas* in the fourth *pāda*.

Madhva cites another verse, again without specifying its source, then elaborates on another point, namely that the Lord is never affected by the living entity and *prakṛti*:

It is declared 'Even though everything is situated in the Supreme, it is never in Him.' Since the life of Hari is not through the living entity, therefore, the living entity is not in Hari. *Prakṛti* also is certainly not in Him since [it] does not create bondage [for Hari]. Action is [not in Hari] since it is not the giver of the results [for Hari] and time [is not in Hari] since it does not transform [Hari].<sup>68</sup>

The verse Madhva quotes is reminiscent of BhaGī 9.4 wherein Kṛṣṇa says that all beings are in Him but He is not in them.<sup>69</sup> The issue is how to deal with the tension between the unity and the purity of Brahman. On the one hand, the Upaniṣadic passages, such as 'This all is Brahman'<sup>70</sup> and 'one only without second',<sup>71</sup> suggest that nothing exists outside Brahman. This means that the living entity and *prakṛti* are also in some ways within Brahman.

On the other hand, there are Upaniṣadic passages such as 'Brahman is truth, knowledge, and without limit',<sup>72</sup> 'This self is devoid of evil, without aging, without death, without sorrow, without hunger and without thirst',<sup>73</sup> and so on. These statements teach that Brahman is completely pure. But how, while containing the living entity and *prakṛti*, which are changing and imperfect, can Brahman be completely pure?

Śaṅkara tries to solve this tension by claiming that the individual living entity and *prakṛti* ultimately do not exist. Madhva, however, is a realist who does not deny their existences. His answer is that while the individual living entity and *prakṛti* do exist within Brahman, they are nevertheless separate from Brahman, and they do not influence Brahman. Madhva illustrates this point by an example: 'Just as parasol-bearers and so on, though mounted on chariots, are never called charioteers, in the same way, though [the living entity, *prakṛti*, action, and time] are in Hari [they are not called Hari].'<sup>74</sup>

<sup>67</sup> For details, see Sharma 1986a: 306–319.

<sup>68</sup> *'sarvaṃ pare sthitam api naiva tatra' iti bhāṇyate / yato harer na jīvena jīvanaṃ na harau tataḥ / jīvaḥ prakṛtir apy atra yato naiva hi bandhakṛt / karma cāphaladātrtvāt kālāś cāpariṇāmanāt /*

<sup>69</sup> *mayā tatam idaṃ sarvaṃ jagad avyaktamūrtinā / matsthāni sarvabhūtāni na cāhaṃ teṣv avasthitaḥ //*

<sup>70</sup> ChāU 3.14.1: *sarvaṃ khalv idaṃ brahma*

<sup>71</sup> ChāU 6.2.1: *ekam evādvitīyam*

<sup>72</sup> TaiU 2.1: *satyaṃ jñānam anantaṃ brahma*

<sup>73</sup> ChāU 8.2.7: *ēṣa ātmāpāhatapāpmā vijaro vimṛtyur viśoko vijighatso 'pipāśaḥ*

<sup>74</sup> *yathā chatradharādyās tu rathasthā api sarvaśaḥ rathino naiva bhāṇyanta evaṃ harigatā api //*

In conclusion, it may be observed that Madhva's emphasis is again on the distinction between Brahman and everything else. It may also be noted that in his commentary Vijayadhvaṇya follows Madhva very closely, including his two unspecified quotations and the example of the parasol-bearers.

(b) Śrīdhara

Śrīdhara's commentary on the second verse of the CaśloBhā is substantially different from that of Madhva. Śrīdhara focuses on *māyā*'s two effects, and he does not mention the living entity or *prakṛti*. Śrīdhara defines *māyā* as follows:

Even though without substantial content {*rte 'rtham*}, that due to which {*yat*} something unspeakable is observed {*pratiyeta*} in the substrate {*ātmani*}, and [that due to which] even what is real is not perceived [in the substrate], you should know that to be *māyā* of myself {*ātmano*}.<sup>75</sup>

According to Śrīdhara, two effects of *māyā* are: (1) something which is without substantial content is perceived; (2) something which is real is not perceived. Śrīdhara interprets *yathābhāsa* and *yathā tamaḥ* in the fourth *pāda* to be two examples illustrating these two effects of *māyā*:

'Like an appearance' is an example with regard to recognition without substantial content, such as [observing] two moons. 'Like darkness' is [an example] with regard to non-recognition of what is real. Just as, Rāhu, which is darkness, is not seen even though situated in the realm of planets, in the same way [what is real is not perceived because of *māyā*].<sup>76</sup>

The first example of two moons is commonly used by Advaita Vedānta as an example of false knowledge.<sup>77</sup> When someone develops an eye disease, he may perceive two moons. This, however, is false knowledge arising from the disease.

In contrast to Madhva who says that *māyā* primarily means the energy (*śakti*) of the Lord, Śrīdhara's understanding of *māyā* seems much closer to the Advaitic understanding. He describes the first function of *māyā* as the cognition of something unspeakable (*kim apy aniruktam*). This echoes the Advaita view that *māyā* is unspeakable (*anirvacanīya*), neither real nor unreal.

The second example describes the case where something real is not perceived. According to South Asian astronomy, Rāhu is the name of a planet which is believed to be the cause of eclipse (Dowson 1998: 262). It is real, but cannot be

<sup>75</sup> *rte arthaṃ vināpi vāstavam arthaṃ yad yataḥ kim apy aniruktam ātmany adhiṣṭhāne pratiyeta sad api ca na pratiyeta, tad ātmano mama māyāṃ vidyāt /*

<sup>76</sup> *yathābhāso dvicandrādir ity arthaṃ vinā pratītau dṛṣṭāntaḥ / yathā tama iti sato 'pratītau / tamo rāhur yathā grahamaṇḍale sthito 'pi na dṛśyate tathā //*

<sup>77</sup> Cf. Śaṅkara BraSūBhā 4.1.15: *bādhitaṃ api tu mithyājñānaṃ dvicandrajñānavat saṃskār-avaśāt kiñcitkālaṃ anuvartata eva / Maṇḍana Mīśra Brahmasiddhi 2.138: sarvātmanārtho jñānena kenacin na hi gṛhyate / tathājñānavivekasya dvicandrādiviparyayāt //*

perceived due to its darkness. Again, Śrīdhara's general understanding of *māyā* seems close to that of Advaita Vedānta. *Māyā* causes something without substantial reality to be perceived, while it also causes something real not to be perceived. It creates illusion on the one hand, and covers reality on the other. A later Advaitin, Sadānanda, for example, says ignorance (*ajñāna*), which is often used synonymously with *māyā*,<sup>78</sup> has two capacities, namely the capacity to project (*vikṣepa*) illusion and the capacity to conceal (*āvaraṇa*) reality.<sup>79</sup>

### (c) Jīva

Jīva's commentary on the verse is considerably more complex than those of his predecessors. Moreover, unlike his commentary on the previous verse, he gives his own explanation and does not particularly seem to follow either Madhva or Śrīdhara. Commenting on verse 33a–c, Jīva defines *māyā* as follows:

'What may be perceived without {*rte*} Me [i.e. the Lord], who is the highest truth {*artham*}, since its perception is absent when there is a perception of Me.' What this means is 'whose cognition is outside of me'. [The verse says] *yac cātmani na pratīyeta*. This means, 'And, whose perception is not possible without resting on Me.' One should know {*vidyāt*} that the object which is characterized in that manner [i.e. *taṭ*] is the energy called *māyā* {*māyām*} of mine {*ātmano*}, i.e. of the Supreme Lord. [*Māyā*] is twofold, namely *jīvamāyā* and *guṇamāyā*.<sup>80</sup>

Jīva's interpretation of the word *artham* is different from both Madhva's and Śrīdhara's. Madhva interprets *artham* as 'meaning', Śrīdhara as 'substantial reality', whereas Jīva interprets the word to mean 'the highest truth', which is the Lord Himself. According to Jīva, the first half of the definition of *māyā*, which is based on verse 33a, is that which is perceived when the Lord is not perceived, and that which is not perceived when the Lord is perceived. The second half of the definition based on verse 33b is that the perception of *māyā* is dependent on the Lord (*madāśrayatva*), and perception of it is not possible without Him (*svataḥ pratītir nāsti*). Thus, *māyā*, according to Jīva, is something which is perceived only outside the Lord, and yet its existence is

<sup>78</sup> See for example, Thrasher 1993: 58.

<sup>79</sup> Sadānanda (1911) pp. 51–55: *asyājñānasyāvaraṇavikṣepanāmakam asti śaktidvayam / āvaraṇaśaktis tāvad alpo 'pi megho 'nekayojanāyatam ādityamaṇḍalam avalokayitrnayana-pathapidhāyakatayā yathāchchādayatīva tathājñānaṁ paricchinnam apy ātmānam aparicchinnam asaṁsāriṇam avalokayitr buddhipidhāyakatayā chādayatīva / [ . . . ] vikṣepaśaktis tu yathā rajjvajñānaṁ svāvṛtarajjau svaśaktiā sarpādīkam udbhāvayaty evam ajñānam api svāvṛtātmani vikṣepaśaktiā kāśādiprapaṇcam udbhāvayati /*

<sup>80</sup> *artham paramārthabhūtam mām vinā yat pratīyeta matpratītau tatpratītyabhāvāt matto bahir eva yasya pratītir ity arthaḥ / 'yac cātmani na pratīyeta' yasya ca madāśrayatvam ([mad-] BhaSa; yad- KraSa) vinā svataḥ pratītir nāstīty arthaḥ / tathālakṣaṇam vastu ātmano mama paramēśvarasya māyām jīvamāyā guṇamāyēti dvyātmikām māyākhyāśaktim vidyāt /*

dependent on Him. Then Jīva says that *māyā*, which is defined in this way, is the energy (*śakti*) of the Lord. This is close to Madhva's understanding; he says that *māyā* primarily means the energy of the Lord.<sup>81</sup>

Jīva then discusses the ontological status of the living entity in relation to the Lord. To avoid any confusion, it is to be noted that the living entity and *jīvamāyā* are two separate things. *Jīvamāyā* is an energy of the Lord that affects the living entity.<sup>82</sup> Jīva explains the living entity's relation with the Lord as follows:

Here it is intended that the pure living entity too is indeed included within Himself [i.e. the Lord] because it is non-different [from the Lord] with regard to the fact that its nature is consciousness and because it is like the rays belonging to Him [i.e. the Lord].<sup>83</sup>

Jīva seems to depart from Madhva's dualistic view when he emphasizes the living entity's ontological inclusion within the Lord and the non-difference of the living entity and the Lord as consciousnesses.

Jīva explains this close relationship between the living entity and the Lord using the analogy of the sun and its rays. He uses the same analogy in his BhaSa *Anuccheda* 16:

And, the energy [of the Lord] is of three kinds, [namely] internal, external, and liminal.<sup>84</sup> Among them, by the internal [energy], which is called *svarūpaśakti*, it

<sup>81</sup> Indeed, Jīva may have borrowed these two terminologies from Madhva. These two terms *jīvamāyā* and *guṇamāyā* appear in a verse attributed to the *Mahāsaṃhitā* in BhaSa *Anuccheda* 22:

*śrīr bhūr durgeti yā bhinnā jīvamāyā mahātmanah /  
ātmanāyā tadicchā syāt guṇamāyā jaḍātmikā //*

The same verse from the *Mahāsaṃhitā* is also quoted by Sanātana Gosvāmī in his *Brhadbhāga-vatāmṛta* 2.4.173. In TaSa *Anuccheda* 28 Jīva lists the *Mahāsaṃhitā* as one of the texts which he quotes from Madhva. This text, for example, is quoted by Madhva in his commentary on BhāPu 1.1.2. Appayya Dikṣita lists the text as one of Madhva's untraceable sources (Mesquita 2000: 31).

<sup>82</sup> In BhaSa *Anuccheda* 22, Jīva defines *jīvamāyā* as 'that whose object is the living entity': *tattadrūpeṇa yā bhedaṃ prāptā, sā jīvaṇīyā tadacchaktir jīvamāyety ucyate /*

<sup>83</sup> *atra śuddhajīvasyāpi cidrūpatvāviśeṣeṇa tadīyaraśmishānīyatvena ca svāntahpāta eva vivakṣitaḥ /*

<sup>84</sup> The term *taṭastha* in *taṭasthaśakti* is translated in various manners: 'intermediary' (Brahmachari 1974: 171–178); 'marginal' (Gupta 2007: 33, 41, 42, 180). Similarly Dasgupta (1932–1954: Vol. 4) renders it in various ways: 'special' (14), 'disengaged' (21), 'second' (398), 'neutral' (421). The term literally means 'standing [*stha*] on the shore [*taṭa*]', and it denotes the borderline between a river and its bank. The borderline can be seen as belonging either to the river or to its shore. In an analogous manner, the living entity can belong to either of Lord's two other energies, namely, the internal energy (*antaraṅgaśakti*) and the external energy (*bahiraṅgaśakti*). Therefore the living entities are called *taṭasthaśakti*, suggesting that they are between the external energy and internal energy. An implication of this ontological scheme is that the living entities always have the choice either to turn their faces to the Lord (*antarmukha*) and join the transcendental realm or to turn their faces away from the Lord (*bahirmukha*) and join the material realm. Taking all these points into consideration, I translate *taṭastha* as 'liminal', as suggested by Dr. Killingley. The adjective 'liminal' means the position of being at the threshold

[i.e. the highest principle, which is the Lord] exists as (1) *fully* Himself and as (2) the power of His own nature, which are *Vaikuṇṭha* and so on, just as [the sun is] representing [1] the sun [itself] and [2] his halo [by its internal energy].

By the liminal [energy], [the highest principle exists] as (3) the living entity, whose nature is conscious only, and pure, representing [3] the sunrays [in the analogy]. And by the external [energy], which is called *māyā*, [the highest principle exists] as (4) *pradhāna*, whose nature is insentient, which is the external power belonging to it [i.e. the highest principle], representing [4] the variegatedness of colors in the reflection [in the analogy]. Thus [the highest principle] exists in fourfold.

Precisely because of this, [that is,] because the living entity and *pradhāna* are identical with Him, the living entity is nothing but the liminal energy, and *pradhāna* is included in *māyā*. Intending this, three energies are counted in the illustrious *Viṣṇu Purāṇa*: “The energy of Viṣṇu is called the highest, and [the energy] which is called “the knower of the field” is said to be lower. [And the energy] which is called “the one whose effect is ignorance” is acknowledged as the third energy.”<sup>85</sup>

According to Jīva, the Lord exists as Himself (*svarūpa*) and as His abode and so on (*vaikuṇṭhādi*) through His internal energy. He exists as the living entity through His liminal energy, and He exists as *pradhāna* through His external energy. This is just like the sun exists as itself (*sūrya*), its disc (*maṇḍala*), its rays (*raśmi*), and as its reflection (*praticchavi*). Jīva further supports this view by quoting ViPu 6.7.61. Their similarities appear as follows:

the sun ( <i>sūrya</i> )	the Lord ( <i>bhagavān</i> )	the energies of the Lord	ViPu. 6.7.61
the sun itself ( <i>sūrya</i> ) and the surface ( <i>maṇḍala</i> )	the Lord Himself ( <i>svarūpa</i> ) and His abode ( <i>vaikuṇṭhādi</i> )	the internal energy ( <i>antaraṅgaśakti</i> / <i>svarūpaśakti</i> )	the highest energy ( <i>viṣṇuśakti</i> / <i>parāśakti</i> )
sunrays ( <i>raśmi</i> )	the living entity	the liminal energy ( <i>taṭasthaśakti</i> )	the knower of the field ( <i>kṣetrajñā</i> / <i>aparāśakti</i> )
reflection ( <i>praticchavi</i> )	<i>pradhāna</i>	the external energy ( <i>bahiraṅgaśakti</i> / <i>māyā</i> )	the third energy ( <i>avidyākarma</i> / <i>ṭṛtiyā śakti</i> )

and it appears to capture the image conveyed by the term *taṭastha* accurately. I avoid Gupta’s translation ‘marginal’, since the adjective has a negative connotation of being unimportant.

<sup>85</sup> *śaktiś ca sā tridhā antaraṅgā bahiraṅgā taṭasthā ca / tatrāntaraṅgayā svarūpaśakti-  
khyayā sūryatanmaṇḍalasthānyena* ([*sthāniyena*] em. Isaacson; *sthāniya* Haridāsa) *pūrṇenaiva  
svarūpeṇa vaikuṇṭhādisvarūpavaibhavarūpeṇa ca tad avatiṣṭhate / taṭasthayā rāsmisthāniyaci-  
dekātmaśuddhajivarūpeṇa, bahiraṅgayā māyākhyayā praticchavigatavarnaśābalyasthāniyata-  
diyabahiraṅgavaibhavajaḍātmapradhānarūpeṇa ceti caturdhātvaṁ / ata eva tadātmakatvena  
jīvasyaiva taṭasthaśaktitvaṁ pradhānasya ca māyāntarbhūtatvaṁ abhipretya śaktitrayaṁ śrīviṣ-  
ṇupurāṇe gaṇitam ‘viṣṇuśaktiḥ parā proktā kṣetrajñākhyā tathāparā / avidyākarmasamjñānyā  
ṭṛtiyā śaktir iṣyate //’* (ViPu. 6.7.61). BhaSa Anuccheda 16: *avidyā karma kāryaṁ yasyāḥ sā,  
tatsamjñā māyety arthaḥ* / The expression *antarbhūta* indicates that what is meant by the term  
*māyā* is larger than the *pradhāna*.



According to this analogy of the sun and its rays, the Lord is the material cause with regard to the universe. With regard to the living entities, the Lord is the source from which they manifest. The possessor of the energies (*śaktimān*, i.e. the Lord) and His energies (*śaktis* i.e. *pradhāna* and the living entity) are considered simultaneously one with (*abheda*) and different from (*bheda*) each other. What is noteworthy is that, according to Jīva, the oneness and difference between Brahman, the living entity, and *pradhāna* are both real. In contrast, Madhva holds the view that only the difference between Brahman, the living entity, and *pradhāna* is real. Therefore, this analogy of the sun and its rays is an example of Jīva's theological distance from Madhva.

Going back to the discussion of *jīvamāyā* and *guṇamāyā*, it is again important to be aware that *jīvamāyā* is different from the living entity. According to Jīva, *jīvamāyā* is the efficient cause of the universe and *guṇamāyā* is the material cause: 'Therefore, in this way, we should distinguish even in the beginning that *jīvamāyā* is the efficient cause part and *guṇamāyā* is the material cause part.'<sup>86</sup> As will be seen later, Jīva understands *jīvamāyā* as an energy of the Lord which causes insentient *prakṛti* to unfold, and thereby causes the living entity to experience the material world. Jīva develops such a theory by commenting on the fourth *pāda* of verse 33, *yathābhāso yathā tamaḥ*. Jīva says that although only one word, *māyā*, is discussed in the verse, the verse is actually about two energies, namely *jīvamāyā* and *guṇamāyā*, because two analogies are given in the fourth *pāda*.<sup>87</sup> According to Jīva, the first analogy 'like a reflection {*yathābhāsa*}', explains *jīvamāyā*:

With regard to this, clarifying by an example that which is called *jīvamāyā*, which is [His] primary portion, is such,<sup>88</sup> [the Lord] sets aside the impossibility [of *jīvamāyā*], stating *yathābhāsa*. *Ābhāsa* is a particular kind of reflection that somehow appears in a place removed from the light source's own shining. Just as it [i.e. the reflection of light] is cognized clearly outside of it [i.e. the light source's own shining] but [at the same time] there is no cognition of it [i.e. the reflection of light] without it [i.e. the light source's own shining], so also is she [i.e. *jīvamāyā* is cognized outside the Lord but it cannot be cognized without the Lord's existence].<sup>89</sup>

As previously seen, Jīva, based on his interpretation of verse 33a–c, defines *māyā* as something perceived outside the Lord and yet whose existence is dependent on the Lord. The example of reflection is employed to describe this asymmetrical ontological relation between *jīvamāyā* and the Lord.

<sup>86</sup> *tad evaṃ nimittāṃśo jīvamāyā, upādānāṃśo guṇamāyety agre 'pi vivecanīyam /*

<sup>87</sup> *tatrāsyā (māyāyā) dvyātmakatvenābhīdhānaṃ dṛṣṭāntadvaidhena ([dvaidhena] KraSa; dvaividyhena BhaSa) labhyate /*

<sup>88</sup> That the living entity is included within Brahman, like the sunrays are included within the sun.

<sup>89</sup> *tatra jīvamāyākhyasya prathamāṃśasya tādṛśatvaṃ dṛṣṭāntena spaṣṭayann asambhāvanāṃ nirasyati 'yathābhāsa' iti / ābhāso jyotirbimbasya svīyaprakāśād vyavahitapradeśe kathaṅcid uccalitapratichavivīṣeṣaḥ / sa yathā tasmād bahir eva pratiyate, na ca tam vinā tasya pratītiḥ tathā sāpīty arthaḥ /*

Jīva further develops this analogy to explain how *jīvamāyā* affects the living entity as well as *prakṛti*:

Just as it [i.e. the reflection], in some cases being extraordinarily strong, obscures the light of the eyes of people whose eyes are fallen into the mass of its own brightness, [and] having covered it [i.e. their eyesight] and confusing the eyes of the seers just by its own super excellent brightness, emits the variegatedness of color in its own proximity, [and] at some point transforms that very thing [i.e. the variegatedness of color] into various forms, which are not separate [from the variegatedness of color], in the same way this [i.e. *jīvamāyā*] also covers the knowledge of the living entity, emits insentient *prakṛti* called *guṇamāyā*, who has the nature of the equilibrium of qualities such as *sattva* and so on, and at some point transforms [it i.e. undifferentiated insentient *prakṛti*] into various forms, which has qualities such as *sattva* and so on, which are not separate [from undifferentiated insentient *prakṛti*].<sup>90</sup>

According to Jīva, a pure individual self (*śuddhajīva*) exists within the Lord, though it is separate from the Lord. As Jīva explained in his commentary on verse 32, this pure self stays with the Lord in *Vaikuṇṭha*, and its existence is so close to the Lord that it is included within the notion of 'I' when the Lord refers to Himself. However, when the living entity comes under the influence of *jīvamāyā*, this *jīvamāyā* covers its knowledge and causes the living entity to experience the material world.

*Jīvamāyā* has another function. It emits (*udgirati*) *prakṛti*, which is identical with *guṇamāyā*, and causes it to evolve. Here, the function of *jīvamāyā* seems akin to that of *māyā* in Advaita Vedānta, covering the true knowledge about the Self on the one hand, and manifesting the world of illusion on the other. However, there are two significant differences between these two understandings of *māyā*. First, according to Jīva, *jīvamāyā* is dependent on the Lord. Therefore, *jīvamāyā* actually exists. In Advaita Vedānta, however, *māyā* is neither real nor unreal, but inexplicable. Second, Jīva says that the material world manifests as a result of a transformation of *prakṛti* or *guṇamāyā*. This *prakṛti* or *guṇamāyā*, according to BhaSa 16, is an energy of the Lord. Therefore, it is also real. According to Advaita Vedānta, the world is again neither real nor unreal, like the mistaken perception of a piece of silver superimposed on mother-of-pearl.

<sup>90</sup> *atra sa yathā kvacid atyantodbhāṭmā svacākcikyacchaṭāpatitanetrāṇām* ([*svacākcikyacchaṭā*-] BhaSa; *svacākcikvacchaṭā*- KraSa) *janānām* ([*-netrāṇām janānām*] BhaSa; [*-netrāṇām*] KraSa) *netraprakāśam āvṛṇoti, tam āvṛtya ca svenātyantodbhāṭatejastvenaiva* ([*svenātyantodbhāṭa*-] BhaSa; *svenābhyantodbhāṭa*- KraSa) *draṣṭṛnetraṃ vyākulayan svopakaṇṭhe varṇasāvalyam udgirati, kadācit tad eva prthagabhāvena nānākāratayā pariṇamayati, tatheyam api jīvajñānam āvṛṇoti, sattvādiguṇasāmyarūpam guṇamāyākhyam jadām prakṛtim udgirati, kadācit prthagabhūtān sattvādiguṇān nānākāratayā pariṇamayati cetyādy api jñeyam /*

In the second analogy, Jīva says that *guṇamāyā* is like darkness {*tamas*}:

Then, [the Lord] clarifies the second part also, which is called *guṇamāyā*, which has been established thus, by an example, stating *yathā tamaḥ*. Here, by the word *tamaḥ* is meant the variegatedness of color mentioned earlier, which is like *tamas*. Just like, even though it [i.e. the variegatedness of color] does not exist in the light, which is its source, [the variegatedness of color] does not exist without [its] dependence on it [i.e. the original light], like that [i.e. like the variegatedness of color], it [*guṇamāyā*] is also.<sup>91</sup>

Just like the variety of colors does not exist in the original light but it cannot exist without the original light, in the same way, while *guṇamāyā* does not exist in the Supreme Lord, it cannot have the capacity to create, and so on, without Him. Regarding the interpretation of the word *tamas*, Jīva, though not explicit, seems to be closer to Vijayadhvaṇa than to Śrīdhara. Vijayadhvaṇa interprets the analogy of darkness in relation to *prakṛti*, whereas, for Śrīdhara, it is an example of something that exists but is not perceived.

After explaining the entire verse, Jīva refers back to the verb *vidyād* in the verse and explains that the Lord teaches what *māyā* is so that the living entity can overcome it, which is the necessary condition for experiencing the Lord directly:

It is said 'One should know {*vidyād*}'. The following is the idea of the specification of the first person [i.e. an explanation for the reason why *vidyād* is in the third person singular]. This instruction is indeed for others only but you [i.e. Brahmā] are experiencing [Me] directly by the energy given by me. Thus, only after going beyond the eyes, which are the production of *māyā*, one should experience Me, who is characterized by form and so on.

The following is the meaning of [the Lord's] causing [His devotee] to experience [Him] directly through exclusion. The experience of My own form and so on, even though they are described by words, is not possible just by immersion in the effects of illusion. Therefore, for the purpose of it [i.e. the direct experience of Lord's form and so on], we should certainly give up illusion. Thus by this [act of giving up illusion], because of the inherent nature of it [i.e. the direct experience of the Lord's form and so on], one experiences even *prema*. We understand in this way.<sup>92</sup>

<sup>91</sup> *athaivam siddham* ([*siddham*] KraSa; *siddham jīvamāyākhyam* BhaSa) *guṇamāyākhyam dvitīyam apy aṁśam dr̥ṣṭāntena spaṣṭayati 'yathā tama' iti / tamaḥśabdenātra pūrvaproktaṁ* ([*pūrvaproktaṁ*] KraSa; *pūrvoktaṁ* BhaSa) *tamaḥprāyaṁ varṇasāvalyaṁ ucyaṭe / tad* ([*tad*] BhaSa; *yad* KraSa) *yathā tanmūlajyotiṣy* ([*-jyotiṣy*] BhaSa; *-jyotiṣy* KraSa) *asad api tadāśrayatvaṁ vinā na sambhavati tadvad iyaṁ apīti /*

<sup>92</sup> *vidyād iti prathamapurūṣanirdeśasyāyaṁ bhāvaḥ / anyān praty eva khalv ayam upadeśaḥ tvaṁ tu maddattaśaktiā sāksād evānubhavann asīti / evaṁ māyikaśṛṭidṛṣṭim atityaiva rūpādiviśiṣṭaṁ mām anubhaved iti vyatirekamukhena anubhāvanasyāyaṁ bhāvaḥ / śabdena nirdhārita-syāpi matsvarūpāder māyākāryāveśeṇaivānubhavo na bhavati, tatas tadarthaṁ māyātājānam eva kartavyam iti / etena tadavinābhāvāt premāpy anubhavati iti gamyate //*

According to Jīva, the Lord clarifies that the direct perception of Him granted to Brahmā was possible only due to His power (*maddattaśaktyā*). Thus, direct experience of the Lord is described as something given, not something the living entities can achieve merely by their own effort. Another point Jīva explains is that living entities cannot see the Lord so long as they are under the influence of *māyā* (*jīvamāyā* specifically). Only when they overcome *māyā*'s influence can they enjoy reunion with the Lord and experience Him directly, as His associates in Vaikuṇṭha do. In the next verse Jīva explains that this direct perception of the Lord is possible only through the eyes of devotion anointed with the ointment of the supreme love of God (*premāñjanacchuritabhaktivilocanena*).

In conclusion, the main distinctions among the four commentaries on the second verse are summarized as follows:

<i>Theological</i>	
Madhva / Vijayadhvaṇa	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <i>Māyā</i> primarily means the energy (<i>śakti</i>) of Viṣṇu and metaphorically refers to the living entity and <i>prakṛti</i>.</li> <li>- The distinction between Brahman / Viṣṇu and everything else.</li> </ul>
Śrīdhara	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <i>Māyā</i> causes something without substance to be perceived and causes what is real not to be perceived.</li> <li>- Śrīdhara's understanding of <i>māyā</i> sounds Advaitic.</li> </ul>
Jīva	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <i>Māyā</i> is an energy (<i>śakti</i>) of the Lord.</li> <li>- <i>Jīvamāyā</i> is the efficient cause and <i>guṇamāyā</i> is the material cause of the universe.</li> <li>- The <i>bhedābheda</i> view between Brahman and the living entity (the analogy of the sun and the sunrays).</li> </ul>
<i>Exegetical</i>	
Madhva / Vijayadhvaṇa	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <i>yathābhāso yathā tamaḥ</i>: <i>ābhāsa</i> refers to the living entity, <i>tamas</i> refers to <i>prakṛti</i>.</li> </ul>
Śrīdhara	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <i>yathābhāso yathā tamaḥ</i>: <i>ābhāsa</i> refers to examples such as the vision of two moons, <i>tamas</i> refers to examples such as the lack of the vision of Rāhu.</li> </ul>
Jīva	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <i>yathābhāso yathā tamaḥ</i>: <i>ābhāsa</i> refers to <i>jīvamāyā</i>, <i>tamas</i> refers to <i>guṇamāyā</i>.</li> <li>- BhāPu 2.9.33 explains the insight (<i>vijñāna</i>) mentioned in BhāPu 2.9.30.</li> </ul>
<i>Stylistic</i>	
Madhva / Vijayadhvaṇa	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Vijayadhvaṇa follows Madhva very closely.</li> </ul>

It may be observed that Jīva's commentary on the second verse of the CaŚloBhā seems unique exegetically as well as theologically. Exegetically, his

definition of *māyā* based on verse 33a–c follows neither Madhva nor Śrīdhara. His interpretation of the two analogies of reflection and darkness as referring to *jīvamāyā* and *guṇamāyā* is also unique to his commentary.

Theologically, his interpretation of *māyā* as the Lord's energy is closer to Madhva's *dvaitic* understanding than Śrīdhara's *advaitic* interpretation. However, Jīva discusses two new concepts, namely *jīvamāyā* as the efficient cause of the universe, and *guṇamāyā* as the material cause, both of which seem to be his unique contributions. Furthermore, the identification of *guṇamāyā* with *prakṛti* is unique to Jīva since, according to Madhva, *māyā* refers to the living entity and to *prakṛti* only metaphorically. Furthermore, Jīva's analogizing of the living entity as sunrays, which implies the *bhedābheda* relation between the living entity and Brahman, is opposed to Madhva's dualistic view.

At the end of the commentary, Jīva explains that a devotee can experience *prema* by overcoming the influence of *māyā*. As will be explained in his commentary on the next verse, *prema* as the fifth and highest goal of human life (*puruṣārtha*) is unique to the Gauḍīya tradition, but not accepted by the Mādhva tradition.

### 3.5. THE THIRD VERSE (BHĀGAVATA PURĀṆA 2.9.34)

After explaining what *māyā* is, the Lord speaks in the third verse how He exists in relation to the world:

*yathā mahānti bhūtāni bhūteṣūccāvaceṣu ca /  
praviṣṭāny apraviṣṭāni tathā teṣu na teṣv aham // 34 //*

Just as great elements enter and do not enter in various beings, in the same way I am in them and not in them.

According to Madhva and Vijayadhvaṇa, the verse means:

Just as great elements are inside and outside various bodies, in the same way I am inside and outside the elements {*na teṣu*}.

According to Śrīdhara:

Just as great elements entered into various bodies after creation and did not enter into various bodies before creation, in the same way I am in beings after creation and not {*na*} in beings {*teṣu*} before creation.

Jīva offers two interpretations:

Just as great elements though outside various beings appear inside beings, in the same way though I am outside the hearts of those who have bowed down {*nateṣu*}, I enter and appear in them.

Just as great elements manifest in various beings both externally and internally, in the same way I appear in those who have bowed down {*nateṣu*} both externally and internally.

Each commentary is examined in detail below.

### (a) *Madhva and Vijayadhvaja*

Madhva's commentary on this verse is extremely short, consisting of one unidentified quotation. According to him, this verse speaks about the all-pervasiveness of the Lord:

And it is said, 'Just as the great elements are in the bodies and outside [the bodies], in the same way Hari is also both in the elements and outside [the elements] because of [His] pervasion. Therefore, Lord Hari is said to be both in them and not in them.'<sup>93</sup>

This is a good example of Madhva's untraceable quotes. First, he does not reveal the source of the citation but simply says 'And it is said (*iti ca*)'. Second, the verse cited so closely resembles verse 34 that it gives the impression that it is written by someone to specifically elaborate on verse 34. For example, verse 34a *yathā mahānti bhūtāni* is directly incorporated into the anonymous quotation. In addition, the phrase *tatstho na tatsthaś ca* in the quoted verse is meant to explain *tathā teṣu na teṣu* in verse 34c. In other words, the structural resemblances between verse 34 and Madhva's anonymous quotation makes it difficult to imagine that the latter verse originally existed in some other context. Third, it is as if Madhva has already expressed his view in the very quotation, as he does not give any explanation on the verse cited. If this verse were a genuine citation, one would expect some explanation as to why Madhva cites it. These three factors make it doubtful that Madhva took the quoted verse from an original text. Rather, it seems more reasonable that Madhva composed the verse.

Again, as Madhva's commentary is extremely short, it is typical that Vijayadhvaja writes his commentary in such a way that it supplements Madhva's lack of explanation. He also cites Madhva's anonymous quote verbatim:

<sup>93</sup> 'yathā mahānti bhūtāni śarīreṣu bahis tathā /  
evaṃ hariś ca bhūteṣu bahiś ca vyāptihetutaḥ /  
tasmāt tatstho na tatsthaś ca procyaate harir īśvaraḥ /' *iti ca //*

The Lord teaches [His] own pervasion with an example. Thus [He] says: Just as the five elements exist, entering into the bodies which are their own effects, then also, not entering into them because [they] exist in extreme pervasion, in the same way I also enter into the beings which are pervaded in unlimited places and time and do not enter into them because [I am] also situated externally to them, as it is said in statements such as ‘Just as the great elements are in the bodies and outside [the bodies], in the same way (Hari is also both in the elements and outside [the elements] because of [His] pervasion. Therefore, the Lord Hari is said to be both in them and not in them).’<sup>94</sup>

Vijayadhva makes it clear that, according to Madhva, the main point of verse 34 is to teach about the Lord’s all-pervading nature. The great elements (*mahābhūtas*) are inside the bodies since they consist of these elements. At the same time, the elements, due to their pervasiveness, are also outside the bodies. In the same way, due to His pervasiveness, the Lord is both inside and outside all beings. It is significant that Madhva interpretes *na teṣu* in verse 34d as consisting of two words, *na* and *teṣu*. Śrīdhara also follows this division. As will be seen later, however, Jīva instead takes these as the word *nateṣu*, which has a significant implication in his interpretation.

### (b) Śrīdhara

In BhāPu 2.9.31, the Lord says to Brahmā, ‘Through my favor, may you possess the insight into truth, how I am exactly, what My nature is, what My form, qualities, and activities are.’<sup>95</sup> According to Śrīdhara, the Lord is going to explain the part concerning ‘what My nature is (*yathābhāva*)’ in the third verse of the CaśloBhā:

As the Lord said ‘what [My] nature is’, He clarifies this [point]. Just as {*yathā*} after creation, the great elements {*mahānti bhūtāni*} entered inside beings since they [i.e. the great elements] are perceived in them [i.e. in the beings], and [just as] in the very beginning [of creation] they [i.e. the great elements] did not enter [inside the beings] since [the great elements] were existing in them [i.e. in the beings] as the cause, in the same way I am in beings {*teṣu*} and not in them. My existence is in such a way. This is the meaning.<sup>96</sup>

<sup>94</sup> *bhagavān svavyāptim* [-vyāptim] em.; -vyātim) *sodāharaṇam upadiśatīty āha yathā mahānti pañcabhūtāni uccāvaceṣu bhūteṣu svakāryaśāreṣu praviṣṭāni vartante tato ’py adhika-vyāptisadbhāvāt teṣu apraviṣṭāni ca tathāham apy anantadeśakālavāpyāpteṣu bhūteṣu praviṣṭas tebhyo bahir api sthitatvāt teṣu na praviṣṭas ca ’yathā mahānti bhūtāni śāreṣu bahis tathā’ ityādeḥ //*

<sup>95</sup> BhāPu 2.9.31: *yāvān ahaṁ yathābhāvo yadrūpaguṇakarmakaḥ / tathaiva tattvavijñānam astu te madanugrahāt //*

<sup>96</sup> *yathābhāva ity etat spaṣṭayati / yathā mahābhūtāni bhautikeṣv anu sṛṣṭer anantaram praviṣṭāni teṣūpalabhyamānatvāt, apraviṣṭāni ca prāḡ eva kāraṇatayā teṣu vidyamānatvāt, tathā teṣu bhūtabhautikeṣv ahaṁ na ca teṣv ahaṁ / evambhūtā mama sattety arthaḥ //*

Whereas Madhva and Vijayadhvaṇa explain the analogy of the great elements (*mahābhūtas*) in terms of their all-pervasiveness, Śrīdhara explains *mahābhūtas* in terms of the causal relation between the great elements and beings. Before creation, since the great elements exist as the cause, they are not inside beings. After creation, however, the elements are inside beings in the sense that these elements materialize into the physical manifestations of beings.<sup>97</sup> In a similar manner, the Lord is not inside beings before creation but is in them after creation. How the Lord is outside and inside beings will be explained in Śrīdhara's commentary on the next verse.

(c) *Jīva*

As in his commentary on the second verse of the CaśloBhā, Jīva's commentary on the third verse is unique and independent from what his predecessors wrote. His main discussion concerns the concept of *prema*. However, Jīva tries to justify his interpretation in relation to Śrīdhara's commentary.

In the context of Indian intellectual thought, the goals of human life are usually defined as *kāma* (sensual enjoyment), *artha* (material prosperity), *dharma* (moral pursuit), and *mokṣa* (liberation). The first three goals are seen as mundane, but the last as supramundane. All the schools of Vedānta, both Advaita and Vaiṣṇava, consider *mokṣa* the highest goal of human life, although the precise nature of the liberated stage differs in each school. However, the Gauḍīyas consider *prema* the fifth and highest goal of life (*pañcamapurūṣārtha*), even higher than *mokṣa* (Gupta 1998: 169). In this regard, Rūpa says in his BhaRaASi 1.1.33 that devotion to the Lord causes a devotee to disregard *mokṣa* (*mokṣalaghutākṛt*): 'When the heart is filled with even a little love for the Lord, the four goals of life (culminating in *mokṣa*) turn to nothing but straw' (Rūpa 2003: 9).<sup>98</sup>

The word 'love (*rati*)' used in this verse denotes a preliminary stage of a devotee's attachment to the Lord, which becomes *prema* when it matures. According to Rūpa, the joy of love of God is so great that even a slight manifestation of it is enough to diminish the attraction to other goals of life. Toward the end of Jīva's commentary on the second verse of the CaśloBhā, he explains that the Lord speaks about *māyā* so that the living entity can overcome it and experience *prema*. Jīva states that this *prema*, or supreme love of God, is the subject matter of the third verse: 'Now, by saying *yathā*

<sup>97</sup> As Sheridan suggests, in this part of Śrīdhara's commentary he does seem to accept the Sāṅkhya theory of causation (1994: 64).

<sup>98</sup> *manāḥ eva prarūḍhāyām hṛdaye bhagavadratau / puruṣārthās tu catvārās tṛṇāyante samantataḥ //*



*mahānti*, [the Lord] teaches that this same *prema* is the secret.<sup>99</sup> This is contrary to Śrīdhara's commentary because Śrīdhara says that this verse describes the Lord's nature (*yathābhāva*), which He mentions in BhāPu 2.9.31. Jīva is aware of his divergence and tries to justify his interpretation later in his commentary. Meanwhile, Jīva offers two interpretations of the verse. The first interpretation is as follows:

Just as the *mahābhūtas* {*mahānti bhūtāni*}, though outside {*apraviṣṭāni*} beings {*bhūteṣu*}, appear inside {*anupraviṣṭāni*} beings {*bhūteṣu*}, in the same way even though [I] have not entered, inasmuch as [I am] situated in *Vaikuṇṭha*, which is beyond the mundane realm, I {*aḥam*}, situated in the heart, enter and appear in those who have bowed down {*nateṣu*}, who are famous for various virtues {*teṣu*}.<sup>100</sup>

Exegetically speaking, Jīva's contribution is that he interprets *nateṣu* in the fourth *pāda* as one word, meaning 'those who have bowed down'. This differs from interpreting the phrase as two words '*na teṣu* (not in them)' as Madhva and Śrīdhara do. Jīva also understands the pronoun *teṣu* in the sense of *prasiddha* (well known).<sup>101</sup>

Consequently, Jīva's interpretation of the verse differs significantly from that of his predecessors. Whereas Madhva and Śrīdhara say that the verse teaches about the Lord's all-pervasiveness, according to Jīva the meaning of this verse is that the Lord resides both in *Vaikuṇṭha* and in the heart of His devotees who have bowed down (*nata*) to Him. Therefore, Jīva says, the verse teaches about the devotees' supreme devotion (*premabhakti*), which causes the Lord to appear in their heart: 'Thus in this way, it is hinted that they [i.e. those who have bowed down to the Lord] have the secret, which is *premabhakti* of such kind, which subjugates Myself [i.e. the Lord].'<sup>102</sup>

To justify this point, Jīva then quotes two verses from the BraSa:

And in this way, it is said in the *Brahmasamhitā*; 'I worship Govinda, the primordial person, who is the self of all, who indeed stays in *Goloka* only, in His own form, together with those parts [i.e. the *Gopīs*] who are counter suffused with the *rasa* of bliss and consciousness.' 'I worship Govinda, the primordial

<sup>99</sup> *atha tasyaiva premṇo rahasyatvaṃ bodhayati 'yathā mahānti' iti /*

<sup>100</sup> *yathā mahānti bhūtāni ([mahānti bhūtāni] KraSa; mahābhūtāni BhaSa) bhūteṣv apraviṣṭāni bahiḥsthitāny apy anupraviṣṭāni antaḥsthitāni ([anupraviṣṭāny antaḥsthitāni] BhaSa; anupraviṣṭāni KraSa) bhānti tathā lokātītavaikuṇṭhasthitatvenāpraviṣṭo ([-sthitatvenāpraviṣṭo] BhaSa; -sthitatvenāpraviṣṭe KraSa) 'py aḥam teṣu tattadgunavikhyāteṣu nateṣu prajātajaneṣu praviṣṭo hr̥disthito 'ham bhāmi /*

<sup>101</sup> For example, *sa* in the sentence *so rājāḥ* expresses that the king is famous.

<sup>102</sup> *tad evaṃ teṣāṃ tādṛg ātmavaśākārīṇī premabhaktir nāma rahasyam iti sūcitam /* The BhāSaA suggests *ātma* here means 'the Lord': *sutarām jis premabhakti—mamatva kā sañcāra jīvaḥr̥daya hone se śrībhagavān vaśibhūta hote haiṃ / prajāta jīva ke hr̥daya meṃ bhagavadvaśīkārīṇī ukta bhakti vidyamāna rahati hai / isse ukta premabhakti kī parama rahasyatā sūcita hote haiṃ //* But *ātma* can refer to *nata*, i.e. those who bow down to the Lord.

person, whose qualities and nature are paradoxical, who is blackish and beautiful, whom saintly people certainly always behold even in [their] heart through the eyes of devotion anointed with the ointment of *prema*.<sup>103</sup>

The first quotation establishes that the Lord resides in the transcendental realm. This corresponds to the first part of the analogy that just as the great elements are outside beings, the Lord resides outside beings. The second quotation corresponds to the second part of the analogy that just as the great elements reside inside beings, the Lord appears inside the devotees. Furthermore, the latter quotation links the internal manifestation of the Lord with His devotees' supreme love for Him. Therefore, according to Jīva, the third verse of the CaśloBhā teaches *prema*, even though *prema* is not explicitly mentioned in the verse itself: 'Even though His qualities and nature are paradoxical, [the saintly people see the Lord] by the sight whose nature is devotion, which is shining intensely, as if being anointed by the ointment called *prema*. This is the meaning.'<sup>104</sup>

Jīva offers another interpretation of the third verse. According to the second interpretation, what is implied in the third verse is also *prema*:

Or else, just as they [i.e. the *mahābhūtas*] manifest in them [i.e. in various beings] both externally and internally, in the same way in devotees also, I appear in the activities of the mind which are internal and in the activities of the senses which are external. Thus, for devotees, the cause for [their] activities being undistracted in every respect is certainly the extraordinary self-luminous thing called *prema*, which has the nature of bliss, and which is My secret. Thus it is implied.<sup>105</sup>

Jīva writes that for devotees, both their internal and external activities are undistracted because the Lord manifests in these activities. According to Jīva, the reason the Lord appears in the activities of the devotees is because they have intense love of God. Jīva cites BhāPu 2.6.33 to elucidate this point:

<sup>103</sup> *tathā ca brahmasaṃhitāyām,*  
 'ānandacinmayarasapratibhāvitābhis tābhir ya eva nijarūpatayā kalābhīḥ /  
 goḷoka eva nivasaty akhilātmabhūto govindam ādipuruṣaṃ tam ahaṃ bhajāmi //  
 premāñjanacchuritabhaktivilocanena santaḥ sadaiva hṛdaye 'pi vilokayanti /  
 yaṃ ([yaṃ] BhaSa; te KraSa) śyāmasundaram acintyaḥśvarūpaṃ govindam ādipuruṣaṃ tam  
 ahaṃ bhajāmi //' (BraSa 5.29–30) iti /

<sup>104</sup> *acintyaḥśvarūpaṃ api premākhyam yad añjanam tena cchuritavat uccaiḥ ([añjanam  
 tena cchuritavat uccaiḥ] BhaSa; añjanacchuritavad uccaiḥ KraSa) prakāśamānam bhaktirūpaṃ  
 vilocanam tenety arthaḥ / ([arthaḥ] KraSa; arthaḥ / ye bhajanti ca mām bhaktyā mayi te teṣu cāpy  
 aham / iti gītapaniṣadaś ca / BhaSa).*

<sup>105</sup> *yad vā teṣu yathā tāni bahiḥsthitāni cāntaḥsthitāni ca bhānti tathā ([tathā] KraSa; tadvat  
 BhaSa) bhakteṣv apy ([bhakteṣv apy] KraSa; bhakteṣu BhaSa) aham antarmānavṛttiṣu bahirin-  
 driyavṛttiṣu ca viṣṭurāmīti ([viṣṭurāmīti] KraSa; viṣṭurāmīti ca BhaSa) bhakteṣu sarvathā  
 'nanyavṛttitāhetur nāma kim api svaprakāśam premākhyam ānandātmakam vastu mama raha-  
 syam iti vyañjitam /*

O Nārada, my speech is not found to be false, nor does my mind go anywhere in vain, nor do my senses fall on the path of untruth since I bear Hari with a mind full of longing for [Him].<sup>106</sup>

This is a statement of Brahmā to Nārada. In this verse, Brahmā says that his internal and external activities are free from any mistakes because his heart is full of longing for the Lord (*hr̥dautkaṇṭhyavatā*). From the context, Jīva seems to take this 'longing for the Lord' as semantically equivalent to *prema*.

In both interpretations, it is clear that, according to Jīva, the third verse of the CaśloBhā teaches about *prema* even though *prema* is not explicitly mentioned. This is Jīva's unique contribution since neither Madhva nor Śrīdhara mentions *prema*. Jīva, however, is aware that this uniqueness can be seen as a deviation from his main predecessor, namely Śrīdhara. Since Caitanya accepted Śrīdhara's commentary as the best commentary on the BhāPu, Jīva evidently feels the need to justify his deviation:

Even though this meaning may be denied in accordance with another interpretation,<sup>107</sup> even then the true intention must be in this meaning alone, because of the fact that [this passage] has been undertaken to establish the fourfold propositions which were promised, and because of the fact that [this passage] is in the order of it [i.e. in the order of *jñānam*, *viññānam*, *rahasyam*, and *tadaṅga*].<sup>108</sup>

Śrīdhara says that the third verse of the CaśloBhā is about the Lord's all-pervasive nature, since in BhāPu 2.9.31 the Lord says that He will reveal what His nature is (*yathābhāva*). However, Jīva offers a different interpretation and says that this third verse corresponds to 'the secret (*rahasya*)', which the Lord mentions in BhāPu 2.9.30. There the Lord says that He will reveal four things to Brahmā, namely knowledge (*jñāna*), insight (*viññāna*), a secret (*rahasya*), and their subsidiaries (*tadaṅga*).<sup>109</sup> Jīva argues that the four verses of the CaśloBhā should correspond to these four things. Since BhāPu 2.9.34 is the third verse, it should correspond to the secret mentioned in BhāPu 2.9.30. Thus, Jīva attempts to justify his deviation from Śrīdhara by citing a verse from the BhāPu.

<sup>106</sup> *na bhārati me 'nga mṛṣopalakṣyate na vai kvacin me manaso mṛṣā gatīḥ / na me hr̥ṣīkāṇi patanty asatpathe yan me hr̥dautkaṇṭhyavatā dhṛto hariḥ //*

<sup>107</sup> This refers to the interpretation offered by Śrīdhara.

<sup>108</sup> *yady api vyākhyāntarānusāreṇāyam artho 'palapanīyaḥ syāt tathāpy asminn evārthe tātparyam pratijñācatuṣṭayasāadhanāyopakrāntatvāt tadanukramagatatvāc ca /*

<sup>109</sup> *jñānam paramaguhyam me yadvijñānasamanvitam / sarahasyam tadaṅgam ca grhāṇa gaditam mayā //*

Jīva also tries to justify his interpretation from an exegetical viewpoint:

Furthermore, in that meaning [i.e. according to the interpretation of Śrīdhara], it would be pointless to the expression ‘*na teṣu*’ with its words divided, because [in that interpretation,] only the example can be connected with two activities.<sup>110</sup>

Jīva here argues that his interpretation, which takes *nateṣu* in the fourth *pāda* as one word, is superior to Śrīdhara’s interpretation, which takes it as two words: *na teṣu*. The verse says:

*yathā mahānti bhūtāni bhūteṣūccāvaceṣu ca /  
praviṣṭāny apraviṣṭāni tathā teṣu na teṣv aham //*

The first three *pādas* describe an analogy, which says ‘Just as {*yathā*} the great elements {*mahānti bhūtāni*} enter {*praviṣṭāni*} and {*ca*} do not enter {*apraviṣṭāni*} into various beings {*bhūteṣūccāvaceṣu*}.’ Up to this point, Jīva’s interpretation is more or less identical with Śrīdhara’s. However, according to Śrīdhara, the fourth *pāda* means ‘In the same way {*tathā*} I am {*aham*} in them {*teṣu*} and not {*na*} in them {*teṣu*} (*tathā aham bhagavān praviṣṭas teṣūccāvaceṣu bhūteṣu na ca praviṣṭas teṣūccāvaceṣu bhūteṣu*).’ According to Jīva, the fourth *pāda* means ‘In the same way {*tathā*} I {*aham*} enter and do not enter into those {*teṣu*} who have bowed down {*nateṣu*} (*tathā aham bhagavān praviṣṭo ’praviṣṭas ca teṣu nateṣu*).’

In Śrīdhara’s interpretation, the two actions of entering and non-entering (*praviṣṭāny apraviṣṭāni*) in the analogy cannot be applied directly to the fourth *pāda* because he interprets *na teṣu* as two words. In other words, non-entering (*apraviṣṭāni*) in the pair of *praviṣṭāny–apraviṣṭāni* becomes superfluous in relation to the fourth *pāda*, *tathā teṣu na teṣv aham*, since there is already negation *na* in *na teṣu*. According to Jīva’s interpretation, however, these two actions can be applied directly in relation to the fourth *pāda* since he takes *nateṣu* as one word. Thus, Jīva believes his interpretation is superior to Śrīdhara, as it draws a clearer parallel between the great elements and beings on the one hand, and the Lord and the devotees on the other.

After offering scriptural and exegetical justifications, Jīva offers yet another reason why, although it is not mentioned, *prema* is the subject matter of the third verse. According to Jīva, the idea of *prema* is not shown in the verse precisely because it is the highest secret, which needs to be protected like a precious jewel:

Moreover, what is called the secret indeed is only this, which is a thing very difficult to obtain, which is concealed by a common thing for the sake of keeping

<sup>110</sup> *kiñca* ([*kiñca*] KraSa; *kiṃ* BhaSa) *tasminn arthe na teṣv iti cchinna-padam api vyartham syāt drṣṭāntasyaiva kriyābhyām anvayopapattēh /*

away the sight of people who are bad or indifferent, just like a *Cintāmaṇi* jewel is concealed by a casket and so on.<sup>111</sup>

Though not clearly stated, Jīva is still discussing Śrīdhara's interpretation in relation to his own. From Jīva's perspective, while Śrīdhara's interpretation is a viable option, it conceals the real meaning of the third verse, which is *prema*. Therefore, Jīva compares Śrīdhara's interpretation to a casket and so on, which conceals a precious jewel from the sight of ordinary or bad people. In other words, according to Jīva, Śrīdhara offers an exoteric interpretation, which is perfectly acceptable both exegetically and theologically but is inferior. In contrast, Jīva says that he offers a superior, esoteric interpretation of the verse, which reveals the most valuable secret. Thus, Jīva offers a way to justify both commentators' interpretations.

Jīva goes on to explain, by citing from the BhāPu, why *prema* or love of God is the highest secret. He first defines that what is secret must be (1) not to be given; (2) not well disseminated; (3) a great thing.<sup>112</sup> He cites BhāPu 5.6.18d, 6.14.5a, 3.25.34b to illustrate that devotion to the Lord fulfills these three categories:

The fact that it [i.e. the secret] is not to be given, rarely manifest, and great, is clear everywhere, in statements such as: 'O King! The Lord is the protector, the competent teacher, the object of worship, the friend, the head of the family, and sometimes a servant for you and the Yadus. Let Him be in this way indeed! The giver of liberation (Mukunda)) gives liberation {*mukti*} to those who worship [Him] but never the *yoga* of devotion.'<sup>113</sup> 'O great sage! Even among ten millions) perfected ones who are liberated, (someone who is sorely devoted to Nārāyaṇa, whose nature is calm, is very rare.)'<sup>114</sup> '[Causeless] devotion to the Lord is more important than perfection. [It quickly burns the sheath (of the body) just as fire (in the stomach quickly burns) the remnants (of food)].'<sup>115/116</sup>

The first citation says that the Lord gives liberation but not devotion to Him. The second citation states that devotion to the Lord is rarely found. The last verse illustrates the idea that devotion to the Lord is greater even than perfection. Thus, Jīva explains that devotion to the Lord is what is called secret

<sup>111</sup> *api ca rahasyaṃ nāma hy etad eva yat paramadurlabhaṃ vastu duṣṭodāsīnanajanadṛṣṭini-vāraṇārthaṃ sādharmaṇavastvantareṇācchādyate yathā cintāmaṇiḥ sampuṭādinā /*

<sup>112</sup> *tad eva ca paroḁṣaṃ kriyate yad adeyaṃ viralapracāraṃ mahadvastu bhavati /*

<sup>113</sup> *rājan paṭir gurur alaṃ bhavatāṃ yadūnāṃ daivam priyaḥ kulapatih kva ca kiṅkaro vaḥ / astv evam aṅga bhagavān bhajatāṃ mukundo muktiṃ dadāti karhicit sma na bhaktiyogam //* This is about *adeyatva*.

<sup>114</sup> *muktānāṃ api siddhānāṃ nārāyaṇaparāyaṇaḥ / sudurlabhaḥ praśāntātmā koṭiṣv api mahāmune //* This is about *viralapracāratva*.

<sup>115</sup> *animittā bhāgavatī bhaktiḥ siddher gariyasi / jarayaty āśu yā koṣaṃ nigīrṇam analo yathā //* This is about *mahattva*.

<sup>116</sup> *asyaivādeyatvaṃ viralapracāratvaṃ ([-pracāratvaṃ] KraSa; -vicāratvaṃ BhaSa) mahattvaṇ ca 'muktiṃ dadāti karhicit sma na bhaktiyogam' ityādaḥ 'muktānāṃ api siddhānāṃ' ityādaḥ 'bhaktiḥ siddher gariyasi' ityādaḥ ca sarvatra vyaktam /*

because it fulfills the definition. To solidify his point, Jīva further quotes BhāPu 2.7.51–2:

It was glorious Brahmā who revealed this very secret to glorious Nārada; ‘This *Bhāgavata* indeed is what was spoken to me by the Lord. This is the collection of riches. You should spread this in such a manner that mankind will have devotion to Lord Hari, who is the self of all and the support of the universe. Desiring in this way, you should describe [this *Bhāgavata*].’<sup>117</sup>

According to Jīva, therefore, the highest secret taught in the third verse of the CaŚloBhā is *prema* or devotion to God, and that is the essence of the entire BhāPu, which was originally revealed by the Lord to Brahmā, and which Brahmā subsequently taught to his son, Nārada.

According to the *Purāṇa*, this secret teaching of devotion was then taught by Nārada to Vyāsa, who wrote down the teaching in the form of the *Purāṇa*. Śrīdhara was the first to give a full commentary on the *Purāṇa*. Caitanya accepted the *Purāṇa* as the highest scripture, and Śrīdhara as the best commentator on it. Thus, to demonstrate that he is, ultimately, not contradicting Śrīdhara, Jīva offers scriptural, exegetical, and theological justifications for his own interpretation of the third verse of the CaŚloBhā, even though his interpretation differs substantially from that of his predecessor.

This is observed at the end of Jīva’s commentary on the third verse, wherein he says: ‘Therefore, it is well explained by [Śrīdhara] Svāmī also, stating “devotion is the secret”.’<sup>118</sup> Here, Jīva refers to Śrīdhara’s commentary on BhāPu 2.9.30, wherein Śrīdhara identifies devotion to the Lord with the secret. Jīva’s basic interpretation that the third verse of the CaŚloBhā corresponds to the third item mentioned in BhāPu 2.9.30 is contrary to Śrīdhara’s view that it corresponds to *yathābhāva* of BhāPu 2.9.31. However, it is clear that Jīva tries his best to demonstrate his conformity to Śrīdhara.

In conclusion, the four commentaries may be contrasted with each other as follows:

Jīva offers an exegetically as well as theologically distinct interpretation on the third verse. Exegetically, Madhva and Śrīdhara read *na teṣu* as two words whereas Jīva reads them as one word. This generates a significant theological

<sup>117</sup> *idam eva rahasyam śrīnārādāya svayaṁ śrībrahmaṇaiva prakāṣṭam /*

*‘idam bhāgavatam nāma yan me bhagavatoditam /*

*saṁgraho ‘yam vibhūtinām tvam etad vipulīkuru //*

*yathā harau bhagavati nṛṇām bhaktir bhaviṣyati /*

*sarvātmany aṅghilādhāre ([aṅghilādhāre] BhaSa; aṅghilādhāra KraSa) iti saṅkalpya varṇaya //*

<sup>118</sup> *tasmāt sādhu vyākhyātam svāmīcaranair api ‘rahasyam bhaktir’([rahasyam bhaktir] BhaSa; rahasyabhaktir KraSa) iti //*

<i>Theological</i>	
Madhva / Vijayadhvaja	- All-pervasiveness of the Lord is explained based on the analogy of all-pervasiveness of great elements in the beings.
Śrīdhara	- All-pervasiveness of the Lord is explained based on the analogy of the causal relation between great elements and the beings.
Jīva	- The most secret teaching ( <i>rahasya</i> ) of the BhāPu is the supreme love of the Lord ( <i>prema</i> ).
<i>Exegetical</i>	
Madhva / Vijayadhvaja	<i>teṣu na teṣu</i> : the Lord is in the beings and not in the beings.
Śrīdhara	<i>teṣu na teṣu</i> : the Lord is in the beings and not in the beings. - BhāPu 2.9.34 explains the Lord's nature ( <i>yathābhāva</i> ) mentioned in BhāPu 2.9.31.
Jīva	<i>teṣu nateṣu</i> : the Lord is in those who bowed down, who are famous for their virtues. - Jīva tries to show that his interpretation is not contrary to Śrīdhara's. - BhāPu 2.9.34 explains the secret ( <i>rahasya</i> ) mentioned in BhāPu 2.9.30.
<i>Stylistic</i>	
Madhva / Vijayadhvaja	- Madhva's commentary is extremely short, almost enigmatic. - Vijayadhvaja supplements Madhva's commentary.

difference. In relation to Śrīdhara, Jīva strives to demonstrate his conformity. In relation to Madhva, however, Jīva does not seem to worry about his divergence at all. It is significant that Jīva considers *prema* the meaning of the third verse. Neither Madhva nor Śrīdhara discusses the idea of *prema*. This is a distinctly Gauḍīya idea promoted by Rūpa, who was Jīva's uncle and his predecessor. While trying to be faithful to Śrīdhara, Jīva is not backward in expressing doctrine unique to the Gauḍīya school.

### 3.6. THE FOURTH VERSE (BHĀGAVATA PURĀṆA 2.9.35)

The fourth and last verse of the CaśloBhā is as follows:

*etāvad eva jijñāsyam tattvajijñāsunātmanah /  
anvayavyatirekābhyām yat syāt sarvatra sarvadā // 35 //*

One who wishes to know the reality of the self should know only this much: It exists everywhere at all time through connection and exclusion.

Madhva and Vijayadhva explain the verse as follows:

That which is pervaded in all places and in all time, with the natures of place and time which are connected with and not connected with some other entity, that much only should be deliberated on as My nature, by you who desire to know the truth of the Supreme Self.

Śrīdhara:

He who desires to know the reality of the self should deliberate only this: the self always exists everywhere because it exists in the wakening state and so on and because it exists in *samādhi*.

Jīva:

*Bhakti* is the reality, which is one only, which is always present everywhere through positive and negative statements. This much only is to be learned by someone who is desirous of experiencing the true nature of Me.

The four commentaries are examined below.

#### (a) Madhva and Vijayadhva

Madhva's commentary is again extremely short and almost unintelligible. He simply explains the compound *anvayavyatirekābhyām*: '*anvayavyatireka* means that It [i.e. Brahman] is the possessor of energy which exists and does not exist at time and place where there is existence and non-existence of anything else'.<sup>119</sup>

The compound is the most difficult part of the verse but Madhva's commentary is too short to clarify the matter. Again, Vijayadhva's commentary provides a further insight. He gives the following gloss on the verse:

[The Lord] concludes [His] teaching, consisting in clarifying [His] pervasion, which was spoken [before], by the statement beginning with *etāvad*. That which is pervaded in all places {*sarvatra*}, in all time {*sarvadā*}, with the natures of place and time which are connected with and not connected with some other entity {*anvayavyatirekābhyām*}, that much only {*etāvad eva*} should be deliberated on {*jijñāsyam*} as my nature, by you who desire to know the truth {*tattvajijñāsunā*} of the Supreme Self {*ātmanah*}.<sup>120</sup>

<sup>119</sup> *anyabhāvābhāvakāle deśe ca tad vidyamānāvidyamānaśaktimad* ([*vidyamānāvidyamānaśaktimad*] em. Isaacson; *vidyamānāvidyamānaśaktimān* G, *vidyamānāśaktimad* P) *ity anvayavyatirekaḥ* //

<sup>120</sup> *uktavyāptisphuṭikarānapūrvakam upadeśam upasamharati 'etāvad' iti / yad vastu sarvatra* ([*sarvatra*] em. Isaacson; *sarvajñe*) *sarvadeśe sarvadā sarvasmin kāle cānvayavyatirekābhyām vastvantarānvitānanvita* ([*vastv-*] em. Isaacson; *avastv-* G, P) *deśakālasvarūpābhyām vyāptam syād etāvad eva matsvarūpam ātmanah paramātmanas tattvajijñāsunā tvayā jijñāsyam vicāryam syād ity anvayaḥ* /



According to Madhva, the third verse teaches that the Lord, like the great elements, is all-pervading. Vijayadhvaṇa says that this fourth verse teaches the same point but as a conclusion (*upasaṃharati*).<sup>121</sup> It teaches that the Lord is all-pervading in time and space. Vijayadhvaṇa glosses the difficult compound *anvaya-vyatirekābhyaṃ* as ‘with the natures of place and time which are connected with and not connected with some other entity’. While it is still slightly ambiguous as to what exactly this compound is supposed to mean, the basic idea seems to be that the Lord is all-pervading since whenever and wherever there is something, He exists in that time and place, and whenever and wherever He does not exist, nothing exists in that time and place. The former thesis signifies a positive concomitance (*anvaya-vyāpti*) and the latter a negative concomitance (*vyatirekavyāpti*).

As Sheridan points out, *anvaya-vyatireka* is a Nyāya terminology denoting logical concomitance, which is the basis of an inference (1994: 61). According to the Naiyāyika, five steps (*avayavas*) are necessary to prove an inference: (1) the establishment of the proposition (*pratijñā*); (2) the reason (*hetu/linga*); (3) the example (*udāharaṇa/dṛṣṭānta*); (4) the application (*upanaya*); (5) the conclusion (*niḡamana*). The standard example is an inference proving the existence of fire on a distant hill:

- (1) there is a fire on this hill
- (2) because there is smoke
- (3) just as in the kitchen, wherever there is smoke, there is fire
- (4) there is also smoke accompanied by fire on this hill
- (5) there is a fire on this hill

According to this inference, the third step is the most significant since the validity of the inference is entirely dependent on it. The concept of *anvaya-vyatireka* applies here. In the example, the positive concomitance (*anvaya-vyāpti*) refers to ‘Wherever there is smoke, there is fire’, and the negative concomitance (*vyatirekavyāpti*) refers to ‘Wherever there is no fire there is no smoke’. Due to these positive and negative concomitances, it is possible to infer that there is a fire on the hill. In the commentaries of Madhva and Vijayadhvaṇa the message of the fourth verse concerns the Lord’s all-pervasive nature taught through inference, which is based on the two concomitances indicated by the compound *anvaya-vyatirekābhyaṃ*.

### (b) Śrīdhara

In his commentary on the third verse of the CaśloBhā, Śrīdhara, using the analogy of a causal relationship, explained the all-pervasive nature of the Lord.

<sup>121</sup> It seems Vijayadhvaṇa agrees with Śrīdhara’s view that the message of the Lord is revealed in these four verses (BhāPu 2.9.32–5) although Madhva does not specify these verses as such.

In the state of effects the great elements exist in beings but in the state of cause they do not exist in beings. In the same way, the Lord exists in beings in the state of effects but does not exist in beings in the state of cause. In his commentary on the fourth verse, Śrīdhara further elaborates on this analogy of causal relationship using the concept of continuation (*anvaya*) and distinction (*vyatireka*):

[The Lord] speaks of the means to obtain [such knowledge about the self]. He who desires to know the reality of the self should deliberate that [the self is] in such a state. [The Lord speaks] only about that. *Anvaya* means the continuation in the effects as the cause. And *vyatireka* means [distinction] from them [i.e. from the effects] in the state of the cause. In a similar way, the continuation {*anvaya*} [of the self] as the witness of various things in the states of waking and so on. And the distinction {*vyatireka*} [of the self from these states] in *samādhi* and so on. In this way, that which exists everywhere and always through continuation and distinction, that only is the self.<sup>122</sup>

Śrīdhara explains that the self exists always and everywhere and this is known through continuation (*anvaya*) and distinction (*vyatireka*). In this context, continuation means that the cause continues to exist in the state of the effects, and distinction means the cause in the state of the cause is distinct from the effects.

This indeed is the view according to *satkāryavāda*. In the analogy the great elements, which are the cause of the physical manifestation of beings, continue to exist in those beings, which are the effects of the great elements. Before creation, however, the great elements, which are in the state of the cause, exist separately from the beings. These two states, namely the great elements existing within beings and their separation from beings correspond to *teṣu na teṣu* in the fourth *pāda* of the third verse. In the same way, the self, which is the cause of the waking state and so on, continues to exist in the states of waking, dreaming, and sleeping. At the same time, the self in its original state exists separately from the waking states and so on. According to Śrīdhara, such an original state of the self is called *samādhi*. Thus, Śrīdhara uses the fourth verse of the CaśloBhā to clarify the analogy of causal relationship used in the third verse.

In the third verse, it was explained that the Lord, like the great elements, exists and does not exist in beings. However, the third verse did not make it clear exactly how this is so. The fourth verse, therefore, explains that the self exists in beings during the waking state and so on in the sense that the self is aware of its embodied nature. In its original state, which is *samādhi*, however, the self does not exist in beings in the sense that the self is separated from the physical elements and is not affected by them. The correlation between these two verses may become clearer in the following chart:

<sup>122</sup> *sādhanaṃ āha / ātmanas tattvajijñāsunā etāvattvaṃ eva jijñāsyam vicāryam / tad evāha / anvayaḥ kāryeṣu kāraṇatvenānuvṛttiḥ / kāraṇāvasthāyān ca tebhyo vyatirekaḥ / tathā jāgradādyavasthāsu tattatsākṣitayānvayaḥ / vyatirekaś ca samādhyātau / evam anvayavyatirekābhyāṃ yat syāt sarvatra sarvadā ca tad evātmēti //*

The third verse (BhāPu 2.9.34)		
Analogy		What is described by the analogy
The cause	The great elements are outside beings { <i>na teṣu</i> }	The Lord is outside beings
The effects	The great elements are inside beings { <i>teṣu</i> }	The Lord is inside beings
The fourth verse (BhāPu 2.9.35)		
Analogy		What is described by the analogy
The cause	The cause is outside the effects { <i>vyatireka</i> }	The self is separate from the body ( <i>samādhi</i> )
The effects	The cause is inside the effects { <i>anvaya</i> }	The self is in the body (in the waking state etc.)

According to Śrīdhara, therefore, the fourth verse teaches that the self (*ātman*) exists always and everywhere. From Śrīdhara's commentary, however, it is unclear whether his idea of the self refers to the Lord or the living entity. Consequently, it is ambiguous as to exactly how Śrīdhara understands the relationship between the two. From the monistic elements in his commentary it is clear that he is not a dualist like Madhva. However, his commentary seems to reflect both the *abheda* and *bhedābheda* views.

Sheridan writes that Śrīdhara understands the term *anvayavyatireka* in the sense used in logical inference. Consequently, he translates *anvaya* as positive concomitance and *vyatireka* as negative concomitance (1994: 64). As has been pointed out, *anvayavyatireka* is a technical term describing concomitances, which are the basis of any inference. Madhva and Vijayadhva understand the term in that sense. However, this is not how Śrīdhara interprets the term. Considering the connection between Śrīdhara's commentary on the third and fourth verses, it is clear that what he wants to discuss by the term *anvayavyatireka* is not positive and negative concomitances but the relationship between cause and effect according to the *satkāryavāda*. This becomes clear upon examining Śrīdhara's definitions of *anvaya* and *vyatireka*. In the context of an inference, positive and negative concomitances can be stated as follows:

When A exists, B exists (*anvaya*).

When B does not exist, A does not exist (*vyatireka*).

According to Śrīdhara, *anvaya* in the fourth verse means 'the continuation in the effects as the cause'. If this is a part of an inference, this definition can be restated as follows:

When the effects exist, the cause exists (in the effects).

If Śrīdhara understood this as a positive concomitance, he should have defined the negative concomitance as:

When the cause does not exist, the effects do not exist.

While this is not against his *satkāryavāda*, it is not what he writes. Instead, he defines *vyatireka* as ‘the distinction from the effects in the state of the cause’, which may be restated as:

When the cause exists (as the cause), the effects do not exist.

It is thus clear that Śrīdhara’s understanding of *anvayavyatireka* is not used in the sense of an inference.

Sheridan also understands that the self in the waking state and so on and the self in *samādhi* and so on are two examples of *anvaya* and *vyatireka* (1994: 64). However, if we consider Śrīdhara’s commentary on the third and fourth verses together, it is clear that it is the other way around. It is not that the different states of the self are used to describe *anvaya* and *vyatireka*. Rather, Śrīdhara uses the relation between the cause and effects, explained by the term *anvayavyatireka*, as an analogy to describe how the self exists in different states. From the last sentence of Śrīdhara’s commentary on the fourth verse, we understand that it is the self, not *anvayavyatireka*, which is the main subject of the discussion. Therefore, the different states of the self are what Śrīdhara wants to describe using an analogy and are not an analogy themselves.

### (c) Jīva

According to Madhva and Vijayadhvaja, the fourth verse of the CaśloBhā teaches about the all-pervasive nature of the Lord through positive and negative concomitances. For Śrīdhara, the verse teaches about the all-pervasive nature of the self or of the Lord through the analogy of causal relationship according to *satkāryavāda*. In Jīva’s view, the verse teaches about the all-pervasive nature of devotion to the Lord, based on positive and negative statements. Jīva’s understanding of *anvayavyatireka* thus differs from those of his predecessors.

Moreover, unlike Śrīdhara, Jīva again emphasizes the distinction between the living entity and the Lord and says that the CaśloBhā teaches about the Lord. Furthermore, Jīva argues that the Lord who spoke these four verses is not Nārāyaṇa but Kṛṣṇa. Although Jīva’s commentary on the fourth verse does not follow Śrīdhara at all, at the end of his commentary Jīva praises Śrīdhara’s commentary to show respect.

Jīva begins his commentary on the fourth verse by defining its scope:

Now, by this verse [starting with] *etāvad eva*, [the Lord] teaches about the auxiliary part of it [i.e. of *prema*] as nothing but the secret, because [the auxiliary

part] ultimately accomplishes the secret, which is [the current topic] obtained according to the order.<sup>123</sup>

As seen in his commentary on the third verse, Jīva holds that the four verses of the CaśloBhā correspond to the four points mentioned in BhāPu 2.9.30, namely knowledge (*jñāna*), insight (*viññāna*), secret (*rahasya*), and their subsidiaries (*tadaṅga*). Since this is the fourth verse, Jīva says that it should explain the fourth item, the auxiliary. By the auxiliary, he means devotion (*bhakti*) to the Lord, which ultimately accomplishes the fifth and highest goal of human life, *prema*. Jīva diverges from Śrīdhara who says that the fourth verse teaches about the all-pervasiveness of the self or of the Lord.

Jīva interprets the fourth verse as follows:

This much only {*etāvad eva*} should be learnt from a revered teacher {*jijñāsyam*} by someone desirous of experiencing the true nature {*tattvajijñāsunā*} of Me, who is the Lord {*ātmanah*}. What is that? [*Bhakti* is] the reality which is one only {*yad*}, which is always present {*syāt*} everywhere {*sarvatra sarvadā*} through positive and negative statements {*anvayavyatirekābhyām*}.<sup>124</sup>

Exegetically, Jīva differs with Śrīdhara on two important points. First, Jīva specifies that in the second *pāda* *ātman* refers to the Lord (*bhagavān*). In Śrīdhara's commentary, *ātman* can be taken either as the Lord, the living entity, or both. This shows that Jīva is more dualistic than Śrīdhara. Another important point is that Jīva interprets the compound *anvayavyatireka* as injunctive and prohibitive statements (*vidhiniṣedha*). He glosses *anvaya* and *vyatireka* as *vidhi* and *niṣedha*, which in the context of Pūrvamīmāṃsā would be normally translated as injunction and prohibition. However, in this particular context I translate *vidhi* and *niṣedha* as 'injunctive statements' and 'prohibitive statements', to distinguish Jīva's usage of the words from the Pūrvamīmāṃsakas'.

In the Pūrvamīmāṃsā context the standard examples of injunctions and prohibitions are sentences such as *svargakāmo yajeta* (One who desires heaven should perform sacrifice), *surāṃ na pibet* (One should not drink alcohol). Those sentences typically contain verbs in the optative form (*liṅ*). In contrast, the examples Jīva gives to demonstrate *anvaya* and *vyatireka* are not typical injunctions and prohibitions in the Pūrvamīmāṃsā sense since

<sup>123</sup> *atha kramaprāptarahasyaparyantasādhakatvāt rahasyatvenaiva tadaṅgam upadiśati etāvad* ([*etāvad*] em.; *evāvad* KraSa) *eveti* /

<sup>124</sup> *ātmano mama bhagavatas tattvajijñāsunā yāthārthyam* ([*yāthārthyam*] KraSa; *premar-ūpaṃ rahasyam* BhakSa) *anubhavitum icchunā etāvad* ([*etāvad*] KraSa; *etāvan mātram* BhakSa) *eva jijñāsyam* ([*jijñāsyam*] KraSa; *jijñāsitavyam* BhakSa) *śrīgurucaraṇebhyaḥ śikṣaṇīyam / kiṃ tat? yad ekam eva vastu anvayavyatirekābhyām vidhiniṣedhābhyām sadā sarvatra* ([*vastu anvayavyatirekābhyām vidhiniṣedhābhyām sadā sarvatra*] KraSa; *anvayena vidhimukhena, vyatirekeṇa niṣedhamukhena ca* BhakSa) *syād upapadyate* /

they do not contain verbs in the optative form. Rather, Jīva's examples suggest one to perform devotion (*bhakti*) by positive and negative descriptions of *bhakti*. In other words, these examples are descriptive grammatically, but they are prescriptive in their contents.<sup>125</sup> Jīva's interpretation of the compound *anvayavyatireka* differs from Madhva, Vijayadhvaṇa, and Śrīdhara. According to Jīva, the fourth verse teaches something that is present always and everywhere, which is the means to accomplish *prema*, and this is proved by injunctive and prohibitive statements. Jīva then tries to establish that what is taught in this verse is devotion to the Lord (*bhakti*). The rest of his commentary consists of a series of citations mainly from the *Purāṇas*, especially the BhāPu, which both positively and negatively describe the omnipresence of devotion to the Lord.

By injunctive statements (*anvaya*), Jīva means the statements that describe the supremacy of devotion. For example, Jīva cites BhāPu 7.7.55: 'In this world, this much only is taught as the supreme self-interest of men: Exclusive devotion to Govinda, which is seeing Him everywhere.'<sup>126</sup> This verse teaches devotion to Govinda as the highest interest of mankind. By prohibitive statements (*vyatireka*), Jīva means the statements that teach the supremacy of devotion negatively. These statements generally put forward the idea that everything is fruitless if there is no devotion to the Lord. For example, Jīva cites BhāPu 11.5.2-3:

From the mouth, arms, thighs, and feet [of the primordial] Person, the four *varṇas*, such as the *Brāhmaṇas* were born separately according to the qualities, together with the four stages of life. Those who do not worship Him [or] those who despise Him who is the primordial person, the Lord, the one from whom there is a birth of themselves, they go down to hell after falling from [their] positions [i.e. their respective *varṇas* and *āśramas*].<sup>127</sup>

This verse teaches that following the order of *varṇa* and *āśrama* is useless without devotion to the Lord from whom the order originates. In a similar manner, Jīva quotes almost fifty verses, which describe both positively and negatively how devotion is present always and everywhere. A list of the verses quoted is given as follows:

<sup>125</sup> Therefore I choose to translate *anvaya* and *vyatireka* in Jīva's commentary as 'injunctive statements' and 'prohibitive statements'. In this translation 'statement' emphasizes their descriptive nature whereas the adjectives 'injunctive' and 'prohibitive' emphasize their prescriptive nature.

<sup>126</sup> *etāvān eva loke 'smin puṁsaḥ svārthaḥ paraḥ smṛtaḥ /  
ekāntabhaktir govinde yat sarvatra tadikṣaṇam //*

<sup>127</sup> *mukhabāhūrupādebhyaḥ puruṣasyāśramaiḥ saha /  
catvāro jajñire varṇā guṇair viprādayaḥ prthak //  
ya eṣāṃ puruṣaṃ sāksād ātmaprabhavam īśvaram /  
na bhajanty avajānanti sthānād bhraṣṭāḥ patanty adhaḥ //*

<i>Bhakti exists in</i>	Injunctive statements { <i>anvaya</i> }	Prohibitive statements { <i>vyatireka</i> }
General	BhaGī 9.24a (18.65a), 18.61 BhāPu 3.25.45a (6.3.22a, 7.7.55a)	BhaGī 7.15a BhāPu 3.9.10cd, 11.5.2a PaPu 7.85.33a
All scriptures ( <i>sarvaśāstreṣu</i> )	BhāPu 2.2.34 LiPu 2.7.11 (SkaPu Āvatya, 3.3.15, MaBhā 13.124.22) SkaPu ?? (HaBhaVi 11.201)	BhāPu 11.11.18 GaPu 1.227.16cd/17ab NāPu 1.30.111cd–112 PaPu <i>Uttaraṇḍa</i> 71.311
All agencies ( <i>sarvakartṛṣu</i> )	BhāPu 2.7.46 GaPu 1.230.31	BhāPu 2.4.17
- A well-behaved person and an ill-behaved person ( <i>sadācāre durācāre ca</i> )	BhaGī 9.30	
- A knowledgeable person and an ignorant person ( <i>jñāniny ajñānini ca</i> )	BhāPu 11.11.33a NāPu 1.11.100ab	
- A detached person and an attached person ( <i>virakte rāgiṇi ca</i> )	BhāPu 11.14.18	
- A person desirous of liberation and a person who is liberated ( <i>mumukṣau mukte ca</i> )	BhāPu 1.2.26a, 1.7.10a	
- A person who is not perfected in devotion and a person who is perfected in devotion ( <i>bhaktyasiddhe bhaktisiddhe ca</i> )	BhāPu 6.1.15ab, 11.2.53	
- A person who has obtained the state of being an associate of the Lord ( <i>bhagavatpārśadatām prāpte</i> )	BhāPu 9.4.67	
- A person who is an eternal associate of the Lord ( <i>nityapārśade</i> )	BhāPu 3.15.22a	
All places ( <i>sarvadeśeṣu</i> )		BhāPu 3.29.13a, 5.19.24, 10.59.41a
All sense faculties ( <i>sarvakaraṇeṣu</i> )	BhaRaASi 1.2.182	
All substances ( <i>sarvadravyeṣu</i> )	BhaGī 9.26ab	
All actions ( <i>sarvakriyāsu</i> )	BhaGī 9.27 BhāPu 11.2.12	BhāPu 7.7.52a

<i>Bhakti</i> exists in	Injunctive statements { <i>anvaya</i> }	Prohibitive statements { <i>vyatireka</i> }
All effects ( <i>sarvakāryeṣu</i> )	NāPu 1.17.108	BhāPu 1.5.12a
All results ( <i>sarvaphaleṣu</i> )	BhāPu 2.3.10a, 4.31.14a	BhāPu 3.15.48a
All the time ( <i>sarvadā</i> )	<i>Viṣṇudharma</i> 1.16 (GaPu 1.230.22, LiPu 1.73.22cd–23ab)	
- The beginning of creation ( <i>sargādau</i> )	BhāPu 11.14.3ab	
- The four types of dissolution ( <i>caturvidhapralayeṣu</i> )	BhāPu 3.7.37c	
- All the <i>yugas</i> ( <i>sarveṣu yugeṣu</i> )	BhāPu 12.3.52.	
All the stages of life ( <i>sarvāvasthāsu</i> )	BhāPu 2.1.11	
- The embryo ( <i>garbhe</i> )	Nārada instructs Prahlaḍa	
- Childhood ( <i>bālye</i> )	Dhruva	
- Youth ( <i>yauvane</i> )	Ambarīṣa	
- Old age ( <i>vārddhake</i> )	Dhṛtarāṣṭra	
- Death ( <i>maraṇe</i> )	Ajāmilā	
- The state of being a heaven- dweller ( <i>svargitāyām</i> )	Citraketu	
- A hellish condition ( <i>nārakitāyām</i> )	BhāPu 9.4.62d <i>Nṛsimha Purāṇa</i> 8.31	
Everywhere and all the time ( <i>sarvatra sarvadā</i> )	BhāPu 2.2.33a, 2.2.36ab PaPu <i>Uttaraṇḍa</i> , 71.100	

Jīva substantiates his argument systematically. First, in order to prove that devotion to the Lord exists everywhere, Jīva cites verses that positively demonstrate how it exists in all scriptures, agencies, places, sense faculties, substances, actions, effects, and results.<sup>128</sup> With regard to devotion in all the agencies, Jīva further elaborates how it exists in a variety of beings: in a well-behaved person (*sadācāre*), in an ill-behaved person (*durācāre*), in a knowledgeable person (*jñānīni*), in an ignorant person (*ajñānīni*), in a detached person (*virakte*), in an attached person (*rāgiṇi*), in a person desirous of

<sup>128</sup> *kutra kutropapadyate? sarvatra śāstrakartṛdeśakaraṇādravyakriyākāryaphaleṣu samas-  
teṣv eva /*



liberation (*mumukṣau*), in a person who is liberated (*mukte*), in a person who is not perfected in devotion (*bhaktyasiddhe*), in a person who is perfected in devotion (*bhaktisiddhe*), in a person who has obtained the state of being an associate of the Lord (*tasmin pārśadatām prāpte*), and in a person who is an eternal associate of the Lord (*tasmin nityapārśade*).

At the end of the section, Jīva describes how devotion is present in all the *kāraḥ*:

Similarly, it is shown in the *Purāṇas* that the one who performs devotion, that cow and so on, which is offered to the Lord, that through which, as a means, devotion is performed, that to which [the cow and so on] are given for the sake of pleasing the glorious Lord, that from which, such as a cow, milk and so on are taken and offered to the Lord, that in which, a place and so on or a house-hold, someone performs devotion. In this way, [the all-pervasiveness of devotion to the Lord is] also in the *kāraḥ*.<sup>129</sup>

The *kāraḥ* are technical terminologies used in Sanskrit grammar. According to the Sanskrit grammatical tradition, any action can be analyzed using the six *kāraḥ* or elements which correspond to the six case endings of a noun: the agent of action (*kartṛ*/nominative case), the object of action (*karma*/accusative case), the means of action (*karaṇa*/instrumental case), what the agent of action wants to reach through the object (*sampradāna*/dative case), a fixed point from which departure takes place (*apādāna*/ablative case), the locus of action (*adhikaraṇa*/locative case). In the previously quoted citation, Jīva describes how devotion exists in all the six *kāraḥ*, which may be listed as follows:

The <i>kāraḥ</i>	Devotion to the Lord
<i>kartṛ</i> /nominative case	the one who performs devotion
<i>karma</i> /accusative case	the cow and so on, that which are offered to the Lord
<i>karaṇa</i> /instrumental case	that through which, as a means, devotion is performed
<i>sampradāna</i> /dative case	that to which [the cow and so on] are given for the sake of pleasing the glorious Lord
<i>apādāna</i> /ablative case	that from which, such as the cow, milk and so on are taken and offered to the Lord
<i>adhikaraṇa</i> /locative case	that in which, a place and or a household, someone performs devotion

<sup>129</sup> *evam yo bhaktim karoti, yad gavādikam bhagavate dīyate, yena dvārabhūtena bhaktiḥ kriyate, yasmai śrībhagavatprīṇanārthaṁ dīyate, yasmād gavādikāt payādikam ādāya bhagavate nivedyate, yasmin deśādau kule vā kaścid bhaktim anuṣṭhāti, teṣāṁ api kṛtārthatvaṁ purāṇeṣu dṛśyate iti kāraḥ* /

This adoption of the *kāraka* theory is by no means unique to Jīva. Since the theory is widely known, different authors adopted it to demonstrate the all-pervasiveness of a certain state. For example, Abhinavagupta uses this theory to describe the omnipresence of Śivahood in ritual: ‘The agent, the object which is offered, the locus, the point of oblation, the thing to which they are given, all of these reach oneness with Śivahood through the sequence of *nyāsa*.’<sup>130</sup>

Then Jīva analyzes the idea that devotion always exists (*sarvadā*). He says it exists in the beginning and middle of creation, at the times of the four types of dissolution, and in all the *yugas*. He also analyzes the concept that devotion exists in all stages of life: in the embryo, in childhood, in youth, in old age, at death, in the state of being a heaven-dweller, in a hellish condition. For each stage of life, Jīva points to an exemplary figure in the narratives of the BhāPu. For example, devotion to the Lord exists in the embryo because while Prahlāda was still in the womb of his mother, he received instruction from Nārada.

So far, Jīva has separately analyzed the idea that devotion exists everywhere (*sarvatra*) and how it exists always (*sarvadā*). At the end, he quotes verses that show how devotion exists everywhere *and* always. After systematically analyzing this, and after providing injunctive statements for each point, Jīva quotes prohibitive statements, albeit not as systematically as he did for their counterparts, as can be seen from the previous chart.

Summarizing his argument, Jīva says that only devotion (*bhakti*) is fit to be the auxiliary of *prema* (*tadaṅga*):

The following amounts to having been said. What is ‘ritual action’ is effective up to the obtainment of renunciation or of the body for enjoyment. ‘Yoga’ is effective up to [the obtainment of] supernatural powers. ‘Sāṅkhya’ is effective up to [the obtainment of] knowledge of the self. ‘Knowledge’ is effective up to [the obtainment of] liberation.

Likewise, all are inclined to various [paths]. Also, in the case of the action and so on, which are thus [explained], we should know that [they are] not [always] concomitant with the scriptures. However, it is appropriate that devotion to Hari is the auxiliary of the secret, which exists in such a way since [devotion to the Lord] exists by [its] various glories always and everywhere, through injunctive and prohibitive statements.<sup>131</sup>

<sup>130</sup> *Tantrāloka* 15.159: *yaṣṭryāyatatādādhārakaraṇādānasampradāḥ / nyāsakrameṇa śivatātādātmyam adhiśerate //*

<sup>131</sup> *etaḍ uktaṁ bhavati / yat ‘karma’ tat sannyaśabhogaśarīraprāptyavadhi, ‘yogaḥ’ siddhyavadhi, ‘sāṅkhyam’ ātmajñānāvadhi, ‘jñānam’ mokṣāvadhi / tathā ([tathā] KraSa; tathā tathā BhakSa) tattadyogyatādikāni ([tattadyogyatādikāni] BhakSa; tattadyogyatādikāni KraSa) ca sarvāṇi / evambhūteṣu karmādiṣu śāstrādivyabhicāritā ca jñeyā / haribhakte tu anvayavyatir-ekābhyām sadā sarvatra tattannmahimabhir upapannatvāt tathābhūtasya rahasyasyāṅgatvaṁ yuktam /*

According to Jīva, different types of people are inclined toward different paths, such as the path of ritual action and so on. These paths are effective in obtaining certain goals. However, scriptures testify positively and negatively that only the path of devotion is present always and everywhere. Therefore, only the path of devotion is fit to be the means for obtaining the highest secret, which is *prema*.

Jīva then discusses how devotion accomplishes *prema*, or direct experience of the Lord. Jīva elaborates different stages of devotion, particularly *sādhana-bhakti*:

With regard to this, the following is the procedure. Since *sādhana-bhakti* [exists] everywhere and eternally, first it [i.e. *sādhana-bhakti*] is to be received from a teacher. Then, from the performance of it [i.e. *sādhana-bhakti*], there results external performance, the state of being accompanied by dispassion, proper behavior, and knowledge and realization of the self.

Then, and furthermore, because of being in such a state, devotion [to the Lord] certainly follows since there are statements such as ‘A pure self who is Brahman (neither laments nor desires. Being equal to all beings, [such a person] obtains the highest devotion to Me).’ At that very moment, the knowledge and realization of the Lord also [follow] since there are statements as well, such as ‘And the sages, who rejoice in the self, (though free from all hindrances, perform unmotivated devotion to the far-stepping one i.e. Viṣṇu. Hari is the one who has such a quality).’<sup>132</sup>

In his description of *sādhana-bhakti*, Jīva follows his uncle Rūpa’s *magnum opus*, the BhaRaASi.<sup>133</sup> According to Rūpa, *sādhana-bhakti*<sup>134</sup> is the means to obtain the foundational emotion of love (*bhāva*),<sup>135</sup> and when *bhāva* is

<sup>132</sup> *tatreyam prakriyā—sādhana-bhakteḥ sārva-trikātvāt sadātānatvāc ca prathamam sā guror grāhyā / tatas tadanuṣṭhānād bāhyasādhanaṁ vairāgya-purāḥsaratā śīlam ātmajñānavijñāne ceti ānuṣṅikam bhavati / tato bhūyaś ca tathābhūtātvād bhaktir anuvartata* ([*anuvartata*] em. Harimoto; *anuvartita* KraSa) *eva ‘brahmabhūtaḥ prasannātmā’ (BhaGī 18.54a) ityādibhyaḥ / ‘ātmārāmāś ca munayaḥ’ (BhāPu 1.7.10a) ityādibhiś ca tadaiva bhagavajñānavijñāne ceti / BhaGī 18.54: brahmabhūtaḥ prasannātmā na śocati na kāṅkṣati / samaḥ sarveṣu bhūteṣu madbhaktim labhate parām //* BhāPu 1.7.10: *ātmārāmāś ca munayo nirgranthā apy urukrame / kurvanty ahaitukīm bhaktim itthambhūtaguṇo hariḥ //*

<sup>133</sup> The following discussion of Rūpa’s understanding of *sādhana-bhakti* is based on Rūpa 2003: xlix–liii.

<sup>134</sup> BhaRaASi 1.2.2: *kṛtisādhyā bhavet sādhyabhāvā sā sādhana-bhīdhā / nityasiddhasya bhāvasya prākṛtyaṁ hṛdi sādhyatā //* ‘Devotion that achieves a foundational emotion (*bhāva*) through physical effort is called *sādhana*. Its goal is the manifestation in the heart of an eternally perfected emotion (*nityasiddhabhāva*)’ (Rūpa 2003: 19).

<sup>135</sup> BhaRaASi 1.3.6: *sādhana-bhīniveśena kṛṣṇatadbhaktayoḥ tathā / prasādenātidhanyānām bhāvo dvedhābhijāyate / ādyaś tu prāyikaś tatra dvitīyo viralodayaḥ //* ‘This loving emotion (*bhāva*) is born in two ways: either from diligent dedication to spiritual practices (*sādhana*), or for the very fortunate, by the grace (*prasāda*) of Kṛṣṇa or His devotees. The first, however, is more common; the second is rare’ (Rūpa 2003: 99).

intensified, it becomes *prema*.<sup>136</sup> Rūpa divides *sādhana*bhakti into *vaidhibhakti* and *rāgānugabhakti*. *Vaidhibhakti* is the first phase of *sādhana*bhakti. The term *vaidhi* means ‘according to injunctions (*vidhi*)’. In this phase, devotion is still unmanifest within a devotee who does not have a spontaneous desire to perform devotional service to the Lord. Therefore, she is recommended to perform devotional service according to injunctions, with the aim of cultivating devotional sentiment.

When the devotional sentiment manifests and matures in her, she is eligible to proceed to the next stage, *rāgānugabhakti*. At this stage, she performs devotional service imitating the eternal associates of the Lord in Vraja.<sup>137</sup> This practice leads to the obtainment of *bhāva*, which subsequently matures into *prema*. In his BhaRaASi 1.4.15–16, Rūpa describes the stages of the development of devotion:

The first stage of love for practitioners is faith (*śraddhā*), then, in order comes association with the saints (*sādhusaṅga*), acts of worship (*bhajanakriyā*), the cessation of worthless activity (*anarthanivṛtti*), steadiness (*niṣṭhā*), desire (*ruci*), attachment (*āśakti*), *bhāva*, and then the manifestation of *prema*. (Rūpa 2003: 119; trans with a slight modification.)<sup>138</sup>

The above-cited quotation from Jīva roughly corresponds to this description given by Rūpa. According to Jīva, *sādhana*bhakti is first received from a teacher (*guru*). This corresponds to faith (*śraddhā*) and association with the saints (*sādhusaṅga*) in Rūpa’s scheme. The reception of *sādhana*bhakti from a teacher results in its external performance (*bāhyasādhana*). This corresponds to acts of worship (*bhajanakriyā*). External performance of *sādhana*bhakti results in the state of being accompanied by dispassion (*vairāgyapuraḥsaratā*), proper behavior (*śīla*), and the knowledge and realization of the self (*ātmajñānavijñāne*). The first two effects described by Jīva seem to correspond to the cessation of worthless activity (*anarthanivṛtti*) in Rūpa’s scheme. The last effect seems to correspond to steadiness (*niṣṭhā*). By quoting BhaGī 18.54 and BhāPu 1.7.10, Jīva seems to suggest that once steadiness in devotional

<sup>136</sup> BhaRaASi 1.4.1: *samyaiṃmasṛṇitasvānto mamatvātiśayāṅkitāḥ / bhāvaḥ sa eva sāndrātmā budhaiḥ premā nigadyate //*

‘When the Bhāva softens the heart completely and becomes very intense, and when it is marked by a high degree of “myness”, it is called Prema by the wise’ (Rūpa 2003: 117).

<sup>137</sup> BhaRaASi 1.2.270: *virājantīm abhivyaktām vrajavāsī janādiṣu / rāgātmikām anusṛtā yā sā rāgānugocyate //* ‘Devotion is called Rāgānugā when it imitates the Rāgātmikā Bhakti that shines forth clearly in the residents of Vraja’ (Rūpa 2003: 77).

<sup>138</sup> *ādau śraddhā tataḥ sādhusaṅgo ’tha bhajanakriyā / tato ’narthanivṛttiḥ syāt tato niṣṭhā rucis tataḥ // athāśaktiḥ tato bhāvas tataḥ premābhyudañcati / sādhanānām ayaṃ premnaḥ prādurbhāve bhavet kramaḥ //*

performance is obtained, a devotee spontaneously experiences attachment to the Lord. This seems to correspond to the stages from desire (*ruci*) up to *prema* in Rūpa's analysis. The idea of *sādhana-bhakti*, especially its division into *vaidhibhakti* and *rāgānugabhakti*, is unique to the Gauḍīya tradition.

Jīva concludes his commentary on the four verses of the CaśloBhā by arguing that the speaker of these verses is none other than the Lord (*bhagavān*):

Therefore it is the Lord Himself who is taught about by the four verses [i.e. BhāPu 2.9.32–35] also, which is the instruction of knowledge, realization, secret, and its auxiliary. Here, it is clear that this speaker [of the CaśloBhā] is indeed the glorious Lord because of the characteristics of the state of being glorious Kṛṣṇa, which are in accordance with the GoTāU and so on [...].<sup>139</sup>

Commenting on the word *aham* in BhāPu 2.9.32, Jīva argued that the speaker of the CaśloBhā is not the living entity, but the Lord Himself. In this section, however, it seems what Jīva wants to clarify is not the difference between the Lord and the living entity but Kṛṣṇa's identity as the Lord. In other words, Jīva wishes to argue that the speaker of the four verses is not Viṣṇu or Nārāyaṇa but two-armed Kṛṣṇa.

In order to substantiate his point, Jīva quotes GoTāU 1.25: 'Brahmā spoke about it: While performing the order of Brahman, I perceived the Supreme, who was meditated upon and praised, at the end of the night. A person in the form of a cowherd manifested in front of me.'<sup>140</sup> In this verse Brahmā speaks about the occasion when he experienced direct contact with the Lord. Jīva suggests that the event mentioned in the GoTāU is identical with the revelation of the CaśloBhā. In this verse from the GoTāU it is clear that Kṛṣṇa is the Lord who appeared in front of Brahmā because He is described as 'in the form of a cowherd (*gopaveśa*)'.

This, however, is a rather forced interpretation. According to the BhāPu, the Lord manifested Himself, being pleased by Brahmā's performance of austerity. A description of the Lord's manifestation starts with BhāPu 2.9.9, and in BhāPu 2.9.15, the Lord is described as 'four-armed (*caturbhujā*)'.<sup>141</sup> This shows that, according to the BhāPu, the Lord who appeared to Brahmā and

<sup>139</sup> *tasmād jñānavijñānarahasyatadaigānām* ([jñāna] KraSa; *svajñāna* BhaSa)([*-aigānām*] BhakSa; *-ajñānām* KraSa) *upadeśena catuḥślokyāpi svayaṁ bhagavān* ([*bhagavān*] KraSa; *śrībhagavān* BhaSa) *evopadiṣṭaḥ / atra, [...]* *tāpaniśrutyādyanukūlitaśrīkṛṣṇatvaliṅgena cāsyā vaktuḥ* ([*vaktuḥ*] BhaSa; *vaktum* KraSa) *śrībhagavattvam eva spaṣṭam* ([*spaṣṭam*] KraSa; *suphutaṁ* BhaSa) /

<sup>140</sup> *tad u hovāca / brahmasavanaṁ carato me dhyātāḥ stutaḥ paramaḥ parārdhānte so 'budhyata / gopaveśo me puruṣaḥ purastād āvirbabhūva //*

<sup>141</sup> *bhṛtyaprasādābhīmukhaṁ dṛgāsavaṁ prasannahāsāruṇalocanānam / kirīṭinaṁ kuṇḍalinaṁ caturbhujāṁ pītāṁśukaṁ vakṣasi lakṣitaṁ śrīyā //*

spoke the CaśloBhā was not two-armed Kṛṣṇa. Nonetheless, Jīva insists that it was the cowherd Kṛṣṇa, not the four-armed Nārāyaṇa, who revealed the original seed of the BhāPu:

[Therefore, this speaker] is not at all the *Garbhodaśāyipurusa* called Nārāyaṇa, who is a portion of Him [i.e. of Kṛṣṇa]. Precisely because of this, this great *Purāṇa* too is called nothing but the glorious *Bhāgavata*. It is expressed precisely in this way.<sup>142</sup>

In these two sentences, Jīva makes three points: (1) Nārāyaṇa is a portion (*aṁśa*) of Kṛṣṇa; (2) therefore, only Kṛṣṇa is fit to be addressed as the Lord (*bhagavat*); (3) the fact that the BhāPu is named *Bhāgavata* (that which belongs to the Lord) suggests that it was originally revealed by *bhagavat*, who is none other than Kṛṣṇa.

The second point is not explicitly stated but implied. Jīva insists on the superiority of Kṛṣṇa over Viṣṇu or Nārāyaṇa because this is another doctrine unique to the Gauḍīya tradition. Rūpa explains in his LaBhāA that Kṛṣṇa is indeed the source of Viṣṇu or Nārāyaṇa.<sup>143</sup> According to Madhva, however, Kṛṣṇa is one of the incarnations of Viṣṇu, and there is no hierarchy among His incarnations.<sup>144</sup>

Jīva further cites BhāPu 12.13.19 as more scriptural evidence for his argument that Kṛṣṇa, not Nārāyaṇa, is the speaker of the CaśloBhā:

Let us meditate on that supreme principle, which is pure, spotless, free from sorrow, immortal, which [out of compassion] illuminated this unequaled lamp of knowledge to Ka [i.e. Brahmā] in the beginning, and the one who has such nature (i.e. Brahmā) [illuminated it] to Nārada, the one who has such a form [i.e. Nārada] to the sage Kṛṣṇa [i.e. Vyāsa], the one who has such a form [i.e. Vyāsa] to the lord of *yogīs* [i.e. Śukadeva], the one who has a such self [i.e. Śukadeva] to the one who rejoices in the Lord [i.e. Parikṣit].<sup>145</sup>

Jīva says that the word ‘in the begining (*purā*)’ in the verse proves that Kṛṣṇa is the speaker of the CaśloBhā.<sup>146</sup> The idea seems to be that since Nārāyaṇa manifests from Kṛṣṇa, He did not exist in the beginning, that is, before creation. Therefore, Nārāyaṇa could not have been the speaker of the CaśloBhā. This, of course, is based on an assumption that Kṛṣṇa is the original and Nārāyaṇa comes after Kṛṣṇa.

<sup>142</sup> *na jātu tadamśabhūtanārāyaṇākhyagarbhodaśāyipurusaṭvam / ata evāsyā mahāpurāṇa-syāpi śribhāgavatam ity evākhyā /*

<sup>143</sup> 1.16ab: *paravyomanāthas tu govindasya yathā smṛtaḥ /* ‘Just as it is taught traditionally that Paravyomanātha i.e. Nārāyaṇa belongs to Govinda i.e. Kṛṣṇa.’

<sup>144</sup> See Chapter 4, section 1.3 for a detailed discussion on this point.

<sup>145</sup> *kasmai yena vibhāsito 'yam atulo jñānapradīpaḥ purā tadrūpeṇa ca nārādāya munaye kṛṣṇāya tadrūpiṇā / yogīndrāya tadātmanātha bhagavadrātāya kārūṇyatas tac chuddhaṁ vimalaṁ viśokam amṛtaṁ satyaṁ paraṁ dhimahi //*

<sup>146</sup> *purāśabdena bhagavadvaktṛtvam evoktam [ . . . ]*

Jīva concludes that Nārāyaṇa is different from the speaker of the CaśloBhā:

The Lord Himself, after showing right there [around the lotus] the great Vai-  
kuṇṭha world, which is spreading everywhere, revealed this *Purāṇa* to Brahmā,  
who was situated on the lotus stemming from the navel of glorious Nārāyaṇa.  
This is the meaning. And this is following the history of the second book  
[of the BhāPu].<sup>147</sup>

Jīva says that Nārāyaṇa and Kṛṣṇa were both present at the time of revelation  
of the CaśloBhā, and they were present separately. Kṛṣṇa spoke to Brahmā  
while Nārāyaṇa was lying down and Brahmā sat on the lotus arising from  
Nārāyaṇa's navel.

Jīva ends his commentary on the CaśloBhā with a verse: 'May this declar-  
ation of the Lord, which is an exposition having four meanings, be victorious,  
and [may] that commentary belonging to [Śrīdhara] Svāmī, which was my  
livelihood, [be victorious].'<sup>148</sup> Among the four commentators discussed in this  
chapter, Jīva is the only one who ends the commentary on the four verses with  
a verse. This seems to reflect Jīva's awareness of the centrality of these verses to  
the Gauḍiyya theology. Furthermore, the second half of the verse shows Jīva's  
reverential attitude toward Śrīdhara since he states that Śrīdhara's commen-  
tary was a life-giving element (*jīvikā*) for him.

The four commentaries on the fourth verse may be summarized as follows:

<i>Theological</i>	
Madhva/ Vijayadhva	- All-pervasiveness of the Lord is explained by an inference, which is based on positive and negative concomitances.
Śrīdhara	- The self ( <i>ātman</i> ) exists always everywhere. This is explained by the analogy of the relation between cause and effect.
Jīva	- Devotion to the Lord ( <i>bhakti</i> ) is all-pervasive. This is explained by injunctive and prohibitive statements. - A discussion on <i>sādhana</i> <i>bhakti</i> . - The speaker of the CaśloBhā is Kṛṣṇa in the form of a cowherd, not four- armed Nārāyaṇa. - Nārāyaṇa is a partial manifestation ( <i>aṁśa</i> ) of Kṛṣṇa.

<sup>147</sup> *śrīnārāyaṇanābhipaṅkaje sthitam brahmāṇam prati svayaṁ bhagavatā* ([*bhagavatā*]  
KraSa; *śrībhagavatā* BhaSa) *tatraiva vyāpimahāvaikuṇṭhalokaṁ prakāśyedaṁ purāṇaṁ prakāśi-*  
*taṁ ity arthaḥ / anugataṁ caitat dvitīyaskandhetihāsasyeti /*

<sup>148</sup> *jīyād asau bhagavataḥ pratijñā cāturarthikī /*  
*vyākhyā ca svānipādānām sā* ([*sā*] em. Isaacson; *yā* KraSa) *yā 'bhūn mama jīvikā //*

<i>Exegetical</i>	
Madhva/ Vijayadhvaja	<i>anvayavyatirekābhyām</i> : positive and negative concomitances.
Śrīdhara	<i>anvayavyatirekābhyām</i> : continuance of cause in effect and distinction of cause from effects. - Śrīdhara's commentary can be interpreted in an Advaitic way since it is unclear whether the self ( <i>ātman</i> ) refers to the living entity, the Lord, or both.
Jīva	<i>anvayavyatirekābhyām</i> : injunctive and prohibitive statements ( <i>vidhiniṣedha</i> ). - BhāPu 2.9.35 explains the secret's auxiliary ( <i>tadaṅga</i> ) mentioned in BhāPu 2.9.30. - Jīva specifies that the self ( <i>ātman</i> ) refers to the Lord, not the living entity.
<i>Stylistic</i>	
Jīva	- Jīva ends his commentary with a verse praising the CaśloBhā and Śrīdhara's commentary.

### 3.7. CONCLUSION

Based on the above examination it is observed that in Jīva's commentary on the CaśloBhā he explains almost all the major doctrines unique to the Gauḍīya theology: the emphasis on the Lord's charm, the intimacy between the Lord and His devotees, His pastimes, the identification of the living entity and *prakṛti* as His energies (*śaktis*), the acceptance of the Lord as the efficient and material cause of the world, the acceptance of Kṛṣṇa's superiority over Viṣṇu / Nārāyaṇa, and, above all, the conception of *prema* as the fifth and highest goal of human life.

These are the very cornerstones of Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavism that make the tradition theologically distinct from other schools. Jīva does not hesitate to express these points even though they are not in accordance with the commentaries of Madhva and of Vijayadhvaja. With respect to Śrīdhara, apart from Viṣṇu's identification with the universe, which both Jīva and Śrīdhara accept, it is also clear that Jīva's approach is quite different from Śrīdhara's. Whereas Śrīdhara's commentary is often ambiguous and leaves some interpretive space for the Advaitic interpretation, Jīva emphasizes the distinction between the Lord and the living entity and also rejects the idea that the ultimate reality is without characteristics. On these two points, Jīva is theologically close to Madhva. Putting these four commentators together with Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja on the spectrum of the *bheda-abheda* dichotomy, they might be described as follows:






Fig. 3.1 Theological Positions

Jīva's position is very close to Rāmānuja's since both take the *bhedābheda* view. Śrīdhara's commentary on the first verse seems to show a realist view of the universe, which makes Śrīdhara closer to the *bhedābheda* position. However, in the second verse, his understanding of *māyā* leans toward Advaita. Moreover, his commentary on the fourth verse can be easily interpreted in an Advaitic way. These points place Śrīdhara closer to the *abheda* position.

From the exegetical viewpoint, Jīva differs in major ways from his predecessors. His interpretation of the word *aham* and the ambiguous compound *sadasatparam* in the first verse, his definition of *māyā* and interpretation of what *ābhāsa* and *tamas* refer to in the second verse, his analysis of *teṣu nateṣu* in the third verse, his analysis of *anvayavyatirekābhyām* in the fourth verse, his understanding that the four verses of the CaŚloBhā correspond to the four points in BhāPu 2.9.30 are all unique to him. In relation to Śrīdhara, however, Jīva tries to show that his own interpretation is not contradictory to his predecessor's. This is shown in Jīva's commentary on the third verse when Jīva says that the teaching of *prema* is in accordance with Śrīdhara's interpretation, even though the latter does not speak of it. In relation to Madhva and Vijayadhva, Jīva does not make such an attempt to justify his interpretation even when he differs significantly from them.

Stylistically, Jīva's commentary is much longer and his discussions far more detailed than those of the others. This simple fact reflects the centrality of the CaŚloBhā in Jīva's theology. In relation to the Mādhva tradition, what becomes clear is that in his commentary on the CaŚloBhā, Jīva does not refer to Madhva's untraceable quotations at all; this sharply contrasts with Vijayadhva, who quotes virtually all the untraceable verses mentioned by Madhva. Therefore, it must be accepted that even though Jīva accepts the validity of Madhva's untraceable quotes in his TaSa, the degree to which he follows Madhva is significantly lesser than the degree to which Vijayadhva follows Madhva. In relation to Śrīdhara, Jīva expresses his high regard at the end of his commentary on the CaŚloBhā.

The above comparison between the four commentaries was done in order to clarify the Gauḍīyas' theological relation to the Mādhvas. Based on this comparison it might be concluded that Jīva is not theologically affiliated to the Mādhvas. Jīva's emphasis on the distinction between the Lord and the

living entity certainly echos Madhva's teaching. Apart from that point, however, Jīva's teaching is unique enough that it should be considered theologically independent. Exegetically also, despite the fact that Jīva was aware of Madhva's works he does not refer to them in his commentary on these important verses. This is striking when we observe how much attention he pays to Śrīdhara's commentary.

In Chapter 4, we shall further examine how this issue of theological affiliation plays out in Baladeva's commentary on the BraSū. In the case of Baladeva, Madhva's theological influence is much more visible. At the same time, Baladeva, like Jīva, expresses the points unique to the Gauḍīya tradition as well. Based on a careful textual analysis I shall argue that Baladeva was theologically affiliated to the Gauḍīya tradition despite the fact that he had a formal affiliation with the Mādhvas in his early days, and despite the fact that clear influence of the Mādhva tradition can be observed in his works.

## Baladeva's *Govindabhāṣya*

In Chapters 2 and 3 I examined the nature of the Gauḍīya affiliation with the Mādhvas. In Chapter 2, I distinguished a formal affiliation from a theological affiliation and pointed out that the Gauḍīyas and the Mādhvas may have been affiliated formally. As far the theological connection is concerned, however, I concluded that Caitanya's theological affiliation is not clear.

Since Caitanya and his predecessors, such as Mādhavendra Purī and Īśvara Purī, did not leave any substantial written works, in Chapter 3 I examined Jīva's commentary on the CaśloBhā in order to understand the theological connection between the Gauḍīyas and the Mādhvas. After analyzing the commentaries of Madhva, Vijayadhvaṇa, Śrīdhara, and Jīva, it was shown that Jīva's commentary differs from the rest theologically, exegetically, and stylistically.

In this chapter I examine several important sections in Baladeva's GoBhā in comparison with the theologies of Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, Madhva, and Jīva in order to understand Baladeva's theological position.<sup>1</sup> In this context, I will discuss (1) Baladeva's opening verse (*maṅgala*) in the GoBhā, (2) his commentary on the first five *Brahmasūtras*, (3) his view on *prakṛti*, (4) his view on the living entity (*jīva*) (5), his view on Śrī, and (6) his view on *viśeṣa*.

<sup>1</sup> All translation of the GoBhā and its sub-commentary Sūṭī used in this book is mine. An English translation of the GoBhā by S. C. Vasu (Baladeva 1912) is available. While Vasu's translation is generally not of an unreliable quality, I translated the relevant parts of the GoBhā in order to gain a firm understanding of Baladeva's theology. Besides, Vasu sometimes mixes his translation of the GoBhā with what is mentioned in the Sūṭī. Therefore, I have produced my own translation to maintain transparency. As for the passages quoted from the BraSū commentaries of Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, Madhva, and Jīva, I have used available translations (Śaṅkara 1890, 2004, Rāmānuja 1899, 1904, 1964, 1965, Madhva 1904, 2005c, Jīva 2007). Occasionally I provide my own translation for these commentaries if particular parts of the available translations are not reliable. Whether I supply an available translation or my own, I provide the Sanskrit texts for all the citations so that the reader can check the correctness of translation herself. For the Sanskrit texts I use Śaṅkara 1917, Rāmānuja 1967, Madhva 1999a, Jīva 2007, Baladeva 1953, 1968. The variants between Baladeva 1953 and 1968 are recorded in the footnotes. Therein, Baladeva 1953 is designated as 'M', Baladeva 1968 'K'.

Based on a study of these, I will argue the following two points. First, Baladeva writes the GoBhā as a Gauḍīya follower. That is, he is theologically affiliated with and committed to the Gauḍīya tradition. He does not hesitate to follow Jīva even where Jīva clearly differs from the Mādhva tradition. In other words, Baladeva's theology is primarily in resonance with Jīva's, and he accepts Madhva's theology in so far as Jīva accepts it. My second point is that even when Baladeva appears to follow Madhva and to diverge from Jīva, ultimately he does so in the service of Gauḍīya theology. His use of the idea of *viśeṣa* is the case in point. He employs the Mādhva concept but uses it to articulate a Gauḍīya doctrine.

#### 4.1. BALADEVA ON MAṆGALA

We begin our examination of the GoBhā with a study of its opening verse (*maṅgala*). *Maṅgala*, or an opening verse, is a prayer written by an author at the very beginning of his work, offered to his chosen deity in order to aid successful completion of the work (Sanderson 2005: 89). In this connection, the opening verse can be considered the 'face' of the work where the author's personal devotion and his motivation in undertaking a particular work may be observed (Minkowski 2008: 1). Besides the GoBhā, Baladeva wrote a sub-commentary on the GoBhā called the *Sūkṣmā Ṭikā* (SūṬī). In what follows, I examine the opening verse of the GoBhā with its sub-commentary, and suggest that Baladeva writes the GoBhā as a Gauḍīya follower.

##### 4.1.1. The Introduction of the *Sūkṣmā Ṭikā*

Baladeva begins his SūṬī with a long sentence explaining the *raison d'être* of the GoBhā:

Now, beginning with [the word] *satyam*, Baladeva offers a benedictory verse for the sake of the completion of it [i.e. the GoBhā], which is free from obstacles. The benedictory verse is in the form of paying homage to his tutelary deity, who is to be explained in the scripture [i.e. the BraSū]. [Paying homage to one's tutelary deity] is what we know from the conduct of learned people. Baladeva, whose other name is Vidyābhūṣaṇa, is solely devoted to glorious Govinda.

Baladeva, the commentator, wishes to explain the BraSū in detail, in accordance with the doctrine of the sage Madhva, which follows the glorious BhāPu, which is the essence of all the Vedānta, the natural commentary of [the BraSū], and which is obtained through the profound meditation of Vedavyāsa. The doctrine of the sage Madhva was accepted by Hari who is [identical with] the

glorious Kṛṣṇa Caitanya. The *Brahmasūtras* are also called *mīmāṃsā*, and they arise from the churning of the exceedingly great ocean of all the Vedas and the *Itihāsas*.<sup>2</sup>

In this introduction several elements reveal Baladeva's Gauḍīya affiliation. First, Baladeva describes himself as 'the one who is solely devoted to the glorious Govinda (*śrīgovindaikāntī*)'. This Govinda denotes the image of Govindadeva worshipped by the Gauḍīyas. According to the *Bhāgavatamāhātmya* section of the SkaPu, the image was originally installed by Vajranābha, a great grandson of Kṛṣṇa.<sup>3</sup> The *Sādhanaḍīpikā* of Rādhākṛṣṇa Gosvāmī mentions that the image was rediscovered and worshipped by Rūpa Gosvāmī (Kapoor 1996: 300).

As pointed out in Chapter 1, Mānsingh of the Kachvāhās built the Govindadevājī temple in Vṛndāvana in 1590 to support Rūpa's worship of the image. The image was then taken from Vṛndāvana around 1670 to escape Aurangzeb's religious persecution. The image and its companions (Rādhā and Vṛndādevī) moved westward over the following decades, until finally Jaisingh II installed them in Jaipur in 1723. Although Rāma had been the tutelary deity of the Kachvāhās since the time of Prithirāj (r. 1503–1527) (Horstmann 2009: 4), Jaisingh II made Govindadeva the main image for the state. In this way the name Govinda represents a long-standing connection between the Gauḍīyas and the Kachvāhās, and points to the prosperity of the Gauḍīyas in the Kachvāhā state in the eighteenth century. Thus, the fact that Baladeva names his BraSū commentary after the image and describes himself as a devotee of Govinda suggests his Gauḍīya identity.

Second, Baladeva subsumes the Mādhvas under the Gauḍīyas by identifying Kṛṣṇa Caitanya with Hari. First Baladeva identifies himself as a Gauḍīya, by stating that he is a devotee of Govindadeva. Then he connects himself to the Mādhva *sampradāya* by stating that he writes his GoBhā according to the

<sup>2</sup> Sūṭi: *atha sarvavedetihāsātimahārṇavamathanotthitamīmāṃsāparanāmadheyabrahmasūtrāṇi vedavyāsasamādhilabdhataḍakṛtrimabhāṣyabhūtasarvavedāntasāraśrīmadbhāgavatānugaśrīkṛṣṇacaitanyaharivikṛtamadhvamunimatānusārataḥ vyācikyāsura bhāṣyakāraḥ śrīgovindaikāntī vidyābhūṣaṇāparanāmā baladevo nirvighnāyai tatpūrtaye śiṣṭācāraparipṛptaśāstrapratipādeyaśādevatānamaskārārūpaṃ maṅgalam ācarati satyam iti //*

<sup>3</sup> SkaPu 2.6.2.4–6: *vajras tu tatsahāyena śāṇḍilyasyāpy anugrahāt /*

*govindagopagopīnām līlāsthānāny anukramāt //*4//

*vijñāyābhīdhyāsthāpya grāmān āvāsya bahūn /*

*kuṇḍakūpāḍīpūrtena śivādisthāpanena ca //*5//

*govindaharidevādisvarūpāropanena ca //*

*kṛṣṇaīkabhaktīm sve rājye tatāt ca mumoda ha //*6//

'With his help and the blessings of Śāṇḍilya, Vajra came to know the various spots of Govinda, the cowherdesses and cowherds. He named them duly and established them. He made many village settlements and colonies. Ponds, wells, lakes and other amenities for the public were constructed. Idols (and *Liṅgas*) of Śiva and other deities were installed. The images of Govinda, Hari, and other Devas were installed. He propagated exclusive devotion to Kṛṣṇa in his realm and rejoiced' (Tagore 1994: 277).

teachings of Madhva (*madhvamunimatānusārataḥ*). In this way Baladeva substantiates the claim that the Gauḍīya tradition formally belongs to the Mādhvas. However, Baladeva reclaims the Gauḍīya identity of the *sampradāya* by asserting that the Mādhva *sampradāya* belongs to Caitanya because Hari accepts Madhva's teachings and Caitanya is Hari Himself.<sup>4</sup>

In other words, Baladeva first claims that the Gauḍīyas belong to the Mādhvas but then reverses the hierarchy and concludes that actually the Mādhvas belong to the Gauḍīyas. As shown in Chapter 2, sometimes Baladeva is seen as being responsible for creating the Gauḍīyas' formal affiliation with the Mādhvas. It is a fact that he emphasized this affiliation. However, Baladeva was ultimately dedicated to Caitanya.

The identification of Caitanya with the Lord is Gauḍīya's unique doctrine, which the Mādhvas do not accept. For example, Jīva opens the TaSa by quoting BhāPu 11.5.32, which says:

The one whose [name has two] syllables *kṛṣṇa*,<sup>5</sup> who is not blackish [i.e. He is whitish] because of [His] splendour, who is accompanied by his associates, ornaments, weapons, and attendants, is worshipped by the wise by means of sacrifice, the chief of which is the glorification [of the Lord].<sup>6</sup>

According to Jīva, this verse in the BhāPu predicts the advent of Caitanya. Thus, in the second verse of the TaSa, Jīva identifies the figure worshipped in BhāPu 11.5.32 with Kṛṣṇa Caitanya:

In the age of Kali, by means of glorifying [the Lord] we resort to Kṛṣṇa Caitanya, who is blackish internally, [but] who is yellowish externally, by whom the power of [His] associates and so on are shown.<sup>7</sup>

In this verse, Kṛṣṇa Caitanya is described as internally blackish (*antaḥ kṛṣṇam*) but externally yellowish or golden (*bahir gauram*) since, according to the Gauḍīya tradition, it is believed that Caitanya is a combined incarnation of Kṛṣṇa, whose color is blackish, and of Rādhā, whose color is golden (Kapoor 1976: 16–17). Thus, it is seen that by identifying Caitanya with Hari or Kṛṣṇa

<sup>4</sup> Bhaktivinoda Thākura, a nineteenth-century Gauḍīya revivalist wrote a creative novel called the *Navadvīpadhāmamāhātmya*. In the novel, he makes Caitanya appear in a dream to Madhva and has him say: 'Everyone knows that you are My eternal servant. When I appear Navadvīpa, I will accept initiation from your disciplic succession. Go everywhere, carefully uproot all the false scriptures of the impersonalists [i.e. Advaitins] and reveal the glories of Deity worship. Soon, I Myself will broadcast your teachings' (Thākura 1993: 112–113).

<sup>5</sup> Although a more obvious meaning of the *bahuvrihi* compound *kṛṣṇavarṇa* would be 'black-colored', indicating Kṛṣṇa, Jīva interprets it otherwise since he wants to interpret this verse as a prophecy of Kṛṣṇa Caitanya's descent. For a thorough explanation of this verse, see Elkman (1986: 65–66, fn. 1).

<sup>6</sup> *kṛṣṇavarṇam tviṣākṛṣṇam sāṅgopāṅgāstrapārṣadam / yajñaiḥ saṅkīrtanaprāyair yajanti hi sumedhasaḥ //*

<sup>7</sup> TaSa 2: *antaḥ kṛṣṇam bahir gauram darśitāṅgādivaibhavam / kalau saṅkīrtanādayaiḥ smaḥ kṛṣṇacaitanyam āśritāḥ //*

(*śrīkṛṣṇacaitanyahari*), Baladeva reveals his acceptance of an important Gauḍīya doctrine.

The last important point to be observed is the argument that the GoBhā is in accordance with the BhāPu. As pointed out in Chapter 1, the acceptance of the BhāPu as the highest means of knowledge and as the most natural commentary of the BraSū is another doctrine unique to the Gauḍīya tradition. This teaching is not accepted by the Mādhvas. The centrality of the BhāPu in Jīva's theology was discussed in Chapter 3. Baladeva follows Jīva in this regard, which suggests that his commentary on the BraSū is based on the theology of the BhāPu.

#### 4.1.2. The First Interpretation

The Sūṭī offers two interpretations of the opening verse of the GoBhā. According to the first interpretation, the verse reads as follows:

*satyaṃ jñānam anantaṃ brahma śivādistutaṃ bhajadrūpaṃ /  
govindaṃ tam acintyaṃ hetum adoṣaṃ namasyāmaḥ //*

We pay homage to Govinda, whose pastime is being a cowherd boy, who is known by the Vedas, who is omnipresent [and] self-luminous, who is Brahman, whom the principal gods such as Śiva praise as being accessible, whose manifestations are His devotees, from whom come the forms of those who worship, who is beyond the realm of logic, who is the efficient and material cause of all, and who is free from any fault such as fatigue.<sup>8</sup>

Baladeva first explains the verb *namasyāmaḥ* (we pay homage). According to the Sūṭī, the plural case used here indicates the rejection of absolute monism (*kevalādvaitavāda*) and the doctrine of the single-self (*ekajīvanavāda*):

<sup>8</sup> My translation is based on the Sūṭī, which gives the first interpretation of the verse as follows: *taṃ sarveśvaraṃ namasyāmaḥ, vayaṃ iti svasatīrthaśiṣyādyabhiprāyeṇa bahuvacanam / tena kevalādvaitavādaikajīvanavādau ca nirastau / taṃ viśiṇaṣṭi, satyaṃ ityādinā / satyaṃ prāmāṇikaṃ śrutyādipratipannam iti jalākāśāditaḥ, jñānam svaprakāśam iti prakṛtyāditaḥ, anantaṃ vibhum iti jivebhyaś ca vyāvṛttiḥ / sevyatvaṃ vyañjayan viśiṇaṣṭi, brahmetyādinā / brahmasa-tyatvādibhiḥ sārvaṇīyasārvaśīvaryānandasauhārdādibhiḥ ca brhadbhir guṇair viśi-ṣṭaṃ, ata eva śivādibhir devamukhyaiḥ stutaṃ sukhāpopaślokitam / bhajadrūpaṃ bhajanto bhaktā nityamuktādayo rūpāṇi mūrtayo yasyeti tannityasāhityadyotanād vicitrānantalīlam ity arthaḥ / bhajatāṃ rūpāṇi yasmād iti svasaṃkalpenaiva pārśadatanupradam iti ca / nanu svahetum eva sarvaḥ śrayati na svahetum iti cet tatrāha, hetum iti / nikhilanimittopādānarūpaṃ ity arthaḥ / tathā adoṣaṃ śramādidoṣarahitam / acintyaṃ tarkāgocaraṃ / svaśaktimātrasahāyaḥ sṛṣṭyādi kurvan śramādikṛtaṃ kaścīd api vikāraṃ na labhata iti śrutyādibhiḥ kīrtanāt, na tatra tarkāvakāśaḥ / sarvam etat yathāsthalam viśphuṣibhāvi / govindaṃ gopālalīlam iti sukhasevyat-vaṃ sūcyate / yady api 'gobhūmivedavidita' ityādiśrautaniruktair arthāntaram apy asti tathāpi 'mahendramadabhit priyān na indro gavām'iti śrīśukoktes tathā vyākhyātam / parikaro 'trālaṅ-kāraḥ, 'viśeṣaṇair yat sākūtair ukṭiḥ parikaras tu sa' iti tallakṣaṇāt / sābhiprāyair anekair viśeṣaṇair viśeṣyapuṣṭiḥ parikara iti tadārthaḥ /*

In [the statement] 'We pay homage to the Lord of all', the plural form 'we' [is used], indicating those who follow the same teacher [as the author] and the students [of the author] and so on. By this [usage of the plural form], he also rejects the doctrine of absolute non-dualism and the doctrine of the single-self.<sup>9</sup>

This rejection of absolute monism and of the doctrine of the single-self are in line with Jīva's teachings. As seen before, Jīva rejects the view of absolute monism when he comments on the word *aham* in the first verse of the CaṣloBhā, for example. Also, in his PaSa *Anuccheda* 105 Jīva explains that the verb *dhīmahī* ('let us meditate') in the first verse of the BhāPu suggests that absolute monism is untenable.<sup>10</sup>

The plural form *dhīmahī* (is used) in order to convey the necessity of meditation for everyone situated in the continuity of time and place. This is because it speaks of meditation on Bhagavān, who is the source (*aṃśī*) of the *puruṣas* who dwell within unlimited millions of universes. By this (word *dhīmahī*), the doctrine of apparent transformation (*vivartavāda*) (of the Advaitins), which is the very life of the doctrine of a 'single jīva' (advocated by a section of the Advaitins), is set aside. (Jīva 2007: 169; with slight modifications)<sup>11</sup>

Jīva claims that the use of the plural case (*bahuvacana*) indicates the rejection of the doctrine of apparent transformation (*vivartavāda*) and, by implication, the doctrine of the single-self (*ekajīvavāda*). We can observe that Baladeva's argument in the SūTī resonates with that of Jīva.

This rejection of absolute monism may be seen as the Mādhva influence on Gauḍīya philosophy in general. Mādhva Vedānta is well known for its doctrine of the fivefold differences (*pañcabheda*). In ViTaVi 69 Madhva says:

The Universe consists of five differences, viz. the difference between the Jīvas and Īśvara, the Jaḍas and Īśvara, the differences among the Jīvas, between the Jaḍas and Jīvas, and among the Jaḍas. This difference is real and beginningless. If it had a beginning, then it would have ended; it never ends. This difference is not a projection of illusion. If it were projected by illusion it would have been sublated. It is never sublated. Therefore, it is only the opinion of the ignorant that there is no difference. The wise, on the contrary, clearly know that this fivefold difference is known and maintained by the Supreme God Viṣṇu. Therefore, the difference is

<sup>9</sup> SūTī: *taṃ sarveśvaram namasyāmaḥ, vayam iti svasatīrthaśiṣyādyabhiprāyeṇa bahuvacanam / tena kevalādvaitavādaikajīvavādaḥ ca nirastau /*

<sup>10</sup> BhāPu 1.1.1: *janmādy asya yato 'nvayād itarataś cārtheṣv abhijñāḥ svarāt tene brahma hr̥dā ya ādikavaye muhyanti yat sūrayaḥ / tejovārīmṛdāṃ yathā vinimayo yatra trisargo 'mṛṣā dhāmnā svena sadā nirastakuhakam satyam param dhīmahī //*

<sup>11</sup> *dhīmahīti bahuvacanam kāladeśaparamparāsthitasya sarvasyāpi tatkartavyatābhiprāyeṇa anantakoṭibrahmaṇḍāntaryāminām puruṣāṇām aṃśibhūte bhagavaty eva dhyānasyābhidhānāt / anenaikajīvavāda-jīvanabhūto vivartavādo 'pi nirastah /*



real. God is Supreme. This is stated in the *Parama-Śruti*. (Madhva 1991: 179; with slight modifications)<sup>12</sup>

We may note Madhva's polemical expression against the Advaitins, who do not accept the difference between the living entity and Brahman: 'Therefore, it is only the opinion of the ignorant that there is no difference.' Baladeva thus follows both Madhva and Jīva in terms of his rejection of the Advaita position. I suggest that Baladeva accepts the teachings of Madhva in so far as they are in line with Jīva's theology. However, Baladeva rejects Madhva on points which are not in accordance with his Gauḍīya predecessors.

Baladeva's divergence from Madhva becomes clear when we examine his interpretation of the compound *bhajādrūpa* in the opening verse. In his analysis, Baladeva gives two interpretations for the compound. First, he analyzes it as a genitive *bahuvrihi*, meaning 'Govinda is the one whose manifestations are the devotees who are worshipping Him, [the devotees who are] the eternally liberated souls and so on.'<sup>13</sup> As discussed in chapter three, section three, Jīva explains that when the Lord says 'I (*aḥam*)' in the first verse of the CaśloBhā, He includes His eternal associates and so on within Himself. This striking closeness of the Lord and His devotees is an emphasis unique to the Gauḍīyas.

In the second interpretation, the compound *bhajādrūpa* means 'Govinda is the one from whom come the forms of those who worship.'<sup>14</sup> Further glossing the compound, Baladeva says 'By nothing more than his own will He bestows the bodies of the attendants.'<sup>15</sup> According to Baladeva, not only the living entities but also their bodies manifest from Govinda. Therefore, Baladeva concludes that 'Govinda is the one who is the efficient and the material cause of all.'<sup>16</sup> As shown in chapter three, section four, Jīva teaches that the living entity and *pradhāna* are Bhagavān's energies (*śakti*), and they are considered simultaneously one with and different from Bhagavān in a paradoxical manner (*acintyabhedābheda*). Baladeva's second interpretation of the

<sup>12</sup> *jīveśvarabhidā caiva jaḍeśvarabhidā tathā /  
jīvabhedo mithaś caiva jaḍajīvabhidā tathā //*  
*mithaś ca jaḍabhedo 'yaṁ prapañco bhedapañcakaḥ /*  
*so 'yam satyo hy anādiś ca sādiś cen nāśam āpnuyāt /*  
*na ca nāśaṁ prayāty eṣa na cāsau bhrāntikalpitaḥ //*  
*kalpitaś cen nivarteta na cāsau vinivartate /*  
*dvaitaṁ na vidyata iti tasmād ajñāninām mataṁ //*  
*matam hi jñāninām etan mitam trātaṁ ca viṣṇuṇā /*  
*tasmāt satyam iti proktaṁ paramo harir eva tu //* *iti paramaśrutiḥ /*  
<sup>13</sup> *SūTī: bhajanto bhaktā nityamuktādayo rūpāṇi mūrtayo yasya [...]* /  
<sup>14</sup> *SūTī: bhajatām rūpāṇi yasmād [...]* /  
<sup>15</sup> *SūTī: svasaṅkalpenaiva pārśadatanupradam [...]*  
<sup>16</sup> *SūTī: nikhilanimittopādānarūpam [...]*

compound *bhajadrūpa* is based on this doctrine of the transformation of the Lord's energies (*śaktipariṇāmavāda*).

In contrast, Madhva holds the view that the difference between Brahman, the living entity, and *pradhāna* is real, and their oneness cannot be taken literally. As shown above in the citation from ViTaVi69, Madhva teaches the fivefold differences: (1) between the living entity and Brahman, (2) between the insentient beings and Brahman, (3) between the insentient beings and the living entities, (4) among the living entities, (5) among the insentient beings. According to Madhva, these differences are real (*satya*) and without beginning (*anādi*). Therefore *pradhāna*, which is eternally distinct from Brahman, is accepted as the material cause of the world. Jayatirtha explains in his *Nyāya-sudhā*: "The material cause, which is beginning-less and which is called by the word "subtle existence" is *pradhāna*."<sup>17</sup> With regard to the living entity, Madhva states that it is eternally distinct from Brahman. According to Madhva, the *Śruti* passages, which speak of the non-difference (*abheda*) between the living being and Brahman indicate only their similarities, not their oneness. Thus, in AnuVya 2.3.29, Madhva writes:

The Śruti speak of the oneness of Jīva and Brahman on the basis of the former's bearing some measure of similarity to Brahman and the primacy of and independence of Brahman. They do not speak anywhere of their identity of essence. (Sharma 1986a: 319, fn. 12)<sup>18</sup>

Accordingly, Brahman in the Mādhva system is only the efficient cause (*nimittakāraṇa*) and not the material cause (*upādānakāraṇa*) of the universe. Baladeva therefore sharply diverges from Mādhva Vedānta by accepting Brahman as both the material and the efficient cause of the universe.

Baladeva's explanation of the name Govinda in the opening verse emphasizes the Lord's approachability. It also emphasizes His enchanting aspect (*mādhurya*) over His lordly aspect (*aiśvarya*). This emphasis on the intimacy between the living entity and the Lord is another unique feature of Gauḍīya theology. In contrast, Mādhva Vedānta emphasizes the Lord's supremacy and a clear distinction between Him and the living entity. Commenting on the word Govinda, Baladeva explains that the name Govinda indicates Kṛṣṇa as *gopālalīla*, that is, a cowherd boy who plays in Vṛndāvana,<sup>19</sup> who can be served with ease.<sup>20</sup> What is emphasized here is Kṛṣṇa's accessibility.

<sup>17</sup> *anāder upādānasya bhūtasūkṣmaśabdābhidheyasya pradhānatvāt* / Quoted in Sharma 1986a: 234. Translation mine.

<sup>18</sup> *sādrśyāc ca pradhānatvāt svātantryād api vābhidām / āhur īśena jīvasya na svarūpābhidām kvacit //*

<sup>19</sup> *SūTī: govindam gopālalīlam iti [...]* /

<sup>20</sup> *SūTī: sukhasevyatvam ucyate [...]* /

According to the BhāPu, Kṛṣṇa comes down to earth to enjoy his pastimes, such as playing with his cowherd friends at the end of the *Dvāparayuga*. As the Lord, Kṛṣṇa is full of power (*aiśvarya*) and so on.<sup>21</sup> However, in His role as a cowherd boy, He voluntarily conceals his lordly aspects and manifests His enchanting aspects (*mādhurya*) instead. As a result, the residents of Vṛndāvana are all attracted to Kṛṣṇa but do not know why. Nor are they aware that Kṛṣṇa is the Lord Himself.

By interpreting *govinda* as *gopālalīla*, Baladeva rejects another interpretation of the term offered by the GoTāU. The Upaniṣad claims *govinda* means 'the one who is known to the earth and the Vedas'.<sup>22</sup> According to this interpretation, *govinda* would indicate Viṣṇu or Nārāyaṇa, the more majestic manifestations of Kṛṣṇa. However, by interpreting *govinda* as *gopālalīla*, Baladeva seeks to emphasize the more intimate and sweet aspects of Kṛṣṇa as a cowherd boy.

Baladeva justifies his interpretation of *govinda* by quoting the last section of BhāPu 10.26.25. The full quotation is as follows:

When the god [i.e. Indra], in his anger because the sacrifice had been ruined, caused rain together with thunderbolt, a shower of stones, and wind, [Kṛṣṇa] saw that the cowherds, animals, and women were distressed and were resorting to Him. Being compassionate, smiling, [He] plucked the hill by one hand, just like a child [plucks] a mushroom, [and] carrying it [i.e. the hill], protected the assembly. May the Lord of the cows, the destroyer of Indra's pride, protect us.<sup>23</sup>

In this verse Śuka, the narrator of the BhāPu, describes Kṛṣṇa as the Lord of the cows (*indro gavām*). Baladeva's argument is that *govinda* should be interpreted as *gopālalīla* since Śuka describes Him in relation to the cows.

The verse quoted summarizes a famous act of Kṛṣṇa known as *govardhanalīla* (that of lifting up the Govardhana hill). In this narrative, Kṛṣṇa recommends the residents of Vṛndāvana perform a sacrifice to a hill called Govardhana, instead of worshipping Indra, the demigod in charge of rain. Following Kṛṣṇa,

<sup>21</sup> Cf. ViPu 6.5.74: *aiśvaryaśya samagrasya vīryasya yaśasaḥ śrīyaḥ / jñānavairāgyayoś caiva saññāṃ bhaga itiraṇā //*

There are six opulences: wealth, strength, fame, beauty, knowledge, and renunciation. *Bhagavān* means the person who possesses all these in full.

<sup>22</sup> GoTāU 5: *gobhūmivedavidita* [...] / This is a part of a conversation between Brahmā and the sages headed by Nārada. In verse 4 the sages ask Brahmā about the identity of Kṛṣṇa. Then Brahmā answers in verse 5: *tad u hocuḥ—kaḥ kṛṣṇaḥ govindaś ca ko 'sāv iti / gopījanavallabhaś ca kaḥ / kā svāheti //4// tān uvāca brāhmaṇaḥ—pāpakarṣaṇo gobhūmivedavidito gopījanavidyā-kalāprerakaḥ / tanmāyā ceti sakalaṃ paraṃ brahmaiva tat / yo dhyāyati rasati bhajati so 'mrto bhavati //5//* Prabodhānanda Sarasvatī glosses: *gaur bhūmiś ca gaur vedaś ceti gāvah teṣu vidito vikhayāta iti tān viditāveditā labdheti ca govinda ity arthaḥ /*

<sup>23</sup> *deve varṣati yajñaviplavaruṣā vajrāśmavarṣānilaiḥ sīdatpālapaśustry ātmaśaraṇaṃ dṛṣtvā-nukampy utsmayan / utpāṭyaikakareṇa śailam abalo lilocchilindram yathā bibhrad goṣṭham apān mahendramadabhit pāyān na indro gavām //* BhāABho: [...] *sīdatpāpapaśustry ātmaśaraṇaṃ sīdantaḥ pālāḥ paśavaḥ striyaś ca yasmim tat tathā, ātmā svayam eva śaraṇaṃ yasya tad goṣṭham dṛṣtvā* [...]

the residents of Vṛndāvana offer ample food to the hill, which is devoured by Kṛṣṇa Himself who mysteriously assumes the form of the hill. Frustrated because he received no sacrifice, Indra attacks Vṛndāvana as a punishment, with a torrent of rain, stones, thunderbolts, and so on. In order to protect the residents, who are all devotees of Kṛṣṇa, He keeps the hill in the air for seven days. Staying beneath the hill held by Kṛṣṇa, the residents and the animals of Vṛndāvana avoid Indra's attack. Finally Indra realizes Kṛṣṇa's real identity as the Lord, and surrenders to him.

This incident is significant in that it describes Kṛṣṇa's lordly aspect in relation to Indra, while simultaneously revealing His intimate, sweet relationship with the residents of Vṛndāvana. BhāPu 10.25.23 describes Kṛṣṇa in the following manner, when He carries the hill:

Disregarding the disturbance due to hunger and thirst, and [disregarding] concern for [His own] happiness, [Kṛṣṇa] held the mountain, while being looked at by those residents of Vraja [i.e. Vṛndāvana]. He did not move from the site for seven days.<sup>24</sup>

Viśvanātha Cakravartī, one of the Gauḍīya teachers of Baladeva and a prominent figure in the Gauḍīya community in the seventeenth century, comments on this verse in his SāADa as follows:

It should be understood that Kṛṣṇa stood directly facing everyone [while carrying the hill]. By continuously drinking the nectar of the beauty and loveliness of Kṛṣṇa, the *Vrajavāsīs* [i.e. the residents of Vṛndāvana] felt no hunger and so on, and Kṛṣṇa, by seeing the beautiful forms of His beloved *gopīs* [i.e. cowherd girls], also forgot about eating, drinking, and sleeping. The seven days of continuous rain from the *Sāṃvartaka* clouds failed to flood the district of Mathurā because the Lord, simply by His desiring energy, immediately dried up the water as soon as it fell to the ground. For the *Vrajavāsīs* the seven days passed as if they were one *ghaṭikā* [i.e. twenty-four minutes]. (Trans. from Viśvanātha 2004: 271 with some modifications.)<sup>25</sup>

What is depicted here is an intimate relationship between Kṛṣṇa and the residents of Vṛndāvana. Kṛṣṇa is directly facing each one of the residents, and, being absorbed by Kṛṣṇa's beauty and loveliness, the *Vrajavāsīs* forget about hunger and all other inconveniences; as does Kṛṣṇa, being transfixed by the beauty of the cowherd girls. In this intimate atmosphere, the residents of

<sup>24</sup> *kṣuttrdvyathām sukhāpekṣām hitvā tair vrajavāsibhiḥ /  
vikṣyamāṇo dadhārādriṃ saptāhaṃ nācalat padāt //*

<sup>25</sup> *kṛṣṇo 'tra sarvābhīmukho babhūveti bodhyam / atra śrīkṛṣṇasaudaryalāvanyapīyūṣapā-  
nena vrajaukasām preyasīsaundaryād ity anena kṛṣṇasya ca kṣudhādivigamo 'bhavad iti atra  
saptāhavyāpīnyā sāmavartakameghavrṣṭyāpi yan māyuramaṇḍalaṃ na mamajja tat khalu bha-  
gavacchaktyaiva sadyahpayahśoṣaṇād ity jñeyam tathā ṣaṣṭhighaṭikasyaiva kālasya divasatvāt  
ghaṭīti prasiddhā ghaṭikā gaṇanenaiva vrajajanānām saptadivasaśāñjñānam abhūd ity api  
jñeyam //*

Vraja spend seven days as if it were only twenty-four minutes. Thus, Baladeva emphasizes the sweet and intimate connection between the living entity and the Lord, by interpreting *govinda* as *gopālalīla*, and by making reference to the *govardhanalīlā*.

With regard to this connection, Baladeva is again in line with Jīva. In his commentary on BhāPu 2.9.32, Jīva describes Kṛṣṇa's form as 'most mind-captivating' (*paramamanohara*). He also emphasizes the intimate relationship between the Lord and the living being by saying that the word 'I (*aham*)' includes the Lord's associates.<sup>26</sup>

Emphasis on this close relationship between the living entity and Bhagavān is unique to the Gauḍīya tradition. Graham Schweig calls this closeness 'intimism':

The word ['theistic intimacy' or 'intimism'] implies [...] a vision of God that presents his 'innermost' relations within the godhead, his 'nearest' or 'closest' relationships of love. Typically, in traditions of theistic intimism, the love between the soul and God is expressed through various loving, intimate relationships that resemble those of this world, such as the adoring love of a parent for a child or the love shared between two friends. However, it is the love that resembles the passionate feelings between lover and beloved that is common to most traditions of intimacy [...]. The Chaitanyaite [i.e. Gauḍīya] tradition is also absorbed in the erotic vision of God, Krishna as the lover, along with his beloved consort Radha, as the most worshipable forms of the intimate deity. (Schweig 2004: 14)

Whereas the intimacy between the living entity and the Lord is emphasized in the Gauḍīya tradition, the distinction between the two and the Lord's majesty are of fundamental significance in the Mādhva system. This was shown in Madhva's commentary on the first and the second verses of the CaśloBhā.<sup>27</sup> Thus, Baladeva's emphasis on the Lord's sweet aspect suggests his close

<sup>26</sup> See 3.3.

<sup>27</sup> See 3.3. and 3.4. This is also observed in the beginning of Madhva's TaSaṁ:

*svatantram asvatantram ca dvididham tatvam iṣyate /*

*svatanthro bhagavān viṣṇur bhāvābhāvau dvidhetarat /*

The principles are taught to be twofold, [namely] that which is independent and that which is not independent. The independent [principle] is Lord Viṣṇu. The other [i.e. the non-independent principle] is two-fold, [namely] the existence and the non-existence.

Another work by Madhva, called the *Tattvaviveka*, starts in an almost identical manner:

*svatantram asvatantram ca prameyaṁ dvididham matam /*

*svatanthro bhagavān viṣṇur nirdoṣākhilasadguṇaḥ //*

*dvididham paratantram ca bhāvo 'bhāva itiritah /*

*Tattvavivekavivaraṇa: nirdoṣaś cāsāv akhila sadguṇaś ceti vighrahaḥ /*

The objects of knowledge are considered as twofold, [namely] that which is independent and that which is not independent. The independent [principle] is Lord Viṣṇu, who is without fault, complete, and possessed of good qualities. It is said that the dependent [principles] are twofold, [namely] the existence and the non-existence.

following of the Gauḍīya tradition on the one hand, and his divergence from the Mādhva tradition on the other.

### 4.1.3. The Second Interpretation

After giving the first interpretation, Baladeva provides an alternative reading of the opening verse:

*satyaṃ jñānam anantaṃ brahma śivādistutaṃ bhajadrūpaṃ /  
govindaṃ tam acintyaṃ hetum adoṣaṃ namasyāmaḥ //*

We offer obeisance to glorious Govinda, the son of Nanda, who is well known as the presiding deity of the sacred Vṛndāvana, whom Rūpa [Gosvāmī], a man of that name, the greatest [servant], is worshipping, whom beauty worships, whose form, which is the highest truth, has the form of image because of His favour for His devotees, whose image is paradoxical, and who removes ignorance from worshippers and so on.<sup>28</sup>

In the beginning of his second interpretation Baladeva explains that the name *govinda* specifically indicates Govindadeva, an image of Kṛṣṇa, which was worshipped by Rūpa in Vṛndāvana:

Now, the Lord of all, the glorious one, is the son of Nanda. Having appeared out of His affection for Vajranābha, as a manifestation in the form of image, and after that, having been consecrated by illustrious Rūpa, He appears as the tutelary deity of the glorious Vṛndāvana. With his mind fixed on Him, commenting the

<sup>28</sup> GoBhā: *satyaṃ jñānam anantaṃ brahma śivādistutaṃ bhajadrūpaṃ /  
govindaṃ tam acintyaṃ hetum adoṣaṃ namasyāmaḥ //*

My translation is based on the SūTī, which gives the second interpretation of the verse as follows: *atha sarveśvaro bhagavān nandasūnur vajranābhaprītyārcāvatāratayāvīrbhūtas tadanantaram śrīrūpeṇa cābhiṣiktaḥ śrīmadvṛndāavyadhidevatātvena yaś cakāsti tanniṣṭhamanā bhāṣyakṛt tan-nideśenaiva brahmasūtrārthān vivṛṇvan tatpraṇatīm maṅgalaṃ ācacāra / 'vidyārūpaṃ bhūṣaṇaṃ me pradāpaya' ityādibhāṣyapīṭhakokter iti vadanti / tatpakṣe tv evaṃ vyākhyeyam / tam śrīvṛndā-vanādhīṣṭhātrdevatvena prasiddhaṃ śrīgovindaṃ vayaṃ namasyāmaḥ / kidrśaṃ? / bhajadrūpaṃ / bhajat sevamāno rūpas tannāmā mahattamo yam iti dvitīyāntānyapadārtho bahuvrīhiḥ / bhajanti rūpāni yam iti vā saundaryasevitam ity arthaḥ / rūpaṃ prabhāvasaundarye iti viśvaḥ / arcāsādhāraṇaṃ nirvartya śākṣādbhagavattām vaktuṃ viśeṣaṇāni satyaṃ ityādīni / satyādirūpaṃ yat paratattvaṃ tad eva bhaktānugrahavaśād arcārūpaṃ ity arthaḥ / nanu citsukhamūrter arcyatvaṃ kathaṃ? tatrāha, acintyaṃ iti tarkāviśayaṃ ity arthaḥ / hetum arcakādyavidyānivāraṇam / 'vṛndāvane tu govindaṃ ye paśyanti vasundhare / na te yamapuram yānti yānti punyakṛtām gatim' iti smṛteḥ / punyakṛtām bhaktimatām / punyan tu cārv apity amaraḥ / iha vastunirdeśādirūpaṃ maṅgalaṃ bodhyam / na cedam apramāṇam aphaś ceti vācyam / śiṣṭācārānumitaśrutiprāmāṇyād granthasamāpteh phalatvā ca / nanu kvacit saty apī maṅgale tasyāsamāpter asati ca tasmin samāpter vikṣaṇād vyabhicāraḥ / maivaṃ, anurūpamaṅgalācārānādes tatkāraṇatvāt tatkāraṇāc ca / anyathā śiṣṭas tan nācareyuḥ / vedaprāmāṇyābhyupagatatvaṃ hi śiṣṭatvaṃ / na ca anṛtavyāghātapunaruktadoṣebhyo vedavacanasyāprāmāṇyam iti vācyam, karmakartṛśādhanavai-guṇyād abhyupetya kālabhede doṣavacanād anuvādapapattē ca /*

meaning of the BraSū precisely by the command of the Lord, the commentator [i.e. Baladeva] offers a benedictory verse which is an obeisance to Him.<sup>29</sup>

As shown already, the image of Govindadeva has a strong connotation within the Gauḍīya tradition since it was first worshipped by Rūpa, one of the founding figures of the tradition. The image also points to a strong connection between the Gauḍīya tradition and the Kachvāhā dynasty. Baladeva says that he wrote the GoBhā at the command of Govinda Himself. In Chapter 1 it was discussed that Baladeva had written the GoBhā to justify the prestige and prominence given to Govindadeva and to the Gauḍīyas in Jaipur. Set against this historical background, the fact that Baladeva starts his commentary by offering a prayer to Govindadeva points to his commitment to the Gauḍīya tradition.

Another significant mark of the Gauḍīya tradition is the identification of the Lord as 'the son of Nanda (*nandasūnu*)'. The name *nandasūnu* indicates the cowherd Kṛṣṇa in Vṛndāvana, who is a son of Nanda and Yaśoda. What is implicit in this identification is a Gauḍīya doctrine of Kṛṣṇa's supremacy over all other incarnations, including Viṣṇu and Nārāyaṇa. This is, for example, taught by Rūpa.

Rūpa, in his LaBhāA, explains the hierarchy among the Lord's various manifestations. In verse 11, he explains that the Lord appears (1) as Himself (*svayaṁrūpa*), (2) as forms which are identical with Himself (*tadekātmarūpa*), and (3) as forms which are empowered by Him (*āveśarūpa*).<sup>30</sup> In verse 12 the *svayaṁrūpa* manifestation is defined as that which is not dependent on others.<sup>31</sup> According to Rūpa, this *svayaṁrūpa* form of the Lord is Govinda, as mentioned in BraSa 5.1: 'Kṛṣṇa is the supreme Lord [known as] Govinda. His form is existence, intelligence, and pure happiness. He is beginningless and primordial. He is the cause of all the causes.'<sup>32</sup> Thus Rūpa first establishes that Kṛṣṇa is the Lord's original form.

Then, in verse 15, he explains that the Lord's manifestations as *tadekātmarūpa* have two subcategories, namely *vilāsa* and *svāmśa*: 'That which is His own nature [but] appears as having different forms due to a [different] pastime, [and] which is almost equal to [the Lord] Himself by energy, is called *vilāsa*.'<sup>33</sup>

<sup>29</sup> SūTī: *atha sarveśvaro bhagavān nandasūnur vajranābhapṛītyārcāvatāratayāvirbhūtas tadanantaram* ([*āvirbhūtas tadanantaram*] conj. Isaacson; *āvirbhūtād anantaram* SūTī) *śrīrūpeṇa cābhiśikṭaḥ śrīmadvṛndāṭayadyadhidevatātvena yaś cakāsti tanniṣṭhamanā bhāṣyakṛt tannideśe-naiva brahmasūtrārthān vivṛṇvan tatprāṇatim maṅgalam ācācāra /*

<sup>30</sup> *svayaṁrūpas tadekātmarūpāveśanātமாக / ity asau trividham bhāti prapañcātītadhāmasu //*

<sup>31</sup> *ananyāpekṣi yad rūpaṁ svayaṁrūpaḥ sa ucyate /*

<sup>32</sup> *īśvaraḥ paramaḥ kṛṣṇaḥ saccidānandavigrahaḥ / anādir ādir govindaḥ sarvakāraṇakāraṇam //*

<sup>33</sup> *svarūpaṁ anyākāraṁ yat tasya bhāti vilāsataḥ / prāyeṇātmasamaṁ śaktyā sa vilāso nigadyate //*

The Lord's *vilāsa* manifestations have different forms than Kṛṣṇa because they perform different functions. What is important is that these *vilāsa* manifestations are *almost* identical with the Lord in terms of their energy. This means that they are actually slightly less than Kṛṣṇa in terms of the power they possess. Then, in verse 16, Rūpa argues that Nārāyaṇa is a *vilāsa* manifestation of Govinda.<sup>34</sup> According to Rūpa, therefore, Nārāyaṇa is almost identical with but slightly lesser than Kṛṣṇa/Govinda.




Fig. 4.1 The Hierarchy among the Lord's Manifestations

This point is shown in Rūpa's BhaRaASi 2.1.23–42. Therein sixty-four qualities of Kṛṣṇa are mentioned. The last four qualities in the list are said to belong only to Govinda: 'These last four extraordinary qualities—divine love play, supreme love of dear friends, the sweet flute, and the sweet form—belong exclusively to Govinda' (Rūpa 2003: 133).<sup>35</sup> Only Kṛṣṇa has these four qualities that are necessary to exhibit the Lord's sweet aspect in full. Thus, according to the Gauḍīya tradition, Kṛṣṇa or Govinda is the source of all other incarnations, including Nārāyaṇa, and Govinda is the most complete. This is why Jīva insists in his commentary on BhāPu 2.9.35 that the speaker of the CaśloBhā is the two-armed Kṛṣṇa and not the four-armed Viṣṇu.<sup>36</sup>

<sup>34</sup> *paravyomanāthas tu govindasya yathā smṛtaḥ /*

<sup>35</sup> BhaRaASi 2.1.43: *lilā premṇā priyādhikyaṃ mādhyurayaṃ veṇurūpayoḥ / ity asādhāraṇaṃ proktaṃ govindasya catuṣṭayaṃ //*

<sup>36</sup> See 3.6.



Madhva does not accept such a hierarchy or gradation among the Lord's manifestations and he explains this in his commentary to BraSū 3.2.13 *api caivam eke* /:

*Evam* [in the *sūtra*] means 'precisely as non-different'. From the word *ca* in the *sūtra*, [it means that] some branches [of the Vedas] also teach that [the Lord] has many forms. [Thus Gauḍapāda's *Kārikā* 1.29 says] 'He who knows the one who is partless and [yet] full of parts, the one who destroys false knowledge, the auspicious one, the letter *om*—that person is a sage and no one else.' Although [the different forms of the Lord] are non-different, the statement of difference [among different forms of the Lord] is possible due to the difference of [their] abodes and on account of their power.<sup>37</sup>

Quoting Gauḍapāda's *Kārikā* (Nikhilānanda 1949: 89) on the *Maṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*. Madhva explains how Brahman appears as different manifestations, although there is no real difference among them. Commenting on Madhva, Jayatīrtha says, 'the multitude of the forms of the Lord is taught only along with non-difference'.<sup>38</sup> On this point, Sharma says:

[I]n Madhva's view, these various manifestations are absolutely on a par with one another. There is no gradation among them in respect of powers or potentialities. Madhva is vehemently opposed to the idea of making any invidious distinctions among these manifestations of God or putting some on a higher pedestal than others [ . . . ] It is the same Infinite in every manifestation [ . . . ] To him [i.e. to Madhva], all Avatāras are of equal merit and status. There is no question of degrees of fullness among them, no 'partial' and 'complete Avatāras'. (1986a: 375–6).

In Mādhva Vedānta, real difference or any hierarchy among the manifestations of Brahman is not accepted. Thus, Baladeva's choice of the name *govinda* in the opening verse, and his emphasis on the Lord's sweet aspect, who appears in Vṛndāvana as a son of Nanda, point to his Gauḍiya identity.

Baladeva's connection to Rūpa Gosvāmī has been shown several times already. There are two more places in the SūTī sub-commentary where such a connection is observed. In the second interpretation, Baladeva offers the following explanation for the compound *bhajādrūpa*:

<sup>37</sup> *evam abhedenaiva / caśabdād anantarūpatvaṃ caike śākhinaḥ paṭhanti / 'amātro 'nantamātraś ca dvaitasyopaśamaḥ śivāḥ / omkāro vidito yena sa munir netaro janāḥ //'* iti / *abhede 'pi bhedavyapadeśaḥ sthānabhedād aiśvaryayogāc ca yuhyate /* TaPra: *amātro bhinnāmśaśūnyaḥ punar anantāmśaḥ / dvaitasyopaśamo mithyājñānopaśama-kartā /*

<sup>38</sup> *abhedena sahaiveśvararūpāṇāṃ bahutvasya paṭhitatvāt [ . . . ] /*

[Govinda is] *bhajadrūpa*. [This is] a *bahuvrīhi* compound, having its meaning in another word, which ends with the accusative case. It means that [Govinda] is the one whom Rūpa, a man of that name, the greatest [servant], is worshipping {*bhajat*}.<sup>39</sup>

This passage makes it clear that *govinda* in the verse denotes the actual image of Govindadeva, which was indeed worshipped by Rūpa. The historical importance of this particular image was discussed in chapter one, section two. Baladeva also expresses his reverence toward Rūpa by describing him as the greatest (*mahattamo*).

Another point of reference to the Gauḍīya tradition can be found in Baladeva's second interpretation of the term *hetu*:

*Hetu* means that [Govinda] removes ignorance from the worshippers and so on. For, there is a *Smṛti* passage, 'O Earth! Those who see Govinda in Vṛndāvana do not go to the city of death but go to the destination of the virtuous.'<sup>40</sup>

*Hetu* means that Govinda, in the form of the image, removes ignorance of those who worship Him. In order to support this explanation, Baladeva quotes a *Smṛti* passage. The same passage is found in Rūpa's BhaRaASi in the context of seeing the image of the Lord (*śrīmūrteḥ īkṣaṇam*), which is one of the sixty-four types of devotional activities. Baladeva's interpretation of the compound *bhajadrūpa* and the word *hetu* indicate Baladeva's respect for Rūpa and his awareness of Rūpa's works.

#### 4.1.4. Conclusion

On the one hand, Baladeva is content to follow Mādhva doctrines such as the rejection of absolute monism, in so far as his Gauḍīya predecessors also accept them. On the other hand, he accepts without hesitation those Gauḍīya doctrines which are not accepted by the Mādhvas, such as (1) exclusive devotion to Govinda or Kṛṣṇa; (2) the acceptance of Kṛṣṇa Caitanya as Kṛṣṇa's *avatāra*; (3) the acceptance of the BhāPu as the most natural commentary on the BraSū; (4) Brahman as the efficient and the material cause of the living entity and the universe; (5) the emphasis on Kṛṣṇa's sweet aspect and His intimate relationship with the devotees. The Mādhvas accept none of these points. Therefore,

<sup>39</sup> *bhajadrūpaṃ / bhajat sevamāno rūpas tannāmā mahattamo yam iti dvitīyāntānyapa-dārtho bahuvrīhiḥ /*

<sup>40</sup> *hetum arcakādyavidyānivāraṇam /*  
*'vṛndāvane tu govindaṃ ye paśyanti vasundhare /*  
*na te yamapuram yānti yānti puṇyakṛtām gatim //*

The same quotation is found in BhaRaASi 1.2.166. According to Rūpa, this verse is found in the VāPu (*atha śrīmūrter darśanam, yathā vārāhe*). This is a verse given to illustrate the seeing of the image of the Lord (*śrīmūrteḥ īkṣaṇam*), one of the sixty-four items of devotional activities discussed in BhaRaASi 1.2.86.

Baladeva's Sūṭī commentary on the GoBhā's opening verse suggests that he was theologically not affiliated to the Mādhva tradition despite the fact that he claimed the Gauḍīyas' formal affiliation with the Mādhvas.

#### 4.2. BALADEVA ON THE FIRST FIVE SŪTRAS

In section 4.1 the opening verse of the GoBhā was examined together with Baladeva's own commentary, the Sūṭī. We observed that Baladeva follows Jīva's teachings even at the cost of diverging from those of Madhva while Baladeva is happy to follow Madhva on the points which are accepted by Jīva. However, he does not accept the teachings of Madhva if Jīva does not accept them. Based on this observation, Baladeva's theological stance in relation to Jīva and Madhva may be expressed as follows:




Fig. 4.2 Theological Overlaps between Jīva and Madhva

The (J) circle represents Jīva's teachings. The (M) circle represents those of Madhva. The overlapping space  $(J \wedge M)$  represents the teachings accepted by both Jīva and Madhva. To restate the above-mentioned observation, Baladeva's theology consists of (1) the teachings which exclusively belong to Jīva  $\{(J) - (J \wedge M)\}$  and (2) the teachings accepted by Jīva and Madhva  $\{(J \wedge M)\}$ , but excludes (3) the teachings which exclusively belong to Madhva  $\{(M) - (J \wedge M)\}$ .

In this section, Baladeva's commentary on the first five BraSū is examined in relation to those commentaries of Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, Madhva, and Jīva. Like the opening verse, what a Vedāntic author comments on the first five sūtras can be seen as a summary of his entire theological system. Therefore, it is critical to examine this section of the GoBhā in detail. In relation to the first five sūtras, I argue that the above-mentioned hypothesis concerning

Baladeva's theological stance (i.e. Baladeva's theology =  $\{(J) - (J \wedge M)\} + (J \wedge M)$ ) holds good.

One element, however, new in this case is the fact that Baladeva quotes Madhva's untraceable citations many times. In Chapter 3 the peculiarity of these untraceable verses was discussed several times.<sup>41</sup> The nature of these verses is such that it is most likely that Madhva wrote them. As pointed out in chapter three, section one, those outside the Mādhva tradition criticized Madhva for manufacturing them. At the same time, it was shown that those inside the Mādhva tradition, such as Vijayadhvaja, accept Madhva's untraceable citations and follow them closely in their commentaries. Therefore, the acceptance or rejection of these untraceable verses is a good criterion by which Madhva's influence on a particular author can be judged. In this context Baladeva's acceptance of these verses indicates Madhva's influence on him. However, I will point out that Baladeva cites only those untraceable verses which Jīva also cites. I suggest that Madhva's untraceable verses cited by Baladeva belong to the second area  $(J \wedge M)$  in the diagram.

#### 4.2.1. Preamble

After offering two *maṅgala* verses and before starting to comment on the first *sūtra*, Baladeva writes a considerable amount summarizing the basic tenets of his system. This section, therefore, is dealt with separately as a preamble.

Baladeva first describes the origin of the BraSū:

In the SkaPu, there is a story: In the *Dvāparayuga*, when the Vedas are almost lost, being requested by Brahmā and so on whose intelligence was confused, the Lord as Kṛṣṇadvaipāyana, after resurrecting the Vedas, divided them.<sup>42</sup> [Then Vyāsa] brought forth the inquiry into Brahman, which is in four chapters, which decides the meaning of them [i.e. of the four Vedas].<sup>43</sup>

This is almost an exact copy of Madhva's preamble in his BraSūBhā. Neither Śaṅkara nor Rāmānuja tells this narrative. That Baladeva copies Madhva is unmistakable since, in the SūTī, Baladeva quotes the following verses, which give the narrative:

The wisdom which had been derived from Narayana was in the Kṛta age perfect (as given). In the next age of Treta, it was changed a little; and in Dvāpara it became wholly altered. Further, owing to the curse of the sage Gautama, wisdom

<sup>41</sup> See 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6.

<sup>42</sup> The Vedas are divided into *Rk*, *Sāma*, *Yajur*, and *Atharva*.

<sup>43</sup> GoBhā 1.1.1: *dvāpare vedeṣu samutsanneṣu saṅkīrṇaprajñair brahmādibhir abhyarthito bhagavān puruṣottamaḥ kṛṣṇadvaipāyanaḥ san tām uddhṛtya vibabhāja / tadarthanirṇetrīm catulakṣaṇīm brahmanimāṃsāviścakāra ity asti kathā skāndī /*

became converted into false knowledge; and Brahma, Rudra and the other gods became confused in mind and sought refuge under Narayana, the faultless as the fittest to be resorted unto for refuge. Having been informed by them as to what had to be done, this Supreme Person of divine glory became incarnated in the form of a sage born of Parasara and Satyavati. Thus He, who is the Lord Hari of supreme glory, Himself gave forth the Vedas which had been lost to the world; and divided them into four, and these four again into twenty-four, a hundred and one, a thousand and twelve branches respectively; and, for the proper understanding of their import, He composed the Brahma Sutras or the great aphorisms which possess in full the chief requirements of Sutras or aphorisms. Those that know the characteristics of the Sutra, say that it should be concise, unambiguous, of fresh and high import, of universal application, free from repetition and inaccuracies of word and sense. (Madhva 1904: 3–4)<sup>44</sup>

Although Baladeva attributes these verses to the SkaPu, they are exact quotes from Madhva's commentary on the BraSū 1.1.1. Madhva also attributes these verses to the SkaPu. However, according to Roque Mesquita, they are not to be found in the SkaPu currently available (2008: 285). Therefore, there is a good possibility that Madhva created these verses. For anyone familiar with Madhva's work, the way Baladeva begins his commentary looks distinctively Madhvite.

This, however, does not mean that Baladeva follows Madhva's Vedānta *in toto*. As has been seen in his SūTī commentary on the *maṅgala* verse and as shall be seen later in this section, Baladeva is not hesitant about following Jīva's theology, even when it is not in accordance with Madhva. It is also noteworthy that Jīva quotes the same verses in his TaSa *Anucceda* 16. My hypothesis, therefore, is that although Baladeva consciously presents his GoBhā as Madhvite, he accepts Madhva's authority only to the extent that Jīva, his Gauḍīya predecessor, accepts it.

The narrative attributed to the SkaPu states that after resurrecting the Vedas, Vyāsa wrote the BraSū to clarify their correct meaning and remove any false ideas concerning them. In the GoBhā, Baladeva elaborates this point

<sup>44</sup> BraSūBhā (Ma) 1.1.1: *nārāyanād viniṣpannam jñānam kṛtayuge sthitam / kiñcid anyat tathā jātaṁ tretāyāṁ dvāpare 'khilam // gautamasya ṛṣeḥ śāpāj jñāne tv ajñānatām gate / saṅkīrṇabuddhayo devā brahmarudraparaḥsarāḥ // śaraṇyam saraṇam jagmur nārāyaṇam anāmayam / tair vijñāpitakāryas tu bhagavān puruṣottamaḥ // avatīrṇo mahāyogī satyavatyāṁ parāśarāt / utsannān bhagavān vedān ujjahāra hariḥ svayam // caturdhā vyabhajat tāṁś ca caturviṁśatidhā punaḥ // śatadhā caikadhā caiva tathaiva ca sahasradhā // kṛṣṇo dvādaśadhā caiva punas tasyārthavittaye / cakāra brahmasūtrāṇi yeṣāṁ sūtratvam aṅjasā // alpākṣaram asandigdham sāravad viśvatomukham / astobham anavadyaṅ ca sūtram sūtravido viduḥ //*

and says that the BraSū reject the views of those who have low intelligence (*durmati*) and establishes the supremacy of Viṣṇu:

People with bad intelligence accept superficial meanings [such as] (1) [the Mīmāṃsā position]: the Vedas [teach] ritualistic action [only], which is the [sole] cause of all human goals [i.e. *dharma*, *artha*, *kāma*, and *mokṣa*], Viṣṇu is merely auxiliary / instrumental to ritual performances, the results of ritual action such as [attaining] heaven is eternal, the living entity and *prakṛti* are independent agents; (2) [the Advaita position]: Brahman alone becomes the living entity either due to limiting adjunct, reflection, or delusion [bound by *māyā*], the living entity [obtains] the cessation from transmigration from mere contemplation on the nature of Brahman, which is consciousness only.

Having made them *prima facie* views, we will examine the nature of knowledge about Viṣṇu which includes that He is independent, He is the creator of everything, He is omniscient, He constitutes the highest goal of human life and so on.<sup>45</sup>

Baladeva attacks the teachings of the Mīmāṃsakas and Advaitins. This shows that these two traditions are the main opponents he has in mind. In the SūTī Baladeva further mentions other schools to be rejected: the Cārvakas; the four schools of Buddhism (the Mādhyamikas, the Yogacāras, the Sautrāntikas, and the Vaibhāṣikas); the Sāṅkhya school of Kapila; the Yoga school of Patañjali; the Vaiśeṣika school of Kaṇāda; the Nyāya school of Gautama.<sup>46</sup>

After listing the views to be refuted, Baladeva presents the view to be established: the BraSū establish five principles: the Lord, the living entity, *prakṛti*, time, and *karma*.<sup>47</sup> It appears that Baladeva takes this idea from the VeSyā written by Rādhādāmodara, Baladeva's teacher in the Gauḍīya tradition.<sup>48</sup>

<sup>45</sup> GoBhā 1.1.1: *vedeṣu khalu karmaṇo nikhilapumarthahetutvaṃ viṣṇo tu karmāṅgatvaṃ, svargādeḥ karmaphalasya nityatvaṃ, jīvasya prakṛteś ca svataḥ kartṛtvaṃ, paricchinnasya pratibimbasya bhrāntasya vā brahmaṇa eva jīvatvaṃ, cinmātrabrahmātmakatvadhīmātrād evāsyā jīvasya saṃsṛtvinivṛttir ity āpātato durmatibhiḥ pratiyante / tān imān pūrvapakṣān vidhāya parasya viṣṇor iha svāntantryasarvakartṛtvasārvajñyapumarthatvādidharmakavijñānasvarūpatvaṃ nirūpyate /*

<sup>46</sup> It is curious that Baladeva does not mention the Jains, the Śaivas, and the Śāktas, although later in the GoBhā he does reject these schools as well.

<sup>47</sup> *īśvarajīva-prakṛtikālakarmāṇi pañcatattvāni śrūyante /* Baladeva introduces the same five categories in the beginning of his commentary on the BhaGī as well: *tasyāṃ khalv īśvarajīva-prakṛtikālakarmāṇi pañcārthā varṇyante / teṣu vibhusaṃvid īśvaraḥ / aṇusaṃvij jīvaḥ / sattvādiguṇatrayāśrayo dravyaṃ prakṛtiḥ / traiguṇyaśūnyaṃ jaḍadravyaṃ kālāḥ / pumprayat-naniṣpādyam adṛṣṭādisābdavācyaṃ karmeti /*

<sup>48</sup> At the end of the VeSyā is found the verse which attributes the work to Rādhādāmodara: *rādhādidāmodaranāma bibhratā vipreṇa vedāntamayāḥ syamantakaḥ / śrīrādhikāyā vinivedito mayā tasyāḥ pramodaṃ sa tanotu sarvadā //* 'May the Syamantaka jewel consisting of Vedānta, which is composed for glorious Rādhikā by me, a Brāhmaṇa bearing a name Dāmodara preceded by Rādhā, spread her joy.' I thank David Buchta for his suggestion to render *ādi* in the sense of 'preceded by'. I am also thankful to Aleksandar Uskokov (University of Chicago) for informing me of the five categories mentioned in the *Vedāntasyamantaka*.

At the end of the work he cites ViPu 1.2.24<sup>49</sup> and 2.12.42.<sup>50</sup> The first verse mentions the Lord, the living entity, *prakṛti*, and time. The second verse mentions *karma*.

Elkman is of the opinion that by introducing these five categories, Baladeva goes against Jīva Gosvāmī, who accepts the principle of nonduality (*advaya*) mentioned in BhāPu 1.2.11:

These five *tattvas* are discussed in even greater detail by B.D. [i.e. Baladeva] in his *Govinda Bhāṣya* (1/1/1) [ . . . ] The doctrine of five *tattvas* cannot be traced to the writings of the Gosvāmīns, and in fact, goes against the explicit statement of this text, based on the words of the *Bhāgavata*, that the *tattva*, described in section 51 as 'non-dual consciousness', admits of no second reality. (1986: 134)

Elkman points out that in TaSa *Anuccheda* 51 Jīva states that the only self-existent principle is Brahman, and other principles belong to Brahman as Its energies (*śakti*):

Then in reply to the question, 'What is the nature of this principle of reality (*tattva*)?' Sūta states: 'The knowers of this principle of reality declare non-dual consciousness to be reality.' Here, *jñāna* ('consciousness') means 'having pure consciousness as its essential nature'. This consciousness is termed *advaya* ('non-dual') for the reasons that there exists no other self-existent *tattva*, either similar or dissimilar; it represents the sole support for its *śaktis*; and without this consciousness as their ultimate substratum, these *śaktis* could not exist. (Elkman 1986: 151)<sup>51</sup>

<sup>49</sup> 'O Brāhmaṇa, these other two forms [namely] *pradhāna* and *puruṣa*, are indeed different from Viṣṇu's own form. These two which belong only to Him [i.e. Viṣṇu] are combined and separated by another form which is called time.'

*viṣṇoḥ svarūpāt parato hi te 'nye rūpe pradhānaṁ puruṣaś ca vipra / tasyaiva te 'nyena dhr̥te viyukte rūpāntaram yat tad dvija kālasamjñam //*  
Śrīdhara, ĀPra: *kālasvarūpaṁ vivṛṇoti viṣṇor iti caturbhiḥ / parato nirūpādheḥ viṣṇoḥ svarūpāt te prāḡ ukte pradhānaṁ puruṣaś ceti dve rūpe anye vilakṣaṇe māyākṛte / 'te 'nye' ity āṛṣaḥ sandhiḥ / tasya viṣṇor evānyena rūpeṇa te deve rūpe dhr̥te sargakāle saṁyojite, viyukte ca pralayakāle / yadvā viyukte yathā tiṣṭhatas tathā pralayakāle dhr̥te sthāpīte, tayoṛ aviyoḡe pralayābhāvaprasaṅgāt / tad etad kālasamjñam rūpāntaram //*

<sup>50</sup> '[It is seen that] earth [obtains] pot-ness by being a pot. [Subsequently it is seen as] potsherd, pieces of potsherd, dust, and then particles. Tell us—what eternal entity is seen here by people whose self-conviction is weakened by their own action.'

*mahī ghaṭatvaṁ ghaṭataḥ kapālikā kapālikācūrṇarajas tato 'nuḥ / janaiḥ svakarmāstimittātmaniścayair ālakṣyate brūhi kim atra vastu //*  
Śrīdhara, ĀPra: *anyathātvam evodāharan mithyātvam āha mahīti / mahī piṇḍādidvārā ghaṭatvaṁ prāptā ālakṣyate, ghaṭatvānantaraṁ ca kapālikābhūtā lakṣyate / kapālikā ca satī cūrṇam rajas ca lakṣyate / tataś cāṇur atisūksmā lakṣyate / svakarmanā pratibandhakena stimito mandibhūta ātmaniścayo yeṣāṁ tair janair atra pariṇāmaparamparāyām kim vastv ālakṣyate? na kiñcit pūrvarūpapracayuter ity arthaḥ /*

<sup>51</sup> *atha kiṁ rūpaṁ tadvastutattvam ity atrāha 'vadanti tat tattvavidas tattvaṁ yaj jñānam advayaṁ iti [BhāPu 1.2.11] / jñānaṁ cidekarūpaṁ / advayatvaṁ cāśya svayamsiddhatādr̥śātādr̥śatattvāntarābhāvāt svaśaktyekasahāyāt /*

According to Elkman, by introducing the five categories Baladeva goes against Jiva who emphasizes the oneness of reality. After discussing the five categories, however, Baladeva states their oneness:

These four [the living entity, *prakṛti*, time, and *karma*] constitute the energies of Brahman, and only Brahman is the possessor of energy. [Thus these elements are] connected to the statement of the oneness of Brahman as well.<sup>52</sup>

Baladeva explicitly states that the four principles are the energies of Brahman, and the statement of oneness (*advaitavākya*) is therefore maintained. By identifying the living entity and *prakṛti* as the energies of Brahman, Baladeva demonstrates his theological affiliation with the Gauḍīyas and his divergence from Madhva's teaching.

Baladeva then explains each of these five categories, starting with the Lord. Baladeva states:

The Lord possesses infinite consciousness whereas the living entity possesses infinitesimal consciousness. Both of them are eternally possessed of qualities such as consciousness and so on and possessed of 'I' awareness. It is not contradictory to say that knowledge is [simultaneously] a knower, just like light is [simultaneously] a lighter.

In this context, *īśvara* is self-dependent and one whose essential nature is energy, who runs the universe by entering into it and controlling it, and manifests both enjoyment and liberation for the living entities. Even though He is one, He becomes many. Even though undivided, He becomes both the qualities and the possessor of the qualities. Even though unmanifest, He becomes the object of the understanding of the wise. He is revealed through *bhakti* and He is of one nature. He grants bliss consciousness which is the nature of the living entities.<sup>53</sup>

Two points in the wording of this definition of the Lord (*īśvara*) are very Madhvaite. First, the duality (*dvaita*) of the Lord and the living entity is emphasized. Both are consciousness (*caitanya*), but one is infinite (*vibhu*) and the other infinitesimal (*aṇu*). Second, the word '*svatantra* (self-dependent)' is typically used by Madhva to contrast the nature of the Lord with that of the living entity, who is '*paratantra* (dependent on other)'.

Besides these two points, Baladeva's definition of the Lord is full of statements that reject the Advaitic notion of Brahman. For instance, Baladeva rejects the notion of quality-less (*nirviśeṣa*) Brahman by stating that the Lord is endowed with 'I' awareness (*asmadārtha*). This means that Baladeva

<sup>52</sup> *caturṇām eṣāṃ brahmaśaktivād ekaṃ śaktimadbrahmety advaitavākye 'pi saṅgatiṛ iti [...]* /

<sup>53</sup> *teṣu vibhucāitanyam īśvaraḥ / aṇucāitanyam tu jīvaḥ / nityajñānādiguṇakatvam asmadārthatvaṃ cobhayatra / jñānasyāpi jñātrtvaṃ prakāśasya svaprakāśakatvavad aviruddham / tatreśvaraḥ svatantraḥ svarūpaśaktimān praveśaniyamanābhyaṃ jagad vidadhat kṣetrajñabhogāpavargau vitanoti / eko 'pi bahubhāvenābhinno 'pi guṇaguṇibhāvena ca vidvatpratīter viśayo 'vyakto 'pi bhaktivyaṅgya ekarasaḥ prayacchati citsukhaṃ svarūpam /*



accepts agency (*kartṛtva*) in Brahman. He therefore says that Brahman is both knowledge (*jñāna*) and the knower (*jñātṛ*).

This acceptance of the agenthood diametrically opposes Śaṅkara's famous explanation of the word *jñāna* in the TaiU passage *satyaṃ jñānam anantaṃ brahma*:

*Jñāna* means knowledge, consciousness. The word *jñāna* conveys the abstract notion of the verb (*jñā*, to know); and being an attribute of Brahman along with truth and infinitude, it does not indicate the agent of knowing. If Brahman be the agent of knowing, truth and infinitude cannot justly be attributed to It. For as the agent of knowing, it becomes changeful; and, as such, how can It be true and infinite? (Śaṅkara 1972: 292)<sup>54</sup>

According to Śaṅkara, the word *jñāna* in the passage cannot denote any agenthood of Brahman since such a definition goes against Brahman as truth or being (*satya*), and as infinite (*ananta*). Rejecting this view, Baladeva says that Brahman is both knowledge and the knower. He also states that Brahman is both the qualities (*guṇa*) and their possessor (*guṇin*).<sup>55</sup> Toward the end of his definition of the Lord, Baladeva says that He is known through devotion (*bhaktivyaṅgya*). The rejection of the quality-less Brahman and the emphasis on devotion as the means to know Brahman are typical points put forward by Vaiṣṇava Vedāntists.

Moving to the second topic of the BraSū, namely the living entity, Baladeva writes:

As for the living entities they are of various states. Since they turn away from the Lord, there is bondage for them. But when they look toward the Lord favorably, there is cessation of two kinds of covering, namely the covering of one's nature and the covering of one's qualities, then there is direct realization of one's nature and so on.<sup>56</sup>

Baladeva attributes the cause of bondage to the individual self's state of turning away (*vaimukhya*) from the Lord. The word *vaimukhya* is derived from *vimukha*, which literally means 'to have face (*mukha*) away from (*vi*)'. This bondage is cut when the opposite happens, which is the state of facing toward (*sāmmukya*) the Lord. In the use of these two terms Baladeva is following Jīva and distancing himself from Madhva's notion of bondage.

<sup>54</sup> Śaṅkara's commentary on the TaiU 2.1.1: *jñānaṃ jñaptir avabodho—bhāvasādhano jñānaśabdo na tu jñānakartṛ, brahmaviśeṣaṇatvāt satyānantābhyāṃ saha / na hi satyatānantatā ca jñānakartṛtve saty upapadyete / jñānakartṛtvena hi vikriyamāṇaṃ katham satyam bhaved anantaṃ ca?*

<sup>55</sup> Baladeva explains this point in GoBhā 3.2.28–31.

<sup>56</sup> GoBhā 1.1.1: *jīvātmānas tv anekāvasthā bahavaḥ / pareṣavaimukhyāt teṣāṃ bandhas tatsāmmukhyāt tu tatsvarūpatadguṇavarāṇarūpadvidhabandhavinivṛttis tatsvarūpādisākṣātkṛtiḥ /*

In his BhakSa, Jīva says, "The means [to obtain the Lord] is nothing but the state of turning towards Him (*tatsāmmukhya*), which arises from the state of rejecting the state of turning away from Him (*tadvaimukhya*)."<sup>57</sup> According to this explanation, which is reminiscent of ŚveU 4.6–7,<sup>58</sup> the will of the individual self is emphasized as the cause of bondage and liberation.

In contrast, Madhva emphasizes the will of the Lord as the cause of bondage and liberation. In his ViTaVi 29 there is a famous definition, attributed to the SkaPu,<sup>59</sup> concerning the eightfold activity of the Lord: 'Hari only is independent, from whom arise creation, maintenance, destruction, restriction, knowledge, covering, bondage and liberation.'<sup>60</sup> In the same section Madhva quotes another anonymous verse which emphasizes this point even more: "There is no doubt that Viṣṇu only is the supreme Brahman, the giver of liberation, who binds [living beings] by the snare of worldly existence and who liberates [living beings] from the snare of worldly existence."<sup>61</sup> Given Baladeva's familiarity with the works of Madhva, he must have known Madhva's view on bondage and liberation expressed in these verses from the ViTaVi. Therefore, Baladeva's explanation on the cause of bondage and liberation indicates his tendency to follow Jīva when Jīva differs from Madhva.

Moving on to the third topic of the BraSū, namely *prakṛti*, Baladeva states:

*Prakṛti* is in the state of equilibrium of *guṇas* such as *sattva* and so on. It is also described by the word *tamas*, *māyā* and so on. Her power is obtained through the glance of the Lord, and she is the creator of the variegated universe.<sup>62</sup>

The description of *prakṛti* as consisting of the three *guṇas* of *sattva* and so on is the standard Sāṅkhya exposition which the Vedāntins commonly accept. That the power of *prakṛti* is obtained by the Lord's glance points to the Lord as the efficient cause (*nimittakāraṇa*). Both the Gauḍīyas and the Mādhvas accept this. However, as previously mentioned within this chapter, Baladeva diverges from Madhva by accepting *prakṛti* as Brahman's energy.

As for the fourth category, time, Baladeva identifies it also as Brahman's energy. This is again in accordance with Jīva's view, which follows the BhāPu.<sup>63</sup>

<sup>57</sup> BhakSa Anuccheda 1: *tatrābhidheyam tadvaimukhyavirodhitvāt tatsāmmukhyam eva /*

<sup>58</sup> *dvā suparnā sayujā sakhāyā samānam vṛkṣam pariśavajāte /*  
*tayor anyah pippalaṁ svādv atty anaśnann anyo abhicākaśīti //*  
*samāne vṛkṣe puruṣo nimagno anīśayā śocati muhyamānaḥ /*  
*juṣṭam yadā paśyaty anyam īśam asya mahimānam iti vitaśokaḥ //*

<sup>59</sup> According to Mesquita this verse is not found in the SkaPu (2008: 128).

<sup>60</sup> ViTaVi 29, BraSūBhā (Ma) 1.1.2: *utpattisthitisamhārāḥ niyatir jñānam āvṛtiḥ /*  
*bandhamokṣau ca puruṣāt yasmāt sa harir ekarāt //* *iti skānde /*

<sup>61</sup> ViTaVi 29: *bandhako bhavapāśena bhavapāśac ca mocakaḥ /*  
*kaivalyadaḥ param brahma viṣṇur eva na saṁśaya //* *iti ca /*

<sup>62</sup> GoBhā 1.1.1: *prakṛtiḥ sattvādiguṇasāmyāvasthā tamomāyādiśabdavācyā tadikṣaṇāvāpta-sāmarthyā vicitrajagajjananī /*

<sup>63</sup> For example, in KṛSa Anuccheda 43 Jīva explains the phrase *svakālaśaktyā* in BhāPu 10.1.22 as *svaśaktyā kālaśaktyā ca*.

Other than this, however, the detailed description of time that Baladeva offers is not particularly close to Jīva's, who often defines time as the agitator (*kṣobhaka*) of material nature.<sup>64</sup> Instead, Baladeva defines time as follows:

Time is the cause of verbal expressions such as 'past', 'future', 'present', 'simultaneous', 'long', 'short', and so on. Time begins with a second and ends with infinite, it is moving like a circle, is responsible for dissolution and creation of the universe, and is a specific kind of insentient substance.<sup>65</sup>

Baladeva describes time in terms of past, future, and so on. He also says time is substance (*dravya*). These descriptions of time are typically seen in Vaiśeṣika philosophy. For example, following VaiSū 2.2.6,<sup>66</sup> Praśastapāda's PaADhaSa describes time as 'that which is marked by the ideas of prior and posterior, contact, simultaneousness, unsimultaneousness, long, and short'.<sup>67</sup> Furthermore, VaiSū 1.1.4 categorizes time as substance (*dravya*).<sup>68</sup>

These descriptions of time are not typical of the Mādhvas. According to Madhva's TaSaṅ, time is classified along with the *Purāṇas* and *prakṛti* as 'eternal-cum-non-eternal (*nityānitya*)'.<sup>69</sup> Jayatīrtha explains that the *nityānitya* entity is 'that which is neither always stable nor non-eternal'.<sup>70</sup> According to Jayatīrtha, time as a moment has a beginning and end, but time as the possessor of these moments has neither beginning nor end.<sup>71</sup>

Baladeva defines the fifth category, *karma*, as that which 'is unconscious, expressed by words such as unseen effect (*adrṣṭa*), and so on. It has no beginning but has an end'.<sup>72</sup> This definition of *karma* in relation to *adrṣṭa* is again reminiscent of the Vaiśeṣika school. Praśastapāda, for example, says that the *karma* of leaving a body and of entering a body is due to the connection of the soul with mind, which depends on *adrṣṭa*.<sup>73</sup> He also states, 'When one obtains heaven, the cause of connection with the previous body is produced by unseen effects (*adrṣṭa*) which arise from *karma*.' Thus, the idea of *karma* and the idea of *adrṣṭa* are intimately connected in the Vaiśeṣika system.

<sup>64</sup> Cf. Commenting on the word *kāla* in BhāPu 3.24.33, Jīva says '*kālaṃ teṣāṃ kṣobhakam* [ . . . ]' (BhaSa *Anuccheda* 21). Again, commenting on the word *kāla* in the BhāPu 10.63.26, Jīva says '*kālaḥ kṣobhaka* /' (PaSa *Anuccheda* 53).

<sup>65</sup> GoBhā 1.1.1: *kālas tu bhūtabhaviṣyadvartamānayugapaccirakṣiprādi vyavahārahetuḥ kṣa-  
ṇādiaparārdhāntaścakravat parivartamānaḥ pralayasarganimittabhūto jaḍadravyaviśeṣaḥ /*

<sup>66</sup> *aparasmīn paraṃ yugapad ayugapac ciraṃ kṣipram iti kālaliṅgāni /*

<sup>67</sup> *kālaḥ parāparavyatikarayaugapadyāyugapadyacirakṣiprapratyayaliṅgam* / (1984: 63).

<sup>68</sup> *prthivy āpas tejo vāyur ākāśaṃ kālo dig ātmā mana iti dravyāṇi /*

<sup>69</sup> *nityā vedāḥ purāṇādyāḥ kālaḥ prakṛtir eva ca /  
nityānityaṃ tridhā proktam anityaṃ dvividam matam /*

<sup>70</sup> Jayatīrtha, *Tattvasaṅkhyānaṭikā*: *yan na sarvathā kūtasthaṃ nāpy anityaṃ eva tad ucyate  
nitānityam* / (2005: 203).

<sup>71</sup> Jayatīrtha, *Tattvasaṅkhyānaṭikā*: *ekadeśe utpattivinaśāv ekadeśinaḥ tadabhāvaḥ* / (2005: 203).

<sup>72</sup> *karma ca jaḍam adrṣṭādiśabdavyapadeśyam anādi vināśi ca bhavati /*

<sup>73</sup> PaADhaSa *apasarpaṇakarmotpasarpaṇakarma cātmamanāḥsamyogād adrṣṭāpeksāt* / (1984: 89).

Baladeva says that among these five categories, the first four, namely the Lord, the living entity, *prakṛti*, and time are eternal.<sup>74</sup> In the *SūTī*, he backs up this statement by referring to the *Bhāllaveyaśruti*.<sup>75</sup> According to Mesquita, the *Bhāllaveyaśruti* is one of the names of the texts produced by Madhva (2000: 189). Thus, it is possible that Baladeva is influenced by Madhva on this particular point.

After explaining the five categories, Baladeva connects these categories with the *BhāPu*.<sup>76</sup> First he quotes *BhāPu* 1.7.4–6:

Through the yoga of devotion, Vyāsa saw a complete person together with *māyā*, who depended on Him. Though superior, the living entity, being bewildered by *māyā*, thinks, 'My self consists of three *guṇas*', and accepts impurity made of *māyā*. For the people who are ignorant, the wise [Vyāsa] created the *Sātvatasamhitā*, which destroys impurities by means of direct connection to the Lord Adhokṣaja.<sup>77</sup>

These verses are cited in Jīva's *TaSa Anuccheda* 30. According to Jīva, these verses summarize the content of the entire *BhāPu*.<sup>78</sup> Commenting on this section of the *TaSa*, Baladeva says that the word 'saw (*apaśyat*)' in the first verse indicates time, and these three verses therefore indicate that Vyāsa realized the four principles of the Lord, the living entity, *prakṛti*, and time.<sup>79</sup>

Since the principle of *karma* is still lacking, Baladeva further quotes *BhāPu* 2.10.12: 'Substance, *karma*, time, and the living entity in the natural state exist by the favour of the Lord, and they do not exist when neglected by Him.'<sup>80</sup> In this verse, there are *karma*, time, the living entity, and the Lord, who is indicated by the relative pronoun *yat*. Concerning the word 'substance (*dravya*)', Baladeva takes it in the sense of the material cause (*upādāna*), that is, *prakṛti*, following Śrīdhara and Viśvanātha.<sup>81</sup> In this way Baladeva explains

<sup>74</sup> GoBhā 1.1.1: *īśvarādayaś catvāro 'rthā nityāḥ* [...] /

<sup>75</sup> *SūTī*: *īśvarādayaś catvāro 'rthā nityā ity atra bhāllaveyaśrutīś ca 'atha ha vāva nityāni puruṣaḥ prakṛtir ātmā kāla'* iti / Baladeva quotes the same verse when he comments on *TaSa Anuccheda* 34.

<sup>76</sup> GoBhā 1.1.1: *tadarthātmake śrībhāgavate vivriyate* [...] /

<sup>77</sup> *bhaktiyogena manasi samyak praṇihite 'male /*  
*apaśyat puruṣaṃ pūrṇaṃ māyāṃ ca tadapāśrayāṃ //*  
*yayā sammohito jīva ātmānaṃ triguṇātmakam /*  
*paro 'pi manute 'nārthaṃ tatkr̥tāṃ cābhipadyate //*  
*anarthopāśamaṃ sākṣād bhaktiyogam adhokṣaje /*  
*lokasyājānato vyāsaś cakre sātvatasamhitāṃ //*

<sup>78</sup> Jīva *TaSa* 30: *tādṛśam eva tātparyam karisyamānataḥ granthapratipādyatattvanirṇayakṛte tatpravakṛtśrībādarāyaṇakṛte samādhāv api saṅkṣepata eva nirdhārayati /*

<sup>79</sup> Baladeva *Tattvasandarbhāṭikā*: *apaśyat ity anena kālo 'pi ānītaḥ / tad evam īśvara-jīva-māyākālākhyāni catvāri tattvāni samādhau śrīvyāsena dr̥ṣṭāni /*

<sup>80</sup> *dravyaṃ karma ca kālaś ca svabhāvo jīva eva ca /*  
*yadanugrahaṭaḥ santi na santi yadupekṣayā //*

<sup>81</sup> *SūTī*: *dravyam upādānam /; BhāABO: dravyam upādānam /; SāADa: dravyam upādānam prthivyādikaṃ* [...] / Elkman says that these five categories are not traced in the writings of the Gosvāmīs (1986: 134).

that the scheme of the five categories he discusses in the GoBhā is in accordance with the BhāPu. We can observe Baladeva's intention to write the GoBhā based on the BhāPu, the most sacred scripture for the Gauḍīyas.

Baladeva then cites well-known verses attributed to the GaPu, which describe the BhāPu's significance:

This [scripture] called the *Bhāgavata*, which consists of twelve books, a hundred chapters, and eighteen thousand verses, is the meaning of the *Brahmasūtras*. It explains the meaning of the *Mahābhārata*, it has the nature of a commentary on the *Gāyatrī* mantra, it strengthens the meaning of the Vedas, it has the nature of the *Sāmaveda* among the *Purāṇas*, and it is the direct speech of the Lord.<sup>82</sup>

Jīva quotes the same verses while explaining the value of the BhāPu in his TaSa *Anuccheda* 21. These verses can be traced in Madhva's BhāTāNi 1.1.1. According to Mesquita, these verses are untraceable (2008: 158).<sup>83</sup> Therefore, Jīva's acceptance of those verses indicates the Mādhva influence on the Gauḍīya tradition. However, the difference is that Jīva uses these verses to place the BhāPu as the single, most significant scripture, whereas Madhva does not accord the BhāPu such an exclusive importance. While Madhva does not say anything about the BhāPu in the opening of his BraSūBhā, Baladeva in GoBhā's opening section makes a clear connection between the BraSū and the BhāPu. This indicates that Baladeva accepts Jīva's teaching concerning the BhāPu's significance.

At the end of the preamble, Baladeva briefly gives the four points which need to be stated at the beginning of any *śāstra*: (1) the qualification required for a student who wishes to study the text (*adhikāra*); (2) the correlation between the text and the object to be established by the text (*sambandha*); (3) the object to be understood in the text (*viśaya*); (4) the goal of studying the text (*prayojana*). These four points are, for example, discussed in the beginning of the VeSā by Sadānanda, who was an Advaitin in the sixteenth century. Baladeva states the qualifications (*adhikāra*) required for the student of Vedānta as follows:

In [the study of the BraSū], a qualified student must possess the following qualities: he has a clean mind devoid of desire; he has obtained association with saintly people; he is faithful; he is possessed of tranquility and so on.<sup>84</sup>

<sup>82</sup> artho 'yaṁ brahmasūtrāṇāṁ bhāratārthavinirṇayaḥ /  
gāyatrībhāṣyārūpo 'sau vedārtaparibhṛṁhitah //  
purāṇānāṁ sāmārūpaḥ sāksād bhagavatoditah /  
dvādaśaskandhayukto 'yaṁ śatavicchedasaṁyutah //  
grantho 'śīḍaśasāhasraḥ śrīmadbhāgavatābhīdhaḥ /

<sup>83</sup> He also points out that the GaPu (tenth century) was composed earlier than the BhāPu (eleventh century) and therefore could not have mentioned the BhāPu (Mesquita 2000: 90, fn. 153).

<sup>84</sup> GoBhā 1.1.1: yatra niṣkāmādharmānirmalacittāḥ satprasaṅgalubdhāḥ śrāddhālūḥ śāntyā-dimān adhikārī /

In contrast, Sadānanda, following Śaṅkara, says that the student of Vedānta needs to possess the following four qualities (*sādhana-catustaya*): (1) discernment concerning what is eternal and what is non-eternal; (2) renunciation of enjoyment in this world and the next; (3) accomplishment in six qualities such as tranquility; (4) desire for liberation.<sup>85</sup> What is distinct in Baladeva's definition of the qualifications is the element of association with saintly people. I will discuss this point in detail in relation to Baladeva's interpretation of *atha* in BraSū 1.1.1 and shall suggest that this is a unique Gauḍīya element which Baladeva takes from Jīva.

Sadānanda defines *viśaya* and *sambandha* as follows:

The object (*viśaya*) of study is the thing to be known, the pure consciousness, which is the oneness of the living entity and Brahman, since the BraSū explain this very point. The co-relation (*sambandha*), on the other hand, is defined by the object of knowledge and that which makes us understand the object of knowledge [namely], the object of knowledge which is the sameness of them [i.e. the living entity and Brahman] and the means of knowledge which is the Upaniṣads, which makes us understand it [the oneness of the living entity and Brahman].<sup>86</sup>

According to Sadānanda, the object of study is the sameness of the living entity and Brahman, and the corelation means that such sameness is known through the Upaniṣads. The corelation establishes the suitability of the text in relation to the object to be studied. Sadānanda's point is that the Upaniṣads are suitable texts for understanding the sameness of the living entity and Brahman.

Baladeva defines the corelation (*sambandha*) as follows: 'The co-relation is that [Brahman is] expressed by words and [the BraSū] describe [Brahman] by words.'<sup>87</sup> According to Baladeva, the BraSū is a suitable text for understanding Brahman. This Brahman is the object (*viśaya*) of study, which he defines as follows: 'The object [of the study of the BraSū] is Puruṣottama, who is blameless, who is possessed of a multitude of pure and unlimited qualities, whose energy is paradoxical and unlimited, and who is eternal, conscious, and full of joy.'<sup>88</sup> Puruṣottama is a distinctive name for Viṣṇu. By this definition, therefore, Baladeva, following his Vaiṣṇava predecessors like Rāmānuja and Madhva, identifies the Brahman of the BraSū as Viṣṇu. Viṣṇu is furthermore described as having unlimited qualities. These points reject the Advaita notion of quality-less (*nirviśeṣa*) Brahman. The sameness of the living entity and

<sup>85</sup> VeSā: *sāadhanāni nityānityavastuvivekehāmutrārthabhogavirāgaśamādiṣaṭkaśaṃpattimukṣutvāni* /

<sup>86</sup> VeSā: *viśayo jīva brahmaikyam śuddham caitanyam prameyam tatraiva vedāntānām tātparyāt / sambandhas tu tādāikyaprameyasya tatpratipādakopaniṣatpramāṇasya ca bodhyabodhakabhāvalakṣaṇaḥ* /

<sup>87</sup> GoBhā 1.1.1: *sambandho vācyavācakabhāvaḥ* /

<sup>88</sup> GoBhā 1.1.1: *viśayo niravadyo viśuddhānantaguṇagaṇo 'cintyānantaśaktiḥ saccidānandaḥ puruṣottamaḥ* /

Brahman mentioned by Sadānanda is nowhere to be found in Baladeva's discussion on *viṣaya* and *sambandha*.

Finally, Baladeva defines the goal (*prayojana*) as a 'direct experience of Brahman, which occurs after the destruction of all impurities',<sup>89</sup> whereas Sadānanda defines *prayojana* as 'the cessation of ignorance concerning the object of knowledge which is the sameness of them [the living entity and Brahman] and the obtainment of bliss which is one's own nature'.<sup>90</sup> Again Baladeva does not mention anything about the sameness Sadānanda discusses.

Concluding the analysis of Baladeva's preamble, the following points may be observed. First, when Jīva and Madhva have different views on a particular issue, Baladeva follows Jīva and rejects Madhva. Baladeva accepts the principle of nonduality (*advaya*) and the concept of energy (*śakti*), which Jīva expounds in TaSa *Anuccheda* 51. Baladeva particularly diverges from Madhva by accepting the living entity and *prakṛti* as the energies of Brahman. Baladeva also follows Jīva rather than Madhva concerning the issues of bondage and liberation of the living entity. Baladeva similarly follows Jīva's exclusive acceptance of the BhāPu.

Second, in terms of Madhva's influence on Baladeva, Baladeva accepts Madhva's teachings as long as Jīva accepts them. Baladeva follows Madhva's emphasis on the difference between the Lord and the living entity, and on the independence of the Lord, ideas that Jīva also accepts. Baladeva cites Madhva's untraceable quotes when Jīva quotes them. Baladeva quotes a narrative attributed to the SkaPu from Madhva's BraSūBhā 1.1.1, which tells of the origin of the BraSū. Jīva also quotes this narrative in his TaSa *Anuccheda* 16. Baladeva similarly quotes the verses attributed to the GaPu that explain the BhāPu's significance. These verses are found in Madhva's BhāTāNi 1.1.1 and quoted by Jīva in his TaSa *Anuccheda* 21.

Third, Baladeva sees the Mīmāṃsakas and the Advaitins as his main opponents. He rejects the Mīmāṃsaka position that all that matters in the Vedas are the injunctions and prohibitions concerning ritual performance. Baladeva also rejects the Advaita notion of quality-less Brahman and the ontological oneness of the living entity and Brahman. Although Baladeva accepts the principle of *advaya* that Jīva expounds, based on BhāPu 1.2.11, this principle is distinguished from the oneness explained by the Advaitins.

Finally, the way Baladeva describes time and *karma* seems to have been influenced by the Vaiśeṣika school, and his emphasis differs from the description of time and *karma* according to Jīva or Madhva.

<sup>89</sup> GoBhā 1.1.1: *prayojanam tv aśeṣadoṣavināśapurahśaras tatsākṣātkāra ity upari spaṣṭam bhāvi /*

<sup>90</sup> VeSā: *prayojanam tadaikyaprameyagatājñānanivṛttiḥ svasvarūpānandāvāptiś ca /*

4.2.2. *Brahmasūtra* 1.1.1

Moving to his commentary on the first *sūtra*, Baladeva says that each *sūtra* is examined according to five auxiliaries, namely, topic, doubt, *prima facie* view, conclusion, and connection.<sup>91</sup> It is not clear from where Baladeva draws these five elements. As far as I am aware, the only available parallel is Mādhava's *Jaiminiyanyāyamālāvistara* on JaiSū 1.1.1.<sup>92</sup> Neither Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, Madhva, nor Jīva follows this particular format.

According to Baladeva, the topic of discussion (*viśaya*) for the first *sūtra* is the following two verses from the Upaniṣads:

Bhūman is the very source of happiness and nothing else. Prosperity is nothing other than Bhūman, and it is Bhūman which is to be investigated.<sup>93</sup>

O Maitreyi! The Supreme Lord is to be seen, to be heard, to be thought about and to be meditated upon.<sup>94</sup>

The first verse, wherein Bhūman refers to Brahman, says that Brahman should be investigated (*vijijñāsitavya*). According to Baladeva, 'to be meditated upon' in the second verse also means 'to be investigated (*jijñāsitavya*)'. Therefore, both verses say that Brahman should be investigated.

On this topic, the doubt (*saṁśaya*) Baladeva raises is whether or not an inquiry into Brahman is suitable for one who has studied the Vedas, who is familiar with *dharma*.<sup>95</sup> The *prima facie* view (*pūrvapakṣa*) rejects the need for investigation into Brahman: '[An inquiry into Brahman] is not suitable [for a person who has studied the Vedas and who is familiar with *dharma*] since we hear in the Vedas that [such a person becomes] immortal and obtains undecaying happiness through *dharma*.'<sup>96</sup>

This is the opposing Mīmāṃsaka view: that what matters in the Vedas is the pursuit of *dharma*, or more specifically the execution of ritual injunctions taught in the Vedas. The opponent cites R̥Ve 8.48.3a and *Āpastambhaśrautasūtra* 8.1.1 to support this view: 'We drank Soma. We became immortal',<sup>97</sup> 'Verily, one who performs the *Cāturmāsya* sacrifice obtains eternal benefit.'<sup>98</sup>

<sup>91</sup> GoBhā 1.1.1: *yasyām khalu viśayasamśayapūrvapakṣasiddhāntasaṅgatibhedāt pañcanyāyāṅgāni bhavanti /*

<sup>92</sup> *itthaṁ saṅgatīr vyutpādyaṥa pratyadhikaraṇaṁ viśayasamśayapūrvapakṣasiddhāntāṁś caturo 'vayavāntañjighr̥kṣuḥ prathamādhyaṣya prathame pāde prathamādhikaraṇaṁ bhaṭṭa-matenāracyati [ . . . ] //*

<sup>93</sup> ChāU 7.23.1: *yo vai bhūmā tat sukhaṁ nānyat sukhaṁ asti / bhūmaiva sukhaṁ bhūmā tv eva vijijñāsitavyaḥ //*

<sup>94</sup> Br̥ĀU 2.4.5: *ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitavyo maitreyi /*

<sup>95</sup> GoBhā 1.1.1: *iti bhavati saṁśayaḥ / adhitavedasya puṁso dharmajñasya brahmajijñāsā yuktā na yuktā veti /*

<sup>96</sup> GoBhā 1.1.1: *dharmair amṛtatvākṣayyasukhatvaśravaṇān na yukteti [ . . . ]*

<sup>97</sup> *apāma somam amṛtā abhūma /*

<sup>98</sup> *akṣayyaṁ ha vai cāturmāsyaṁ yajñinaḥ sukr̥taṁ bhavati /*



The opponent's argument is that since the execution of ritual injunctions brings immortality, which is the highest goal of human life, there is no need for further investigation in the form of Vedānta.

Commenting on the first aphorism *athāto brahmajijñāsā*, Baladeva rejects the *prima facie* view and establishes the conclusion (*siddhānta*). Following Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, and Jīva, Baladeva suggests that *atha* means posteriority.<sup>99</sup> He does not accept Madhva's interpretation, which understands *atha* to mean auspiciousness. Baladeva, rather, glosses the first *sūtra* as saying that a student first needs to study the Vedas according to the scriptural injunction, to understand their general meaning, to purify the mind by maintaining his *āśrama*,<sup>100</sup> and by being truthful and so on. For such a student, the desire to understand Brahman (*brahmajijñāsā*) arises after (*atha*) he attains association with a knower of truth (*tattvavitprasaṅga*) since (*ataḥ*) the student understands that the result of rituals done to satisfy one's desire is limited and non-eternal, whereas the nature of Brahman obtained through knowledge is unlimited and imperishable.<sup>101</sup>

In this explanation there are many points on which Baladeva agrees with Rāmānuja as well as with Jīva, who follows Rāmānuja. Like Rāmānuja and Jīva, Baladeva argues that the study of the Vedas and their ritual performances are necessary antecedents to the study of Brahman because these procedures help a candidate to realize the transitory nature of the ritual performances and the eternality of knowledge of Brahman. This position is against that of Śaṅkara, who says that the study of Pūrvamīmāṃsā is not necessary for the study of Vedānta.

However, the acquisition of qualities like truthfulness is also counted among the prerequisite qualifications. This particular point can be seen as Śaṅkara's influence, since, in the third among his four characteristics for a student of Vedānta, he suggests calmness and so on as necessary prerequisites. According to Baladeva, however, these conditions are necessary, but not sufficient. What is decisive, Baladeva says, is association with those who know the truth (*tattvavitprasaṅga*). This element of association as a prerequisite is one of Baladeva's unique contributions to the discussion on the meaning of *atha*.

Baladeva further clarifies the importance of association by referring to both Śruti and Smṛti passages. From the Śruti he refers to a conversation between Sanatkumāra and Nārada:

<sup>99</sup> GoBhā 1.1.1: *athātaḥ śabdāḥ atrānantaryahetubhāvayor bhavataḥ / athānantaram ato brahmajijñāsā yuktety akṣarayojanā /*

<sup>100</sup> The four stages of life referred to here are the periods of being a student (*brahmacārī*), a householder (*grhastha*), a forest-dweller (*vānaprastha*), and a renouncer (*sannyāsī*).

<sup>101</sup> GoBhā 1.1.1: *vidhinādhītavedasyāpātato 'dhigatatadarthasyāśramasatyādibhiś ca vimṛṣṭa-sattvasya labdhatattvavitprasaṅgasyātha tatprasaṅgānantaram ataḥ kāmākarmāṇi parimitānitya-phalāni brahmasvarūpaṁ tu jñānalabhyam akṣayānantacitsukhaṁ nityajñānādiguṇakam nityasukhahetur iti pratyayāt kāmākarmaprahāṇapuraḥsarā caturlakṣaṇyā jijñāsā yuktety arthaḥ /*

The association with the knower of truth is indeed the cause of knowledge since we see that Nārada and so on desired to know Brahman because of the association with Sanatkumāra and so on.<sup>102</sup>

Baladeva specifically writes that association with a knower of the truth (*tattva-vitprasaṅga*) is the cause of knowledge (*jñānahetu*). The association of Nārada with Sanatkumāra refers to their conversation described in ChāU 7,<sup>103</sup> in which Nārada approaches Sanatkumāra for instructions. Nārada says he has studied all the Vedas but still does not know the Self that is Brahman.<sup>104</sup> Sanatkumāra subsequently gives instructions about Brahman that Nārada had not yet learned. This is an illustration based on the *Śruti* passages wherein the knowledge of Brahman becomes accessible through the association of those who know the truth.

From the *Smṛti*, Baladeva cites BhaGī 4.34: 'Know It [i.e. the supreme Self] by paying obeisance [to the teacher], by asking questions [to him], and by serving [him]. Those who have knowledge, who have seen the truth, will teach you.' This passage directly supports Baladeva's argument that, for acquiring knowledge of Brahman, one needs to connect with those who know the truth.

Concluding his explanation of *atha*, Baladeva writes:

After studying the Vedas together with [six] auxiliary disciplines as well as with the Upaniṣads, then having understood their meanings instantly, when there is no desire for anything transient because of the discrimination of what is eternal and what is transient, [the discrimination which arises] because of the contact with a knower of truth, one proceeds to [the study of] that which is characterized by four [i.e. the BraSū] for the sake of understanding the specifics of what is eternal.<sup>105</sup>

Baladeva points out the four elements that must precede the inquiry into the knowledge of Brahman: (1) the study and understanding of the Vedas; (2) lack of desire for anything transient; (3) discrimination between what is eternal and what is non-eternal; and (4) contact with a knower of truth. The first element echoes Rāmānuja and Jīva. The second and the third elements echo Śaṅkara's first two prerequisites. The fourth point, however, is Baladeva's unique

<sup>102</sup> GoBhā 1.1.1: *tattvavitprasaṅgaḥ khalu jñānahetuḥ nārādādīnāṃ sanatkumārādiprasaṅgena brahmajijñāsādarśanāt /*

<sup>103</sup> SūTī: *nārādādīnāṃ iti bhūmādhikaraṇe viṣphuṭibhāvi /* GoBhā 1.3.8–9 is named as the *Bhūmādhikaraṇa*, where the passages in ChāU 7 are discussed.

<sup>104</sup> ChāU 7.1: *ṛgvedaṃ bhagavo 'dhyemi yajurvedaṃ sāmavedaṃ ātharvaṇaṃ caturthaṃ itihāsapurāṇaṃ pañcamaṃ vedānāṃ vedaṃ pitṛyaṃ rāṣiṃ daivaṃ nidhiṃ vākovākyaṃ ekāyaṇaṃ devavidyāṃ brahmavidyāṃ bhūtavidyāṃ kṣatratridyāṃ nakṣatratridyāṃ sarpadevajanaṇavidyāṃ etad bhagavo 'dhyemi // so 'haṃ bhagavo mantravid evāsmi nātmavit / śrutaṃ hy eva me bhagavadbr̥ṣebhyas tarati śokaṃ ātmavid iti /*

<sup>105</sup> GoBhā 1.1.1: *sāṅgaṃ saśīraskam ca vedaṃ adhīya tadarthān āpātato 'dhigamya tattvavitprasaṅgena nityānityavivekato 'nityavitṛṣṭe nityaviśeṣāvagataye caturlakṣaṇyāṃ pravartata iti /*

contribution. Baladeva goes on to refute the interpretations of *atha* offered by Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, and Madhva, and points out that association with a knower of truth is the essential prerequisite.

Śaṅkara argues that if *atha* is used in the sense of immediate succession, something should precede the desire to know Brahman, just as the study of the Vedas precedes the desire to know proper ritual procedure (*dharma*).<sup>106</sup> The question is 'What precedes the desire to know Brahman?' After rejecting the study of Pūrvamīmāṃsā as that which precedes the desire to know Brahman, Śaṅkara suggests the following four prerequisites that a student of Vedānta needs to possess: (1) distinguishing what is eternal and what is transient; (2) being indifferent to enjoyment as the result of work in this world and the next; (3) accomplishing practices such as calmness and sense-control; (4) the state of being desirous of liberation. When these qualities exist in a candidate, the desire to know Brahman arises even before studying Pūrvamīmāṃsā. Therefore, according to Śaṅkara, *atha* denotes these four qualities as that which precede the desire to know Brahman.<sup>107</sup>

In opposition to Śaṅkara's view, Baladeva states:

It is not possible to say that [the desire to know Brahman arises] immediately after success in the fourfold accomplishment such as discrimination between what is eternal and what is transient since prior [to association with saintly people] it [i.e. success in the fourfold accomplishment] is difficult and [success in the fourfold accomplishment] arises after the instructions [given] through association with saintly people.<sup>108</sup>

Baladeva does not deny that the four prerequisites suggested by Śaṅkara are necessary for a student who wishes to enter into the study of Brahman. However, he suggests that these four prerequisites cannot be acquired without association with saintly people. Therefore, according to Baladeva, association with saintly people is the most fundamental prerequisite.

Whereas Śaṅkara suggests four characteristics, Rāmānuja contends that the study of Pūrvamīmāṃsā is what is required before an inquiry into Brahman:

Here the word 'then' [*atha*] is used in the sense of coming immediately after; the word 'therefore' is used in the sense that that (enquiry) which has been concluded (viz., the enquiry into the *Karmakāṇḍa*) is the reason (for undertaking the present

<sup>106</sup> BraSūBhā (Śa) 1.1.1: *satī cānantaryārthatve yathā dharmajijñāsā pūrvavṛttam vedādhyayanam niyamenāpekṣata evaṃ brahmajijñāsāpi yatpūrvavṛttam niyamenāpekṣate tadvakta-vyam /*

<sup>107</sup> BraSūBhā (Śa) 1.1.1: *ucyate / nityānityavastuvivekaḥ, ihāmutrārthabhogavirāgaḥ, śama-damādisādhanaśampat, mumukṣutvaṃ ca / teṣu hi satsu prāḡ api dharmajijñāsāyā ūrdhvaṃ ca śakyate brahmajijñāsitum jñātum ca na viparyaye / tasmād athaśabdena yathoktasādhanaśampattyānantaryam upadiśyate /*

<sup>108</sup> GoBhā 1.1.1: *na ca nityānityavivekādisāadhanacatuṣṭayasampattyānantaryam śakyam vak-tum, prāk tasyā daurlabhyāt satprasaṅgaśikṣāparabhāvyatvāc ca /*

enquiry). With he who has (first) studied and learnt the Vedas with all their limbs and head, and who, through realizing that the mere knowledge of (ritualistic) works gives small and transitory results, has the desire for final release born in him—(with him), the desire for that knowledge of the Brahman, which is productive of infinite and eternal results, is indeed, of subsequent origin.<sup>109</sup> (Rāmānuja 1899: 2–3)

Unlike Śāṅkara, Rāmānuja argues that the study of ritual performance is a necessary antecedent to the inquiry into Brahman. The desire to understand Brahman, which leads to infinity and eternity, arises only in those who have understood the insignificance and transience of knowledge concerning ritual performance (*karmajñāna*). Quoting from the ŚrīBhā, Jīva follows Rāmānuja's view on this point:

It is said that the fruits of *karma*, which is known from the earlier section of Mīmāṃsā, are impermanent and paltry, and the fruits of knowledge of Brahman, which is learnt in the later section, are imperishable and infinite. Therefore, Brahman should be known subsequent to the knowledge of *karma*. This is what is stated here. The same has been said by the very first commentator (on the *Brahma-sūtra*), the blessed Baudhāyana, 'Immediately after the study of *karma* has been completed, there is inquiry into Brahman.' (Jīva 2007: 171–172)<sup>110</sup>

As shown earlier in this section, Baladeva considers the study of the Vedas and the performance of Vedic ritual mandatory. However, he also says that the essential cause of the desire to know Brahman is association with saintly people and not the study of the Vedas:

It is not possible to say that [the desire to know Brahman arises] immediately from accomplishing the Vedic rituals since the desire to know Brahman is not seen among those who are devoid of association with saintly people even though they have it [i.e. the accomplishment in ritual performance] and since [desire to know Brahman] is seen among those who have association with saintly people even though they are devoid of it [i.e. accomplishment in ritual performance].<sup>111</sup>

As in relation to Śāṅkara, Baladeva does not reject Rāmānuja's view. Rather, he includes the study of the Vedas as a part of the prerequisite of coming to know Brahman. However, Baladeva does reject the view that such study is the direct cause of the desire to know Brahman.

<sup>109</sup> ŚrīBhā 1.1.1: *atrāyam athaśabda ānantarye bhavati / ataśśabdo vṛttasya hetubhāve / adhītāṅgasāśirskavedasya, adhigatālpāsthīrāphalakevalakarmajñānatayā sañjātamokṣābhilāṣāyānantasthīrāphalabrahmajijñāsā hy anantarabhāvinī /*

<sup>110</sup> ŚrīBhā 1.1.1: *mīmāṃsāpūrvabhāgajñātasya karmaṇo 'lpasthīrāphalatvāt uparitanabhāgā-vaseyasyānantakṣayaphalatvac ca pūrvavṛttāt karmajñānād anantaram tata eva hetor brahma-jñātavyam ity uktam bhavati / tad āha vṛttikāraḥ—vṛttāt karmādhigamād anantaram brahma-vividiṣā iti /*

<sup>111</sup> GoBhā 1.1.1: *na cātra karmasampattyanantaryam śakyam vaktum, tadvatām api tatsaṅ-gavirahīṇām brahmajijñāsāyā adarśanāt, tacchūnyānām api satyādīpūtānām satprasāṅginām darśanāc ca /*

Whereas Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, and Jīva understand the word *atha* only in the sense of immediately after, Madhva says it means both auspiciousness and immediately after achieving eligibility.<sup>112</sup> Thus, Madhva does not entirely agree with his two predecessors with regard to his interpretation of the word. He supports his argument by citing a conversation between Brahmā and Nārada attributed to the GaPu. According to Mesquita, these passages are untraceable in the currently available *Purāṇa* (2008: 166–167).<sup>113</sup> In the conversation cited, the sage asks the meaning of the words *atha* and *ataḥ* which are often found in the beginning of the *sūtras*.<sup>114</sup> Brahmā answers that *atha* means immediately after one's eligibility and auspiciousness and *ataḥ* means reason.<sup>115</sup> Therefore, according to Madhva, *atha* denotes both auspiciousness and eligibility (*adhikāra*), after which there arises the desire to know Brahman.

Concerning Madhva's view, Baladeva rejects the idea that *atha* is used in the sense of auspiciousness (*maṅgala*). As a *prima facie* view, Baladeva says that *atha* is to be taken in the sense of auspiciousness since learned people write the *maṅgala* verses in the beginning of their works to pray for the removal of obstacles that may arise as they write.<sup>116</sup> Baladeva then states in the conclusive view (*siddhānta*) that there is no need for Bādarāyaṇa, the author of the BraSū, to pray for the removal of obstacles because he is none other than the Lord (*īśvara*) and therefore there are no obstacles to be removed for him.<sup>117</sup> To support his argument, Baladeva cites ViPu 3.4.5 wherein Vyāsa, who is considered to be Bādarāyaṇa, is identified with Nārāyaṇa.<sup>118</sup>

In examining and comparing interpretations of *atha* with those of Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, Madhva, and Jīva, it is evident that although Baladeva does not always reject the points made by his predecessors, he makes a unique contribution to the discussion by asserting that association with a knower of truth (*tattvaviprasaṅga*) is the essential cause of the desire to inquire into Brahman.

<sup>112</sup> BraSūBhā (Ma) 1.1.1: *athaśabdo maṅgalārtho 'dhikārānantaryārthaś ca /*

<sup>113</sup> In fact, it seems more likely that Madhva himself wrote this conversation since its content adheres to the point Madhva wishes to make to such an extent that it is difficult to suppose that the conversation was actually in the *Purāṇa* prior to and independent from Madhva. For an in-depth analysis of Madhva's untraceable citations, see Mesquita (2000).

<sup>114</sup> BraSūBhā (Ma) 1.1.1: *athātaḥśabdapūrvāṇi sūtrāṇi nikhilāny api /*

*prārabhante niyatyaiva tat kim atra niyāmakam //*  
*kaś cārthas tu taylor vidvan katham uttamatā tayoh /*  
*etaḥ ākhyāhi me brahman yathā jñāsyāmi tattvataḥ //*

<sup>115</sup> BraSūBhā (Ma) 1.1.1: *ānantarye 'dhikārasya maṅgalārthe tathaiva ca //*  
*athaśabdas tv ataśśabdo hetvarthe samudīritah /*

<sup>116</sup> GoBhā 1.1.1: *maṅgalam evāthaśabdārthaḥ / śāstrārambhe hi śiṣṭā vighnanāśāya tad ācarantīti [...] /*

<sup>117</sup> GoBhā 1.1.1: *naivam īśvarasya vighnāśaṅkāvirahāt /*

<sup>118</sup> ViPu 3.4.5: *kṛṣṇadvaipāyanam vyāsam viddhi nārāyaṇam prabhum /*  
*ko hy anyo bhuvī maitreya mahābhāratakrḍ bhavet //*

From where does Baladeva get this idea? Jīva does not discuss it in his explanation of BraSū 1.1.1. Nonetheless, I suggest that Baladeva's emphasis on such association is derived from Jīva because, in his BhaSa *Anuccheda* 240–243, Jīva stresses that association with devotees (*satsaṅga*) is the primary means of building a relationship with the Lord. In *Anuccheda* 240, Jīva says that no means of reaching the Lord are possible without association with saintly people.<sup>119</sup> To support his argument, Jīva cites BhāPu 11.12.7: 'They did not study the Vedas, nor did they worship great people. They are without any vows and they did not perform any austerity. They achieved Me because of association with Me and My devotees.'<sup>120</sup> This passage occurs in Kṛṣṇa's instruction to Uddhava in which Kṛṣṇa points out that even persons of lower birth came to know Him because of their association with saintly people (*satsaṅga*). According to Jīva, the word *satsaṅga* means both association with the Lord and association with his devotees.<sup>121</sup> In both cases there is a connection with the Lord since one attains His mercy by associating with his devotees.<sup>122</sup> Therefore, association of devotees is said to be the special means of reaching the Lord.<sup>123</sup>

Proceeding to *Anuccheda* 241, Jīva says that the primary means of reaching the Lord is only by association with saintly people and that it is not possible by other means.<sup>124</sup> In *Anuccheda* 243, Jīva further points out that even if one is without knowledge, association with saintly people bestows the goal of life. Jīva substantiates his point by citing BhāPu 3.23.55: 'That very same association which is the cause of transmigration when it is done by ignorance among non-saintly people, when it is done among saintly people, [such association] leads to the state of being without attachment.'<sup>125</sup> According to Jīva, therefore, association with saintly people (*satsaṅga*) is the primary means of reaching the Lord. I suggest that Baladeva's emphasis on association with a knower of truth echoes Jīva's emphasis on association with saintly people.

In summary, we may observe the following points. Baladeva is influenced by Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja in his interpretation of *atha* and in his view on the prerequisites for the study of Brahman. However, Baladeva uniquely argues that what is decisive is the association with a knower of truth. Baladeva's

<sup>119</sup> BhaSa 240: *satsaṅgavyatiriktasāadhanābhāvam āha* [...] /

<sup>120</sup> BhāPu 11.12.7: *te nādhītaśrutiṅgā nōpāsitamahattamāḥ* /  
*avratātaptatapasō matsaṅgān mām upāgatāḥ* //

<sup>121</sup> BhaSa 240: *satsaṅgaśabdenātra mama saṅgo madīyādīnām ca saṅga ity abhidhāpyate* /

<sup>122</sup> BhaSa 240: *ubhayatāpi matsambandhitvād ity abhiprāyeṇa* [...] *bhāgavatasaṅgaenaiva bhagavatkrpā bhavatīty* [...] /

<sup>123</sup> BhaSa 240: *atra tu sa eva bhāgavatasaṅgaḥ sādhanaviśeṣatvenocyata iti na doṣaḥ* /

<sup>124</sup> BhaSa 241: *atha mukhyaṁ vaśīkaraṇam asambhāvitāsāadhanāntareṇa satsaṅgamātreṇa* [...] /

<sup>125</sup> *saṅgo yaḥ saṁsr̥ter hetur asatsu vihito 'dhiyā* /  
*sa eva sādhuṣu kṛto nihsaṅgatvāya kalpate* //

emphasis on this association seems to be the influence of Jīva, the founding father of Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇava theology.

#### 4.2.3. *Brahmasūtra* 1.1.2

In the first aphorism *athāto brahmajijñāsā*, Bādarāyaṇa spoke about the desire to know Brahman. The second aphorism *jānmādi asya yataḥ* defines Brahman, the object of investigation. According to Baladeva, the topic (*viśaya*) of the second verse is TaiU 3.1 wherein Bhṛgu approaches his father Varuṇa and says ‘Teach [me] about Brahman, O Lord.’<sup>126</sup> To this Varuṇa answers, ‘That from which these beings arise, by which those who are born live, [and] to which [they] go and dissolve into, that is Brahman. That you should desire to understand.’<sup>127</sup> Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, Madhva, and Jīva all agree that this particular story in the TaiU is the specific Upaniṣadic text referred to by the second aphorism.

Baladeva raises a doubt (*saṁśaya*) whether this Brahman mentioned in the TaiU is the living entity or the supreme Lord.<sup>128</sup> The *prima facie* view (*pūrvapakṣa*) says that Brahman refers to the living entity because there is the following passage in the same TaiU: ‘If one understands Brahman as consciousness separate from it [i.e. *prakṛti*], [and] if one is not careless [about Brahman], he obtains all desires after removing the sins in the body.’<sup>129</sup> According to the *prima facie* view, the word ‘consciousness (*vijñāna*)’ here refers to the living entity.<sup>130</sup> The opponent further argues that the living entity has the capacity to create beings through the power of *adrṣṭa*. Therefore, it is the living entity which is the object of investigation.

In Baladeva's commentary on the second *sūtra* he rejects this *prima facie* view and states his own conclusive view (*siddhānta*). The aphorism means ‘[We should investigate Brahman] from which {*yataḥ*} there is creation and so on {*janmādi*} of the universe {*asya*}.’ Baladeva explains each word in detail. First, following Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, and Jīva, Baladeva identifies the compound *janmādy* as a *bahuvrīhi* of the *tadguṇasaṁvijñāna* type,<sup>131</sup> meaning ‘the origination,

<sup>126</sup> *bhrgur vai vāruṇiḥ / varuṇaṁ pitaram upasāra / adhihi bho bhagavo brahma /*

<sup>127</sup> *yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante / yena jātāni jīvanti / yat prayanty abhisaṁviśanti / tad brahma / tad vijñānasva /*

<sup>128</sup> GoBhā 1.1.2: *jijñāsyam brahma jīvaḥ sarveśvaro veti ?*

<sup>129</sup> TaiU 2.5: *vijñānam brahma ced veda tasmāc cen na pramādyati / śarīre pāpmano hitvā sarvān kāmān samaśnute //*

<sup>130</sup> Sūṭi 1.1.2: *vijñānam iti / śarīre vidyamānam vijñānam jīvarūpaṁ brahma ced veda [ . . . ] /*

<sup>131</sup> A *tadguṇasaṁvijñānabahuvrīhi* is an adjectival compound using the qualities belonging to the object they qualify. Ex: *lambakaraṇa* ‘one who has long ears’. An *atadguṇasaṁvijñānabahuvrīhi* is an adjectival compound using the qualities which do not belong to the object they qualify. Ex: *citrāgu* ‘one who has brindled cows’.

maintenance, destruction and so on [of the universe]'.<sup>132</sup> The four commentators agree that the term refers to the three states of the universe.

Madhva, however, explains the term as referring to eight activities of Hari, namely, creation, maintenance, destruction, control, knowledge, ignorance, bondage, and liberation.<sup>133</sup> In Madhva's commentary, he cites a verse attributed to the SkaPu which says 'Only Hari is independent, from whom creation, maintenance, destruction, restriction, knowledge, covering, bondage and liberation arise.'<sup>134</sup> Again, according to Mesquita, this citation is untraceable. It also happens to be very close to Madhva's argument that *janmādi* refers to the eightfold activities of Hari. This closeness supports Mesquita's observation that many of Madhva's untraceable citations correspond to his unique doctrines.<sup>135</sup> Jīva does not refer to this untraceable citation in his explanation of *janmādi*. It is significant that Baladeva, following Jīva, does not quote Madhva in this instance.

Baladeva glosses the second word in the *sūtra* 'of the universe {*asya*}' as follows:

[O]f the universe, which has the fourteen worlds, which is accompanied by the unlimited doers and the unlimited enjoyers starting from Brahmā and ending with plants, which is the substrate of the result of various kinds of action, whose extremely variegated arrangement is incomprehensible for the individual self.<sup>136</sup>

This explanation of *asya* closely follows Jīva's explanation on the same word:

The world, which is full of many agents and enjoyers, from Brahmā to the clump of grass, which includes a variety of wonderful creations that are inconceivable to the mind, and which is the repository of the results of both fixed duties and those occasioned by a particular time or place, comes from him. (Jīva 2007: 178)<sup>137</sup>

Jīva's elaboration is itself a combination of explanations on the same word given by Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja.<sup>138</sup>

<sup>132</sup> GoBhā 1.1.2: *tadguṇasaṃvijñānabahuvrīṇā janmasthitibhaṅgādi bodhyate* / Cf. BraSūBhā (Śa) 1.1.2: *janmotpattirādīr asyeti tadguṇasaṃvijñāno bahuvrīṇih / janmasthitibhaṅgaṃ samāsārthaḥ* / ŚrīBhā 1.1.2: *janmāditī sṛṣṭisthitipralayam / tadguṇasaṃvijñāno bahuvrīhi* / PaSa 105: *janmādinī sṛṣṭisthitipralayam / tadguṇasaṃvijñāno bahuvrīhi* /

<sup>133</sup> BraSūBhā (Ma) 1.1.2: *sṛṣṭisthitisaṃhārānyamanajñānājnānabandhamokṣa yataḥ* /

<sup>134</sup> ViTaVi 29, BraSūBhā (Ma) 1.1.2: *utpattisthitisaṃhārāḥ niyatir jñānām āvṛtiḥ / bandhamokṣau ca puruṣāt yasmāt sa harir ekaṛāḥ // iti skānde* /

<sup>135</sup> See Mesquita 2000.

<sup>136</sup> GoBhā 1.1.2: [...] *asya caturdaśabhuvanātmakasya viriṇcyādīsthāvarānantakartṛbhoktryuktasya nānāvidhakarmaphalāyatanasya jīvātarkyātivicitraracanasya viśvasya* [...] /

<sup>137</sup> PaSa 105: *asya viśvasya brahmādistambaparyantānekakartṛbhoktrsaṃyuktasya pratinyatadeśakālanimittakriyāphalāśrayasya manasāpy acintyavividhavicitraracanārūpasya* [...] /

<sup>138</sup> BraSūBhā (Śa) 1.1.2: [...] *asya jagato nāmarūpābhyāṃ vyākṛtasyānekakartṛbhoktrsaṃyuktasya pratiniyatadeśakālanimittakriyāphalāśrayasya manasāpy acintyaracanārūpasya* [...] / 'Of this universe that is manifested through name and form, that is associated with diverse agents and experiences, that provides the support for actions and results, having



Moving to the last word of the *sūtra*, Baladeva glosses *yatas* as follows:

From the supreme {*yatas*}, which is the possessor of paradoxical energies, which has the nature of the independent agent and so on, as well as the nature of the material cause. That [supreme] is Brahman which is desired to be investigated.<sup>139</sup>

According to Baladeva, three defining features of Brahman are: it has paradoxical energies (*avicintyaśakti*); it is the efficient cause (*nimittakāraṇa*) of the universe; it is the material cause (*upādānakāraṇa*) of the universe. All four Vedāntins accept the second point. Śāṅkara, Rāmānuja, and Jīva accept the third point but not Madhva. Baladeva particularly follows Jīva in emphasizing Brahman as the possessor of paradoxical energies. In fact, Baladeva's definition of Brahman is almost identical to Jīva's; the latter glosses *yatas* as 'Through the paradoxical energy, he is himself the material cause as well as the agent, etc.'<sup>140</sup>

As mentioned in the preamble, for Baladeva, Advaita Vedānta is the main opponent, particularly in its two related doctrines of the sameness of the living entity and Brahman, and of quality-less Brahman. In the remainder of Baladeva's commentary on the second *sūtra*, he assails these two doctrines, often following Rāmānuja and Jīva. Baladeva explains Brahman mentioned in the first aphorism is not the living entity since the etymological root of the word Brahman indicates the greatness of the Lord:

[T]he word Brahman exists in that very verse [i.e. BraSū 1.1.1] on account of the infinite and abundant qualities [of the Lord]. Since there is a statement in the *Śruti* 'Now why is It called "Brahman"? It is because great qualities are in It', this [word Brahman in BraSū 1.1.1] is primarily meant with regard to Him [i.e. the Lord] only.<sup>141</sup>

Baladeva explains that Brahman is called Brahman because of Its great qualities (*brhanto guṇāḥ*). In other words Baladeva argues that Brahman denotes the Lord, not the living entity because the word 'Brahman' is based on the

well-regulated space, time, and causation, and that defies all thoughts about the nature of its creation' (Śāṅkara 2004: 14).

ŚrīBhā 1.1.2: *asyācintyaavividhavicitraracanasya niyatadeśakālaphalabhogabrahmādistambhāparyantakṣetrajñamiśrasya jagataḥ* / 'The word *asya* denotes the world which is constituted in an unthinkable varied and wonderful fashion, and which is mixed up with (all) the individual souls, beginning with Brahṁā and ending with a clump of grass, each of which has its own particularly assigned enjoyment of the fruits (of *karmas*) limited to particular times and places' (Rāmānuja 1899: 196).

<sup>139</sup> GoBhā 1.1.2: *yato yasmāt parāt vā avicintyaśaktikāt svayaṅkartrādirūpād* ([*kartrādirūpād*] K; *kartādirūpād* M) *upādānarūpāc ca tad brahmātra jijñāsyam ity arthaḥ* /

<sup>140</sup> PaSa 105: *yato yasmād acintyaśaktiā svayam upādānarūpāt kartrādirūpāc ca* [...] /

<sup>141</sup> GoBhā 1.1.2: *nirṇeyamānatvāt brahmaśabdas tu niḥśimātiśayagunayogāt tatraiva vartate* / 'atha kasmād ucyate brahmeti brhanto hy asmin guṇāḥ' (??) *iti śrautininirvacanāt ato 'yaṁ tatraiva mukhyaḥ* / Cf. Jīva BhaSa *Anuccheda* 4: *atha kasmād ucyate brahma brhmāti brhmhayati ceti śruteḥ* /; PaSa *Anuccheda* 34: *atha kasmād ucyate brahmā brhmāti brhmhayati ceti cānyatra* /

etymological root  $\sqrt{brh}$  which means 'to grow, to be great'. This etymological explanation comes from Jīva's commentary, which in turn follows Rāmānuja's.<sup>142</sup> Concerning the meaning of the word Brahman, Baladeva points out that there is a conventional meaning (*rūḍhi*) which can refer to the living entity:

[The individual self is meant by the word Brahman] since the word Brahman, which means 'something vast, the *Brāhmaṇa* birth, the individual self, Brahṁā, and the Vedas', is conventionally used with regard to it [i.e. the individual self].<sup>143</sup>

In the Sūṭī, however, Baladeva says that the *Śrutis* use the word Brahman based on its etymological meaning, not in terms of its conventional meaning. Therefore, even though the conventional meaning is usually considered stronger than the etymological meaning, in this particular case the conventional meaning is rejected.<sup>144</sup> His view is that the word Brahman in the BraSū's context primarily refers to the Lord. Therefore, he says that the term can refer to the living entity only secondarily because of the living entity's connection with Brahman, as in the case of the term 'king'.<sup>145</sup> In the Sūṭī Baladeva explains this analogy. A king's agent is called 'king' because he shares, in a small portion, the king's qualities.<sup>146</sup>

After pointing out that Brahman denotes the Lord, not the living entity, Baladeva says that Brahman is Viṣṇu:

For the sake of liberation, the individual selves, who are scorched by the three-fold affliction,<sup>147</sup> should desire to investigate only Him who is the ocean of parental compassion to those who resort to Him. Hence Puruṣottama only, whose name is Parabrahman, is the object of inquiry.<sup>148</sup>

The name Puruṣottama refers only to Viṣṇu. Baladeva's identification of Brahman as Puruṣottama and Parabrahman indicates the influence of Rāmānuja and Jīva.<sup>149</sup> Since Brahman has great qualities and is identical with Viṣṇu, Baladeva rejects the idea of quality-less Brahman.

<sup>142</sup> ŚrīBhā 1.1.2: *upalakṣyaṃ hy anavadhikātiśayaabrhat, br̥mhaṇaṇ ca; br̥hater dhātos tad-darthatvāt* / '[T]hat which is characterised (here) by means of accidental characteristics is greatness unsurpassed in excellence; it is growth also, because the root *brh* (to grow) is capable of that meaning' (Rāmānuja 1899: 198). PaSa 105: *niratiśayaabrhad br̥mhaṇaṇ ceti nirvacanāt / tat ca brahma* [...] / '[T]he etymology of "brahman" is "unsurpassed greatness and growth"' (Jīva 2007: 179).

<sup>143</sup> GoBhā 1.1.2: *'br̥hajjātijīvakamalāsanaśabdarāśiṣv' (??) iti brahmaśabdasya ca tatra rūḍ-*  
*her* [...] /

<sup>144</sup> Sūṭī 1.1.2: *br̥hadguṇayogena brahmatvaṃ śrutyā varṇitaṃ yady api rūḍhir yogāt balavati tathāpi śrutyuktasya yogārthasya jīve asambhavāt na sādriyate* /

<sup>145</sup> GoBhā 1.1.2: *tato 'nyatra tu tadguṇāṃśayogāt bhākta eva rājādivat* /

<sup>146</sup> Sūṭī 1.1.2: *rājādiśabdavad iti rājasevako 'pi rājā cocyate tadguṇāṃśayogāt* /

<sup>147</sup> Three types of sufferings are ones caused by oneself (*adhyātmika*), caused by gods (*adhidaivika*), and caused by environment (*adhibhautika*).

<sup>148</sup> GoBhā 1.1.2: *sa eva svāśritavātsalyanīradhis tāpatrayavipluṣyamānair jīvair niḥśreyasāya jijñāsaḥ / ataḥ parabrahmābhīdhānaḥ puruṣottama eva jijñāśākarmabhūtaḥ* /

<sup>149</sup> Cf. PaSa 105: [...] *parabrahmabhūtaḥ sarveśvaraḥ puruṣottamaḥ* /

On this point, Baladeva has his opponent say as follows: '[T]he imposition of qualities [on Brahman] is not appropriate to speak in this context since that would essentially lead to an unwanted consequence with regard to the state of being Brahman.'<sup>150</sup> The *prima facie* view comes from the Advaitin who says that the attributes of Brahman such as being the creator, the maintainer, and the destroyer of the universe are superimposed on Brahman. Baladeva says that this view is not appropriate because if Brahman were devoid of quality, this would contradict the etymological meaning of Its own name. Baladeva concludes by stating that since the second *sūtra* teaches the difference between Brahman and the living entity, it is not possible they are the same.<sup>151</sup>

In Baladeva's commentary on the second *sūtra*, he closely follows Jīva who in turn follows Rāmānuja. It is significant that Baladeva does not follow Madhva when Jīva does not, as can be seen from his interpretation of the compound *janmādi*. In his explanation of *yatas*, Baladeva again diverges from Madhva and follows Jīva and Rāmānuja, who consider Brahman to be the material cause of the universe. Baladeva's discussion on the etymological meaning of the word Brahman is also derived from Rāmānuja and Jīva. As far as his commentary on the second *sūtra* is concerned, Baladeva does not quote anything from Madhva's commentary.

#### 4.2.4. *Brahmasūtra* 1.1.3

In his commentary on the third *sūtra*, *śāstrayonitvāt*, Baladeva refutes two opinions. He first rejects the Naiyāyika view that Brahman can be known through inference. Following Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, Madhva, and Jīva, Baladeva argues that scripture is the only valid means of knowing Brahman. He then refutes the Mīmāṃsaka view that the scripture teaches only injunction and prohibition but not Brahman.

According to Baladeva, the third *sūtra* has the following two Upaniṣadic passages as its objects of discussion. The first is from the GoTāU, and the second from the BṛĀU:

Obeisance to Kṛṣṇa, whose nature is existence, consciousness, and bliss, who creates [the world] without affliction, who is known through Vedānta, the teacher, who witnesses intelligence.<sup>152</sup>

I inquire about that person taught in the Upaniṣads.<sup>153</sup>

<sup>150</sup> GoBhā 1.1.2: *na cātra guṇādhyāso vaktuṃ yuktaḥ vastuto brahmatvaprasaṅgāt /*

<sup>151</sup> GoBhā 1.1.2: *iha brahmaṇo jīvetaratvapratipādanāt tayor advaitaṃ nābhimatam [...] /*

<sup>152</sup> GoTāU 1.1.1: *saccidānandarūpāya kṛṣṇāyākliṣṭakāriṇe /*  
*namo vedāntavedyāya gurave buddhisākṣiṇe //*

<sup>153</sup> BṛĀU 3.9.26: *tat tv upaniṣadam puruṣam prcchāmi /*

These two passages teach that Brahman or Hari is known through the scriptures. Baladeva then raises a question as to whether Hari should be understood through inference (*anumāna*) or through the Upaniṣads.<sup>154</sup> The *prima facie* view argues that Hari should be understood through inference for two reasons. First, this is the position of Gautama, the founder of the Nyāya school. Second, the scripture also supports inference as a valid means of knowing Brahman, as shown by the word 'to be thought of (*mantavya*)' in the passage 'The Self [i.e. Brahman] is to be seen, to be heard, to be thought of and to be meditated upon.'<sup>155</sup>

In Baladeva's commentary on the third *sūtra*, he rejects this view. At the outset he says that the negative particle *na* should be borrowed from the fifth *sūtra*, *īkṣater nāśabdām*,<sup>156</sup> and the aphorism should be read as *na śāstrayonitvāt*.<sup>157</sup> With this negative particle the aphorism means 'Those who desire liberation should not {*na*} infer Him [i.e. the Lord] since we hear from the Śrutis the fact that [the Lord is the one] whose source {*yoni*} of understanding is the Upaniṣads {*śāstra*}'.<sup>158</sup> None of Baladeva's four predecessors (i.e. Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, Madhva, and Jīva) enacts this borrowing of a negative particle. Baladeva rejects inference because he analyzes *śāstrayoni* as a *bahuvrihi* compound. According to this analysis, the *sūtra* establishes an epistemological point: that the scripture only is the valid means of knowing Brahman. Baladeva's four predecessors accept this *bahuvrihi* analysis of the compound.

Śaṅkara, however, also offers an alternative analysis of the compound. *Śāstrayoni* can be interpreted as the genitive *tatpuruṣa* type, which means 'Brahman is the source {*yoni*} of the great scriptures such as *Ṛgveda* {*śāstra*}'.<sup>159</sup> According to this interpretation the *sūtra* establishes the omniscience of Brahman. In this regard Śaṅkara provides an analogy: in the mundane context, it is understood that authors like Pāṇini possess greater knowledge than is expressed in their works. In the same manner, Brahman must be omniscient since scriptures like the *Ṛgveda*, which are omniscient, effortlessly manifest from Brahman like breathing.<sup>160</sup> For support, Śaṅkara cites a passage from the BrĀU: 'That which is called *Ṛgveda* is the exhalation of this great being [i.e. Brahman].'<sup>161</sup>

<sup>154</sup> GoBhā 1.1.3: *upāśyo harir anumānenopanīṣadā vā vedyā iti /*

<sup>155</sup> BrĀU 4.5.6: *ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitavyo maitreyi /*

<sup>156</sup> GoBhā 1.1.3: *'īkṣater na' ity ato nety ākṛṣyam /*

<sup>157</sup> This borrowing from other *sūtra* is called *maṇḍūkapluti* 'frog-leap'.

<sup>158</sup> GoBhā 1.1.3: *mumukṣubhir asau nānumeyaḥ / kutaḥ? śāstreti / śāstram upanīṣad yonir bodhahetur yasya tattvāt upanīṣadbodhyatvaśravaṇād ity arthah /*

<sup>159</sup> BraSūBhā (Śa) 1.1.3: *mahata ṛgvedādeḥ śāstrasya [ . . . ] yoniḥ kāraṇam brahma /*

<sup>160</sup> BraSūBhā (Śa) 1.1.3: *yadyadvistarārtham śāstram yasmāt puruṣaviśeṣāt sambhavati, yathā vyākaraṇādi pāṇinyāder jñeyaikadeśārtham api sa tato 'py adhikataravijñāna iti prasiddham loke / kimu vaktavyam [ . . . ] ṛgvedādyaḥ sarvajñānākārasya aprayatnenaiva līlānyayena puruṣaṇiḥśvāsavad yasmān mahato bhūtād yoneḥ sambhavaḥ [ . . . ] /*

<sup>161</sup> BrĀU 2.4.10: *asya mahato bhūtasya niḥśvasitam etad yad ṛgvedaḥ //*

In Rāmānuja's ŚrīBhā on the third *sūtra*, he discusses only the *bahuvrīhi* analysis of the compound and how inference cannot establish Brahman. Madhva not only does not mention the *tatpuruṣa* analysis in his BraSūBhā but also rejects this option in his commentary on BhaGī 3.15:

*śāstrayonitva* means the one whose source is scripture. When it is said *janmādy asya yataḥ*, concerning such a statement, the means of knowing is expected [ . . . ] [The third *sūtra* therefore] is not about the omniscience [of Brahman]. If the creator of the Vedas is omniscient, why is it not so with the creator of the universe? Therefore the only point intended in the third *sūtra* is that the means for attaining knowledge of [Brahman] is the Vedas.<sup>162</sup>

According to Madhva, Śaṅkara's argument that Brahman is omniscient because It is the source of the Vedas is redundant and therefore unnecessary. The second *sūtra* has already established Brahman as the source of the universe. This implies that Brahman is the source of the Vedas since they are but a part of the universe. Therefore, there is no need to repeat the same point in the third *sūtra*. The topic of the third *sūtra* rather concerns the means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) that Brahman as the source of the universe is known only through the scriptures.

Regardless of Madhva's criticism, Jīva (2007: 187–188), following Śaṅkara, adopts the *tatpuruṣa* analysis of the compound. Baladeva, however, following Rāmānuja and Madhva, discusses only the *bahuvrīhi* compound analysis. This is a rare case wherein Baladeva does not follow Jīva. Perhaps Baladeva felt justified in not accepting the *tatpuruṣa* analysis since Rāmānuja does not adopt it and since Madhva explicitly criticizes it.

Concerning the means of knowing Brahman, Baladeva reiterates the standard Vedāntic view: (1) Brahman is known only through the scripture; (2) inference is valid only when it is supported by the scripture; (3) mere inference devoid of scriptural support cannot establish Brahman. As discussed in the Introduction,<sup>163</sup> this commitment to the scripture precisely is what differentiates theology from philosophy. Regarding the first point, Baladeva refers to BrĀU 3.9.26 in which Brahman is described as 'that which is known from the Upaniṣads (*aupaniṣadam*)'.<sup>164</sup> For the second and third points, Baladeva refers to a verse attributed to an unidentified Śruti passage: "Without any contradiction of an earlier [sentence] and a later one, what would be the desired meaning here?" Reasoning such as this is [called] logic [*tarka*]. However, groundless logic [*śuṣkatarka*] should be abandoned.<sup>165</sup>

<sup>162</sup> *Bhagavadgītābhāṣya* 3.15: *śāstraṃ yonir yasyeti tu śāstrayonitvam / 'janmādy asya yataḥ' ityukte pramāṇaṃ hi tatpāreṣitam / [ . . . ] na ca sarvajñatve / yadi vedasraṣṭā sarvajñāḥ kim iti na jagatsraṣṭā? tasmād vedapramāṇakatvam evātra vivakṣitam /*

<sup>163</sup> See 0.4.

<sup>164</sup> *tat tv aupaniṣadam puruṣaṃ prcchāmi /*

<sup>165</sup> *GoBhā* 1.1.3: *pūrvāparāvirodhena ko 'rtho 'trābhīmato bhavet / ityādyam ūhanaṃ tarkaḥ śuṣkatarkaṃ tu varjayet // ityādiśruteḥ /*

Curiously, though the GoBhā attributes this verse to a *Śruti*, the SūTī attributes it to the KūPu.<sup>166</sup> In fact practically the same verse is cited by Madhva in his BraSūBhā 1.1.3 and is attributed to the KūPu.<sup>167</sup> As one might expect, according to Mesquita (2008: 189), this is also an untraceable quote. Jīva cites the same verse in his SaSa on TaSa *Anuccheda* 11 and attributes it to the KūPu. This is another example wherein Baladeva follows Jīva's citing from Madhva.

As previously mentioned, the *prima facie* view argued that the word '*man-tavya* (to be thought of)' in BrĀU 4.5.6 proves the validity of inference as a means of knowing Brahman. Baladeva cites an untraceable verse attributed to the KūPu to reject this view. Like his four predecessors, his point is that inference independent from scripture cannot be a valid means of knowing Brahman. Furthermore, following Jīva Baladeva cites BraSū 2.1.1,<sup>168</sup> which states the unreliability of inference in knowing Brahman when it is unaided by scripture. According to Baladeva, the characteristics of Brahman, which is known only through the scriptures, are:

Hari has natures such as being the one whose body is the Self, [He is] the experiencer of experience, [He] has the nature of being the substrate of the qualities which are non-different from Himself,<sup>169</sup> being the creator of the universe without transformation and so on.<sup>170</sup>

It appears that the first characteristic that Hari has, that is, being the one whose body is the Self (*ātmanmūrtitva*), comes from Rādhādāmodara's VeSyā. Therein, citing the GoTāU to support his view,<sup>171</sup> Rādhādāmodara explains that having the Self as His body denotes the idea that for the Lord there is no difference between the body and the self as is the case with the living entity. The second characteristic of the Lord, that He is the experiencer of experience (*anubhūter anubhavitṛtva*) echoes BrĀU 3.4.2,<sup>172</sup> which points to the unknowability of Brahman except through the scriptures. The third characteristic, that

<sup>166</sup> SūTī 1.1.3: *pūrveti / kaurme vanaparvaṇi ca /*

<sup>167</sup> *pūrvottarāvirodhena ko 'rtho 'trābhīmato bhavet / ity ādyam ūhanam tarkaḥ śuśkatarkaṃ tu varjayet // ityādīkaurme /* The underlined part differs from the version cited in the GoBhā 1.1.3.

<sup>168</sup> *tarkāpratiṣṭhānāt //*

<sup>169</sup> For example, in the phrase '*satyaṃ jñānam anantaṃ brahma*', Brahman is both the qualities (*guṇa*) such as *satya* and the possessor (*guṇin*) of the qualities. According to Śaṅkara, however, *satya* here means the absence of *asatya* (*asatyābhāvāt*).

<sup>170</sup> GoBhā 1.1.3: *itthaṃ ca harer ātmanmūrtitvam anubhūter anubhavitṛtvaṃ svātmakadharmād-hiṣṭhānaśālitvaṃ jagatkartṛnirvikāratvaṃ cetyādiśrūyamānarūpatayā tasyopāśanam sidhyati /*

<sup>171</sup> VeSyā 20: *sa ca dehadehibhedaśūnyo harir ātmanmūrtir bodhyaḥ / satpūṇḍarīkanayanam meghābhāṃ vaidyutāmbaram / dvibhujam jñānamudrāḍhyaṃ vanamālinam īśvaram //* (GoTāU 1.9). *sākṣātprakṛtiparo yo 'yam ātmā gopālah /* (GoTāU 2.23). *taṃ ekaṃ govindaṃ saccidānandavigrahaṃ /* (GoTāU 1.33). *itīśruteḥ //*

<sup>172</sup> *katamo yājñavalkya sarvāntaraḥ / na dṛṣṭer draṣṭāraṃ paśyeḥ / na śruteḥ śrotāraṃ śṛṇuyāḥ / na mater mantāraṃ manvithā / na vijñāter vijñātāraṃ vijāniyāḥ / eṣa ta ātmā sarvāntaraḥ /*

Brahman is both the qualities and the substrate of the qualities, is contrary to Śaṅkara's view.<sup>173</sup> Finally, the fourth point, that the Lord is simultaneously the creator of the universe and is without transformation, points to His paradoxical nature, which cannot be known through inference. These are all characteristics of Brahman that can be known only through the scriptures. Baladeva therefore says that one should first understand Brahman according to the scriptures and then reflect upon It accordingly.<sup>174</sup>

After rejecting the Nyāya view, in the rest of his commentary on BraSū 1.1.3–4 Baladeva deals with the Mīmāṃsā view of the scriptures. This section reveals the GoBhā's highly eclectic nature. Baladeva's description of the Mīmāṃsaka position and its refutation in GoBhā 1.1.3 are taken from the commentaries of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja on BraSū 1.1.4, whereas in GoBhā 1.1.4 Baladeva follows Madhva's commentary on BraSū 1.1.4.

According to the Mīmāṃsakas, in the Vedas only injunctions (*vidhi*) and prohibitions (*niṣedha*) are meaningful. The goal must be something that is to be accomplished (*kārya*). The Mīmāṃsakas are not interested in entities such as Brahman, which are already established (*siddhavastu*). Consequently, they consider the Upaniṣadic statements that give information of Brahman useless since they are neither injunctions nor prohibitions. Baladeva summarizes the Mīmāṃsā position thus:

A series of statements in the Upaniṣads, like the statements such as 'The earth consists of seven islands' are indeed not fit to be used since they are devoid of any purpose because they inform about the objects, which are already established. Statements in the forms of injunction and prohibition, which inform about goals to be achieved, are seen as worthy of use since they have purpose.<sup>175</sup>

This description of the Mīmāṃsaka position follows Śaṅkara's BraSūBhā 1.1.4 wherein he summarizes the *prima facie* view: '[T]he scriptures have injunctions or prohibitions as their purpose.'<sup>176</sup> Rāmānuja also follows Śaṅkara in his commentary.<sup>177</sup> The opponent gives an example of a useless sentence: 'The earth consists of seven islands.'<sup>178</sup> This example is also taken from Śaṅkara's BraSūBhā 1.1.4.<sup>179</sup>

<sup>173</sup> See Section 4.2.1.

<sup>174</sup> GoBhā 1.1.3: *tasmāt vedāntāt viditvāsau dhyeya iti /*

<sup>175</sup> GoBhā 1.1.3: *na khalu tāvad vedāntavākyaṅganāḥ prayogayogyaḥ siddhārthabodhakatvena prayojanaśūnyatvāt, 'saptadvīpā vasundharā' ityādivākyaavat / pravṛttinivṛttirūpasādhārthabodhakāni vākyaṇi prayojanavattvāt prayogayogyāni dṛṣṭāni /*

<sup>176</sup> BraSūBhā (Śa) 1.1.4: *pravṛttinivṛttiprayojanatvāc chāstrasya /*

<sup>177</sup> ŚrīBhā 1.1.4: *na vedāntavākyaṇi brahma pratipādayanti pravṛttinivṛtṭyanvayavirahīṇaś śāstrasyānarthakyāt /*

<sup>178</sup> Oddly enough, this sentence is not found among the Śruti texts but only among the Smṛti texts, such as *Bhṛgusaṃhitā* 35.67, BraPu 29.20, MāPu 53.42.

<sup>179</sup> BraSūBhā (Śa) 1.1.4: *kartavyavidhyānupraveśamantareṇa vastumātram ucyamānam ānarthakam syāt 'saptadvīpā vasumatī' tyādivad iti, tatparihṛtam /*

Baladeva then has the opponent give the following four sentences as examples of injunctions and prohibitions:

Among the people [there are statements] such as 'One who desires wealth should approach the king', 'One who has weak digestion should not drink water.' It is also said in the Vedas 'One who desires heaven should perform sacrifices',<sup>180</sup> 'One should not drink alcohol.'<sup>181</sup>

The first two sentences cited are examples of mundane (*laukika*) injunction and prohibition. The latter two are examples of Vedic (*vaidika*) injunction and prohibition. Except for the last statement cited, all the examples are taken from Rāmānuja:

The purpose [of scriptural sentences] is conceived of as having the nature of obtaining what is desired and rejecting what is not desired through the means of injunctions and prohibitions such as, 'One who desires wealth should go to the king's palace', 'One who has weak digestion should not drink water', 'One who desires heaven should perform sacrifice', 'One should not eat flesh.'<sup>182</sup>

Again, the first injunction and prohibition are mundane, and the second two Vedic. Baladeva further follows Rāmānuja when describing the opponent's view that only injunctions and prohibitions are meaningful:

[W]ithout expressing any purpose, one does not make any statement. Moreover, it [i.e. the purpose] is understood to be of the nature of obtaining what is desired or giving up what is not desired, which are accomplished by injunction and prohibition.<sup>183</sup>

According to the Mīmāṃsaka position described by Baladeva, the Upaniṣadic sentences, such as '[Brahman is] real, knowledge, and unlimited',<sup>184</sup> are therefore meaningless since they are merely descriptive, and they neither prescribe nor prohibit anything.<sup>185</sup>

It may be argued that the Upaniṣadic sentences cannot be meaningless since they are a part of the *Śruti*. In response, according to Baladeva, the Mīmāṃsaka

<sup>180</sup> Cf. The ŚaBhā on JaiSū 1.1.2, 3.5.18, etc.

<sup>181</sup> GoBhā 1.1.3: 'arthalipsur nrpaṃ gacchet', 'mandāgnir na jalaṃ pibet', iti loke / 'svargakāmo yajeta', 'surāṃ na pibet' iti vede ca /

Cf. MaSmṛ 11.93d: surā vai malam annānām pāpmā ca malam ucyate / tasmād brāhmaṇarājanyau vaiśyaś ca na surāṃ pibet //

<sup>182</sup> ŚrīBhā 1.1.4: [...] prayojanaṃ pravṛttinivṛttisādhyeṣṭāniṣṭhāprāptiparihārātmakam upalabdham, 'arthārthī rājakulaṃ gacchet', 'mandāgnir nāmbu pibet', 'svargakāmo yajeta', 'na kalañjaṃ bhakṣayet' ityevamādiṣu /

<sup>183</sup> GoBhā 1.1.3: [...] prayojanam anuddiśya vākyaprayogaḥ sambhavati / tac ca pravṛttinivṛttisādhyeṣṭāptiyanīṣṭhāparihārātmakam ([sādhyeṣṭāptiyanīṣṭhāparihārātmakam] K; -sādhyeṣṭāptiparihārātmakam M) avagatam /

<sup>184</sup> TaiU 2.1.1.

<sup>185</sup> GoBhā 1.1.3: brahma khalu pariniṣpannam vastu / tadbodhakasya 'satyaṃ jñānam anantam' ityādivākyasya tacchūnyatvān na tadyogyatvam /



position is that the Upaniṣadic statements are useful only when they are connected either to an injunction or to a prohibition:

If someone desires to use it [i.e. the series of the Upaniṣadic statements], then he should say that it [the series of the Upaniṣadic statements] also has it [i.e. purpose], using it [the group of the Upaniṣadic statements] in line with the statements that have purpose.<sup>186</sup>

The idea is that the Upaniṣadic statements can be used in subordination to the injunctive sentences. For example, the explanatory statements concerning sacrifice, the presiding deity of the sacrifice, and the priest who performs the sacrifice can be meaningful since they facilitate the execution of sacrifice even though they are descriptive.<sup>187</sup> The opponent at the end cites JaiSū 1.2.1 and 1.1.25 to back up the Mīmāṃsaka view:

Since the Vedas are dedicated to action, it is therefore said that [the statements] not dedicated to action are meaningless and non-eternal.<sup>188</sup>

[Those sentences] which are not aiming at action are connected with [the sentences] which aim at action since the meaning [of words] is to cause it [i.e. the meaning of sentence].<sup>189</sup>

Baladeva's description of the Mīmāṃsā position, including the two *sūtras* from the JaiSū, closely follows Śāṅkara's BraSūBhā 1.1.4.<sup>190</sup> In summary, the *prima facie* view according to Baladeva argues that the Upaniṣadic statements are either meaningless because they are neither injunction nor prohibition or they are meaningful only when they are subordinated to the injunctive or prohibitive statements.

Following Śāṅkara and Rāmānuja, Baladeva rejects the Mīmāṃsaka view. He says that although the Upaniṣadic statements are neither injunction nor prohibition, they are meaningful 'since they teach the existence of Brahman,

<sup>186</sup> GoBhā 1.1.3: *yadi kaścit taṃ prayuyukṣur bhavet tarhi prayojanavadvākyaikavākyatayā taṃ prayujānas tasyāpi tadvattvaṃ brūyāt /*

<sup>187</sup> GoBhā 1.1.3: *kratudevatākartṛpratipādanena tadvān tadvākyagaṇas tadyogyo bhavati /*

<sup>188</sup> JaiSū 1.2.1: *āmnāyasya kriyārthatvād ānarthakyam atadarthānām tasmād anityam (anityam) Jaimini 1974; anityatvam K, M) ucyate /*

<sup>189</sup> JaiSū 1.1.25: *tadbhūtānām kriyārthena samāmnāyo 'rthasya tannimittatvād /* My translation of *tadbhūtānām* as '[sentences] which are not aiming at action' follows the SūTī, and is different from Śabara's interpretation. SūTī: *tadbhūteṭi / tasyārthaḥ, kriyārthena vākyena tadbhūtānām akriyārthānām samāmnāyaḥ samuccāraṇaṃ sambandha ity yāvat / kutaḥ, arthasyeti / padārthasya vākyārthahetutvād ity arthaḥ /* Śabara: *teṣv eva padārtheṣu bhūtānām vartamānānām kriyārthena samuccāraṇaṃ /*

<sup>190</sup> *yady api śāstrapramāṇakam brahma tathāpi pratipatividhiviśayataiva śāstreṇa brahma samarpyate / yathā yūpāhavahaniyādīny alaukikāny api vidhiśaṣatayā śāstreṇa samarpyante tadvat [...] tathāhi śāstratātparyavida āhuḥ [...] 'tadbhūtānām kriyārthena samāmnāyaḥ' (JaiSū 1.1.25), 'āmnāyasya kriyārthatvād ānarthakyam atadarthānām' (JaiSū 1.2.1) iti ca /*

which is the highest goal of human life'.<sup>191</sup> The same idea is found in Rāmānuja's gloss on BraSū 1.1.4 *tat tu samanvayāt*:

The word *samanvaya* means the proper purport, that is, such a purport as constitutes an object of human pursuit. The meaning is that, owing to the fact that Brahman, who is the highest object of human pursuit and whose very nature is unsurpassed bliss, forms the purport (of the scriptures) by constituting the thing that is to be denoted (by them)—*that*, namely, the fact that the scripture forms the means of proving (Brahman) is undoubtedly established. (Rāmānuja 1899: 246–247)<sup>192</sup>

Using an analogy, Baladeva explains how information concerning Brahman can be meaningful:

This is like a statement informing about the existence of treasure. Just as, due to the statement of a trustworthy person 'There is a treasure in your house', its acquisition becomes the sole purpose of his life, in the same manner it [i.e. the highest goal of human life] [manifests] by understanding the existence of It [i.e. Brahman] as 'There exists Brahman, whose nature is imperishable, blissful, and conscious, blameless, the friend to all, the one who gives oneself, the one who possesses me'.<sup>193</sup> Therefore, [the set of Upaniṣadic statements] is not devoid of such a state of being [i.e. it is not devoid of purposefulness].<sup>194</sup>

Information about treasure is descriptive. It is neither an injunction nor a prohibition. Nonetheless, it is meaningful and impels a person to act based on such information since treasure is inherently valuable. Baladeva argues that the Upaniṣadic sentences are similarly meaningful since they teach about Brahman, which is the highest goal of human life. This analogy of treasure is found in ŚrīBhā 1.1.4.<sup>195</sup>

After pointing out that the Upaniṣadic statements can be meaningful, Baladeva rejects the Mīmāṃsaka idea that the Upaniṣadic statements must be subordinated to the injunctive sentences. Such subordination is not possible

(1) because of the difference of the sections [i.e. the Upaniṣadic statements belong to a different section to those statements intended for action], (2) because [the Upaniṣadic statements] rather reject action and its result, and (3) because of an

<sup>191</sup> GoBhā 1.1.3: [...] *pravṛttinivṛttibodhakatāvirahe 'pi paramapumartharūpabrahmāstitivabodhanenaiva tasya tadvattvāt* [...] /

<sup>192</sup> ŚrīBhā 1.1.4: *samanvayaḥ samyag anvayaḥ / puruṣārthatayānvaya ity arthaḥ / parama-puruṣārthabhūtasānavadhikātiśāyānandasvarūpasya brahmaṇo 'bhidheyatayānvayāt tat śāstrapramāṇakatvaṃ siddhyaty evety arthaḥ /*

<sup>193</sup> This resonates with Rāmānuja's *aṃśa-aṃśi* analogy.

<sup>194</sup> GoBhā 1.1.3: [...] *nidhisattāvabodhakavākyavat / yathā tvadgrhe nidhir astity āptavākyāt tatprāpty ekalakṣaṇaḥ pumarthas tathākṣayānandacidrūpaṃ niravadyaṃ sarvasuhrd ātmapradaṃ madamśi brahmāstiti tatsattvapratyayād eva sa iti na tadvattvavirahaḥ /*

<sup>195</sup> ŚrīBhā 1.1.4: *yathā svaveśmani nidhir astitvākyena nidhisadbhāvaṃ jñātvā tṛptas san paścāt tadupādānaṃ ca prayatate /*

unwanted result that what is heard [i.e. that Brahman is supreme] is rejected and what is not heard [i.e. that action is supreme] is accepted.<sup>196</sup>

The first reason explains that the Upaniṣadic statements belong to the *Jñāna-kāṇḍa* of the Vedas, whereas the injunctive statements belong to the *Karma-kāṇḍa* of the Vedas. This explanation follows Śaṅkara who says that the *Mīmāṃsā* and *Vedānta* have different objects of inquiry.<sup>197</sup> The second reason refers to the idea that the result of ritual action is temporary and is therefore not desirable. An example of this idea is expressed in BhaGī 9.21, 'After enjoying the vast heavenly world, when [their] merit is diminished, they enter the world of mortals.'<sup>198</sup> The third reason is taken from Śaṅkara.<sup>199</sup> From the viewpoint of the Vedāntists, the appropriate topic (*samanvaya*) of the Upaniṣads is Brahman. Therefore, to say that the Upaniṣads are focused on instructing injunction and prohibition is to violate the purpose of these texts.

The *prima facie* view cited two aphorisms from the JaiSū to support the idea of subordination. Baladeva, however, says that this cannot be the correct understanding of Jaimini's teaching:

Nor is it possible to say that by maxims such as JaiSū 1.2.1, Jaimini considered it [i.e. the group of the Upaniṣadic statements] to be aiming at action since he was devoted to Brahman. Therefore, after indeed rejecting the primary meaning of some statements in the section of ritual action, he [i.e. Jaimini] considered [the statements concerning ritual performance] to be aiming at It [Brahman] but not anything else.<sup>200</sup>

In the SūTī, Baladeva explains that Jaimini had been devoted to Brahman since he was Bādarāyaṇa's disciple.<sup>201</sup> The idea is that, since Jaimini was Bādarāyaṇa's student, he could not have gone against his teacher. Baladeva, therefore, reverses the hierarchy between the Upaniṣadic statements and the injunctive sentences. Whereas the *Mīmāṃsaka* opponent subordinates the Upaniṣadic statements to the injunctive sentences, he subordinates the injunctive sentences to the Upaniṣadic statements. Ritual action is aimed at Brahman in the sense that the efficacy of ritual influences those who practice them to accept the authority of the Vedas, which teach about Brahman. Or, in other words,

<sup>196</sup> GoBhā 1.1.3: *na cōktarītyā kriyāparatā tasya śakyā vaktuṃ prakaraṇabhedāt pratyuta karmataphalavigānāt śrutahānyaśrutakalpanaprasaṅgā ca* ([ca] M; om. K) /

<sup>197</sup> BraSūBhā (Śa) 1.1.4: *nanv iha jijñāsyā vilakṣaṇyam uktam / karmakāṇḍe bhavyo dharmo jijñāsyā iha tu bhūtaṃ nityanivṛttaṃ brahma jijñāsyam iti / tatra dharmajñānaphalād anuṣṭhānāpekṣād vilakṣaṇaṃ brahmajñānaphalaṃ bhavitum arhati /*

<sup>198</sup> BhaGī 9.21: *te taṃ bhuktvā svargalokaṃ viśālaṃ kṣīṇe puṇye martyalokaṃ viśanti /*

<sup>199</sup> BraSūBhā (Śa) 1.1.4: *na ca tadgatānāṃ padānāṃ brahmasvarūpaviṣaye niścite samanvaye 'vagamyamāne 'rthāntarakalpanā yuktā, śrutihānyaśrutakalpanāprasāṅgāt /*

<sup>200</sup> GoBhā 1.1.3: *na cāmñāsyetyādīnyāyena jaimininā karmaparatvaṃ tasya samarthitam iti vācyaṃ tasya brahmaniṣṭhatvāt / tasmāt karmaṇprakaraṇasthānāṃ keṣāṃcid vākyānāṃ svārthān tyaktvaiva tatparatvaṃ tena samarthitaṃ na tv anyat /*

<sup>201</sup> SūTī 1.1.3: *jaiminer brahmaniṣṭhatvaṃ tadgurunā bādarāyaṇena jijñāsyate [ . . . ] /*

the teachings concerning ritual action are effective in teaching about Brahman since the result of ritual action is arranged by the Lord, that is, Brahman.<sup>202</sup> In their commentaries on BraSū 1.1.3 or 1.1.4, none of Baladeva's four predecessors discusses the idea that Jaimini was a disciple of Bādarāyaṇa, although Rāmānuja, in commenting on *atha* in BraSū 1.1.1, does speak about the unity of the Mīmāṃsā school established by Jaimini and the Vedānta school established by Bādarāyaṇa.

In conclusion, the following may be noted. In his analysis of the compound *śāstrayoni*, Baladeva, following Rāmānuja and Madhva, accepts only the *bahuvrīhi* compound analysis. Baladeva does not follow Śaṅkara's *tatpuruṣa* compound analysis even though Jīva accepts it. Baladeva then accepts an untraceable quote of Madhva attributed to the KūPu, which points to the futility of inference that is not supported by scripture. Jīva also cites the same verse in his SaSa. This citation therefore supports the view that Baladeva accepts Madhva's untraceable quotes only when Jīva accepts them. Other than these particularities, Baladeva's refutation of the Naiyāikas follows the standard Vedāntic view that the Upaniṣads are the only valid means of knowing Brahman. In relation to Baladeva's refutation of the Mīmāṃsaka view, most of his arguments, examples, and citations used in GoBhā 1.1.3 are derived from the commentaries of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja on BraSū 1.1.4. Since all the Vedāntins reject the Mīmāṃsaka view of scripture, Baladeva draws from all of them in his refutation.

#### 4.2.5. *Brahmasūtra* 1.1.4

In his commentary on BraSū 1.1.4, Baladeva continues to discuss and reject the Mīmāṃsaka view of scripture. This time, however, he does so following Madhva. Baladeva says that this repetition is 'in order to render firm the objective in the previous section'.<sup>203</sup> Baladeva's aim is to establish that Brahman is the object that will come to be known through the Vedas.

According to Baladeva, the topic under discussion (*viśaya*) in BraSū 1.1.4 is GoTāU 2.21, 'He who is praised in all the Vedas',<sup>204</sup> and KaU 2.15a, 'Whose stride all the Vedas celebrate'.<sup>205</sup> The doubt (*saṃśaya*) is whether Viṣṇu is the object that will come to be known by the Vedas.<sup>206</sup> The *prima facie* view

<sup>202</sup> Śabara on JaiSu 2.4.20 says that praising one thing does not imply the rejection of another: *na hi nindā nindyam ninditum prayujyate / kiṃ tarhi ninditād itarat praśamsitum, tatra na ninditasya pratīśedho gamyate* / Applying this principle (*na hi nindyā nyāya*), praising ritual performance in the *Karmakāṇḍa* does not imply rejecting Brahman in the *Jñānakāṇḍa*.

<sup>203</sup> GoBhā 1.1.4: *atha pūrvārthadārḍhyāya brahmaṇaḥ sarvavedavedyatvam ucyate /*

<sup>204</sup> *yo 'sau sarvair vedair giyate /*

<sup>205</sup> *sarve vedā yatpadam āmananti [ . . . ] /*

<sup>206</sup> GoBhā 1.1.4: *sarvavedavedyatvaṃ viṣṇor ayuktaṃ na veti /*

(*pūrvapakṣa*), again according to the Mīmāṃsakas, is that the Vedas teach only the ritual performances and not Viṣṇu:

It is unfitting that He [i.e. Viṣṇu] is so [i.e. to be known by all the Vedas] since ordaining ritual action is what is primarily seen in the Vedas. We observe that the Vedas ordain ritual activities such as the *Kārīrī* sacrifice, the *Putrakāmyeṣṭi* sacrifice, and the *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice together with auxiliaries and methodologies, [sacrifices] which have the results such as rain, a son and heaven.<sup>207</sup>

Baladeva says that BraSū 1.1.4 *tat tu samanvayāt* rejects this Mīmāṃsā view. He explains the *sūtra* as follows: ‘The word “but {*tu*}” is used in the sense of cutting doubts. It is appropriate that Viṣṇu is to be known by all the Vedas {*tat*}. Why? Because of the proper syntactical connection {*samanvayāt*}.<sup>208</sup> Baladeva explains that proper syntactical connection (*samanvaya*) refers to the six indicatory marks (*tātparyalinga*): ‘*Anvaya* is the [six] indicatory marks of the meaning [of any text]. *Samanvaya* means it is well investigated.’<sup>209</sup> Baladeva’s definition of syntactical connection (*anvaya*) follows Madhva’s.<sup>210</sup> In this case, Baladeva does not follow Jīva, who defines *samanvaya* in terms of positive and negative concomitance.<sup>211</sup>

In the beginning of his commentary on BraSū 1.1.3, Baladeva cites a verse that spells out the six indicatory marks: ‘(1) Beginning and conclusion; (2) repetition; (3) novelty; (4) result; (5) praising; and (6) reasoning are the signs for ascertaining the meaning [of a text].’<sup>212</sup> An identical verse is found in Madhva’s commentary on BraSū 1.1.4. Madhva attributes the verse to a text called *Bṛhatsaṃhitā*, which is one of the untraceable works cited by Madhva (Mesquita 2000: 189).<sup>213</sup> Jīva also quotes that verse in PaSa *Anuccheda* 105. This is yet another example in which Baladeva cites Madhva’s untraceable verse when Jīva accepts it.

Although many secondary literatures state that this particular hermeneutical method of six indicatory marks was first invented by the Mīmāṃsakas and then adopted by the Vedāntins, not one of these texts refers to any Mīmāṃsā

<sup>207</sup> GoBhā 1.1.4: *vedeṣu prāyeṇa karmavidhānadārśanāt ayuktaṃ tasya tat / vṛṣṭiputrasvar-gādīphalakāni kārīripurakāmyeṣṭijyotiṣṭomādīni ([kārīrī-] em.; kārīrī- K, M) karmāṇi sāṅgāni setikartavyāni vidadhato vedā dr̥ṣyante /*

<sup>208</sup> GoBhā 1.1.4: *tuśabdah śaṅkāchedārthaḥ / tat sarvavedavedyatvaṃ viṣṇor yuktam / kutaḥ? samanvayāt /*

<sup>209</sup> GoBhā 1.1.4: *anvayas tātparyalingam / samanvayatvaṃ suvicāritatvaṃ /*

<sup>210</sup> BraSūBhā (Ma) 1.1.4: *anvaya upapattyādi liṅgam /*

<sup>211</sup> PaSa 105: *anvayavyatirekābhyām upapādanam samanvayas tasmāt /* See Jīva 2007: 184, fn. 110 for further explanation.

<sup>212</sup> *upakramopasaṃhārāv abhyāso ’pūrvatā phalam / arthavādopapatti ca liṅgam tātparyanirṇaye //*

<sup>213</sup> Although there is a text called *Bṛhatsaṃhitā* by Varāhamihira, the verse in question is not found in that work.

source text.<sup>214</sup> Śaṅkara seems to apply this method in his explanation of ChāU 6 but he does not refer to all six indicative marks by their names. As far as I am aware, the earliest Advaita text that lists these six marks is Sadānanda's *Vedāntasāra*.<sup>215</sup> If this is the case, Madhva may be the first to have put the six indicative marks in a verse, thus listing all the signs to which the later Vedānta authors refer.

The idea of this methodology is that one can prove the thesis (*tātparyā*) of a text if one can find these six signs in the text. The thesis of a text must be found in the beginning and in the conclusion; it should be repeated; it should be something new, which is unknown through any other means; it should point to the benefit or result of reading the text; it should be praised in the text; the reasoning for the thesis must be found in the text. As an example, Baladeva applies this method to ŚveU 4.6–7 and argues that the Upaniṣad proves the distinction between Brahman and the living entity:

Two birds occupy the same tree together as friends. One of the two eats a palatable fig. The other looks at [him] without eating. On the same tree a depressed person helplessly laments, being bewildered. When he sees the other, the Lord who is satisfied, he attains His greatness and his sorrow vanishes.<sup>216</sup>

Baladeva analyzes these verses according to the six indicative signs:

Those six kinds of signs, which are remembered as the signs, which prove the meaning of a text, also show only the duality [of Brahman and the individual self]. For, to explain, in the ŚveU, (1) the beginning is 'two birds', the conclusion is 'the other, the Lord [who is satisfied]'. The (2) repetitions are 'one of the two', 'the

<sup>214</sup> K. S. Murty makes the following statement: 'The Pūrva Mīmāṃsā system has set forth the principles whereby the purport of scripture can be determined. These are known as the six-fold criteria or *ṣaḍlīṅga* [...] The Advaita Vedānta also accepts these criteria as the *pramāṇas* for finding purport' (1974: 81). He does not refer to any Pūrvamīmāṃsā text. Anantanand Rambachan also says this methodology is taken from Pūrvamīmāṃsā. However, the footnote given does not provide any Pūrvamīmāṃsā source but merely refers to Sadānanda's *Vedāntasāra* (1994: 41). J. G. Suthren Hirst says that Śaṅkara adopted the method from the Mīmāṃsakas (2005: 61–62). She cites a verse listing six indicative marks:

*upakramopasaṃhārāv abhyāso 'pūrvatā phalam /  
arthavāḍopapatti ca līṅgaṃ tātparyaniścaye* // (2005: 204, fn. 20)

This verse is identical with the verse quoted by Madhva, Jīva, and Baladeva, except for the last word *niścaye*. Hirst does not refer to any Mīmāṃsā source but refers to van Buitenen (1956) as her source. Van Buitenen writes, 'The "canons of exegesis" of Mīmāṃsā are summed up in the *śloka*' and quotes the above verse without referring to any Mīmāṃsā source text (1956: 200, fn. 134). Following Hirst, Gupta too writes that this method is derived from the Mīmāṃsā school but again does not give any Mīmāṃsā source (Gupta 2007: 93).

<sup>215</sup> *līṅgāni tūpakramopasaṃhārābhyāsāpūrvatāphalārthavāḍopapattyākhyāni* / (Sadānanda 1911: 98).

<sup>216</sup> ŚveU 4.6–7: *dvā suparṇā sayujā sakhāyā samānam vṛkṣaṃ pariṣavajāte /  
taylor anyah pippalaṃ svādv atty anaśnann anyo abhicākaśīti //  
samāne vṛkṣe puruṣo nimagno anīśayā śocati muhyamānaḥ /  
juṣṭam yadā paśyaty anyam īśaṃ asya mahimānam eti vītaśokaḥ //*

other, without eating' and 'the other, the Lord [who is satisfied]'. (3) The novelty is because without scripture we do not understand the difference in relation to the Lord. (4) The result is 'his sorrow vanishes'. (5) The praise is such as 'he attains His [i.e. the Lord's] greatness'. Furthermore, (6) the reasoning is 'the other, without eating'.<sup>217</sup> In this way, in other places also these [signs proving the duality of the Lord and the individual self] are found.<sup>218</sup>

Baladeva's argument is that the ŚveU teaches the difference between Brahman and the living entity since we find the six indicatory marks that state such duality. Coming back to *sūtra* 1.1.4, Baladeva explains the aphorism:

The meaning [of *tat tu samanvayāt*] is as follows. He [Viṣṇu] only is to be known through them [i.e. through the Vedas] because the meaning of the scripture is with regard to Him [Viṣṇu] only, [the meaning of the scriptures which is known] through the six indicatory marks such as the beginning and the conclusion, which are well considered.<sup>219</sup>

Following Madhva's BraSūBhā 1.1.4, Baladeva thus states that the application of the *tātparyalinga* method points to Viṣṇu as the purport of the Vedas. However, he does not explain in what way each indicatory mark speaks about Viṣṇu.

Then Baladeva cites two verses from the BhāPu in which Kṛṣṇa explains that all the three sections of the Vedas (i.e. the *Karmakāṇḍa*, *Devatākāṇḍa*, and *Jñānakāṇḍa*) point to Himself:

What is ordained? What is revealed? After being repeated, what is to be imagined? Thus no one in this world except for Me knows its heart [the heart of the speech of the Vedas].<sup>220</sup>

It ordains Me. It addresses Me. After manifesting [separately], [such separation] is rejected. For it [i.e. the creation] is indeed I.<sup>221</sup>

Baladeva cites these verses since Madhva quotes the same section of the BhāPu in his BraSūBhā 1.1.4. In the SūTī, Baladeva explains these slightly ecliptic verses. The first verse, BhāPu 11.21.42ab, states three questions and the second verse, 43ab, gives three answers. According to the SūTī, the first question 'What is ordained?' means 'What is ordained by the statements of injunction

<sup>217</sup> This is the reasoning used to prove the difference between *Īśvara* and the living entity because this shows that *Īśvara* does not accept *karma*.

<sup>218</sup> GoBhā 1.1.3: 'dvā suparṇā' ity upakramaḥ, 'anyam iśam' ity upasaṃhāraḥ / 'taylor anyah' 'anaśnann anyah' 'anyam iśam' ity abhyāsaḥ / īśvarasambandhibhedasya śāstraṃ vinā aprāpter apūrvatā / 'vītaśoka' ityādi phalam / 'asya mahimānam eti' ityādy arthavādaḥ / 'anyo 'naśnann' ity upapattiś cety evam anyatrāpy etāni mṛgyāni /

<sup>219</sup> GoBhā 1.1.4: suvimṛṣṭair upakramopasaṃhārādibhiḥ ṣaḍbhir liṅgais tatraiva śāstratāt-paryāt sa eva tadvedya ity arthaḥ /

<sup>220</sup> BhāPu 11.21.42: kim vidhatte kim ācaṣṭe kim anūdyā vikalpayet /

ity asyā hṛdayaṃ loke nānyo mad veda kaścana //

<sup>221</sup> BhāPu 11.21.43ab: mām vidhatte 'bhidhatte mām vikalpyāpohyate tv aham /

in the *Karmakāṇḍa* of the Vedas?<sup>222</sup> The answer 'It ordains Me' means 'The *Karmakāṇḍa* section of the Vedas ordains Me as the one whose nature is sacrifice.'<sup>223</sup> The idea is that either Viṣṇu is identical with sacrifice,<sup>224</sup> or Viṣṇu is the ultimate enjoyer to whom sacrifice is performed.<sup>225</sup>

The second question 'What is revealed?' means 'What is revealed by the statements of *mantra* in the *Devatākāṇḍa* of the Vedas?'<sup>226</sup> The answer 'It addresses Me' means 'The *Devatākāṇḍa* of the Vedas addresses Me as having the forms of various gods.'<sup>227</sup> The Vedas praise many gods. However, all the gods merely represent a part of Viṣṇu. Therefore, the praise of gods is indirectly the same as praise of Viṣṇu.<sup>228</sup> At the end of GoBhā 1.1.4 Baladeva explains, 'The worship of gods who are the auxiliaries of Brahman is indeed the worship of Brahman only and its result is nothing but purification of mind.'<sup>229</sup>

The third question 'After being repeated, what is to be imagined?' means 'After being repeated, what is to be imagined separately [from Brahman] by the negation in the *Jñānakāṇḍa* of the Vedas?'<sup>230</sup> The answer 'After imagining Me [to be separate], [such separation] is rejected. For it is indeed I' means:

That which manifests as separate in the creation, originating from *pradhāna*, *mahat* and so on, which again obtains the state of My nature at the dissolution, its separation [from Me] is rejected. The entire universe is nothing but Me since I have such a nature as the possessor of the energies (*śakti*).<sup>231</sup>

The creation originating from *pradhāna* and so on is insentient and therefore taught as existing separately from Brahman, which is both conscious and the possessor of consciousness. Ultimately, however, *pradhāna* is also a part of Brahman because it becomes one with Brahman at the time of dissolution. Baladeva explains Brahman's oneness with the creation in terms of the theory of energy (*śakti*), which is a distinctive teaching of Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇava Vedānta. In quoting BhāPu 11.21.42 and 43 in his commentary, Baladeva exegetically follows Madhva. However, Baladeva's view of the universe as Brahman's

<sup>222</sup> SūTī: *karmakāṇḍe vidhivākyaiḥ kiṃ vidhatte /*

<sup>223</sup> SūTī: *mām yajñarūpaṃ vidhatte /*

<sup>224</sup> Cf. BhaGī 4.24: *brahmārpaṇaṃ brahma havir brahmāgnau brahmaṇā hutam / brahmaiva tena gantavyaṃ brahmakarmasamādhinā //*

<sup>225</sup> Cf. BhaGī 5.29a: *bhoktāraṃ yajñatapasām [...] /*

<sup>226</sup> SūTī: *devatākāṇḍe mantravākyaiḥ kim ācaṣṭe prakāśayati /*

<sup>227</sup> SūTī: *tattaddevatārūpaṃ mām abhidhatte prakāśayati /*

<sup>228</sup> Cf. BhaGī 5.23: *ye 'py anyadevatābhaktā yajante śraddhayānvitāḥ / te 'pi mām eva kaunteya yajanty avidhipūrvakam //*

<sup>229</sup> *brahmāṅgabhūtaadevatārcaṇaṃ khalu brahmārcaṇam eva tatphalaṃ tu cittaśuddhir eveti [...] /*

<sup>230</sup> SūTī: *jñānakaṇḍe pratiśedhāya kim anūdya vikalpayet /*

<sup>231</sup> SūTī: *yaś ca pradhānamahadādiprapañcājatam sarge vikalpya prṛthāñ nirūpya punaḥ pratisarge madrūpatām āpādyā prthagbhāvas tasyāpohyate / tat sarvam aham eva / śaktimato mamaitadrūpatvād iti /*



energy follows Jīva's teaching and deviates from Madhva. In this way Baladeva explains that all parts of the Vedas, that is, the *Karmakāṇḍa*, *Devakāṇḍa*, and *Jñānakāṇḍa* point to the worship of Viṣṇu.

Coming to the end of his commentary on BraSū 1.1.4, Baladeva summarizes his refutation of the Mīmāṃsā view of scripture and restates his own view that the Vedas are all directed toward teaching about Brahman:

Directly and indirectly, the Vedas teach about Brahman. In this regard, we consider that [the Vedas teach about Brahman] directly in the section dealing with knowledge, by explaining the nature and qualities [of Brahman] and that [the Vedas teach about Brahman] indirectly in the section dealing with ritual action by explaining ritual action, which is the auxiliary of knowledge [...]<sup>232</sup>

As in his explanation on BhāPu 11.21.42–43, Baladeva's aim is to explain how the different sections of the Vedas point to Brahman. The section on knowledge teaches about Brahman directly by providing information concerning its nature. The section on ritual performance teaches about Brahman indirectly. How does the *Karmakāṇḍa* section of the Vedas accomplish this? Baladeva's strategy is to subordinate ritual performance (*karma*) to knowledge of Brahman (*jñāna*):

They [i.e. the Vedas] prescribe the ritual acts which have rain, a son, heaven and so on as their results, only to produce the taste [for the Vedas]. There would be desire for Brahman and indifference to the world for a person to whom the taste for them [i.e. for the Vedas] has arisen because of observing rain and so on, who reflects on the meaning of them [i.e. of the Vedas], who discerns eternal and non-eternal entities. Thus it is established that all those [i.e. the Vedas] are intended for Brahman.<sup>233</sup>

First one develops the taste for the Vedas by observing the efficacy of the rituals described in them. Then one goes on to examine the meaning of the Vedas. This brings him to differentiate between what is eternal and what is non-eternal. Finally, this evolution leads to attachment to Brahman and detachment from the world.

Baladeva's commentary on BraSū 1.1.4 follows Madhva closely. His explanation of the term *samanvaya* in relation to the six indicatory marks, and his citation of BhāPu 11.21.42–43 show this. In this case, Baladeva even rejects Jīva's exegesis on the term *samanvaya* to accept Madhva's. However, as in Baladeva's SūTī commentary on BhāPu 11.2.43, he does not deviate from Jīva

<sup>232</sup> GoBhā 1.1.4: *sākṣātparamparābhyāṃ vedā brahmaṇi pravartante / tatra svarūpaḡaṇanir-ūpaṇena jñānakāṇḍe sākṣāt karmakāṇḍe tu jñānāṅgabhūtakarmapratipādanena paramparayeti manyante [...]*

<sup>233</sup> GoBhā 1.1.4: *vṛṣṭiputrasvargādīphalakakarmavidhāyitā tu teṣāṃ rucyutpādanārthaiva / vṛṣṭyādīphaladrṣṭyā teṣv abhijātaruces tadarthān vicārayato nityānityavastuvivekino brahmatrṣṇā jagadvaitrṣṇyaṃ ca syād iti siddhaṃ sarveṣāṃ teṣāṃ brahmapratvatam /*

in terms of his metaphysical perspective. We should also remember that Jīva too accepts Madhva's untraceable verse explaining the six indicatory marks. In addition, Baladeva spells out more clearly than Madhva the idea of subordinating ritual action to knowledge of Brahman.

#### 4.2.6. *Brahmasūtra* 1.1.5

Baladeva's commentary on BraSū 1.1.5 *ikṣater nāśabdam* closely follows Madhva and diverges from Jīva, who follows Śāṅkara and Rāmānuja. According to Śāṅkara, this *sūtra* deals with the Sāṅkhya idea of *pradhāna* as the cause of the universe. He explains that *aśabda* denotes *pradhāna* in the Sāṅkhya system, which is not (the particle *a* in *a-śabda*) known by the scriptures (*śabda*). Therefore, Śāṅkara says, *nāśabdam* means 'This *pradhāna* {*aśabdam*} is not {*na*} the cause of the universe.'<sup>234</sup> The reason for his statement is 'because of seeing {*ikṣater*}'. Śāṅkara points out that, according to ChāU 6.2.3,<sup>235</sup> Brahman 'visualized {*aikṣata*}' before creation. This statement removes the possibility of *pradhāna* being Brahman since *pradhāna* is insentient.<sup>236</sup> Both Rāmānuja and Jīva follow the same line of argument.

Following Madhva, however, Baladeva says that the topic of the fifth *sūtra* is not ontological but epistemological, in that it concerns the knowability of Brahman by the scriptures. In the fourth *sūtra*, it was explained that Brahman is the sole object of knowledge in all sections of the Vedas. The fifth *sūtra*, therefore, rejects the idea that due to Its transcendence Brahman is unknowable even through the Vedas: 'Now, for the sake of attaining [Brahman, which is] the proper object of knowledge [among the Vedas], [...] [Bādarāyaṇa] rejects [the view] that Brahman cannot be expressed by words.'<sup>237</sup> Baladeva quotes the following two Upaniṣadic verses as the object of discussion (*viśaya*) for the fifth *sūtra*:

One who knows the bliss of Brahman is never fearful, [that Brahman] from which the words return with mind, without reaching [Brahman].<sup>238</sup>

That which cannot be expressed by speech and that by which speech is expressed, know that only as Brahman, not this, which they worship.<sup>239</sup>

<sup>234</sup> BraSūBhā (Śa) 1.1.5: *na sāṅkhyaparikalpitam acetanam pradhānam jagataḥ kāraṇam śakyaṃ vedānteṣv āśrayitum / aśabdam hi tat /*

<sup>235</sup> *tadaiṣata bahu syām prajāyeyeti tattejo 'srjata /*

<sup>236</sup> BraSūBhā (Śa) 1.1.5: *katham aśabdatvaṃ, ikṣateḥ ikṣitṛtvaśravaṇāt kāraṇasya /*

<sup>237</sup> GoBhā 1.1.5: *atha [...] samanvayopapattaye brahmaṇo 'vācyatvam nirasyate /*

<sup>238</sup> TaiU 2.4: *yato vāco nivartante aprāpya manasā saha / ānandam brahmaṇo vidvān na bibheti kadācana //*

<sup>239</sup> KeU 1.5: *yad vācānabhyuditam yena vāg abhyudyate tad eva brahma tad viddhi nedam yad idam upāśate /*

Madhva cites these two Upaniṣadic passages in his commentary on the fifth *sūtra*. Since both passages state that words cannot express Brahman, there is a doubt (*saṁśaya*): 'Can Brahman be expressed by speech?'<sup>240</sup>

The *prima facie* view, according to Baladeva, says that Brahman cannot be expressed by speech for three reasons. First, the above-quoted Upaniṣadic passages state the inexpressibility of Brahman. Second, if Brahman were expressible by speech, this would go against the fact that Brahman is self-revealing.<sup>241</sup> Third, the following *Smṛti* passage states that Brahman is inexpressible: 'I and these other gods bow down to that Lord from whom words return with mind, without reaching [Him].'<sup>242</sup>

Baladeva rejects this view, commenting on the *sūtra* as follows: 'That in relation to which speech is not expressive is *aśabda*. Brahman is not {*na*} such. Rather, It [Brahman] can be expressed by speech. Why? Because of observing {*ikṣater*}'.<sup>243</sup> Whereas Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, and Jīva interpret *aśabda* to mean *prakṛti*, Baladeva interprets the term as that which is not expressible by speech. Brahman is not such an entity. Baladeva elaborates: 'Because of observing {*ikṣater*}' means since we observe in the Upaniṣads that Brahman is defined as 'that which is known through the Upaniṣads (*aupaniṣada*)'.<sup>244</sup> This interpretation of *ikṣater* is taken from Madhva.<sup>245</sup> Two texts Baladeva refers to are BrĀU 3.9.26, 'I inquire about that person taught in the Upaniṣads',<sup>246</sup> and KaU 2.15a, 'Whose stride all the Vedas celebrate.'<sup>247</sup> Madhva also quotes the passage from the KaU.

Using an analogy, Baladeva then explains why Brahman is said to be inexpressible: '[Brahman] is inexpressible however, because [It] cannot be expressed entirely. Although the mount Meru is seen, it is said to be unseen because it is not seen in its entirety.'<sup>248</sup> Brahman is expressible because the Upaniṣads say that It is known through them. At the same time It is inexpressible in the sense that even the scriptures cannot describe It fully, as in the case of seeing Mount Meru. This analogy is taken from an anonymous verse cited by Madhva: 'We cannot know, speak or reason that It [i.e. Brahman] is

<sup>240</sup> GoBhā 1.1.5: *aśabdam śabdavācyaṃ vā brahmeti?*

<sup>241</sup> GoBhā 1.1.5: *śrūtiśvārāsyād aśabdam tat anyathā svaprakāśatāhānāt [ . . . ] /*

<sup>242</sup> BhāPu 3.6.40: *yato 'pṛāpya nīvartante vācaś ca manasā saha /*

*aham cānya ime devās tasmai bhagavate namaḥ //*

<sup>243</sup> GoBhā 1.1.5: *nāsti śabda vācako yasmin tad aśabdam / idṛṣaṃ brahma na bhavati / kintu śabdavācyaṃ eva tat / kutaḥ? ikṣateḥ /*

<sup>244</sup> GoBhā 1.1.5: *praṣṭavyasya puruṣasya aupaniṣadasam ākhyādarśanād ity arthaḥ /*

<sup>245</sup> BraSūBhā 1.1.5 (Ma): *aupaniṣadatvān nāvacanenekṣaṇam //*

<sup>246</sup> *tat tv aupaniṣadam puruṣaṃ pṛcchāmi /*

<sup>247</sup> *sarve vedā yatpadam āmananti [ . . . ] /*

<sup>248</sup> GoBhā 1.1.5: *aśabdam tu kārtsnyenāśabditatvāt / dṛṣṭo 'pi meruḥ kārtsnyenādarśanād adṛṣṭaḥ kathyate /*

such. Wise people, while seeing Meru's form, do not see [the form entirely].<sup>249</sup> Madhva further cites another verse attributed to the GaPu:

It [i.e. Brahman] is inexpressible, un-inferable, and unknowable because [we] fail [to express, infer, or know It fully]. [At the same time Brahman is] expressible, inferable, and knowable because of the statements in all the scriptures. The supreme [Brahman] is remembered in this way.<sup>250</sup>

This verse is untraceable in the *Purāṇa* (Mesquita 2008: 167). Baladeva's analogy of Mount Meru follows these passages closely. Since Jīva cites these two verses in his BhaSa *Anuccheda* 116, this is another instance in which Baladeva accepts Madhva's untraceable verses when Jīva accepts them.

Baladeva says that Brahman must be at least partially expressible by words since 'otherwise statements like "That from which (the words return with mind)" "without (obtaining)" "(That which) cannot be expressed (by speech)" "(Know) that only as Brahman" would be contradicted'.<sup>251</sup> Brahman is expressible since these Upaniṣadic statements cited earlier (i.e. TaiU 2.4, KeU 1.5) do describe Brahman, at least partially. In the Sūṭī Baladeva gives a further explanation on these verses:

When it is said 'Devadatta returned from Kāśī', we understand that he returned only after reaching Kāśī. Thus when it is said [in TaiU 2.4] '(that Brahman) from which the words return', we understand that the words return only after having had some access [to Brahman]. In the same manner, if it is said [in TaiU 2.4] 'without obtaining [Brahman]', in relation to this [statement] we recognize the meaning that [the words] do not describe [Brahman] thoroughly [but] partially. [When it is said in KeU 1.5] '(That which) cannot be expressed (by speech)', the exact meaning is that [Brahman] is not spoken of entirely but spoken of to some extent.<sup>252</sup>

The Devadatta analogy appears to be Baladeva's original. Baladeva ends his explanation of the Upaniṣadic passages by citing the BhāPu:

O Best of the Kurus, these are the stories of the pastimes of Nārāyaṇa, the creator of the universe, who is the abode of all beings. They are told in summary. Even Brahmā is not able to describe [them] fully.<sup>253</sup>

<sup>249</sup> BraSūBhā (Ma) 1.1.5: *na tad idṛg iti jñeyam na vācyaṃ na a tarkyate / paśyanto 'pi na paśyanti mero rūpaṃ vipaścitaḥ // itivat //*

<sup>250</sup> BraSūBhā (Ma) 1.1.5: *aprasiddher avācyaṃ tad vācyaṃ sarvāgamoktitaḥ / atarkyaṃ tarkyaṃ ajñeyam jñeyam evaṃ paraṃ smṛtam // itigāruḍe //*

<sup>251</sup> GoBhā 1.1.5: *anyathā 'yata' iti, 'aprāpya' iti, 'anabhyuditam' iti 'tad eva brahma' iti ca vyākūpyet /*

<sup>252</sup> Sūṭī 1.1.5: *devadattaḥ kāśyā nivṛtta ityukte kāśīm sprṣṭvaiva nivṛtta ity adhigamyate / evaṃ 'yato vāco nivartante' ityukte kathañcid gocarāṃ kṛtvaiva nivartante ity adhigamyate; evaṃ 'aprāpya' ity atra prakarṣeṇa na, kathañcil labdhvety arthaḥ pratiyate / 'anabhyuditam' abhito noditaṃ kiyaḍ uditam evety arthaḥ //*

<sup>253</sup> BhāPu 12.4.39: *etāḥ kuruśreṣṭha jagadvidhātur nārāyaṇasyākḥilasattvadhāmnaḥ / līlākathāḥ te kathitāḥ samāsataḥ kārtsnyena nājo 'py abhidhātum īśaḥ //*  
BhāBho: *etā ity / līlāviśayāḥ kathā ajo brahmā 'pi kārtsnyenābhidhātum neśaḥ //*

Baladeva's conclusion is that when Brahman is said to be inexpressible, this does not mean that nothing can be expressed about Brahman. It means Brahman cannot be expressed in Its entirety. It is valid to say that Brahman is expressed to some extent. Baladeva therefore rejects Śaṅkara's concept of Brahman without qualities, which cannot be known in any way.<sup>254</sup>

As for the objection that if Brahman were expressible by words, this would go against the fact that Brahman is self-revealing (*svaprakāśatā*), Baladeva's reply is: 'To reveal [Brahman] through the Vedas, which are Brahman's own self, is not contradicted with the fact that [Brahman] is self-revealing.'<sup>255</sup> Baladeva here describes the Vedas as Brahman's own self (*svātmā*). Since the Vedas are the self of Brahman, that the Vedas reveal Brahman does not go against Brahman's self-revealing nature. Later, in GoBhā 1.3.30, Baladeva explains that at the time of dissolution, the Vedas become one with Brahman, that possesses energies.<sup>256</sup> Although Baladeva does not clearly state it, the implication seems to be that the Vedas are the self of Brahman since they are Brahman's energy. If this is the case, Baladeva again follows the Gauḍīya doctrine of energy, rejecting Madhva's ontology. According to Madhva, the Vedas are eternally distinct from Brahman since they are insentient (*acetana*) (Sarma 2003: 59).

As in his commentary on the fourth *sūtra*, Baladeva exegetically follows Madhva in GoBhā 1.1.5. As a result, his interpretation of the fifth *sūtra* differs from that of Jīva, who follows Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja. Whereas Jīva discusses the topic of *pradhāna*, Baladeva discusses the expressibility of Brahman. Baladeva argues that Brahman is knowable at least partially. Thus he rejects Śaṅkara's idea of a quality-less Brahman. Although Baladeva does not follow Jīva exegetically in his discussion on the fifth *sūtra*, it must be pointed out that nothing he discusses concerning the *sūtra* goes against Jīva's theology. As previously noted, Baladeva is in complete agreement with Jīva concerning the rejection of a quality-less Brahman. Besides, the identity of the Vedas with Brahman seems to follow the Gauḍīya theory of energy (*śakti*), going against Madhva's ontological view. It is thus important to recognize that following someone exegetically does not automatically indicate following his theology.

<sup>254</sup> Cf. Śaṅkara's commentary on BrĀU 2.3.6: *yasmin na kaścīd viśeṣo 'sti nāma vā rūpaṃ vā karma vā bhedo vā jātir vā guṇo vā / taddvāreṇa hi śabdapravṛttir bhavati / na caiṣāṃ kaścīd viśeṣo brahmaṇy asti / ato na nirdeṣṭuṃ śakyate idaṃ taditi /*

<sup>255</sup> GoBhā 1.1.5: *svātmānā vedena jñāpanaṃ khalu svaprakāśatayā na viruddhyate /*

<sup>256</sup> GoBhā 1.3.30: *mahāpralaye vedās tad vācyās tattadākṛtayaś ca nityāḥ padārthāḥ saśaktike śrīharāv ekibhāvam āpannās tiṣṭhanti /*

### 4.2.7. Conclusion

It is crucial to examine Baladeva's theology and exegesis separately. As far as his commentary on the first five *sūtras* is concerned, Baladeva is always faithful to Jīva's theology. Where Jīva differs theologically from Madhva, Baladeva follows Jīva and rejects Madhva. However, in his exegesis he sometimes rejects Jīva and follows Madhva.

Baladeva's theological faithfulness to Jīva is found in the following points: Baladeva explains the principle of *advaya* and identifies the living entity and *prakṛti* as Brahman's energies (Preamble); he emphasizes the significance of the BhāPu (Preamble); his view on the cause of liberation and bondage of the living beings (Preamble); the importance of association with saintly persons (GoBhā 1.1.1); he accepts Brahman as the material cause of the universe (GoBhā 1.1.2); he explains that the universe is one with Viṣṇu since it is His energy (GoBhā 1.1.4); he accepts the oneness of Brahman and the Vedas (GoBhā 1.1.5). These are the teachings which exclusively belong to Jīva  $\{(J) - (J \wedge M)\}$ .

Exegetically, however, we observe Madhva's clear influence on Baladeva. Throughout Baladeva's commentary on the first five *sūtras*, one such element is his acceptance of Madhva's untraceable quotes. Even here, however, Baladeva's faithfulness to Jīva can be recognized. Baladeva quotes Madhva's untraceable quotes only when Jīva also quotes them. Therefore, these untraceable quotes cited by Baladeva belong to the second area in the chart in chapter four, section two which is an overlapping point between Jīva's and Madhva's theologies  $(J \wedge M)$ . Below is a list of the untraceable quotes Baladeva cites in his GoBhā 1.1.1–5. The chart also identifies where these quotes are cited in the works of Madhva and Jīva:

Content (Attribution)	Baladeva	Madhva	Jīva
The origin of the BraSū (SkaPu)	Preamble	BraSūBhā 1.1.1	TaSa <i>Anuccheda</i> 16
The significance of the BhāPu (GaPu)	Preamble	BhāTāNi 1.1.1	TaSa <i>Anuccheda</i> 21
The futility of inference (KūPu)	GoBhā 1.1.3	BraSūBhā 1.1.3	SaSa
The six indicatory marks (anonymous)	GoBhā 1.1.3 GoBhā 1.1.4	BraSūBhā 1.1.4	PaSa <i>Anuccheda</i> 105
The analogy of Mount Meru (anonymous)	GoBhā 1.1.5	BraSūBhā 1.1.5	BhaSa <i>Anuccheda</i> 116
Brahman is both expressible and inexpressible (GaPu)	GoBhā 1.1.5	BraSūBhā 1.1.5	BhaSa <i>Anuccheda</i> 116

Exegetically, Madhva's influence on Baladeva is seen in his rejection of the *tatpuruṣa* compound analysis of the term *śāstrayoni* in the third *sūtra* and his commentary on the last two *sūtras*. In relation to the fourth *sūtra* Baladeva explains the term *samanvaya* in terms of the six indicatory marks (*tātparyaliṅga*) as discussed by Madhva. In relation to the fifth *sūtra*, following Madhva Baladeva explains the term *aśabdām* in terms of inexpressibility of Brahman, the term *ikṣater* in terms of Its expressibility.

In his commentary on the first three *sūtras*, however, further exegetical influence from Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, and Jīva can be observed. Baladeva follows them in his acceptance of their interpretation of *atha* as posteriority, and rejects Madhva's interpretation of the term as auspiciousness. Baladeva's interpretation of the word *janmādi* in the second *sūtra* also follows Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, and Jīva, who interpret the term as 'the origination, maintenance, and destruction (of the universe)'. Madhva interprets the term as referring to the eight activities of Hari, namely, creation, maintenance, destruction, control, knowledge, ignorance, bondage, and liberation. Baladeva's interpretation of *yatas* in the second *sūtra* follows Jīva and Rāmānuja's acceptance of Brahman as the material cause of the universe, which goes against Madhva's ontology. Baladeva's etymological discussion on the word Brahman in GoBhā 1.1.2 again follows Jīva, who follows Rāmānuja. Baladeva's refutation of the Mīmāṃsā view in his commentary on the third *sūtra* is taken from Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja.

Apart from these specific points, Baladeva follows Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, Madhva, and Jīva in his refutation of the Mīmāṃsakas and Naiyāyikas. In his refutation of Advaita Vedānta, Baladeva follows Rāmānuja, Madhva, and Jīva. As a late Vedāntic author, Baladeva's GoBhā is highly eclectic. Not only is Baladeva familiar with the theological differences among various schools but he is also well acquainted with the arguments and exegetical techniques each school employs to defend its own tradition. Furthermore, Baladeva is able to use these arguments and techniques in the service of Gauḍīya theology. In this sense, therefore, Baladeva's GoBhā can be seen as an attempt to translate Jīva's *Bhāgavata* theology into a full-fledged Vedāntic discourse.

#### 4.3. BALADEVA ON PRAKṚTI

In the previous two sections, 4.1 and 4.2, our study of Baladeva's commentary on the opening verse of the GoBhā and on the first five *sūtras* showed Baladeva's theological faithfulness to Jīva. In the rest of the chapter, Baladeva's theological stance in relation to Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, Madhva, and Jīva will be examined thematically. In this section, Baladeva's view on *prakṛti* will be compared with the views of his predecessors. This will be done by comparing the commentaries of Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, Madhva, and Baladeva on the

section of *prakṛti*, that is, BraSū 1.4.23–27. In this section I continue to argue that Baladeva's theology ultimately follows Jīva's. Baladeva is happy to accept and use the points made by Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, and Madhva if they are in accordance with Jīva's theology. However, if Jīva's theology differs from other three commentators, Baladeva accepts Jīva's teaching and rejects those of the others.

Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, Jīva, and Baladeva claim that Brahman is both the efficient cause (*nimittakāraṇa*) as well as the material cause (*upādānakāraṇa*) of the universe. However, as pointed out earlier, Madhva claims that Brahman is the efficient cause only and not the material cause.<sup>257</sup> Thus, Madhva takes a distinct view of Brahman on this point. There are also differences among those who accept Brahman as the material cause. According to Śaṅkara, the transformation of Brahman is only apparent, not real. According to Rāmānuja, the universe, which constitutes the body (*śarīra*) of Brahman (*śarīrin*), goes through a real transformation (*pariṇāma*). According to Baladeva the transformation of the universe is real also, but the universe is seen as an energy of Brahman (*śaktipariṇāma*). This theory is in accordance with Jīva's view as shown in the third chapter.<sup>258</sup>

The five *sūtras* on *prakṛti*, that is, BraSū 1.4.23–27, are listed as follows:

1.4.23: *prakṛtiś ca pratijñādrṣṭāntānuparodhāt //*

1.4.24: *abhidhyopadeśāc ca //*

1.4.25: *sākṣāc cobhayāmnānāt //*

1.4.26: *ātmakṛteḥ pariṇāmāt //*

1.4.27: *yoniś ca hi gīyate //*

Madhva and Baladeva read *ātmakṛteḥ pariṇāmāt //* as one *sūtra*, following Śaṅkara. Rāmānuja, however, reads it as two *sūtras*, counting *ātmakṛteḥ //* as *sūtra* 1.4.26, and *pariṇāmāt //* as 1.4.27.

#### 4.3.1. *Brahmasūtras* 1.4.23–25

In this section on *prakṛti*, Baladeva does not follow Madhva at all. According to Madhva, the topic in this section is the principle of *samanvaya*, that is, how all the words in the Upaniṣads ultimately denote only Brahman. Madhva discusses how the feminine terms such as *prakṛti* in *sūtra* 1.4.23 and *yoni* in 1.4.27 can denote Brahman.<sup>259</sup> Unlike Madhva, however, Baladeva discusses

<sup>257</sup> See Chapter 4, section 1.2.

<sup>258</sup> See Chapter 3, section 4.

<sup>259</sup> In fact, even Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja see that the first *adhyāya* as a whole is about the principle of *samanvaya*. In this sense, Madhva is more faithfully adhering to the principle of *samanvaya* than his predecessors (Ghate 1960: 67–68, Sharma 1986b: 306).



the causality of the universe, following Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja. Of these two, Baladeva follows Rāmānuja more closely in terms of his discussions and the citations. However, Baladeva at times diverges even from Rāmānuja when he asserts doctrines unique to Jīva's theology.

Commenting on *sūtra* 1.4.23, Baladeva says that in this section Bādarāyaṇa sets aside the theistic Sāṅkhya view and establishes that Brahman is both the material and the efficient cause of the universe.<sup>260</sup> This interpretation is exactly the same as Rāmānuja's. After quoting Upaniṣadic passages,<sup>261</sup> Baladeva raises the same question as Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja do: whether Brahman is the efficient cause only or is both the efficient and the material cause of the universe.<sup>262</sup>

The *prima facie* view argues that Brahman is the efficient cause only. Śaṅkara offers three arguments that support the opponent's view. Like Rāmānuja, Baladeva discusses only the first one: the Upaniṣads say that a thought or an envisioning (*īkṣā*) precedes creation, which is possible only with regard to the efficient cause. Furthermore, since in the world we observe that the efficient cause and the material cause are different, we should not argue that something is both the efficient and the material cause simultaneously. For the scriptural evidence Baladeva cites ChāU 6.2.3 and AiU 1.1, whereas Śaṅkara cites PraU 6.3–4. Then Baladeva quotes the CūU in his *prima facie* view, following Rāmānuja. Baladeva also quotes the *Smṛti* passages: ViPu 1.2.30,<sup>263</sup> 1.4.51,<sup>264</sup> and 2.7.37.<sup>265</sup> These *Smṛti* passages are not cited in the commentaries of Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, or Madhva.

As for the conclusive view (*siddhānta*), Baladeva, like Rāmānuja, follows Śaṅkara. According to Baladeva, the *sūtra* means '[Brahman is] the material cause as well {*prakṛtiś ca*} since there is no contradiction {*anuparodhāt*} with the propositions {*pratijñā*} and the examples {*dṛṣṭānta*} [given in the *Śrutis*].' Baladeva cites ChāU 6.1.3 as a proposition and ChāU 6.1.4 as an example. The former says,

<sup>260</sup> GoBhā 1.4.23: *evaṃ nirīṣvaram pradhānavādaṃ nirasya seṣvaram tam idānīm nirasyan viśvakāraṇatāvādivākyāni parasmīn brahmaṇi pravartayati /*

<sup>261</sup> TaiU 2.1, 3.1, ChāU 6.2.1, 6.2.3, AiU 1.1.

<sup>262</sup> GoBhā 1.4.23: *kim eṣu nimittam eva brahma mantavyaṃ kiṃ vā nimittopādānarūpaṃ tad iti [ . . . ] /*

<sup>263</sup> *yathā sannidhimātreṇa gandhaḥ kṣobhāya jāyate / manaso nopakartrtvāt tathāsau paramēśvaraḥ //*

'Just like an odor causes agitation in a mind only by its proximity, in the same manner the Supreme Lord does not directly undertake [the creation].'

<sup>264</sup> *nimittamātram evāsau sṛṣṭānāṃ sargakarmaṇi / pradhānakāraṇibhūtā yato vai sṛjyaśaktayaḥ //*

'He is the efficient cause only for the created objects in the act of creation. Therefore the powers of creation reside in the cause which is *pradhāna*.'

<sup>265</sup> *sannidhānād yathākāśakālādyāḥ kāraṇaṃ taroḥ / tathaivāpariṇāmena viśvasya bhagavān hariḥ //*

'Just like space and time and so on, only by their proximity, become the cause of a tree, in the same manner Lord Hari becomes the cause of the universe without being transformed.'

O Śvetaketu, gentle one, thinking highly of your learning, you have become arrogant and proud. [But] did you ask for the teaching by which what is unheard becomes heard, what is unperceived become perceived, and what is unknown becomes known?<sup>266</sup>

The latter says, 'Just like, O gentle one, knowing a lump of clay, everything created by clay is known.'<sup>267</sup>

In this context, 'proposition' refers to an assertion that everything becomes known by knowing Brahman. 'Example' shows that we understand material effects by knowing their material cause. Following Śaṅkara, Baladeva says that in order for such a proposition and an example to be true, Brahman must be not only the efficient cause but also the material cause of the universe since we understand the material effects by knowing the material cause, not by knowing the efficient cause.<sup>268</sup>

In GoBhā 1.4.24, following Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja, Baladeva quotes TaiU 2.6 as scriptural evidence that Brahman is the material cause.<sup>269</sup> GoBhā 1.4.25 follows Rāmānuja, who quotes TaiBrā 2.8.9.<sup>270</sup> Commenting on the TaiBrā passage, Baladeva says that Brahman is both the efficient and the material cause.<sup>271</sup>

#### 4.3.2. *Brahmasūtras* 1.4.26–27

GoBhā 1.4.26 is where Baladeva's unique contribution can be found. He develops the theory of transformation of energy (*śaktipariṇāma-vāda*), which follows Jīva's theology.<sup>272</sup> As in ŚrīBhā 1.4.26, Baladeva argues that TaiU 2.5 'He desired' proves that Brahman is the efficient cause, and TaiU 2.7 'Then It

<sup>266</sup> ChāU 6.1.3: *śvetaketu yan nu saumyedaṃ mahāmanā anūcānamānī stabdho 'sy uta tam ādeśam aprākṣīr yenāśrutaṃ śrutaṃ bhavaty amataṃ matam avijñātaṃ vijñātaṃ /*

<sup>267</sup> ChāU 6.1.4: *yathā saumyaikena mṛtpiṇḍena sarvaṃ mṛnmayaṃ vijñātaṃ syāt /*

<sup>268</sup> GoBhā 1.4.23: *upādānavijñānāt kāryavijñānaviśayas tatraiva śrutāḥ / sa ca nimittamā-tratābhyupagame na sambhavet /*

<sup>269</sup> *so 'kāmayata bahu syāṃ prajāyeyeti, sa tapo 'tapyata tapas taptvā idaṃ sarvaṃ asṛjat / yad idaṃ kiñcana tat sṛṣṭvā tad evānuprāviśat / tad anupraviśya sac ca tyac cābhavat /* 'He desired "Let me become many. Let me create." Then He performed austerity. Having performed austerity, He created this entire universe. Having created whatever exists in the universe, to the very universe He entered. Having entered the universe, He became both the conscious and the unconscious entities.'

<sup>270</sup> *kim svid vanaṃ ka u sa vṛkṣa āsīt yato dyāvāprthivī niṣṭataḥ / manīṣiṇo manasā prcchatait yad adhyatiṣṭhad bhuvanāni dhārayan // brahma vanaṃ brahma sa vṛkṣa āsīt yato dyāvāprthivī niṣṭataḥ / manīṣiṇo manasā prabravimi vo brahmādhyaṭiṣṭhat bhuvanāni dhārayan //*

'What was the forest? What was that tree from which they created [both] the heaven and the earth? O wise men, ask in [your] mind that which presides over, bearing the worlds. Brahman is the forest and Brahman is that tree, from which they produced the heaven and the earth. O wise men, I say to you, with [Its] mind Brahman presides over, bearing the worlds.'

<sup>271</sup> *tad evobhayaṛūpam iti //*

<sup>272</sup> See Chapter three, section four.

Itself created Itself' proves that Brahman is the material cause.<sup>273</sup> To this the opponent asks: 'Surely, how is it that [Brahman] which is one only, which was established earlier, which remains as the agent [of creation], is being operated [as the object of creation as well]?'<sup>274</sup>

As in the case of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja, anyone who argues that Brahman is both the material and the efficient cause has to face two questions: First, how can one entity be the efficient and the material cause simultaneously when in the world we always observe that they are distinct? For example, when creating a pot, a potter is the efficient cause, clay the material cause, and the two are distinct. Second, how can Brahman, which is unchangeable and pure, be the material cause of the universe, which is changeable and impure?

According to Baladeva, Bādarāyaṇa answers these questions by the word *pariṇāmāt* in BraSū 1.4.26. Baladeva gives the following gloss: 'Since there is a particular transformation {*pariṇāma*} that does not contradict with the fact that [Brahman] is unchangeable and so on, it is not contradictory that It [i.e. Brahman] is so [i.e. goes through transformation].'<sup>275</sup> Brahman can be the material cause of the universe and still remain unchangeable, pure and so on, on account of the particular transformation (*pariṇāmaviśeṣa*) It goes through. This 'particular transformation' is what we may call the theory of the transformation of energy (*śaktipariṇāmavāda*). In short, Baladeva argues that Brahman's energy is the material cause, while Brahman Itself remains the efficient cause. Since the imperfections of the material world adhere to Brahman's energy but not to Brahman Itself, Brahman can be both causes without losing Its perfection.

Baladeva first cites ŚveU 6.8c, 6.16c, and ViPu 6.7.61 to argue that Brahman has three energies:

Brahman has three energies since it is said in a *Śruti* text: 'The *Śrutis* say that His supreme energy is indeed variegated', '[Brahman] is the Lord of *pradhāna* and of the knower of the field, and is the Lord of the qualities.' And a *Smṛti* text says, 'Viṣṇu's energy is said to be the highest [*parāśakti*]. And [the energy] called the knower of the field [*kṣetrajñāśakti*] is inferior. [And the energy] which is called 'the one whose effect is ignorance' is acknowledged as the third energy.'<sup>276</sup>

<sup>273</sup> GoBhā 1.4.26: 'so 'kāmayata' (TaiU 2.5) iti sṛṣṭikāmatvena prakṛtaḥ paramātmaiva 'tad ātmānam svayam akuruta' (TaiU 2.7) iti sṛṣṭeḥ kartṛbhūtaḥ karmabhūtaś ca śrūyate, atas tasyaiva tadubhayarūpatvam /

<sup>274</sup> GoBhā 1.4.26: nanu katham ekasyaiva pūrvasiddhasya kartṛtayā sthitasya kriyāmānatvam?

<sup>275</sup> GoBhā 1.4.26: kṛtasthatvāyavirodhipariṇāmaviśeṣasambhavad aviruddhaṁ tasya tat /

<sup>276</sup> GoBhā 1.4.26: 'parāśya śaktir vividhaiva śrūyate' (ŚveU 6.8c), 'pradhānakṣetrajñāpatir guṇeśa' (ŚveU 6.16c) itīśrutes trīśakti brahma / 'viṣṇuśaktiḥ parā proktā kṣetrajñākyā tathāparā / avidyā- karmasaṁjñānyā tṛtīyā śaktir iṣyate //' (ViPu 6.7.61) itismṛteś ca / ŚveU 6.8: na tasya kāryaṁ karaṇaṁ ca vidyate na tatsamaś cābhyadhikaś ca dṛśyate / parāśya śaktir vividhaiva śrūyate svābhāviki jñānabalakriyā ca // ŚveU 6.16: sa viśvakṛd viśvavid ātmanyonir jñāḥ kālākālo guṇī sarvavidyaḥ / pradhānakṣetrajñāpatir guṇeśaḥ saṁsāramokṣasthitibandhahehutuḥ //

The first passage from the ŚveU establishes that Brahman has various types of energies. The second passage, also from the ŚveU, confirms that Brahman is the controller of the knower of the field, that is, the living entity, and the controller of *pradhāna*. The third passage from the ViPu identifies the knower of the field, and *pradhāna* as Brahman's energies. Baladeva declares that Brahman as the possessor of the highest energy (*parāśakti*) is the efficient cause, and Brahman as *kṣetrajñāśakti* and *avidyākarmāśakti* is the material cause:

It is taught that Brahman is the efficient cause as well as the material cause. In this regard, the first is because [It is] the possessor of the energy called the highest. But the second is because of two energies which are other than that [i.e. other than the highest energy].<sup>277</sup>

The two energies other than the highest energy refer to *kṣetrajñāśakti* and *avidyākarmāśakti*. According to Baladeva, Brahman is the material cause in the sense that these two energies of Brahman evolve into the living entity and the universe. The fact that Brahman's energies are the material cause, however, does not contradict Its perfection. Baladeva employs a certain logic (*nyāya*) to justify his position: '[This is so] on account of the logic that prescription and prohibition, which have specific qualities, [always] reside in an attribute.'<sup>278</sup> Baladeva elaborates this point in the Sūṭī:

When an object is characterized, that which is prescription and prohibition indeed amounts to an attribute/specification. This is the meaning. Just as when it is said that 'a person is white', the whiteness of the person described is recognized as residing in a specific body.<sup>279</sup>

When it is said 'The person is white', the whiteness of the person is residing in his body but not in his self (*ātman*). In the same way, when it is said 'Brahman is the material cause of the universe', this attribute of Brahman, namely, the state of being the material cause (*pradhānatva*), resides in the energy of Brahman but not in Brahman Itself.<sup>280</sup> Therefore, the characteristics of being changeable, imperfect, and so on reside in Brahman's energy but they do not touch Brahman Itself.

<sup>277</sup> GoBhā 1.4.26: *tasya nimittatvam upādānatvam cābhidhiyate / tatrādyam parākhyāśakti-mad- rūpeṇa, dvitīyam tu tadanyaśaktidvayadvāraiva /*

<sup>278</sup> GoBhā 1.4.26: *saviśeṣaṇe vidhiniṣedhau viśeṣaṇam upasaṅkrāmata itinyāyāt /*

<sup>279</sup> Sūṭī 1.4.26: *viśiṣṭe vastuni yo vidhir niṣedhaś ca sa khalu viśeṣaṇaparyavasāyīty arthaḥ / yathā gaurah pumān ity atra gauratvam puṁso vihitaṁ tat khalu viśeṣaṇadehaparyavasāyīpratītam /*

<sup>280</sup> Cf. GoBhāA: *gaura puruṣa kahane se jis prakāra gauratva viśiṣṭa puruṣa kā gauratva vidhāna aur agauratva kā niṣiddha hotā hai evaṁ yah gauratva jis prakāra puruṣa kā viśeṣaṇa bhūta hokar śarīra meṁ pariavasita hotā hai tḥik usī nyāyānusāra brahma kā upādānatva śaktimadbhrama kī śakti meṁ hī pariavasita hokar rahatā hai /*

Baladeva's explanation comes very close to that of Rāmānuja. Rāmānuja explains the relationship between Brahman, the living entity, and the material world in terms of the body-soul analogy. In his commentary on BraSū 1.4.27, which he takes to be *pariṇāmāt* /, Rāmānuja says that the nature of Brahman's evolution (*pariṇāma*) is such that the impurities (*doṣa*) of the living entity and the world do not afflict Brahman even though Brahman is the material cause, and has as Its body the living entity and matter.

According to Rāmānuja, the living entity and matter become so subtle at the time of dissolution (*pralaya*) that the two cannot be distinguished from Brahman. This is why they are said to be one with Brahman. At the time of creation, however, the living entity and matter, which were in the subtle state, manifest themselves and become distinct.<sup>281</sup> In the manifested state, furthermore, the experience of suffering (*apuruṣārtha*) is limited to the living entities, and change (*vikāra*) is limited to matter. Thus, these imperfections, according to Rāmānuja, do not touch Brahman:

In regard to this transformation in the form of the world, which consists of the combination of the Supreme Self, the intelligent (individual soul) and the non-intelligent (matter), all the wrong aims of life appertain undoubtedly unto the intelligent part of the body of the Supreme Self and all the substantial modifications belong to the non-intelligent part similarly circumstances. For the Supreme Self, to be the (produced) effect is to be the Self as the controller of those two parts existing in that condition (of effect). The Supreme Self, however, who owing to His being the controller of those two parts which form His body, constitutes their Self, is not touched by the wrong aims of life associated therewith as well as by the modifications (relating thereto). (Rāmānuja 1964: 237)<sup>282</sup>

Brahman is the material cause in the sense that It has as Its body the living entity and matter. It transforms Itself in the sense that Its body become manifest and distinct. However, Brahman as the controller (*niyantr*) of the living entity and of matter is always aloof from imperfections and modifications that pertain to Its body.

Baladeva is certainly aware of Rāmānuja's analogy when he uses the above example of whiteness residing in the body of a person. The difference, however, is that Baladeva identifies the living entity and the world as Brahman's energies. This theory of energy (*śakti*) is in accordance with Jīva's

<sup>281</sup> *svasmād vibhāgyavapadeśānarhatayā paramātmanāikibhūtātāntasūksmacidacidvastu-śarīrād ekasmād evādvitīyāt niratiśayānandāt sarvajñāt satyasaṅkalpād brahmaṇo nāmarūpa-vibhāgarhasthūlacidacidvastuśarīratayā bahubhavanasaṅkalpapūrvako jagadākāreṇa pariṇāmaḥ śrūyate [ . . . ] /*

<sup>282</sup> *paramātmacidacitsaṃghātārūpajagadākārapariṇāme paramātmaśarīrabhūtacidamśagatāḥ sarva evāpuruṣārthāḥ, tathābhūtācidamśagatāś ca sarve vikārāḥ, paramātmani kāryatvam, tadavasthayos tayoṛ niyantrtvenātmatvam, paramātmā tu tayoḥ svaśarīrabhūtayoṛ niyantr-tayātmabhūtaḥ tadgatāpuruṣārthair vikāraiś ca na sprśyate [ . . . ] /*

teaching, as seen in his BhaSa *Anuccheda* 16.<sup>283</sup> Therein Jīva cites ViPu 6.7.61, and discusses *kṣetrajñāśakti* and *avidyākarmaśakti* in relation to the living entity and *prakṛti*.

After citing ŚveU 4.1a, which says: 'He who is one only without colour [becomes] many on account of [His] association with [His] energies',<sup>284</sup> Baladeva concludes his explanation of this particular theory of transformation:

And in this way, it is established that [Brahman], who is one only, is both [the efficient and the material cause] of it [i.e. of the universe], by saying that the efficient cause is unchangeable but the material cause goes through transformation, and that the one whose nature is subtle is the agent, and the one whose nature is gross is the object.<sup>285</sup>

Baladeva answers one of the two questions: How can Brahman go through transformation while at the same time being unchangeable? He argues that this is possible since Brahman as the efficient cause is unchangeable, while Brahman as the material cause goes through transformation. Baladeva elaborates this point in the Sūṭi:

We should understand that Brahman, possessing the highest [energy i.e. *parāśakti*] is the efficient cause [of the universe], which is the agent, in which *prakṛti* called *tamas* has the quality of being unmanifest and [*prakṛti*] called the living entity has contracted consciousness.<sup>286</sup> On the other hand, we should understand such two portions of It [i.e. of Brahman] to be the material cause [of the universe].<sup>287</sup> It is Brahman in which *prakṛti*, beginning with *pradhāna*, has the quality of being manifest,<sup>288</sup> and [*prakṛti*] called the living entity has the quality of being illuminated.<sup>289</sup>

Baladeva answers the other of the two questions: How can Brahman be the efficient cause and the material cause simultaneously? His answer is that Brahman as the possessor of the highest energy (*parāśakti*) is the efficient cause, while *prakṛti* called *tamas* and *prakṛti* called the living entity are the material cause.<sup>290</sup> *Prakṛti* called *tamas* corresponds to *avidyākarmaśakti*, and *prakṛti*

<sup>283</sup> See 3.4.(c).

<sup>284</sup> ŚveU 4.1: *ya eko 'varṇo bahudhā śaktiyogād varṇān anekān nihitārtho dadhāti / vi caīti cānte viśvam ādau sa devaḥ sa no buddhyā śubhayā saṃyunaktu //*

<sup>285</sup> GoBhā 1.4.26: *evaṃ ca nimittaṃ kūṣastham upādānaṃ tu pariṇāmiti sūkṣmaprakṛtikaṃ karṭr sthūlaprakṛtikaṃ karma ity ekasyaiva tadubhayatvaṃ siddham /*

<sup>286</sup> *Sūkṣma* in the GoBhā.

<sup>287</sup> The unmanifest *tamas* and the living entity with contracted consciousness.

<sup>288</sup> *Sthūla* in the GoBhā.

<sup>289</sup> Sūṭi 1.4.26: *sūkṣmānabhivyaktaḡuṇā tamaśabdītā saṅkucitajñānā jīvaśabdītā ca prakṛtir yatra tat parāvadbrahma karṭr-nimittaṃ tādrk tadubhayāṃśas tūpādānaṃ bodyam / sthūlābhivyaktaḡuṇā pradhānādi vikāśitaḡuṇā jīvaśabdītā ca prakṛtir yasya tad brahmeti /*

<sup>290</sup> It is worth noting Baladeva's use of the term *prakṛti*. In Sāṅkhya terminology the term *prakṛti* is applied only to insentient matter consisting of the three *guṇas*, and the sentient element is referred to as *puruṣa*. Baladeva, however, applies the term *prakṛti* to the sentient living entity as well.

called the living entity to *kṣetrajñāśakti*. Since Brahman possesses both energies, It can be referred to as the material cause. At the subtle stage, the material elements are unmanifest and the living entity's consciousness is contracted. At the evolved stage, the material elements are manifest and the living entity's consciousness illuminated. Thus Brahman can be both the efficient cause and the material cause, being unchangeable and going through transformation simultaneously.

After explaining the theory of the transformation of the energies, Baladeva goes on to refute Śaṅkara's theory of apparent transformation:

Since we hear [in the ChāU] the examples of a lump of clay and so on, and because of the letters of the *sūtra* which say, 'On account of transformation {*pariṇāmāt*}', the theory of apparent transformation, which is synonymous with the superimposition called illusion, whose nature is unreal transformation, is completely rejected.<sup>291</sup>

Although Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, and Baladeva all agree that Brahman is the material cause of the universe, Śaṅkara's theory of causality greatly differs from the transformation theory of Rāmānuja and Baladeva. In the transformation theory of causality, the cause and the effect stay in the same level of reality. An example is clay (the cause) and a pot (the effect), which are both empirically real. In Śaṅkara's theory of causality, however, the cause and the effect are on a different level of existence. An example is a rope (the cause) and a snake (the effect). The rope is empirically real but the snake is an illusion (*atāttvika*).

Baladeva refutes Śaṅkara's theory, first by pointing out the inappropriateness of two often-quoted examples. One is the image of silver superimposed on mother-of-pearl. Another is dividing walls superimposed on ether. In both examples, the bases of superimposition, that is, the mother-of-pearl and ether, are visible. Baladeva, however, claims that Brahman, which is supposed to be the basis of the illusory world, is not visible. Thus, the examples are not appropriate.<sup>292</sup>

Baladeva puts forward another argument according to which Śaṅkara's theory would lead to infinite regress:

Furthermore, 'transformation [*anyathābhāva*]' only means 'appearance in a different manner'. And it [i.e. appearance in a different manner] is not possible without worldly existence. Worldly existence, however, since it is other than

<sup>291</sup> GoBhā 1.4.26: *mṛtpiṇḍādidṛṣṭāntaśravaṇāt 'pariṇāmād' itisūtrākṣarāc ca bhrāntyadhyāsaparyāyo 'tāttvikānyathābhāvātmā vivartaḥ parihṛtaḥ /*

Cf. BraSūBhā (Śā) 1.1.1: *tam etam evaṃ lakṣaṇam adhyāsaṃ pañḍitā avidyeti manyante, tadvivakeṇa ca vastusvarūpāvadhāraṇam vidyām āhuḥ /*

<sup>292</sup> GoBhā 1.4.26: *na ca śuktyādivad brahmaṇy adhyāsaḥ sambhavati, tadvat tasya puronihi-tatvābhāvāt / na cākāśavat tatra saḥ, tadvat tasya gamyatvābhāvāt /*

Brahman, falls within the realm of apparent transformation. Thus [it leads to] infinite regress.<sup>293</sup>

In order for mother-of-pearl to appear as silver, silver must really exist somewhere else. Similarly, in order for Brahman to appear as the world, there must be a real world somewhere else. Then the question would be: Where does such a real world, which is other than Brahman, come from? The counter argument that such a real world manifests as a result of the superimposition of the real world on Brahman would provoke the same question: Where does such a real world come from? Thus, Śaṅkara's theory of transformation does not explain the relationship between Brahman and the world.

Baladeva then says that the illusory nature of the world is mentioned in the scriptures for us to cultivate renunciation, but it does not mean that the world is actual illusion like a dream. He offers the regularity of the world as another argument against the theory of apparent transformation:

In this way, the statement about it [i.e. Śaṅkara's theory] is always for the sake of renunciation. Thus [say] those who know the truth. Otherwise we [would] hear that the elements such as the *tanmātra* are [arbitrarily] diminished or excessive since an error is of the nature of being unregulated. However, we see that the transformation of the state is for the objects whose natures are regulated.<sup>294</sup>

If the world were a mere appearance, as Śaṅkara claims, there would be no fixed laws of nature among the objects we see in the world since there are no regulations in illusion. This would imply that we observe unpredictable increase or decrease in the material element. However, we do observe that the transformation of the objects in this world is according to certain laws of nature. This regularity, according to Baladeva, is another point which proves that the world goes through a real transformation, and is not an illusion.

Finally, in his commentary on BraSū 1.4.27: *yoniś ca hi gīyate* //, Baladeva again follows Śaṅkara closely. He cites MuU 1.1.6d,<sup>295</sup> and 3.1.3b,<sup>296</sup> as

<sup>293</sup> GoBhā 1.4.26: *kiṃ cānyathābhāvo 'nyathābhānam eva / tac ca nāvṛttim antareṇa sambhavet / āvṛttis tu brahmetaratvād vivartāntaḥ pated ity anavasthaiva /*

SūTī: *tac cānyathābhānam /*

<sup>294</sup> GoBhā 1.4.26: *evam api kvacit taduktir virāgāyaiveti tattvavidaḥ / itarathā tanmātrabhūtādīnām nyūnatātireko vā śrūyate bhrānter aniyatarūpatvāt / niyatasvabhāvānām vastūnām bhāvavinimayaś ca dṛśyate /*

SūTī: *evam iti /*

*'ātmānam evātmatayā vijñānatām tenaiva jñātaṃ nikhilam prapañcitam / jñānena bhūyo 'pi ca tat praliyate rajjvām aher bhogabhavābhavau yathā //*

(BhāPu 10.14.25) *ityādaḥ vivartavādoktiḥ prapañce vairāgyāyety arthaḥ /*

<sup>295</sup> *yad bṛtayanīm paripaśyanti dhīrāḥ //* 'The wise people see that which is the source of [all] the elements.'

<sup>296</sup> *kartāram īśaṃ puruṣaṃ brahmayonim /* '[The seer sees the one whose color is gold,] who is the creator, the Lord, the primeval person, the source of Brahman.'



Śaṅkara does. These passages refer to Brahman as 'source {*yoni*}'. Baladeva explains that the word *yoni* means the material cause since there is a saying, 'The earth is the source {*yoni*} of the plants and the trees.'<sup>297</sup> This citation is copied from Śaṅkara's commentary. Since the Upaniṣads describe Brahman as 'source', and since 'source' means the material cause, Baladeva concludes that Brahman is the material cause of the universe.

### 4.3.3. Conclusion

In conclusion, the following points in relation to the section on *prakṛti* may be observed. First, Baladeva sharply diverges from Madhva's interpretation. Whereas Madhva, strictly adhering to the principle of *samanvaya*, discusses how feminine words such as *prakṛti* can denote Brahman, Baladeva mainly engages in the discussion of causality, following Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja.

Commenting on BraSū 1.4.27, not only Madhva but also Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja come back to the principle of *samanvaya*, and they all discuss how a word such as *yoni* can be applied to Brahman, albeit in different ways. Baladeva could have easily followed Madhva but he chooses to follow Śaṅkara.

It should be also noted that as far as his commentary on BraSū 1.4.23–27 is concerned, Baladeva does not refer to the untraceable works cited by Madhva, such as the *Pañḍīśruti* and the *Bhāllaveyaśruti*, nor does he cite Madhva's untraceable passages attributed to the BraAPu, the NāPu, and the SkaPu. Given that all the major commentators in the Mādhva tradition, such as Jayatīrtha, accept Madhva's untraceable citations, and considering that Baladeva in his youth was educated in the Mādhva tradition, it must be concluded that Baladeva is consciously diverging from the Mādhva tradition. At the same time, Baladeva offers three arguments for the refutation of Śaṅkara's theory of causation in GoBhā 1.4.26. This may be seen as a possible influence of the Mādhva tradition since the Mādhvas are well known for their refutation of absolute monism and other theories which support it.

Just as his Vaiṣṇava predecessor Rāmānuja, Baladeva does not hesitate to use Śaṅkara's commentary where he deems it useful. The arguments and the texts cited in GoBhā 1.4.23, 24, and 27 are directly taken from Śaṅkara's commentary. Śaṅkara, in his own way, also argues that Brahman is both the efficient and the material cause, and this is undoubtedly valuable for Baladeva. In the end, however, Śaṅkara's solution to the tension between Brahman's perfection and the imperfection of the world is not acceptable to Baladeva, as he makes clear in GoBhā 1.4.26.

<sup>297</sup> GoBhā 1.4.27: *yoniśabdas tūpādānavācī / 'prthivī yonir oṣadhivanaspatīnām' ityādiprayogaḥ /*

In relation to Rāmānuja's commentary, Baladeva's exegetical closeness can be observed in GoBhā 1.4.23 where he identifies the *prima facie* view as the theistic Sāṅkhya view, and when he quotes TaiBrā 2.8.9 in his GoBhā 1.4.25. A theological resemblance is observed in GoBhā 1.4.26 where Baladeva discusses how the imperfections of the world stay outside Brahman. He argues that when it is said that Brahman is the material cause, the state of being the material cause (*upādānatva*) remains in Brahman's energy but not in Brahman Itself, just like when we say someone is white, the whiteness remains in the person's body but not in the person herself (i.e. *ātman*). This analogy closely resembles Rāmānuja's body-soul analogy.

Ultimately, however, Baladeva's theory of transformation of energy is Jīva's view. Baladeva's citation of specific texts, such as ViPu 6.7.61, shows Jīva's direct influence. Thus, Baladeva's view on *prakṛti* supports my hypothesis that Baladeva follows Jīva's teachings, and he takes advantage of the points made by Śāṅkara, Rāmānuja, and Madhva if they are useful for establishing Jīva's theology.

#### 4.4. BALADEVA ON THE LIVING ENTITY

In the section on *prakṛti* (i.e. BraSū 1.4.23–27), Baladeva argued that Brahman is both the material cause (*upādānakāraṇa*) and the efficient cause (*nimittakāraṇa*) of the universe.<sup>298</sup> Baladeva deals with a possible objection to the idea of Brahman as the efficient cause of the universe in his commentary on BraSū 2.1.21–25.<sup>299</sup> Baladeva rejects the *prima facie* view that the living entity is the creator of the universe. Through his discussion of Brahman as the efficient cause of the universe, Baladeva makes a clear distinction between the living entity and Brahman.

##### 4.4.1. *Brahmasūtras* 2.1.21–25

According to Baladeva, the topic of discussion (*viśaya*) in BraSū 2.1.21–25 concerns two *Śruti* passages that seemingly contradict each other. These two passages read as follows:

<sup>298</sup> GoBhā 2.1.21: *prakṛtiś ca pratijñety asminn adhikaraṇe jagad upādānatvaṃ jagan nimitatvaṃ brahmaṇo nirūpitam /*

<sup>299</sup> These five *sūtras* are:

BraSū 2.1.21: *itaravyapadeśād dhitākaraṇādidoṣaprasaktiḥ //*

BraSū 2.1.22: *adhikaṃ tu bhedanirdeśāt //*

BraSū 2.1.23: *aśmādivac ca tadanupapattiḥ //*

BraSū 2.1.24: *upasaṃhāradarśanān neti cen na kṣīravād dhi //*

BraSū 2.1.25: *devādivad iti loka //*

The Lord is the creator [of the universe].<sup>300</sup>

Beings arise from the living entity.<sup>301</sup>

The first quotation suggests that the Lord (*īśa*) is the creator, whereas the second seems to suggest that the living beings arise from another living entity (*jīva*). The *prima facie* view argues that the living entity is the creator of the universe, since if the Lord were the creator of the world it would go against his completeness (*pūrṇatā*).<sup>302</sup> In other words, if the Lord is truly complete then there would be nothing for him to accomplish, and therefore there would be no need for him to engage in any act of creation.

Commenting on *sūtra* 2.1.21 (*itaravyapadeśād dhitākaraṇādidoṣaprasaktiḥ //*), Baladeva rejects the *prima facie* view:

Some people {*itara*} teach {*vyapadeśa*} the living entity as the creator. Or some people accept the teaching {*vyapadeśa*} that the living entity {*itara*} is the creator of the universe. On account of [such teaching], if the living entity were its [i.e. the world's] creator, the wise people who have such a view [must face] an unwanted consequence {*prasakti*} of defects {*doṣa*} such as {*ādi*} the living entity does not do what is beneficial [for himself] {*hitākaraṇa*}.<sup>303</sup>

As far as this *sūtra* is concerned, there are no significant interpretive differences between Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, Madhva, and Baladeva. If the living entity were the creator of the universe, Baladeva says, it would lead to two kinds of defects. First, the living entity would be doing what is not beneficial for himself. Second, if the living entity were the creator, then one has to face various theoretical problems. For example, the living entity would experience immense fatigue in the act of creation.<sup>304</sup>

Baladeva explains the first type of defect: 'For no wise person who is independent would create his own prison house and enter into it like a silkworm. Nor would any clean person obtain a physical body which is low and unclean.'<sup>305</sup> In the South Asian cultural context this world of transmigration (*saṃsāra*) is seen as a cosmic prison house for the living entities. Similarly,

<sup>300</sup> MuU 3.1.3: *kartāram īśam [ . . . ]*

<sup>301</sup> GoBhā 2.1.21: 'jīvād bhavanti bhūtāni' ityādiśruter [ . . . ] /

This is an unidentified citation which Baladeva attributes to a *Śruti* text. Baladeva quotes the same verse in GoBhā 1.4.28, again without identification:

*jīvād bhavanti bhūtāni jīve tiṣṭhanty acañcalāḥ /*

*jīve ca layam icchanti na jīvāt kāraṇam param //*

So far I have not been able to trace this verse in Madhva's writings either.

<sup>302</sup> GoBhā 2.1.21: *tatreśvarasya tatkartṛtve pūrṇatādivirodhāpatter jīvasyaiva tad iti vadanti /*

<sup>303</sup> GoBhā 2.1.21: *itaresāṃ keśāṃcit yo jīvakartṛtvavyapadeśa itarasya vā jīvasya yo jagat-kartṛtvavyapadeśaḥ paraiḥ kaiścit svikṛtas tasmāt itaravyapadeśinām viduṣāṃ tatkartari jīve hitākaraṇādīnām doṣāṇām prasaktiḥ syāt /*

<sup>304</sup> GoBhā 2.1.21: *hitākaraṇam ahitākaraṇam śramādikam ca dūṣaṇam prāpnuyāt /*

<sup>305</sup> GoBhā 2.1.21: *na hi kaścit svādhīno dhīmān svasya bandhanāgāraṇaṃ nirmimāṇaḥ kauśeyakīṭavat tatra praviśet / na vā svayaṃ svacchaḥ sannatyānacchaṃ vapur apēyāt /*

the physical body is seen as a microcosmic prison for a soul. If that is the case, why would any living entity wish to create the world or a physical body only to be trapped in those prison houses? The analogy of a prison house and the example of accepting a physical body are copied from Śaṅkara's commentary on the same *sūtra*.<sup>306</sup> Śaṅkara, however, uses these arguments to describe the *prima facie* view, according to which the creatorship of Brahman is untenable. Thus Baladeva adapts Śaṅkara's *prima facie* view and uses it as a part of his own conclusion (*siddhānta*). Neither Rāmānuja nor Madhva adapts Śaṅkara's analogy and example in their commentaries on the same *sūtra*.

Then Baladeva explains the second defect of the *prima facie* view: 'Nor is any living entity able to accomplish the effects [of the material creation] such as *pradhāna*, *mahat*, ego, space, air, and so on, since he experiences fatigue even by the thought of it.'<sup>307</sup> If the mere thought of creation fatigues the living entity, how would it be possible for him to actually create the universe? It might be the case that Baladeva took inspiration for this argument from Madhva. Commenting on the next *sūtra*, Madhva says the fault of experiencing fatigue does not apply to Brahman because It possesses excellent energies (*adhikaśakti*).<sup>308</sup> One of the implications of this statement would be what Baladeva said previously, that is, if the living entity were the creator of the universe, it would experience fatigue since it does not possess excellent energies like Brahman does.

Moving to Baladeva's commentary on the next *sūtra*, the opponent comes back and argues that these two defects would equally apply to Brahman: 'Surely, Brahman also suffers fatigue, does not do what is beneficial [for Itself] and so on.'<sup>309</sup> Creation must be stressful for Brahman. In addition, there are scriptural statements describing the entrance of Brahman into its creation. If Brahman is the creator, why does It enter into the prison house of this world?

Commenting on BraSū 2.1.22 (*adhikaṃ tu bhedanirdeśāt* //), Baladeva replies that these two defects do not apply to Brahman because of Its superiority:

The word *tu* is for the sake of cutting off the doubt. Brahman is exceedingly superior {*adhikaṃ*} to the living entity due to [Its] being the possessor of excellent energies. How is it [so]? [It is so] since the scriptures describe the difference [between Brahman and the living entity]{*bhedanirdeśāt*} exactly the same way.<sup>310</sup>

<sup>306</sup> BraSūBhā (Śa) 2.1.21: *ataḥ sa svatantraḥ kartā san hitam evātmanah saumanasyakaram kuryān nāhitam janmamaraṇajarārōgādyanekānarthajālam / nahi kaścid aparatanthro bandha-nāgāram ātmanah kṛtvānupraviśati / na ca svayam atyantānirmalaḥ sannatyantamalinam deham ātmatvenopeyāt /*

<sup>307</sup> GoBhā 2.1.21: *na ca kenacit jīvena sādhyam idaṃ pradhānamahadahamviyatpavanādi-kāryam / taccintayāpi śramānubhavāt /*

<sup>308</sup> BraSūBhā (Ma) 2.1.22: *na ca brahmaṇah śramacintādidoṣaprāptiḥ / adhikaśaktitvāt /*

<sup>309</sup> GoBhā 2.1.22: *nānu brahmaṇo 'pi [...] śramahitākaraṇādiprāptiḥ /*

<sup>310</sup> GoBhā 2.1.22: *śaṅkacchedāya tuśabdah / jīvād adhikaṃ brahma uruśaktikatvāt tasmād atyutkṛṣṭam / tat kutaḥ? śāstreṣu tathaiva bhedanirdeśāt /*

Exegetically, Baladeva's interpretation of the *sūtra* is a mixture of the interpretations offered by his three predecessors. Both Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja explain that Brahman is superior (*adhikam*) to the living entity because it is taught that there are differences between Brahman and the living entity in the scriptures (*bhedanirdeśāt*).<sup>311</sup> As we saw already, Madhva writes that the defects of experiencing fatigue and so on do not apply in the case of Brahman because of Its supreme energies (*adhikaśakti*).<sup>312</sup> Baladeva's interpretation of the term *adhika* in the *sūtra* follows that of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja. At the same time his description of Brahman as the possessor of excellent energies (*uruśaktika*) echoes Madhva.

Then Baladeva cites MuU 3.1.2,<sup>313</sup> BhaGī 15.16–17,<sup>314</sup> BhāPu 1.11.39,<sup>315</sup> ViPu 1.2.16,<sup>316</sup> and 1.2.24,<sup>317</sup> and concludes:

Thus, in the *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* and so on, it is taught that there is a distinction between the Supreme Self and the living entity, who is affected by lamentation

<sup>311</sup> BraSūBhā (Śa) 2.1.22: *yat sarvajñaṃ sarvaśakti brahma nityaśuddhabuddhamuktasvabhāvaṃ śārīrād adhikamanyat, tad vayaṃ jagataḥ sraṣṭr brūmaḥ* / [...] *bhedanirdeśāt* / ŚrīBhā 2.1.22: *ādhyātmikādiduḥkhaḥyogārhat pratyakātmānaḥ adhikam arthāntarabhūtaṃ brahma / kutaḥ? bhedanirdeśāt pratyakātmāno hi bhedena nirdiśyate paraṃ brahma* [...] /

<sup>312</sup> BraSūBhā (Ma) 2.1.22: *na ca brahmaṇaḥ śramacintādidōṣaprāptiḥ / adhikaśaktitvāt* /

<sup>313</sup> This is identical to ŚveU 4.6:  
*samāne vṛkṣe puruṣo nimagno 'niśayā śocati muhyamānaḥ /*  
*juṣṭaṃ yadā paśyaty anyam iśam asya mahimānam eti vītaśokaḥ* //  
'On the same tree, the living entity, being depressed [and] bewildered, laments because of the absence of the Lord. At that time, he sees the Lord who is other [than him] [and] who is furnished with [unlimited excellent qualities]. His sorrow disappears [and] he reaches His glory.'

<sup>314</sup> *dvāv imau puruṣau loke kṣaraś cākṣara eva ca /*  
*kṣaraḥ sarvāṇi bhūtāni kūtaṣṭho 'kṣara ucyate* //  
*uttamaḥ puruṣas tv anyāḥ paramātmety udāhṛtaḥ /*  
*yo lokatrayam āviśya bibharti avyaya īśvaraḥ* //  
'In the world, there are these two *puruṣas*. [They are] indeed both perishable and imperishable. It is said that all beings are perishable [and] the one who is situated on the top is imperishable. The highest person, however, is different [from these two persons] and is called the Supreme Self. He who enters into the three worlds and maintains them is the imperishable Lord.'

<sup>315</sup> *etad iśanam iśasya prakṛtistho 'pi tadguṇaiḥ /*  
*na yujyate 'sadātmasthair yathā buddhis tadāśrayā* //  
'This is the greatness of the Lord. Even though [the Lord] is situated in *prakṛti*, [He] is not connected with its qualities, just as the intelligence [of the devotees], whose refuge is He [i.e. the Lord], [is not connected] with that which causes the living entity to stay in the unreal [i.e. *prakṛti*].'

<sup>316</sup> *pradhānapuruṣavyaktakālānāṃ paramaṃ hi yat /*  
*paśyanti sūrayaḥ śuddhaṃ tad viṣṇoḥ paramaṃ padam* //  
'The sages behold that pure [and] supreme abode of Viṣṇu, which is indeed the highest among *pradhāna*, *puruṣa*, the unmanifest, and time.'

Cf. *Rg Veda* 1.22.20a: *tad viṣṇoḥ paramaṃ padam sadā paśyanti sūrayaḥ /*  
<sup>317</sup> *viṣṇoḥ svarūpāt parato hi te 'nye rūpe pradhānaṃ puruṣaś ca vipra /*  
*tasyaiva te 'nyena dhrte viyukte rūpeṇa yat tad dvija kālasaṃjñam* //  
'O sage! These two other forms, [namely] *pradhāna* and *puruṣa*, are from the supreme nature of Viṣṇu. O twice-born! They are maintained [and] controlled by His other nature which is called time.'

and delusion because [the Supreme Self] is the one whose supremacy and so on are unimpaired.<sup>318</sup>

Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, and Madhva all cite various passages, which point to the distinction between the living entity and Brahman. In terms of citations, Baladeva only overlaps with Rāmānuja in quoting MuU 3.1.2. His quotes from the BhaGī, the ViPu, and the BhāPu are not found in his predecessors' commentaries on the *sūtra*. One might suspect certain Gauḍīya influences on Baladeva in this regard since these scriptures were foundational for his Gauḍīya predecessor Jīva Gosvāmī. In fact, ViPu 1.2.24 is cited in Jīva's PaSa *Anuccheda* 53, and BhāPu 1.11.39 in his PrīSa *Anuccheda* 138.

Baladeva then gives an analogy of a spider to argue why Brahman is not liable to the charges raised by the *prima facie* view:

Like a spider, the Lord, whose great energies are not to be comprehended, creates the universe merely by His own will, enters into it, plays, and [He] annihilates when it [i.e. the universe] is old. Thus, there is not [even] a whiff of the fault which was mentioned earlier.<sup>319</sup>

A spider is not fatigued by the creation of its web; nor is it trapped in its own creation since it can also destroy the web. In the same way, because of his inconceivably great energy (*avicintyoruśakti*), the Lord does not experience any fatigue in the act of creation. He is also able to destroy his creation through such power. Therefore, the two defects, experiencing fatigue and being trapped in the creation, which would apply to the living entity's creatorship, do not apply to Brahman.

This spider analogy reflects Jīva's influence on Baladeva most clearly. Besides pointing out how the two defects raised by the opponent do not apply to Brahman, this analogy also indicates how the Lord is simultaneously the material cause and efficient cause of the universe. In his BhaSa *Anuccheda* 40, Jīva describes the Lord as the only creator, citing the analogy of the spider:

We hear an example with regard to the fact that none other than the supreme Lord accomplishes the creation of the universe: 'As a spider (stretches thread) from within (through the mouth, plays with it and again swallows it, in the same

<sup>318</sup> GoBhā 2.1.22: *muṇḍakādaḥ [...] śokamohagrastāt jīvāt paramātmāno 'khaṇḍitaiśvar-yāditvena bhedo nirdiśyate* / I take *akhaṇḍitaiśvaryādi* to be a genitive *bahuvrihi* compound qualifying *paramātmā*: *akhaṇḍitāḥ aiśvaryādiguṇāḥ yasya paramātmā saḥ* / ādi in *aiśvaryādi* refers to five other qualities, power, fame, beauty, knowledge, and renunciation, commonly held to be possessed by the Lord. Cf. ViPu 6.5.74: *aiśvaryasya samagrasya vīryasya yaśasaḥ śrīyaḥ / jñānavairāgyayoś caiva saṅgam bhaga itiraṇā //*

<sup>319</sup> GoBhā 2.1.22: *[...] avicintyoruśaktir īśvaraḥ svasaṅkalpamātrāt jagat sṛṣṭvā tasmin praviśya vikṛīḍati, jīrṇaṃ ca tat saṃharaty ūṇanābhivad iti, na pūrvoktadoṣagandhaḥ /*

way the great Lord [creates the universe from within, maintains it, and dissolves it into Himself]).<sup>320</sup>

A spider creates its web using thread that comes from itself. Therefore, the spider is the material and efficient cause of its own web. Similarly, Brahman creates the universe using material that comes from within. Jīva holds a view of Brahman as both the material and efficient cause of the universe, and Baladeva follows him.

As will be seen below in his commentary on BraSū 2.1.23–25, Baladeva closely follows Madhva. However, it is important to recognize that by accepting Brahman as the material cause of the universe, Baladeva diverges significantly from Madhva's ontological scheme wherein Brahman is accepted only as the efficient cause of the universe. Baladeva's diversion from Madhva here points to his operating principle of using non-Gauḍīya material in the service of establishing the Gauḍīya theology. Baladeva is not shy of borrowing from Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, and Madhva whenever they are useful. At the same time, he is not afraid of rejecting those three predecessors if that is what is required to faithfully follow Jīva's theology.

In fact, a similar observation is made by David Buchta (2005) in his examination of Baladeva's commentary on BraSū 2.1.3. In that section, both Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja reject the Yoga school primarily because the school accepts the Sāṅkhya school's dualism. According to the Sāṅkhya system, *prakṛti* is the material cause of the universe, and it is eternally distinct from *puruṣa*, the efficient cause. Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja cannot accept this dualism since they hold the view that only Brahman is the material and efficient cause of the universe. Madhva, however, offers completely different reasons for his rejection of the Yoga school. For Madhva, the Sāṅkhya view of *prakṛti*, which is shared by the Yoga school, is not necessary an issue since he also holds the view that *prakṛti* is the material cause of the universe. As shown above for example in chapter three, section four, Jīva's view is much closer to Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja in this regard, and consequently Baladeva's commentary on the *sūtra* follows Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja, and neglects Madhva.<sup>321</sup>

At the end of his commentary on BraSū 2.1.22, Baladeva deals with the three *prima facie* views advanced by the Advaitins. These views deal with the three well-known analogies of (i) space and the space circumscribed by a pot,

<sup>320</sup> BhaSa Anuccheda 40: *parameśvarasya jagatsṛṣṭāv ananyasādhakatve dṛṣṭāntaḥ śrūyate, 'yathorṇanābhīr hrdayād'* (BhāPu 11.9.21a) *ityādi tadvat / BhāPu 11.9.21: yathorṇanābhīr hrdayād ūrṇām santatya vaktrataḥ / tayā vihr̥tya bhūyas tām grasaty evaṃ maheśvaraḥ //* BhāABho 11.9.21: *yatheti / hrdayād udgatām / vaktrato vaktreṇa saṃtatya prasārya vihr̥tya krīḍitvā //*

<sup>321</sup> On the topic of Baladeva's relation to the Mādhva tradition, see also Okita 2008 and 2009.

(ii) the moon and its reflection, and (iii) a prince who forgot his royal identity. In each case, he rejects the Advaita view by skillfully pointing out how, within the Advaita system, their arguments are self-contradictory. Śaṅkara uses these analogies to support his conclusive view (*siddhānta*). However, Baladeva uses them as the *prima facie* view. The way Baladeva deals with these analogies reveals his thorough familiarity with the Advaita Vedānta system and its weaknesses. This familiarity might be attributed to the training he received in his youth as a Mādhva Vedāntist, since the Mādhvas are well known for their vehement criticism of Advaita Vedānta.

The first *prima facie* view is based on the analogy of space in a pot. This analogy is taken from the conclusive view (*siddhānta*) in Śaṅkara's commentary on the same *sūtra*. Śaṅkara explains *sūtra* 2.1.22 in terms of the superiority (*adhikam*) of Brahman to the living entity. Therefore, the *prima facie* view in Śaṅkara's commentary raises an objection: 'Surely the teaching of non-difference [between the living entity and Brahman] is also seen, in phrases such as "That you are." How could there be difference and non-difference [between the living entity and Brahman], which are contradictory?'<sup>322</sup>

Śaṅkara gives the conclusive view (*siddhānta*) by using the analogy of space and space limited by a pot: 'This is not a defect since both statements are possible in each case through the maxim of space and space in a pot.'<sup>323</sup> According to Śaṅkara, therefore, the living entity and Brahman are one, like space and space limited by a pot. At the same time, the living entity is limited and different from Brahman as space in a pot is limited and much smaller than space itself. Therefore, Śaṅkara contends, the creatorship of the world can be attributed only to Brahman, and not to the living entity, although ultimately there is no distinction between the two. Baladeva takes this conclusive view of Śaṅkara as the *prima facie* view and replies by negation:

Surely this superiority {*adhikam*} of the Lord over the living entity is like [the superiority] of great space over space in a pot. If [the opponent says] thus, [we say] 'No'. Since [we] do not accept that It [i.e. Brahman] is an object of division like that [i.e. space].<sup>324</sup>

Baladeva thus appeals to the doctrine of Brahman's indivisibility (*akhaṇḍi-tatva*), and says that the analogy of space cannot be applied to Brahman. Since the indivisibility of Brahman is also accepted by the Advaitins, Baladeva shows that the analogy of space is self-contradicting within their system.

<sup>322</sup> BraSūBhā (Śa) 2.1.22: *nanv abhedanirdeśo 'pi darśitaḥ 'tat tvam asi' ity evaṅ jātīyakaḥ / katham bhedābhedau viruddhau sambhaveyātām /*

<sup>323</sup> BraSūBhā (Śa) 2.1.22: *naiṣa doṣaḥ / ākāśaghaṭākāśānyāyenobhayasambhavasya tatra tatra pratiṣṭhāpitatvāt /*

<sup>324</sup> GoBhā 2.1.22: *nanu ghaṭākāśāt mahākāśasyevaitaj jīvād īśvarasyādhikyam iti cen na / tadvat tasya paricchedaviṣayatvāsvikārāt /*



The second view put forward is based on the analogy of the moon and its reflection. In his commentary on BraSū 3.2.18, Śaṅkara cites ABiU 12 to explain how Brahman is superior to the living entity while at the same time they are one: 'To explain, the Self of the beings is one only, placed in each being. We see [it] as both one and many like the moon in the water.'<sup>325</sup> Although the moon is one, its reflection in water can be many. Similarly, the living entities are nothing but reflections of one Brahman. However, Baladeva rejects this analogy:

Nor is it the case that It [i.e. Brahman] is so [i.e. superior] over it [i.e. the living entity] like the moon in the sky is [superior] over the moon [reflected] in the water, since It [i.e. Brahman], being all-pervading [and] formless, cannot have a reflection as it is [possible in the case of] it [i.e. the moon].<sup>326</sup>

According to Baladeva, the analogy of the moon and its reflection in water is not applicable to Brahman since It is all-pervasive (*vibhu*) and formless (*nirūpa*). Again, Baladeva is pointing out the contradiction within the system of Advaita Vedānta. The Advaitins accept that Brahman is ultimately without qualities. If so, It is formless and therefore there can be no reflection. This implies that the analogy of the moon does not support their argument.

The third view put forward is based on the analogy of a prince who forgets his identity. In Śaṅkara's commentary on BrĀU 2.1.20, he gives this analogy:

Again, when someone who is very compassionate informs a prince about the fact that [he is] the son of that [king], knowing that [the prince is] fit for obtaining the wealth of the king, saying 'You are not a hunter. [You are] the son of that king. You have somehow entered into a hunter's house', [at that time] the prince understands this, and gives up the ideas and activities of the hunter class, pursues the way of his own father and ancestors, saying 'I am a king'.<sup>327</sup>

According to this analogy, Brahman behaves as the living entity when It forgets Its true identity, just as a prince who forgets his royal identity behaves as a hunter. In reality, however, the living entity is always Brahman and he just needs to be informed about his/Its true identity. Baladeva rejects this analogy:

<sup>325</sup> *eka eva hi bhūtātmā bhūte bhūte vyavasthitaḥ /  
ekadhā bahudhā caiva dṛśyate jalacandravat //*

<sup>326</sup> GoBhā 2.1.22: *na ca jalacandrāt viyaccandrasyeva tasmāt tasya tad vibhor nirūpasya* ([*nirūpasya*] K; *nirūpasya* M) *tasya tadvat pratibimbāsambhavāt //*

<sup>327</sup> Śaṅkara BrĀUBhā 2.1.20: *yadā punaḥ kaścit paramakāruṇiko rājaputrasya rājaśrīprāp-tiyogvatām jānān amuṣya putratām bodhayati 'na tvaṃ vyādho 'muṣya rājñāḥ putrah, kathaṅ-cid vyādhagrham anupraviṣṭaḥ' iti, sa evaṃ bodhitas tyaktvā vyādhajātipratyayakarmāṇi pitṛpaitāmahim ātmanaḥ padavim anuvartate 'rājāham asmi' iti //*

Nor is it the case that Brahman, who is one, [yet] by error becomes the living entity, [can] have excellence and diminution like a prince, who has become a slave out of confusion since that would contradict the *Śruti* passages regarding omniscience [of Brahman].<sup>328</sup>

The analogy of a prince does not work since it goes against the omniscience (*sārvajñya*) of Brahman. Brahman does not forget Its identity like the prince. The omniscience of Brahman is accepted by the Advaitins, and it is a point which they would not want to give up.

By referring to the indivisibility (*akhaṇḍitatva*), all-pervasiveness (*vibhutva*), formlessness (*nirūpatva*), and omniscience (*sārvajñya*) of Brahman, Baladeva points out that these three analogies of space, the moon, and the prince do not work for Advaita Vedānta. As suggested, the skillfulness Baladeva shows in this discussion might have come from his Mādhva upbringing. At the same time, however, we should remember that the rejection of the oneness between Brahman and the living entity is something Jīva would also accept. Thus, so long as his Mādhva training is useful for strengthening his Gauḍīya predecessor's viewpoint, Baladeva is happy to utilize it.

We witness the impact of Mādhva Vedānta on Baladeva even more vividly in his commentary on BraSū 2.1.23–25. In this particular section, much of Baladeva's commentary is virtually copied from Madhva. After explaining the superiority of Brahman over the living entity, Baladeva points out the impossibility of the living entity being the creator of the universe. Commenting on BraSū 2.1.23 (*aśmādivac ca tadanupapattiḥ* //), Baladeva explains the *sūtra* as follows: 'Even though the living entity is conscious it is not possible {*anupapattiḥ*} that [the living entity] is the independent creator [of the universe] {*tat*} since [the living entity] is not independent like stone, wood, or clay {*aśmādivat*}'.<sup>329</sup> Baladeva's gloss on this particular *sūtra* is almost identical with that of Madhva: 'Even though the living entity is conscious, it is not possible {*anupapattiḥ*} that [the living entity] is the independent creator [of the universe] {*tat*} since [the living entity] is not independent like stone and so on {*aśmādivat*}'.<sup>330</sup>

Baladeva's commentary on this *sūtra* diverges from Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja. Proceeding from the analogy of greater space and the space in a pot, Śaṅkara continues to argue for oneness between the living entity and Brahman. As for Rāmānuja, he uses the *sūtra* to point out the distinction between the living entity and Brahman. According to him, the *sūtra* means that, just as it is not possible that stones and so on are one with Brahman {*aśmādivat*}, it is also not

<sup>328</sup> GoBhā 2.1.22: *na ca rājaputrasyevāptadāsabhramasyaikaṣya brahmaṇo bhramād jīvasyotkarṣāpakarṣau* ([-*apakarṣau*] em. Isaacson; -*apakarṣe* K, M) *sārvajñyaśrutivirodhāt* /

<sup>329</sup> GoBhā 2.1.23: *cetanasyāpi jīvasyāśmakāṣṭhaloṣṭravād asvātantryāt svataḥ kartṛtvānupapattiḥ* /

<sup>330</sup> BraSūBhā (Ma) 2.1.23: *cetanatve 'py aśmādivad asvatantratvāt svataḥ kartṛtvānupapattir jīvasya* /

possible that the living entity is one with Brahman {*tadanupapatti*}.<sup>331</sup> Then Rāmānuja explains the oneness between the living entity and Brahman in terms of the analogy of body and soul: they are one in the sense that the living entity comprises the body of Brahman.<sup>332</sup>

In Baladeva's commentary on BraSū 2.1.24 (*upasaṃhāradarśanān neti cen na kṣīravat dhi //*), he continues to follow Madhva. Commenting on the previous *sūtra*, Baladeva has explained that the living entity cannot be the creator of the universe since he is, like a stone and so on, dependent on Brahman. The *prima facie* view in the commentary on BraSū 2.1.24 comes back to this point and says:

Surely, the living entity is not a non-creator like a stone and so on since we see that he [i.e. the living entity] concludes [his] task. For it is seen {*darśanāt*} that he accomplishes {*upasaṃhāra*} that task which he has undertaken.<sup>333</sup>

The agency (*karṭṛtva*) of the living entity must be accepted since it is seen that the living entity takes up certain tasks and achieves certain goals. Again, this *prima facie* view is almost identical to Madhva's: '[The living entity] is the [independent] creator since it is seen {*darśanāt*} that the living entity accomplishes {*upasaṃhāra*} [some] task.'<sup>334</sup> To this objection, Baladeva replies by commenting on the latter half of the *sūtra*:

Therefore, the living entity only is the creator [of the universe] through action, but not the Lord. If [the opponent says] thus, [the *Siddhāntin* says] 'No'. Why? [Because the *sūtra* says] *kṣīravat dhi*. [That is,] since {*hi*} the accomplishment of action exists like milk {*kṣīravat*}.<sup>335</sup>

Baladeva further elaborates on the analogy of milk:

Even though it is observed that milk [arises from] a cow, it arises from *prāṇa* only, since there is a *Smṛti* text, 'That *prāṇa* causes food to mature in the form of liquid and so on.' In the same manner, even though it [i.e. the accomplishment of the task] is observed with regard to the living entity, it [arises] from the supreme Lord only because of the dependence [of the living entity on the Lord].<sup>336</sup>

<sup>331</sup> ŚrīBhā 2.1.23: *āsmakāṣṭaloṣṭatṛṇādīnām [ . . . ] brahmasvarūpaikyam yathā nopapadyate tathā cetanasyāpy anantaduḥkhaḥyogārhasya svadyo kalpasya [ . . . ] brahmabhāvānupapattiḥ /*

<sup>332</sup> ŚrīBhā 2.1.23: *sāmānādhikaranyanirdeśaḥ 'yasyātmā śarīram' ityādiśruter jīvasya brahmaśarīratvāt [ . . . ] /*

It is worth noting that although metaphysically Baladeva's view on the living entity is much closer to Rāmānuja's view, he follows Madhva's commentary in this section and does not discuss the body-soul analogy of Rāmānuja.

<sup>333</sup> GoBhā 2.1.23: *nanu nāsmādivad akartṛtvaṃ jīvasya tasyaiva kāryopasaṃhāradarśanāt / sa hi yat kāryam ārabhate tat samāpayatīti dṛṣṭam /*

<sup>334</sup> BraSūBhā (Ma) 2.1.24: *jīvena kāryopasaṃhāradarśanāt tasya kartṛtvaṃ iti [ . . . ] /*

<sup>335</sup> GoBhā 2.1.24: *tasmāt jīvasyaiva karmadvārakaṃ kartṛtvaṃ, na tv īśasyeti cen, na / kutaḥ? kṣīravat dhi / hi yataḥ jīve kāryopasaṃhāraḥ kṣīravat pravartate /*

<sup>336</sup> GoBhā 2.1.24: *yathā gavi dṛśyamānam api kṣīraṃ prāṇād eva jāyate, 'annaṃ rasādirūpeṇa prāṇaḥ pariṇamaty' ([pariṇamaty] K; pariṇamayaty M) asau' itismṛteḥ, tathā jīve dṛśyamāṇo 'pi so 'svātantryāt paresād evety ([evety] M ; avety K) arthaḥ /*

This explanation of the analogy of milk is virtually identical to Madhva's commentary on the same *sūtra*:

Even though milk is observed in relation to cows, it arises only from *prāṇa* since there is a statement, 'That *prāṇa* causes food to mature in the form of liquid and so on.' In the same manner, even though the accomplishment of the task is observed in relation to the living entity, it is only done by the supreme since [the living entity is] without independence.<sup>337</sup>

The *Smṛti* text cited by Baladeva is untraceable. Madhva quotes the same text without specifying its source. Following Madhva, Baladeva says that even though the living entity has agency (*kartṛtva*), it cannot be the independent creator of the universe since its agency is dependent on Brahman. Whereas Madhva and Baladeva discuss the agency of the living entity, in Śaṅkara's commentary on this *sūtra* he discusses the agency of Brahman, and Rāmānuja follows Śaṅkara's discussion.

Baladeva's commentary on *sūtra* 2.1.25 (*devādivad iti loke* //) again follows Madhva's commentary very closely. Baladeva starts his commentary by stating that the fact that Brahman is not seen is not contradictory to the idea that It is the creator of the universe.<sup>338</sup> Baladeva explains the reason for this statement by commenting on the *sūtra*:

[The invisibility of Brahman is not against its creatorship] since it is established that, in the world [*loke*], Indra and the other gods [*devādi*] are the agents of raining and so on, even though they are not seen; in the same manner {-*vat*}, the Lord is the creator of the universe, even though he is not seen.<sup>339</sup>

Baladeva's explanation closely follows Madhva's commentary:

Nor is it contradictory that the Lord who is the creator is not seen, since like the gods [*devādivat*][the Lord] has the power to be unseen. In the world [*loke*] also, we see that demon and so on have such capacity [to be unseen]. What more can we say about the Lord?<sup>340</sup>

Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, Madhva, and Baladeva all subscribe to the South Asian cultural view that divine figures (*devas*) control what many see as natural phenomena. Presupposing such a framework, Madhva and Baladeva argue that the invisibility of the Lord is not a defect in his creatorship since, despite the gods' invisibility, it is accepted that they control natural phenomena.

<sup>337</sup> BraSūBhā (Ma) 2.1.24: *yathā goṣu kṣīraṃ dṛśyamānam api prāṇād eva jāyate / 'annaṃ rasādirūpeṇa prāṇaḥ parinamaty* ([*parinamaty*] em.; *parinayaty*) *asau* 'itivacanāt / *evam jīve dṛśyamāno* 'pi *kāryopasaṃhāro* 'svātantryāt parakṛta eva /

<sup>338</sup> GoBhā 2.1.25: *na cānupalabdhivirodha iti* [ . . . ] /

<sup>339</sup> GoBhā 2.1.25: *adṛśyamānasyāpīndrāder loke varṣaṇādikartṛtvasiddheḥ* ([*varṣaṇādi*-] K; *varṣaṇādi*- M) / *tathā cānupalabhyamāno* 'pīśvaro viśvakarteti //

<sup>340</sup> BraSūBhā (Ma) 2.1.26: *na ca kartur īśvarasyādṛṣṭivirodhaḥ / devādivad adṛśyatvaśaktiyo-gāt / loke* 'pi *piścādīnāṃ tādṛśī śaktir dṛṣṭā, kim v īśvarasya* /

Śaṅkara offers a different interpretation of the *sūtra*, and Rāmānuja follows him. Commenting on the previous *sūtra*, Śaṅkara has argued that it is possible for Brahman to create without depending on any instruments that are external to Itself. Śaṅkara follows up this argument and says that Brahman can create the world without depending on any external means, just as in the world {*loke*} it is observed that the gods, the ancestors, and the sages {*devādivat*} can create various objects through their intention only, without any external means.<sup>341</sup> Rāmānuja follows Śaṅkara's argument and says that Brahman does not need any external means for creation since It creates by intention only (*saṅkalpamātreṇa*).<sup>342</sup>

### Summary: BraSū 2.1.21–25

Baladeva accepts the living entity's distinction from Brahman and argues against Advaita Vedānta. He is so familiar with the arguments offered by the Advaitins that he uses Śaṅkara's analogies and examples to argue against the Advaita system. In Baladeva's commentary on BraSū 2.1.21 he uses the analogy of the prison house as a part of his conclusive view. Śaṅkara originally uses this analogy as his *prima facie* view. Also in his commentary on BraSū 2.1.22, Baladeva points out that the analogies of space, the moon, and the prince used by the Advaitins do not actually support their arguments.

His knowledge of the Advaita system and his clear opposition to it can be seen as a result of the training Baladeva received in the Mādhva school. In fact, his commentary on BraSū 2.1.23–25 is virtually copied from Madhva's commentary on the same *sūtras*. Thus, it may be observed that Baladeva utilizes his learning in the Mādhva school when he argues against the oneness of Brahman and the living entity. At the same time, it must be pointed out that Baladeva's close following of Madhva does not destroy his fidelity to Jīva. Jīva is in agreement with Madhva in terms of his rejection of the unity between Brahman and the living entity.<sup>343</sup> Therefore, Baladeva's commentary on BraSū 2.1.23–25 supports my argument that Baladeva follows Madhva's theology as long as Jīva accepts it ( $G \wedge M$ ).

Baladeva's faithfulness to Jīva's teaching is distinctly seen in GoBhā 2.1.22 where Baladeva gives the analogy of the spider. Using this analogy, Jīva supports the view that Brahman is both the efficient and material cause

<sup>341</sup> BraSūBhā (Śa) 2.1.25: *yathā loke devāḥ pitara ṛṣaya ityevamādayo mahāprabhāvās cetanā api santo 'napekṣyaiva kiñcid bāhyaṃ sādhanam aiśvarya viśeṣayogād abhidhyānamātreṇa svata eva bahūni nānāsamsthāni śarīrāṇi prāsādādīni ca rathādīni ca nirmimāṇā upalabhyante man-trārthavādetihāsapurāṇaprāmāṇyāt /*

<sup>342</sup> ŚrīBhā: *yathā devādayaḥ sve sve loke saṅkalpamātreṇa svāpekṣitāni srjanti, tathā 'sau prṣottamaḥ kṛtsnaṃ jagat saṅkalpamātreṇa srjati /*

<sup>343</sup> See 3.3, 4.2.1.

of the world. Baladeva subscribes to this view, which goes sharply against Madhva, who argues that Brahman is the efficient cause only. Jīva's influence on Baladeva was also observed in the *Śruti* and the *Smṛti* texts quoted in Baladeva's commentary on BraSū 2.1.22, particularly in his reliance on the BhāPu and the ViPu.

#### 4.4.2. *Brahmasūtras* 2.3.41–43

In his commentary on BraSū 2.3.41–43,<sup>344</sup> Baladeva follows Jīva's view that the living entity is an energy (*śakti*) of Brahman, and they are both truly different (*bheda*) and truly identical (*abheda*) at the same time. This *bhedābheda* view of Baladeva's, which he takes from Jīva, differs from Madhva, who holds that only the difference between the living entity and Brahman is to be taken literally (*mukhya*); their unity is to be understood in a figurative sense (*gauṇa*) only. Rāmānuja, in contrast, says that both the difference and the unity are to be taken literally. Consequently, Baladeva's ontology is closer to Rāmānuja's than to Madhva's. In addition, at the end of GoBhā 2.3.43, Baladeva makes it clear that he follows Rāmānuja in his understanding of the nature of the living entity.

According to Baladeva, the object (*viśaya*) of discussion in *sūtra* 2.3.41 is the verse describing two birds, which is found in ŚveU 4.6 and MuU 3.1.1: 'Two birds occupy the same tree together as friends. One of them eats a palatable fig, while the other looks at [him] without eating.'<sup>345</sup> According to this passage, Baladeva argues, 'we understand that the Lord is the first whereas the living entity is the second'.<sup>346</sup> A doubt (*saṁśaya*) is raised concerning this duality: '(i) Is the living entity nothing but the Lord, who is limited by illusion or (ii) [is the living entity] like the rays of sun, distinct from Him, dependent on its relations to Him, and a portion of Him? Which option follows naturally?'<sup>347</sup> The *prima facie* view argues for the first option, which is the position of Advaita Vedānta:

The living entity is nothing but the Lord who is delimited by illusion since [the ABiU in] the *Atharva Veda* says, 'Space is enclosed by a pot. Just like when the pot is being moved, the pot may be moved [but] not space, in the same manner,

<sup>344</sup> BraSū 2.3.41: *aṁśo nānāvyaapadeśād anyathā cāpi dāsakitavāditvam adhiyata eke* //  
BraSū 2.3.42: *mantravarṇāt* //

BraSū 2.3.43: *api smaryate* //

<sup>345</sup> *dvā suparṇā sayujā sakhāyā samānaṁ vṛkṣaṁ pariśvasajāte* /  
*tayor anyah pippalaṁ svādu atti anaśnann anyo abhi cākaṣīti* //

<sup>346</sup> GoBhā 2.3.41: 'dvā suparṇā' ityādīni vākyaṇi śrūyante / *tatraika īso dvitīyas tu jīva iti pratīyate* //

<sup>347</sup> GoBhā 2.3.41: *iha saṁśayaḥ / kim īsa eva māyayā paricchinno jīvaḥ kiṁ vā raver aṁśur iva tadbhinnas tatsambandhāpekṣī tasyāṁśa iti / kiṁ prāptam?*

the living entity is like space.' And likewise, the statements such as 'That you are' may be favoured.<sup>348</sup>

We have already seen the analogy of space in Baladeva's commentary on BraSū 2.1.22. This time Baladeva uses more or less the same analogy based on a citation from the ABiU. Brahman is compared to space, the living entity to space in a pot. Space and space in the pot are identical and this sameness remains even when the pot moves. In the same way, Brahman and the living entity are identical and this sameness remains even when the living entity transmigrates from one body to another. The famous great saying (*mahāvākyā*) 'That you are' further supports this sameness.

Baladeva rejects this view by commenting on *sūtra* 2.3.41 (*aṁśo nānāvya-padeśād anyathā cāpi dāśakitavāditvam adhiyata eke//*). He explains the first word *aṁśa* as follows: 'the living entity is a portion {*aṁśa*} of the Supreme Lord, like the sunrays of the sun. They are distinct from Him [i.e. the Lord], they follow Him, and are dependent on the relationships with Him. This is the meaning.'<sup>349</sup>

Baladeva's explanation that the living entity is like the sunrays (*aṁśu*) of the sun (*aṁśumat*) reminds us of Jīva's BhaSa *Anuccheda* 16 where he compares the Lord to the sun (*sūrya*) and the living entity to the sunrays (*raśmi*).<sup>350</sup> This is a clear indication that Baladeva is consciously following Jīva's writings since his commentary diverges on this point from those of Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, and Madhva. Commenting on the word *aṁśa*, Śaṅkara explains that the living entity is a portion of the Lord as a spark (*visphuliṅga*) is of fire (*agni*).<sup>351</sup> Śaṅkara, however, says that we should not understand the word 'portion' in the literal sense since there is no real division between Brahman and the living entity.<sup>352</sup> Rāmānuja simply says that the living entity is a portion of Brahman and he does not use any analogy.<sup>353</sup> Madhva again simply states that the living entity is a portion and the Lord is the possessor of portions (*aṁśī*), referring to various untraceable sources.<sup>354</sup> Although both Rāmānuja and Madhva

<sup>348</sup> GoBhā 2.3.41: *māyayā paricchinnā īśa eva jīva iti 'ghaṭasamvṛtam ākāśaṁ niyamāne* ([*niyamāne*] K; *niyamāne* M) *ghaṭe yathā / ghaṭo niyeta nākāśaṁ tadvaj jīvo nabhopamaḥ //* (ABiU 13). *ityatharvaśruteḥ / evaṁ ca 'tat tvam asi'* (ChāU 6.8–16) *ityādivākyāny* ([*asi*'ityādi-] em. Isaacson; *asi'ādi-*) *anugrhitāni syuḥ /*

<sup>349</sup> GoBhā 2.3.41: *pareśasyaṁśo jīvaḥ aṁśur ivāṁśumatāḥ tadbhinnas tadanuyāyī tatsam-bandhāpekṣīty arthaḥ /*

<sup>350</sup> See chapter three, section four.

<sup>351</sup> BraSūBhā (Śa) 2.3.43: *jīva īśvarasyaṁśo bhavitum arhati, yathāgner visphuliṅgaḥ /*

<sup>352</sup> BraSūBhā (Śa) 2.3.43: *aṁśa ivāṁśo nahi niravayavyasya mukhyo 'mśaḥ saṁbhavati /*

<sup>353</sup> ŚrīBhā 2.3.42: [... ] *brahmāṁśa iti /*

<sup>354</sup> BraSūBhā (Ma) 2.3.43: *'aṁśā eva hīme jīvā aṁśī hi paremeśvaraḥ / svayam aṁśair idaṁ sarvaṁ kārayaty acalo hariḥ //* *itigaupavanaśrutau aṁśatvaṁ jīvasyopalabhyate /*

describe the living entity as a portion of Brahman, their understanding on what it means to be a portion differs from each other.

The reason for the statement that the living entity is a portion of Brahman is given in the second word of the *sūtra*, *nānāvyapadeśāt*, which Baladeva explains in the following manner:

[The *sūtra*] says '[because of the instruction regarding] distinction {*nānāvyapadeśāt*}'. [That is,] since the relation of distinction [between the Lord and the living entity] is taught [in the *Śrutis* and the *Smṛtis*]. [This relation of distinction is] of the nature of being the creator and the created, being the controller and the controlled, being the support and the supported, being the master and the servant, being the friend and the companion, being the one who is obtained and the one who obtains, and so on.<sup>355</sup>

In this explanation Baladeva emphasizes that the distinction between the living entity and Brahman is real. Thus, Baladeva guards against the Advaita view of the sameness between the living entity and Brahman. Baladeva's comment on the word *nānāvyapadeśāt* echoes Rāmānuja's:

The teaching of distinction [between the living entity and Brahman] is observed by facts such as [Brahman is] the creator and [the living entity] the created, the controller and the controlled, the omniscient and the ignorant, the independent and the dependent, the pure and the impure, the one with the multitude of auspicious qualities and the one with the opposite [qualities], and the Lord and the dependent.<sup>356</sup>

Following Rāmānuja, Baladeva says that we can discuss the relationship between the living entity and Brahman only if they are distinct. If they were the same, it would be impossible to talk about any relationship between the two: 'These instructions [concerning the relationship] would not be possible if there were no distinction with regard to the natures [of the living entity and Brahman].'<sup>357</sup>

After explaining the living entity as a Brahman's portion, Baladeva explains their oneness by commenting on the rest of the *sūtra*, *anyathā cāpi dāśakitavāditvam adhiyata eke*://

By other way also {*anyathā ca*}, certain ones {*eke*} [that is,] the followers of the *Atharva Vedas* also {*api*} teach {*adhiyate*} that the living entity is the one whose nature is Him [i.e. the Lord], in as much as it is pervaded by Him [i.e. the Lord]. Thus [it is said], 'Brahman is fishermen, Brahman is servants, Brahman is these rogues' {*dāśakitavāditvam*}.<sup>358</sup>

<sup>355</sup> GoBhā 2.3.41: *kutaḥ? nāneti / [ . . . ] sraṣṭṛsṛjyativānīyantrīnyamyatvādhārādheyatvasvāmīdāśatvasakhāsakhītvaprāpyaprāptṛtvādirūpanānāsambandhavyapadeśāt /*

<sup>356</sup> ŚrīBhā 2.3.42: *nānātvavyapadeśas tāvat sṛṣṭṛtvasṛjyativānīyantrīnyāmyatvasarvajñatvājñatvasvādhīnatvaparādhīnatvaśuddhatvāśuddhatvakalyāṇagunākarakatvatadviparītatvapativāśeṣatvādibir drśyate /*

<sup>357</sup> GoBhā 2.3.41: *na hy ete vyapadeśāḥ svarūpābhede sambhaveyuh /*

<sup>358</sup> GoBhā 2.3.41: *anyathā anyayā ca vidhayā tadvyāpyatayainam jīvaṃ tadātmakam eke ātharvaṇikā apy adhiyate ([adhiyate] K; adhiyante M) 'brahma dāśā ([dāśā] K; dāśā M) brahma dāśā ([dāśā] M; dāśā K) brahmeme kitavāḥ' iti /*



Baladeva explains the oneness of the living entity and Brahman in terms of the living entity being pervaded by Brahman. This explanation follows Rāmānuja. Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, and Madhva all quote the same verse attributed to the AVe,<sup>359</sup> which identifies Brahman with fishermen and so on. As one may expect, Śaṅkara takes this identity in the literal sense, and say that fishermen and so on are nothing but Brahman.<sup>360</sup>

Rāmānuja also understands the oneness of the living entity and Brahman in the literal sense. However, whereas Śaṅkara takes the distinction between them figuratively, Rāmānuja accepts the distinction also in the literal sense. Since Rāmānuja accepts both distinction and oneness in the literal senses, his understanding of the oneness between the living entity and Brahman differs from that of Śaṅkara.<sup>361</sup> According to Rāmānuja, the living entity and Brahman are one in the sense that Brahman pervades the living entity.<sup>362</sup> Baladeva offers the same interpretation.

As for Madhva, he claims that it is not possible to accept both the distinction and the oneness between the living entity and Brahman in the literal sense. Madhva supports this argument by referring to an untraceable verse attributed to the VaPu (Mesquita 2008: 318): 'Since He [i.e. the Lord] is celebrated as different and non-different from it [i.e. the living entity], it is taught that [the living entity] is a portion [of the Lord]. [However, their] difference and non-difference are not [both] in the literal sense.'<sup>363</sup> Madhva's point is that it is not possible to accept both the difference and the identity in the literal senses. One of them must be taken in the secondary, figurative sense. Since Madhva teaches the eternal distinction between the living entity and Brahman, as we saw before, he takes only the difference between them in the literal sense. Contrary to Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, and Baladeva, Madhva considers the oneness between the living entity and Brahman in the figurative sense.<sup>364</sup>

*Sūtra* 2.3.42 therefore teaches of the distinction between the living entity and Brahman in the statement *nānāvyapadeśāt*, and it also teaches of the oneness in the second half: *anyathā cāpi dāśakitavāditvam adhīyata eke*//.

<sup>359</sup> Madhva quotes the verse with a slight variation: 'brahma dāśā brahma kitavāḥ brahmaiveme dāśā' ity abhedenāpy eke 'dhīyate /

<sup>360</sup> BraSūBhā (Śa) 2.3.43: *dāśā ya ete kaivartāḥ prasiddhāḥ, ye cāmī dāsāḥ svāmīṣv ātmānam upakṣapayanti, ye cānye kitavā dyūtakṛtas te sarve brahmaiveti /*

<sup>361</sup> ŚrīBhā 2.3.42: *evam ubhayavyapadeśamukhyatvasiddhaye jīvo 'yaṁ brahmaṇo 'mśa ity abhyupagantavyaḥ /*

<sup>362</sup> ŚrīBhā 2.3.42: *brahmaṇo dāśakitavāditvam apy adhīyate / tataś ca sarvajīvavyāpītenābhedo vyapadiśyata ity arthaḥ /*

<sup>363</sup> BraSūBhā (Ma) 2.3.43: *yato bhedena tasyāyam abhedena gīyate / ataś cāmśatvam uddiṣṭaṁ bhedābhedau na mukyataḥ // iti //*

<sup>364</sup> Jayatīrtha elaborates on this in TaPra 2.3.43: *śrutidvayānyathānupapattiyā bhedam aṅgīkṛtya, abhedasthāne aṁśatvaṁ vaktavyam iti bhāvaḥ /* 'Since it is not possible [to accept] twofold-ness in the *Śruti*, after accepting the distinction [between the living entity and Brahman], we should speak of [the living entity] as a portion [of Brahman] in the place of [their] non-difference.'

Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, and Madhva understand the oneness and the distinction between the living entity and Brahman differently. Of the three, Baladeva follows Rāmānuja most closely:

	Oneness	Distinction
Śaṅkara	literal	figurative
Rāmānuja	literal	literal
Madhva	figurative	literal
Baladeva	literal	literal

After explaining the oneness of the living entity and Brahman in terms of pervasion, Baladeva rejects the Advaita explanations on their sameness:

- (i) It is not possible for the mass of consciousness to be a fisherman and so on. [This is not possible] since, if this were the case, there would be a contradiction with regard to the instruction for renunciation. And, for the Lord, there is no delimitation by illusion since He is beyond the range of it [i.e. delimitation].  
(ii) Nor is the living entity a cut-off [or] a piece of Him, like a piece of a stone cut by a hatchet since [if it were the case,] there will be a contradiction with regard to the scriptures which teach that [Brahman is] indivisible, and since transformation [of the Lord] and so on would undesirably follow.<sup>365</sup>

Baladeva clarifies that the oneness of the living entity and Brahman, even when it is taken literally, does not mean the acceptance of the Advaita position, that is, that the living entity *is* Brahman. His first argument is against the theory of illusion. When the AVe says Brahman is fishermen and so on, it does not mean Brahman deludes Itself. Fishermen, servants, and rogues are particularly mentioned as people who do not have the quality of renunciation. The fact that these people need to develop their sense of renunciation in order to realize Brahman indicates that they are by nature different from Brahman. Besides, Brahman is beyond illusion.

The second argument is against the theory of limiting adjunct (*upādhi*). It is not possible for Brahman to be divided into different living entities since It is indivisible. Baladeva borrows this criticism from Rāmānuja who says: "The fact that [the living entity is] a portion {*aṁśa*} [of Brahman] does not mean the living entity is a piece of Brahman, since Brahman cannot be divided."<sup>366</sup>

<sup>365</sup> GoBhā 2.3.42: *na vā caitanyaghanasya dāsādibhāvaḥ* ([*dāsādi*-] em. Isaacson; *dāsādi*- K, M) / *tathā sati vairāgyopadeśavyākopāt / na ceśasya māyayā paricchedaḥ, tasya tadaviśayatvāt / na ca śaṅkacchinnaḥ pāṣāṇakhaṇḍavat tacchinnaś tatkhāṇḍo jīvaḥ, acchedyatvaśāstravyākopāt vikārādyāpatteś ca /*

<sup>366</sup> ŚrīBhā 2.3.42: *na ca brahmakhaṇḍo jīva ity aṁśatvopapattiḥ, khaṇḍanānarhatvād brahmaṇaḥ* [...]/

So far, Baladeva has followed Rāmānuja closely. This is natural since Baladeva follows Jīva's ontology, which is close to Rāmānuja's. There is, however, a crucial difference between Jīva and Rāmānuja in that Jīva propounds the theory of energy (*śakti*).<sup>367</sup> At this point Baladeva makes it clear that he follows Jīva by introducing the language of energy:

The living entity, who has the relationships [with Him] such as being created by Him, [and] who is distinct from Him, is said to be His portion {*aṁśa*} since [the living entity] is being subordinate to Him. And the fact that it is so is established because it [i.e. the living entity] is His energy (*śakti*).<sup>368</sup>

According to Baladeva, the living entity is Brahman's portion in the sense that it is Its energy. Baladeva backs up his statement by citing ViPu 6.7.61:

The energy of Viṣṇu is called the highest, and [the energy] which is called 'the knower of the field' is said to be lower. [And the energy] which is called 'the one whose effect is ignorance' is acknowledged as the third energy.<sup>369</sup>

In this citation, the energy called 'the knower of the field (*kṣetrajñā*)' refers to the living entity as an energy of Viṣṇu. Baladeva is conscious of Jīva since, as shown in chapter three, section four, Jīva cites the same verse when he argues in BhaSa *Anuccheda* 16 that the living entity is the Lord's liminal energy (*taṭasthaśakti*). Baladeva summarizes his view of the living entity as Brahman's portion:

Obviously, Brahman is one entity, possessing the energies, [and] the living entity, which is a Brahman's energy, is a Brahman's minute portion since it is one part of Brahman. Thus the fact that [the living entity] is subordinate to Him is easily established.<sup>370</sup>

The living entity and Brahman are one in the sense that the former is the latter's energy. They are, however, distinct in as much as a part is not the same as the whole.

In the beginning of GoBhā 2.3.41, the *prima facie* view stated its Advaita view based on the analogy of space in ABiU 13 and the ChāU passage *tat tvam asi*. Baladeva comes back to this point and explains that the oneness of the living entity and Brahman does not mean their sameness:

As for a statement such as '[Space is enclosed by] a pot' [in the ABiU], [such a statement] is appropriate [since we] say that when the conditioning [of the living

<sup>367</sup> See chapter three, section four.

<sup>368</sup> GoBhā 2.3.41: *tatsrjyadvādisambandhavāms tadbhinno jīvas tadupasarjanatvāt tadamśa ucyate / tattvaṁ ca tasya tacchaktitvāt siddham /*

<sup>369</sup> *viṣṇuśaktiḥ parā proktā kṣetrajñākhyā tathāparā / avidyākarmasañjñānyā tṛtīyā śaktir īsyate //*

<sup>370</sup> GoBhā 2.3.41: *brahma khalu śaktimad ekaṁ vastu brahmaśaktir jīvo brahmaikadeśatvāt brahmāṁśo bhavatīti tadupasarjātvaṁ sughaṭam /*

entity] is destroyed, there is a similarity between the two [i.e. the living entity and Brahman]. It is said *tat tvam asi*. This also conveys [points] such as the latter [i.e. the living entity] exists depending on the former [i.e. Brahman] for the reasons such as the *Śruti* statements mentioned before. But it does not teach another [i.e. the passage does not teach the sameness between the living entity and Brahman]. Therefore the living entity is different from the Lord.<sup>371</sup>

According to Baladeva, the analogy of space and space in a pot does not explain that Brahman and the living entity are ultimately the same. Rather, the analogy explains the similarity (*sāyujya*) between them. As for the statement *tat tvam asi*, Baladeva clarifies his explanation in the Sūṭī:

It is said, *tat tvam asi*. *Tat* is earlier whereas *tvam* is later. [This statement] informs that the living entity, who is later, which is the meaning of *tvam*, exists subservient to the Supreme Self, which is the meaning of *tat* indicated earlier since by nature, [the Supreme Self] is the cause [of the living entity].<sup>372</sup>

Again, Baladeva argues that the statement *tat tvam asi* teaches the living entity's dependence on Brahman but it does not teach their sameness.

### BraSū 2.3.42

The next two *sūtras* provide the scriptural evidence for the idea expressed in the previous *sūtra*, namely that the living entity is a portion of Brahman. According to Baladeva, *sūtra* 2.3.42 *mantravarṇāt* // refers to a ṚVe passage:

'All the beings are His foot [*pāda*].' Thus the word {*varṇa*} of a *Śruti* passage {*mantra*} also says that the living entity is a minute portion of Brahman. For, as for the words 'portion [*aṁśa* in the previous *sūtra*]' and 'foot [*pāda* in the ṚVe passage]', [these two words] do not express different meanings. Here, when the *Śruti* passage expresses the multiplicity, saying 'all the beings', we should understand the word *aṁśa* in the *sūtra* [i.e. BraSū 2.3.41], whose ending is the singular case, in the sense of class.<sup>373</sup>

Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, and Madhva all refer to the same ṚVe passage as Baladeva. Baladeva explains that the ṚVe passage cited expresses the same idea as the previous *sūtra*, since the word 'foot (*pāda*)' in the passage and 'portion

<sup>371</sup> GoBhā 2.3.41: *ghaṭetyādivākyam tūpādhihānau tayoh sāyujyam bruvat saṅgatam* / '*tat tvam asi*' *ity etad api parasya pūrvāyattavṛttikatvādi bodhayati pūrvoktaśrutyādibhyo na tv anyat / tasmāt īśāt jīvasyāsti bhedaḥ* / This translation has been revised based on the suggestions by Dr. Hirst and Dr. Killingley.

<sup>372</sup> *tat tvam asīti / tad ity pūrvam tvam iti tu param / tadbhāvenopādānāt parasya tvampadārthasya jīvasya pūrvanirdīśatatpadārthaparamātmādhīnavṛttikatvam bodhayati [...]*

<sup>373</sup> GoBhā 2.3.42: '*pādo* 'sya *viśvā* ([*viśvā*] Aufrecht 1877; *sarvā* K, M) *bhūtāni*' (ṚVe. 10.90.3c) *iti mantravarṇo 'pi jīvasya brahmāṁśatvam āha / aṁśapādaśabdau tu hy anarthāntaravācakai / iha viśvā* ([*viśvā*] em; *sarvā* K, M) *bhūtānīti bahutve śraute sūtre aṁśaśabdo jātyabhiprāyeṇaikavacanānto bodhyaḥ* /

(*aṁśa*)' in the *sūtra* have the same meaning. Both Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja share the same view.<sup>374</sup> As for the difference between the plural case used in the R̥Ve passage for denoting 'all the beings', and the singular case used in the previous *sūtra* for denoting 'portion (*aṁśa*)', Baladeva says this is not a problem since the latter denotes a class (*jāti*) and therefore there is no difficulty accommodating the sense of plurality. This explanation is taken from Rāmānuja's commentary on the same *sūtra*.<sup>375</sup>

### BraSū 2.3.43

According to Baladeva, *sūtra* 2.3.43 *api smaryate* // explains that the *Smṛti* literatures also claim that the living entity is a portion of Brahman. Baladeva first quotes BhaGī 15.7ab: 'In the world of the living entity, the living entity is My minute portion and it is eternal.'<sup>376</sup> Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, and Madhva all quote the same passage in their commentaries on the *sūtra*. Baladeva explains the BhaGī passage as follows:

Thus here, the sacred BhaGī, expressing that [the living entity] is eternal, sets aside [the view that] the living entity is related to the limiting adjunct. Therefore, the living entity who is dependent on the relationships with Him is His minute portion. The fact that it [i.e. the living entity] is a doer and so on is also dependent on Him.<sup>377</sup>

In the BhaGī passage quoted, the living entity is described as eternal (*sanātana*). Therefore, Baladeva rejects the Advaita argument that the living entity realizes its sameness with Brahman when the limiting adjunct (*upādhi*) is removed. According to Baladeva, the living entity is eternally distinct from the Lord and dependent on Him as His minute portion.

Baladeva then cites the following verses attributed to the PaPu, as another reference from the *Smṛti* literatures that supports the idea of the living entity being a portion of the Lord:

[The living entity is] the locus of cognition, one who has the quality of knowledge, who is conscious, superior to *prakṛti*, not born, without transformation, one whose nature is one, and one who has its own nature. And [it is] minute, eternal, one whose nature is all pervading, one whose nature is consciousness and bliss, the object [expressed by the word] 'I'; it is without change, witnessing, its nature is separate [from the Lord], and eternal. [It] indeed cannot be burned, cannot be

<sup>374</sup> BraSūBhā (Śa) 2.3.44: *aṁśaḥ pādo bhāga ity anarthāntaram* / ŚrīBhā 2.3.43: *aṁśavācī hi pādaśabdah* /

<sup>375</sup> ŚrīBhā 2.3.43: *viśvabhūtāni iti jivānām bahutvāt bahuvacanam mantrā / sūtre 'py aṁśa ity ekavacanam jātyabhiprāyam* /

<sup>376</sup> *mamāivāṁśo jivaloke jivabhūtaḥ sanātanaḥ* /

<sup>377</sup> GoBhā 2.3.43: *śrībhāgavatā iha sanātanatvoktyā jīvasyaupādhikatvaṁ nirastam / tasmāt tatsambandhāpekṣī jīvas tadaṁśa iti / tatkartṛtvādikam api tadāyattam* /

cut, cannot be wetted, cannot be dried up, and it is imperishable. [It is] endowed with qualities such as these, and verily being secondary to the supreme. The living entity, which is the knower of the field, always subservient, is expressed by the letter 'M' [of 'A-U-M']. It is the servant of the Lord only and of no one else, at any time.<sup>378</sup>

Jīva quotes the same passages in his PaSa *Anuccheda* 19 and also attributes them to the PaPu.<sup>379</sup> According to Jīva, these passages describe the living entity's nature (*svarūpa*).<sup>380</sup>

After the untraceable citation attributed to the PaPu, Baladeva explains his view of the individual self (*ātman*) in terms of light (*prakāśa*):

As is well-known, light is of two kinds, based on the difference between quality [*guṇa*] and substance [*dravya*]. The first [i.e. light as quality] is the manifestation of its own substrate. The second [i.e. light as substance], however, is a particular thing, which is the cause of the manifestation of itself and others. And that [i.e. a particular thing which is the cause of the manifestation of itself and others] is precisely the self.<sup>381</sup>

Light can be seen as a quality, having a flame as its substrate. It is a quality which manifests from a flame. At the same time it can be seen as a substance also, since a flame as a substrate of light is nothing but light. According to Baladeva, the self (*ātman*) is analogous to light as a substance, which illuminates both itself and others. Baladeva further highlights this particular nature of light as a substance, using the analogy of lamp (*dīpa*):

A lamp, while illuminating the eyes, also makes its own form manifest only by itself. However, a pot and so on do not possess illumination, [and are] dependent on a lamp and so on [to manifest themselves]. Therefore, this [i.e. the lamp] is self-illuminating.<sup>382</sup>

<sup>378</sup> GoBhā 2.3.43: *jñānāśrayo jñānaguṇaś cetanaḥ prakṛteḥ parāḥ / na jāto nirvikāraś ca ekarūpaḥ svarūpabhāk // anur nityo vyāptiśīlaś cidānandātmakas tathā / ahamartho 'vyayaḥ sāksī bhinnarūpaḥ sanātanaḥ // adāhryo 'cchedyo 'kledyo 'śoṣyo 'kṣara eva ca / evamādiguṇair yuktaḥ śeṣabhūtaḥ parasya vai // makāreṇocyate jīvaḥ kṣetrajñāḥ paravān sadā / dāsabhūto harer eva nānyasyaiva kadācana //*

<sup>379</sup> Mesquita does not list this quote as one of the untraceable citations found in Madhva's works. I have not been able to find it in Madhva's works either. Also I have been unable to locate the verses in the PaPu currently available. Apart from the visible influence of BhaGī 2.24, and 7.5, the identity of the quote remains unknown.

<sup>380</sup> PaSa *Anuccheda* 19: *jīvas tasya ca [...] svarūpalakṣaṇaṃ pādmottarakhaṇḍādikam anurūpaḥ [...] /*

<sup>381</sup> GoBhā 2.3.43: *prakāśaḥ khalu guṇadravyabhedaṇa dvibhedaḥ / prathamāḥ svāśrayasya sphūrṭiḥ / dvitīyas tu svaparaspūrṭihetur vastuviśeṣaḥ / sa cātmaiva /*

<sup>382</sup> GoBhā 2.3.43: *dīpaś cakṣuḥ prakāśayan svarūpasphūrṭiṃ ca svayam eva karotī, na tu ghaṭādi prakāśavat tadādisāpekṣaḥ / tasmād ayaṃ ([ayaṃ] K; yam M) svayam prakāśaḥ /*

A lamp, which is light as a substance, illuminates both itself and others, whereas a pot, for example, depends on a lamp for its illumination. The uniqueness of a lamp is that its illuminating power comes from itself. In the same manner, the self is capable of illuminating itself and others without depending on anything external. Baladeva, however, points out a fundamental difference between a lamp and the self in that the former is unconscious (*jāḍya*):

Nonetheless [a lamp] does not illuminate itself, since it is unconscious with regard to itself. The self, however, while illuminating other [objects] also by itself, it illuminates with regard to itself. Therefore, it is said that that which is illuminating by itself for itself is of the nature of consciousness.<sup>383</sup>

While a lamp illuminates itself and others, it is not aware of itself. In contrast, the self is one whose nature is conscious (*cit*), which means that it is aware of itself as well as others through its illumination.

Baladeva's view of the self is inherited from Rāmānuja. His discussion of light as quality and as substance, and the analogy of lamp are both found in the ŚrīBhā on BraSū 1.1.1:

Nor is it the case that the knower, the meaning of the word 'I', is dependent on others for its illumination, since it is self-illuminating. To explain: self-illuminating means being conscious by nature. That which has an illuminating nature is not dependent on others for its illumination, like a lamp. [...] A lamp, which has an illuminating nature, illuminates itself as well as others by its own light. It comes down to saying the following: just as a flame as a substance, which is singular only, exists in the form of light and the possessor of light—even though light is a quality of the flame which is a substance, still it is nothing but the flame as a substance [...]—in the same way, the self, whose nature is nothing but intellect, possesses the quality of consciousness. For, having consciousness as its nature means being self-illuminating.<sup>384</sup>

Rāmānuja explains the relation between the self (*ātman*) and consciousness (*cit*) using the analogy of a flame as a substance (*dravya*) and light as its quality (*guṇa*). Julius Lipner succinctly summarizes Rāmānuja's view of the self and consciousness:

[...] it is the nature of the *ātman* to produce conscious acts. Consciousness is the way of the *ātman*'s self-expression; consequently it enjoys a *sui-generis* relationship with the *ātman*. As constituting the *ātman*'s essence, it exists substantively;

<sup>383</sup> GoBhā 2.3.43: *tathāpi svaṃ prati na prakāśate svasmin jādyāt / ātmā tu svayaṃ paraṃ ca prakāśayan svaṃ prati prakāśate / ataḥ svasmai svayaṃ prakāśaḥ yad asau cidrūpa iti //*

<sup>384</sup> *na cāsau jñātā ahamartha 'nyādhīnaprakāśaḥ svayamparakāśatvāt / caitanyasvabhāvatā hi svayamparakāśatā / yaḥ prakāśasvabhāvaḥ so 'nanyādhīnaprakāśaḥ dipavat / [...] dipaḥ prakāśasvabhāvaḥ svayaṃ eva prakāśate, anyān api prakāśayati svaprabhaya / etad uktaṃ bhavati / yathāikam eva tejodrayaṃ prabhāprabhāvad rūpenāvatīṣṭhate / yady api prabhā prabhāvad-dravyaguṇabhūtā tathāpi tejodrayaṃ eva [...] evaṃ ātmā cidrūpa eva caitanyaguṇaka iti / cidrūpatā hi svayamparakāśatā /*

as separate acts of consciousness characterising and flowing from the *ātman*, it acts attributively. This is what Rāmānuja is trying to articulate when he says that the *ātman* both is of the form of consciousness (*cidrūpa*) and has consciousness for its quality. (1986: 52)

Rāmānuja provides the distinction between the self and consciousness in order to reject the Advaita view that Brahman is consciousness only, without any agenthood:

[Rāmānuja] stresses that the *ātman* and consciousness cannot be identified without remainder. In the final analysis, this is what the Advaitin does, and in the process is dissolved not only the distinction between the conscious subject, the knowing-act and the object known, but also the plurality of individual selves, in an infinite, homogeneous, non-individualised expanse of Knowing (*jñāptimātra*): a position clearly calculated to strike a mortal blow at the root of theistic religion. Rāmānuja, in contrast, wanted very much to keep the mustard-tree of faith vigorously alive, and to do this it was necessary to show that the *ātman* is not consciousness, but that there are conscious selves. And to do this it was necessary to establish the distinction between the knowing subject and its—albeit unique—quality, consciousness. (Lipner 1986: 52)

According to the definition of the Lord in the preamble it is clear that Baladeva argues for the same point.<sup>385</sup> He declares that Brahman is not only knowledge or consciousness (*jñāna*) but also a knowing subject (*jñātṛ*); and the same applies to the living entity since it is a portion of Brahman. Therefore, following Rāmānuja, Baladeva accepts that the individual self is both a knowing subject as well as consciousness.

Baladeva follows Rāmānuja in his discussion on the living entity since Jīva follows him. We have seen that the untraceable PaPu verses Baladeva quotes can be found in Jīva's PaSa *Anuccheda* 19. After the untraceable passages from the PaPu, Jīva quotes the following verses attributed to Jāmātṛ Muni (1370–1443),<sup>386</sup> a Śrī Vaiṣṇava writer after Rāmānuja:

The self is neither a demigod, nor a man, nor an animal nor a plant, nor a body, nor is it the senses, the mind, the breath, or the intelligence. It is not insentient, it is not changing, and it is not knowledge only. It illuminates by itself for itself. It is of one nature, possessing its own nature. It is sentient, all-pervasive, conscious and blissful. The self is the meaning of the word 'I'; it is a locus, it is distinct, minute, eternally devoid of impurities, having the qualities of being the knower, the doer, the enjoyer, and so on; by nature it always has the supreme Self as its sole refuge, and is independent.<sup>387</sup>

<sup>385</sup> See 4.2.1.

<sup>386</sup> For more detailed information on Jāmātṛ Muni, see Dasgupta 1932–1954: Vol. 3, 134–138.

<sup>387</sup> PaSa *Anuccheda* 19: *śrījāmātṛmunināpy upadiṣṭam, yathā—  
ātmā na devo na naro na tiryak sthāvaro na ca /  
na deho nendriyaṃ naiva manaḥ prāṇo na nāpi dhīḥ //*



In this quote Jāmātṛ Muni states that the self is not only knowledge (*jñāna-mātra*) but also the knower (*jñātṛ*) and so on. Baladeva's definition of consciousness referred to earlier, that is, that it is 'that which is illuminating by itself for itself' echoes Jāmātṛ Muni's description of the self: that it 'illuminates by itself for itself'. After this citation from Jāmātṛ Muni, Jīva adds that this explanation is also in accordance with the commentary of Rāmānuja.<sup>388</sup> From these references it is clear that Jīva follows Rāmānuja in his understanding of the living entity, and Baladeva follows Rāmānuja through Jīva.

#### 4.4.3. Conclusion

When Baladeva emphasizes the distinction between the living entity and Brahman in GoBhā 2.1.23–25, he follows Madhva's commentary closely. In GoBhā 2.3.41–43, however, he shows his clear affinity with Rāmānuja and Jīva.

In this section Baladeva continues to reject the Advaita understanding of the sameness between the living entity and Brahman. According to Baladeva, BraSū 2.3.41 teaches not only the difference but also the unity between them. He takes both the difference and the unity in the literal senses. In this regard Baladeva's view is ontologically close to Rāmānuja's. Baladeva's divergence from Madhva is clear on this point since Madhva accepts only their difference in the primary sense.

Baladeva follows Rāmānuja's explanation of the self as the substrate of consciousness. He adopts the analogy of the lamp from Rāmānuja and explains consciousness in terms of substance and quality. By accepting Rāmānuja's view Baladeva rejects the Advaita view that Brahman is consciousness only, bereft of any agenthood.

Baladeva accepts Rāmānuja's *bhedābheda* view as well as his analysis of the self in relation to consciousness since Jīva accepts them. It is natural that Baladeva's ontology is similar to that of Rāmānuja since Baladeva follows Jīva who holds that the living entity and Brahman are both one and different. In terms of his understanding of the self and consciousness, Jīva follows the Viśiṣṭādvaita view in PaSa *Anuccheda* 19 by directly referring to Rāmānuja and Jāmātṛ Muni.

*na jaḍo na vikārī ca jñānamātrātmako na ca /  
svasmai svayaṃ prakāśaḥ syād ekarūpaḥ svarūpabhāk //  
cetano vyāptiśīlaś ca cidānandātmakas tathā /  
ahamarthaḥ pratikṣetraṃ bhinno 'ñur nityanirmalaḥ //  
tathā jñātṛtvakartṛtvabhoktṛtvanijadharmakaḥ /  
paramātmakaśeṣatvasabhāvaḥ sarvadā svataḥ // iti /*  
<sup>388</sup> PaSa *Anuccheda* 19: *śrīrāmānujabhāṣyānusāreṇa vyākhyā ceyam /*




Fig. 4.3 Theological Overlaps between Jīva, Madhva, and Rāmānuja

Though Baladeva follows Rāmānuja closely in GoBhā 2.3.41–43, ultimately Baladeva is on the side of Jīva. Interpreting *aṃśa* in BraSū 2.3.41, Baladeva uses the analogy of the sun and sunrays. In the same *sūtra* he explains that the living entity is an energy of Brahman (*śakti*), citing ViPu 6.7.61. Baladeva's explanation of *aṃśa* as sunrays and his citation of ViPu 6.7.61 suggest that he is following Jīva's understanding of the nature of the living entity in the BhaSa *Anuccheda* 16. Summarizing Baladeva's relation to Rāmānuja, therefore, it may be proposed that, as in relation to Madhva, Baladeva follows Rāmānuja on the points which Jīva accepts ( $J \wedge R$ ). At the same time, Baladeva readily follows Jīva if Jīva differs from Rāmānuja  $\{(J) - (J \wedge R)\}$ .

#### 4.5. BALADEVA ON ŚRĪ

In the previous two sections, 4.3 and 4.4, we examined Brahman's relation to *prakṛti* and to the living entity. According to Baladeva, *prakṛti* and the living entity are united with Brahman in the sense that they are the energies (*śakti*) of Brahman. At the same time, Baladeva makes it clear that their unity does not indicate that they are completely identical. Therefore, Baladeva holds the view that *prakṛti* and the living entity are both one with and different from Brahman (*bhedābheda*).

As mentioned,<sup>389</sup> ViPu 6.7.61 mentions three energies of Viṣṇu: supreme (*parā*), the knower of field (*kṣetrajña*), and the one whose effect is ignorance

<sup>389</sup> See 3.4, 4.3, 4.4.2.

(*avidyākarma*). The second one corresponds to the living entity and the third to *prakṛti*. In GoBhā 3.3.39–42,<sup>390</sup> Baladeva discusses Viṣṇu's supreme energy (*parāśakti*). According to Baladeva, this energy represents all the qualities (*guṇa*) of the Lord. The supreme energy and the Lord are non-different from each other, just as are a quality (*guṇa*) and its substrate (*guṇin*). Therefore, Brahman is with qualities (*saviśeṣa*). Baladeva thus argues against the Advaita view of Brahman being without qualities (*nirviśeṣa*).

The supreme energy is also identified with Śrī, the consort of Viṣṇu. Śrī, therefore, is ultimately non-different from Viṣṇu and eternally accompanies Him. Baladeva follows Jīva concerning this identification of Viṣṇu's consort with His energy. As will be shown later in this section, based on the oneness of Śrī and Viṣṇu, Baladeva argues for the oneness of Rādhā and Kṛṣṇa. This reflects the controversy regarding their worship in the Gauḍīya tradition. It was shown that Jaiśingh II felt the extramarital relationship between Rādhā and Kṛṣṇa to be problematic.<sup>391</sup> Baladeva attempts to justify the worship of Rādhā and Kṛṣṇa by suggesting that they are ontologically non-different.

#### 4.5.1. *Brahmasūtra* 3.3.39

According to Baladeva, the topic of discussion under the *sūtra* is whether the characteristics (*viśeṣa*) of the Lord are illusory or inherent in Him.<sup>392</sup> According to the *prima facie* view they are illusory, citing BṛĀU 2.3.6,<sup>393</sup> and 4.4.19.<sup>394</sup> Baladeva rejects this view in his commentary on *sūtra* 3.3.39 *saiva hi satyādayaḥ* /. Baladeva cites ŚveU 6.8,<sup>395</sup> and ViPu 6.7.61,<sup>396</sup> to point out that Viṣṇu has various energies and they are innate in Him. Then Baladeva identifies Viṣṇu's supreme energy (*parāśakti*) with His qualities such as truth {*satyādi*}:

<sup>390</sup> These *sūtras* are:

BraSū 3.3.39: *saiva hi satyādayaḥ* /

BraSū 3.3.40: *kāmāditaratra tatra cā 'yatanādibhyaḥ* /

BraSū 3.3.41: *ādarādalopaḥ* /

BraSū 3.3.42: *upasthite 'tastadvacanāt* /

<sup>391</sup> See 1.4.1.

<sup>392</sup> GoBhā 3.3.39: *viśeṣa māyikāḥ svābhāvikā veti saṁśayaḥ* /

<sup>393</sup> *athāta ādeśo neti neti* / 'Then, therefore, the instruction is "There is not" "There is not".'

<sup>394</sup> *neha nānāsti kiñcana* / 'In this world, there is no diversity whatsoever.'

<sup>395</sup> *na tasya kāryaṁ karaṇaṁ ca vidyate na tatsamaś cābhyadhikaś ca dṛśyate* /

*parāśya śaktir vividhaiva śrūyate svābhāviki jñānabalakriyā ca* //

'For Him, there is neither effect nor cause. Moreover, we do not see anyone equal to Him or superior to Him. His supreme energy is indeed manifold, innate, and which is the performance of His cognition and strength.'

<sup>396</sup> *viṣṇuśaktiḥ parā proktā kṣetrajñākhyā tathāparā* /  
*avidyākarmasaṁjñānyā tṛtīyā śaktir iṣyate* //

'The energy of Viṣṇu is called the highest, and [the energy] which is called "the knower of the field" is said to be lower. [And the energy] which is called "the one whose effect is ignorance" is acknowledged as the third energy.'

[Viṣṇu's] own energy is called *parā*, something other than illusion. It is innate like hotness is innate to fire. Since {*hi*} that very thing [*saiva*]{i.e. *parāśakti*} is [His] qualities {*satyādayaḥ*}, therefore they are not illusory but connected to the nature [of Brahman]. This is the meaning. [ . . . ] By the word *ādi* [in *satyādayaḥ*], we should also understand purity, compassion, patience, and so on, as well as omniscience, dominion over all, bliss, loveliness, and so on.<sup>397</sup>

Baladeva differs from Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, and Madhva in this interpretation of the *sūtra*. As for the reasons why the highest energy of Viṣṇu is identified with His qualities, Baladeva explains this in the next *sūtra*.<sup>398</sup>

Baladeva then cites verses from the ViPu where Parāśara explains to Maitreya that the word *bhagavat* means that the Lord has qualities:

The letter *bha* is endowed with two meanings, [namely] the total-supporter and the protector. Furthermore, O sage, the meanings of the letter *ga* are: the one who leads [the worshipper to attain their own purity], the one who guides [them to His own abode], [and] the one who creates [variegated bliss for them in His own abode]. [The combined word] *bha-ga* is the term for six [qualities, namely] complete majesty, complete prowess, complete fame, complete beauty, and also complete knowledge and complete renunciation. Furthermore, the meanings of *va* [are that] He is the Self of the beings, the one in whom all beings dwell, and He [dwells] in all beings.<sup>399</sup>

Therefore He is imperishable. Knowledge, energy, might, sovereignty, heroism, splendour in full are expressed by the word *bhagavat*. He is devoid of any qualities which can be transcended [by others].<sup>400</sup>

Baladeva points out that all these qualities, expressed by the syllables in the word *bhagavat* and their combinations, namely, *bha*, *ga*, *va*, *bha-ga*, and *bha-ga-vat*, are inherent in the supreme energy (*parāśakti*) of the Lord, which is non-different from Him.<sup>401</sup>

<sup>397</sup> GoBhā 3.3.39: *māyetaṛā vahnnyuṣṇateva svābhāvikī yā parākhyā svarūpaśaktir uktā, saiva hi yasmāt satyādayo viśeṣā bhavanty atas te na māyikā api tv ātmānubandhinaḥ syur ity arthaḥ* / [ . . . ] *ādisabdāt śaucadayākṣāntyādayaḥ sārvaññyasārvaiśvaryānandasauṇḍaryādayaś* ([*sārvaj-ñya*-] K; *sārvajña*- M) *ca bodhyāḥ* /

<sup>398</sup> GoBhā 3.3.39: *satyādinām guṇānām parātve vakṣyamānāv āyatanau hetu draṣṭavyau* /

<sup>399</sup> ViPu 6.5.73–75: *sambharteti tathā bhartā bhakāro 'rthadvayānvitāḥ* /

*netā gamayitā sraṣṭā gakārārthas tathā mune* //  
*aiśvaryaśya samagrasya vīryasya yaśasaḥ śriyaḥ* /  
*jñānavairāgyayoś cāpi ṣaṇṇām bhaga itīṅganā* //  
*vasanti yatra bhūtāni bhūtātmany akhilātmani* /  
*sa ca bhūteṣv aśeṣeṣu vakārārthas tato 'vyayaḥ* //

<sup>400</sup> ViPu 6.5.79: *jñānaśaktibalaiśvarya-vīryatejāṃsy aśeṣataḥ* /

*bhagavacchabdavācyaṇi vinā heyair guṇādibhiḥ* //

The meaning of the last verse is that the Lord does not simply possess qualities but possesses them in an absolute manner, i.e. His qualities cannot be transcended [*heya*] by others.

<sup>401</sup> GoBhā 3.3.39: *tathā ca tatsvarūpābhinnā paraiva* / *tatra satyādayo viśeṣā bhavantīti dhyeyaṃ dharminirbhedaṃ iti siddham* //

Baladeva's discussion on this *sūtra* is not in line with those of his predecessors. Commenting on the *sūtra*, Śaṅkara discusses BṛĀU 5.4.1 and 5.5.2, and Rāmānuja BṛĀU 3.4.1 and 3.4.2. Madhva does discuss the qualities of Brahman, but in relation to ChāU 7.16–26, which Baladeva does not mention in his commentary.

#### 4.5.2. *Brahmasūtra* 3.3.40

After identifying the qualities of the Lord with His supreme energy (*parāśakti*), Baladeva says that the supreme energy is none other than Śrī, the consort of Viṣṇu. According to Baladeva, the topics of discussion in *sūtra* 3.3.40 are the following three Upaniṣadic verses:

Obeisance to the one whose eyes are like lotuses, obeisance to the one who is garlanded with lotuses, obeisance to the one who has a navel like a lotus, obeisance to the one who is the Lord of Kamalā [i.e. Lakṣmī].<sup>402</sup>

Obeisance to Govinda, who is beautiful, decorated with peacock feathers, who is lovely, whose intelligence is ever fresh, who is the swan in the Mānasa lake of Ramā [i.e. Lakṣmī].<sup>403</sup>

Obeisance to Rāma, whose form is the Vedas and so on, who is the letter *Om*, who is the locus of Ramā [i.e. Lakṣmī] [and whose form is the Self].<sup>404</sup>

All the verses mention Lakṣmī or Śrī in relation to the Lord. Concerning Lakṣmī, Baladeva raises a question: 'Is this Śrī non-eternal because [she is] derived from *prakṛti* or is she eternal because [she is] the supreme energy [of the Lord]?'<sup>405</sup> According to the *prima facie* view she is non-eternal since Brahman does not have any qualities such as beauty.<sup>406</sup>

Commenting on *sūtra* 3.3.40 *kāmādītaratra tatra cāyatanādibhyaḥ* //, Baladeva rejects this view and argues that Śrī is eternal because she is the

<sup>402</sup> GoTāU 1.36: *namaḥ kamalanetrāya namaḥ kamalamāline / namaḥ kamalanābhāya kamalāpataye namaḥ* //

Baladeva attributes this and the following verses to the *Atharvaśiras*. However, these verses are not found in the *Atharvaśiras Upaniṣad*, which is dedicated to Rudra. However, these verses do appear in the GoTāU. Baladeva regularly refers to the GoTāU as *atharvaśiras* (GoBhā 3.2.14, 3.3.6, 3.3.32, 3.3.42). The reason for this attribution is not clear. Baladeva may have used the term to indicate the GoTāU, by interpreting *atharvaśiras* to mean 'the best of the *Atharva Veda*'. This hypothesis, however, presupposes that the *Atharvaśiras Upaniṣad* dedicated to Rudra did not exist or at least was not known in North India around the eighteenth century.

<sup>403</sup> GoTāU 1.37: *barhāpīḍābhīrāmāya rāmāyākuṇṭhamedhase / ramāmānasahaṁsāya govindāya namo namaḥ* //

<sup>404</sup> Rāmātāpini Upaniṣad 1.4.13: *namo vedādirūpāya omkāraya namo namaḥ / ramādhārāya rāmāya śrīrāmāyātmamūrtaye* //

<sup>405</sup> GoBhā 3.3.40: *atra bhavati vīkṣā śrīr iyaṁ prākṛtatvād anityota parātvān* ([*anityota parātvān*] K *anityotaparātvān* M) *nityeti* /

<sup>406</sup> GoBhā 3.3.40: '*athāta ādeśo neti neti*' *iti paramātmāni niḥśeṣaviśeṣapratīṣedhāt, na tatra śrīyādirūpaḥ kaścid viśeṣaḥ sambhavī* /

Lord's supreme energy. Baladeva supplies *saiva* from the previous *sūtra* and declares:

Śrī, who is none other than the supreme energy {*saiva*} [of the Lord], manifests the desire and so on {*kāmādi*} of the supreme Self who is her own master. Therefore, He is the one who is always with Śrī.<sup>407</sup>

According to Baladeva, Śrī manifests the Lord's desire both in this world {*itaratra*} and in the transcendental realm {*tatra ca*}.<sup>408</sup> Furthermore, *āyatanādibhyaḥ* explains the reasons why Śrī can be identified with the Lord's supreme energy: '[Śrī is nothing but *parāśakti*] because of [her] pervasion {*āyāt*} and because [she] spreads the bliss of liberation among devotees {*tanāt*}'.<sup>409</sup>

Śrī is identical with the supreme energy of the Lord since both share the same unique properties such as omnipresence (*vibhutva*) and the ability to bestow liberation (*mokṣapradatva*).<sup>410</sup> Because of these two properties, Baladeva adds, Śrī is non-different from the Lord just like the qualities such as being real (*satyādi*) are.<sup>411</sup> Commenting on the previous *sūtra*, Baladeva explained that these two properties, that is, being omnipresent and liberation-bestowing are the reasons why the Lord's supreme energy (*parāśakti*) is identified with His qualities.<sup>412</sup> The implication seems to be that Śrī can be equated with the Lord's supreme energy and with His qualities since they both share the two particular properties of being omnipresent and liberation-bestowing:




Fig. 4.4 The Lord's Relation to Śrī

<sup>407</sup> GoBhā 3.3.40: *saiveti pūrvato 'nuvartate / saiva paraiva śrīḥ satī [...] svanāthasya paramātmanah kāmādi vitanotīti nityaśrīkaḥ saḥ /*

<sup>408</sup> GoBhā 3.3.40: *[...] tatra prakṛtyasprṣṭe saṁvyomni tasmād itaratra prapañcāntargate tatprakāśe ca [...] /*

<sup>409</sup> GoBhā 3.3.40: *āyād vyāpteḥ / tanād bhaktamokṣānandavistārāc ca /*

<sup>410</sup> Sūṭī 3.3.40: *[...] śrīḥ parā vibhutvān mokṣapradatvāc ca [...] /*

<sup>411</sup> Sūṭī 3.3.40: *vyāpakatvān muktidadtvāc ca hareḥ satyādayo guṇā yathā tadabhinna-parātmakās tathātvād eva śrīś ca tadātmikety arthaḥ /*

<sup>412</sup> GoBhā 3.3.39: *satyādīnāṁ guṇānāṁ parātve vakṣyamānāv āyatanau hetu draṣṭavyau /*

Concerning these two properties of Śrī, Baladeva quotes two verses from the ViPu:

O best among twice-borns, that Śrī, who belongs to Viṣṇu, is indeed eternal, the mother of the universe, and not changing. Just as Viṣṇu is omnipresent, so is she in precisely the same way.<sup>413</sup>

O beautiful one, [you are] the knowledge of sacrifice, extensive knowledge, and secret knowledge. O goddess, you are also the knowledge of the self, the giver of the fruit that is liberation.<sup>414</sup>

The first verse describes Śrī's omnipresence, the second her liberation-bestowing nature. Baladeva argues that Śrī could not possess these properties of Viṣṇu were she not identical with Him.<sup>415</sup> Baladeva also puts forward another verse from the ViPu which states that Śrī is identical with *parāśakti*:

May that Viṣṇu be gracious to us, who is metaphorically<sup>416</sup> proclaimed as the Lord {*īśa*} of Mā {*mā*} [i.e. Śrī], who is nothing but *parāśakti* {*para*}, [Viṣṇu] who is also pure, [Viṣṇu] who is the self of all embodied beings.<sup>417</sup>

In the Sūṭī Baladeva skillfully divides the word *parameśa* of the verse into *para-mā-īśa* and explains its meaning as 'the Lord [*īśa*] of Lakṣmī who is both *parāśakti* [*parā*] and Mā'.<sup>418</sup> According to the *Amarakośa*, Mā is a name for Lakṣmī.<sup>419</sup> Baladeva's explanation of the word *parameśa* is the same as Jīva's, which is given in BhaSa *Anuccheda* 118.<sup>420</sup> By explaining *parāśakti* and Lakṣmī appositionally (*sāmānyādhikarāṇya*), Baladeva argues for their oneness. Baladeva concludes that Lakṣmī is eternal since she is none other than the Lord's supreme energy.<sup>421</sup>

According to Śaṅkara, *sūtra* 3.3.40 examines the connection between ChāU 8.1.1 and BṛĀU 4.4.22. Rāmānuja agrees with Śaṅkara. In this regard Baladeva is influenced by Madhva since both discuss the topic of Lakṣmī under the current and the following two *sūtras*. However, nowhere does Madhva explain the position of Lakṣmī in terms of the Lord's energy (*śakti*). This

<sup>413</sup> ViPu 1.8.17: *nityaiva sā jaganmātā viṣṇoḥ śrīr anapāyini / yathā sarvagato viṣṇus tathaiveyaṃ dvijottama //*

<sup>414</sup> ViPu 1.9.120: *yajñavidyā mahāvidyā guhyavidyā ca śobhane / ātmavidyā ca devi tvam vimuktiphaladāyini //*

<sup>415</sup> GoBhā 3.3.40: *na ca bhede satidaṃ dvayaṃ śakyam vaktum apasiddhāntāpatteḥ /*

<sup>416</sup> This is the translation of *upacārataḥ* in the verse. Viṣṇu is only metaphorically the Lord of Śrī because they are actually identical.

<sup>417</sup> ViPu 1.9.46: *procyate parameśo yo yaḥ śuddho 'py upacārataḥ / prasīdatu sa no viṣṇur ātmā yaḥ sarvadehinām //*

<sup>418</sup> *parā cāsau mā ca lakṣmīs tasyāḥ īśaḥ patir iti upacārataḥ procyate /*

<sup>419</sup> *Amarakośa* 1.1.63: *indirā lokamātā mā kṣīrodatanayā ramā /*

<sup>420</sup> *nanu yadi lakṣmīs tatsvarūpābhinnā katham tarhi lakṣmīyāḥ patir ity ucyate tatrāha procyate iti parā cāsau mā ca lakṣmīs tasyā īśo yaḥ śuddhaḥ kevalo 'pi upacārato bhedavivaśayā procyate /*

<sup>421</sup> GoBhā 3.3.40: *tasmāt paraiva śrīr ato nityā seti /*

identification of Śrī with *śakti* reveals Baladeva's identity as a Gauḍīya follower. In his KṛSa *Anucccheda* 189, Jīva declares that Rukmīṇī, Rādhā, Sītā, Devakī, and so on are the Lord's own energy (*svarūpaśakti*).<sup>422</sup> Citing a passage attributed to the BṛGauTa, Jīva adds that Rādhā is principal among them: 'Goddess Rādhikā is said to be the highest deity consisting of Kṛṣṇa, consisting of all Lakṣmīs, of whom she is the most beautiful, completely infatuating, and the supreme.'<sup>423</sup> Although Baladeva mainly discusses Lakṣmī in his GoBhā 3.3.39–42, he does say that Rādhā is the highest, as it will be shown in section 4.5.4.

### 4.5.3. *Brahmasūtra* 3.3.41

In GoBhā 3.3.41–42, Baladeva discusses a possible objection to the sameness of Śrī and Viṣṇu. The *prima facie* view states: 'Surely, if Śrī is none other than [the Lord's] *parāśakti*, it would undesirably follow that Her devotion [to Him] would disappear, for, one's own devotion to oneself is not possible.'<sup>424</sup> Baladeva rejects this view by commenting on *sūtra* 3.3.41 *ādarād alopaḥ* //:

Even though there is non-difference [between Śrī and the Lord], Her devotion [to Him] does not disappear {*alopaḥ*} since Śrī has respect {*ādarāt*} for the Supreme as being the ocean of various good qualities and as being her own root.<sup>425</sup>

Regardless of her oneness with Viṣṇu, she does not lose her devotion because she recognizes Him as her own source. Baladeva illustrates Śrī's respect for Viṣṇu using two analogies: 'Clearly there is no branch that is not respecting the tree, nor is there light of the moon [that is not respecting] the moon.'<sup>426</sup> As will be seen later, the analogy of the moonlight and the moon could be an influence from the *Pañcarātra* tradition. Baladeva cites BhāPu 10.29.37 to illustrate that Śrī is eager to worship Viṣṇu:

Other gods strive for her glance to themselves. That Śrī, [competing] with Tulsī, desired the dust of the lotus-like feet [of the Lord], [the dust] which is worshipped by the servants, even after achieving [her] abode on the chest [of the Lord]. In such a way we also worship the dust of Your feet.<sup>427</sup>

<sup>422</sup> *svarūpaśaktivyūharukmīṇīrādhādevakisītānām māyāṁśarūpeṇa svena sahābhedakathanam /*

<sup>423</sup> *devī kṛṣṇamayī proktā rādhikā paradevatā / sarvalakṣmīmayī sarvakāntīḥ saṁmohinī parā //*

I have not been able to trace the text called the Brhadgautamīyatantra. There is a text called the Gautamīyatantra but I have not been able to find the passage in Jha's edition (Gautama 1977).

<sup>424</sup> GoBhā 3.3.41: *nanu paraiva cet śrīs tarhi tadbhakter vilopāpattiḥ / na hi svasmin svabhaktiḥ sambhaved iti [ . . . ] /*

<sup>425</sup> GoBhā 3.3.41: *saty apy abhede vicitraguṇaratnākaratvena svamūlatvena ca śriyaḥ para-sminn ādarāt tadbhakter alopaḥ /*

<sup>426</sup> GoBhā 3.3.41: *na khalu vrkṣam anādrīyamānā sākhāstī, na ca candram tatprabhā /*

<sup>427</sup> *śrīr yat padāmbujarajaś cakame tulasā labdhvāpi vakṣasi padaṁ kila bhrtyajuṣṭam / yasyāḥ svavikṣaṇakṛte 'nyasuraprayāśas tadvad vayaṁ ca tava pādarajaḥ prapannāḥ //*



Śrī is so exalted that other gods try to catch her favorable glance. She has already attained her place against Viṣṇu's chest. Still, she is eager to serve Him even through competition with the other associates of the Lord.

#### 4.5.4. *Brahmasūtra* 3.3.42

The *prima facie* view comes back and says that the desire for an amorous relationship between Śrī and Viṣṇu is not possible since love requires a distinction between the locus of love and the object of love, and such a division does not exist in the ultimate reality.<sup>428</sup> Baladeva uses the term 'amorous relation (*śṛṅgāra*)' to describe Śrī's relationship with the Lord. This is a sign of a Gauḍīya influence. Commenting on the *sūtra*, *upasthite 'tas tadvacanāt //*, Baladeva affirms that amorous love is possible between Śrī and Viṣṇu:

The past participle form of *upasthita* expresses a state. Even though [the Lord's] energy and its basis [i.e. the Lord Himself] are non-different, still desire [between Śrī and Viṣṇu] and so on do arise, which are conducive to the state of being the one who delights in oneself, being complete, and so on since the locus of energy abides as Puruṣottama and energy [abides] as the jewel among young women. Therefore {*atas*}, that [i.e. amorous relationship between Śrī and Viṣṇu] is proved. Why is this? Since there is a statement about it {*tadvacanāt*}.<sup>429</sup>

Even though Śrī and Viṣṇu are identical, a distinction between the energy and the possessor of the energy is possible. Baladeva explains that the supreme reality (*paratattva*) is called Puruṣottama when It manifests primarily as Itself. When It manifests as the supreme energy (*parāśakti*), however, It is known as qualities such as knowledge, happiness, compassion, sovereignty, and sweetness.<sup>430</sup> This supreme energy can, furthermore, appear as sounds, places, as well as young ladies:

When it appears as sound, [the supreme energy] has the nature of [the Lord's] names and of [the Lord's] sayings. When it appears as the earth and so on, [it] has the nature of [the Lord's] abode. But when it appears as an excellent young girl,

<sup>428</sup> GoBhā 3.3.42: *nanu rativiṣayāśrayabhāvenālambanavibhāvabhede sati śṛṅgārābhilāṣaḥ sambhavet / nirbhede tu tattve nāsau sambhāvayitum śakya iti [ . . . ] /*

<sup>429</sup> GoBhā 3.3.42: *upasthitam iti bhāve niṣṭhā / yady api śaktitadāśrayayor asty abhedas tathāpi śaktyāśrayasya puruṣottamatvena śakteś ca yuvatīratnatvenopasthitau satyāṃ svārāmat-vapūrttyādyanugūṇaṃ kāmādi samudety ataḥ siddham tat / idaṃ kutaḥ? tadvacanāt /*

<sup>430</sup> GoBhā 3.3.42: *parākhyasvarūpaśaktiviśiṣṭaṃ khalu paratattvaṃ śrutyādiṣu pratipannaṃ / svaprādhānyena sphurat tat puruṣottamasamjñam / parākhyasaktiprādhānyena sphurat tu dharmādisamjñam / paraiva khalu jñānasukhakāruṇyaiśvaryaṃādhuryādyākāreṇa sphuranti dharmarūpā /*

whose nature is consciousness connected with the essence of *hlādinī* [which is gladdening], [it] has the auspicious forms of Rādhā and so on.<sup>431</sup>

These three manifestations of the supreme energy: (1) the Lord's names and speech, (2) His abode, and (3) young girls such as Rādhā, correspond to [1] the cognitive energy (*saṁvitsakti*), [2] the extended energy (*sandhinīśakti*) and [3] the bliss-giving energy (*hlādinīśakti*).

Baladeva takes this threefold division of the supreme energy from Jīva. As shown<sup>432</sup> in BhaSa *Anuccheda* 16 Jīva discusses Viṣṇu's three energies, namely the internal energy (*antaraṅgaśakti/svarūpaśakti*), the liminal energy (*taṭasthaśakti*), and the external energy (*bahiraṅgaśakti*). In ViPu 6.7.61 they correspond to the supreme energy (*parāśakti*), the knower-of-the-field energy (*kṣetrajñāśakti*), and the energy whose effect is ignorance (*avidyākarmaśakti*).

	BhaSa 16	ViPu 6.7.61
the Lord Himself	<i>antaraṅgaśakti/svarūpaśakti</i>	<i>parāśakti</i>
the living entity	<i>taṭasthaśakti</i>	<i>kṣetrajñāśakti</i>
the world	<i>bahiraṅgaśakti</i>	<i>avidyākarmaśakti</i>

In BhaSa *Anuccheda* 117 Jīva says that the internal energy (*antaraṅgaśakti*) or the supreme energy (*parāśakti*) of the Lord has further divisions. In BraSa 5.1,<sup>433</sup> and in GoTaU 1.1,<sup>434</sup> Brahman is described as existence, consciousness, and bliss. Just as Brahman, which is one only, has these three qualities, the energy of Brahman, which is one, also manifests in three ways.<sup>435</sup> Jīva cites ViPu 1.12.68, which mentions these three types of energy: 'One [energy in the forms of] *hlādinī*, *sandhinī*, and *saṁvit* exists in You, who are situated in everything.'<sup>436</sup> To explain these three energies, Jīva cites Śrīdhara's commentary on the verse: '*Hlādinīśakti* causes joy, *sandhinīśakti* is extended, *saṁvid-śakti* is the energy for knowledge.'<sup>437</sup>

<sup>431</sup> GoBhā 3.3.42: *śabdākāreṇāhvayoktirūpā / dharādyākāreṇa dhāmarūpā / hlādinīsārasa-mavetasamvidātmakayuvatīratnatvena tu rādhādiśrīrūpā ceti* [ . . . ] /

<sup>432</sup> See 4.3.

<sup>433</sup> *īśvaraḥ paramaḥ kṛṣṇaḥ saccidānandavigrahaḥ / anādir ādir govindaḥ sarvakāraṇakāraṇam //*

<sup>434</sup> *saccidānandarūpāya kṛṣṇāyākliṣṭakāriṇe / namo vedāntavedyāya gurave buddhisākṣiṇe //*

<sup>435</sup> BhaSa *Anuccheda* 117: [ . . . ] *tāvad ekasyaiva tattvasya saccidānandatvāc chaktir apy ekā tridhā bhidyate /*

<sup>436</sup> ViPu 1.12.68ab: *hlādinī sandhinī saṁvit tvay ekā sarvasaṁsthitau /*

<sup>437</sup> ĀPra: *hlādinī āhlādaḥ sandhinī santatā saṁvid vidyāśaktiḥ /*

BraSa 5.1/GoTaU 1.1	BhaSa <i>Anuccheda</i> 117 (ViPu 1.12.68)	GoBhā 3.3.42
Brahman	the internal energy ( <i>antaraṅgaśakti/svarūpaśakti</i> )	the supreme energy ( <i>parāśakti</i> )
existence ( <i>sat</i> )	the extended energy ( <i>sandhinīśakti</i> )	the abode of Viṣṇu ( <i>dhāma</i> )
consciousness ( <i>cit</i> )	the cognizing energy ( <i>saṁvitsakti</i> )	the names and the speech of Viṣṇu ( <i>vāc, nāma</i> )
bliss ( <i>ānanda</i> )	the bliss-giving energy ( <i>hlādinīśakti</i> )	Rādhā and so on ( <i>yuvatī</i> )

Rūpa in his UNiMa 4.6 declares that Rādhā is the bliss-giving energy (*hlādinīśakti*), which is the best of all the energies.<sup>438</sup> Although Baladeva has been mainly discussing Śrī or Lakṣmī, he does identify the bliss-giving energy with Rādhā and so on. In the Sūṭī Baladeva more clearly states the supremacy of Rādhā over Lakṣmī. He first cites the verse attributed to the BṛGauTa,<sup>439</sup> which Jīva quotes in his KṛSa *Anuccheda* 189, to demonstrate Rādhā's supremacy. In the verse Rādhā is said to be 'consisting of all Lakṣmīs'. Then he says this verse establishes that 'Just as Kṛṣṇa is the Lord Himself, Rādhā is Mahālakṣmī.'<sup>440</sup> The point Baladeva makes is that Rādhā is superior to Lakṣmī or Śrī. This is in accordance with the teachings of his Gauḍīya predecessors such as Rūpa and Jīva.

At the end of GoBhā 3.3.42 Baladeva responds to the *prima facie* view. The opponent says if Śrī is identical with Viṣṇu as His energy, Śrī's love for Viṣṇu cannot exist since any relationship presupposes two distinct entities. Baladeva thinks that their relationship can exist regardless of their oneness:

[E]ven though there is no difference, desire for it [i.e. love] is established because of the manifestations of difference in the cause of emotion, [the difference which arises] due to the effect of difference, which is brought about by *viśeṣa*.<sup>441</sup>

By adopting the concept of *viśeṣa*, Baladeva explains that there is an element of difference (*bhedakārya*) between Śrī and Viṣṇu, although there is ultimately no ontological distinction between them. Due to this *appearance* of difference, Baladeva says, the relationship between Śrī as the locus of love and Viṣṇu as the object of her love is possible. The concept of *viśeṣa* will be examined in detail in section 4.6.

<sup>438</sup> *hlādinī yā mahāśaktiḥ sarvaśaktivarīyāsī /*

<sup>439</sup> *devī kṛṣṇamayī proktā rādhikā paradevatā /*  
*sarvalakṣmīmayī sarvakāntiḥ saṁmohinī parā //*

'Goddess Rādhikā is said to be the highest deity consisting of Kṛṣṇa, consisting of all Lakṣmīs, of whom she is the most beautiful, completely infatuating, and the supreme.'

<sup>440</sup> Sūṭī 3.3.42: [... ] *iti śrīkṛṣṇasya svayaṁbhagavattvam iva śrīrādhāyā mahālakṣmītvam siddham /*

<sup>441</sup> GoBhā 3.3.42: *tathā cābhede saty api viśeṣavijṛmbhitena bhedakāryeṇa vibhāvavailakṣaṇyavibhānāt tadabhilāṣaḥ siddha iti /*

Among Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, and Madhva, Madhva is the only one who discusses the topic of Śrī with regard to BraSū 3.3.40–42. Baladeva is certainly influenced by Madhva in this regard. However, Madhva's understanding of Lakṣmī is significantly different from Baladeva's. According to Madhva's commentary on BraSū 3.3.42, '[Śrī] is the abode of all, she is eternal, and everything is according to her desire;<sup>442</sup> she is not bound, [but she] binds [living beings], she is *prakṛti*, and without modification.'<sup>443</sup> What is striking is that Śrī is identified with *prakṛti*, and as such one of her functions is to bind the living entities. According to Baladeva, however, *prakṛti* is the external energy (*bahiraṅgaśakti*) or the energy whose effect is ignorance (*avidyākarmaśakti*), whereas Śrī is the internal or the supreme energy of the Lord (*parāśakti/antaraṅgaśakti*).

Baladeva's divergence from Madhva is also seen in Madhva's emphasis on the difference between Śrī and Viṣṇu. In his TaSaṅ, Madhva describes Viṣṇu as the only independent entity (*svatantra*) with everything else dependent on him (*paratantra*). Although Śrī is given the special position of being eternal and free of suffering, she is still one among the sentient beings who are all dependent on the Lord.<sup>444</sup>

In comparison with the Mādhva tradition, Baladeva's articulation of Śrī as *parāśakti*, and of her relationship with the Lord is closer to the tradition of *Pañcarātra* and to Śrīvaiṣṇavism, which incorporates significant elements from the *Pañcarātra* tradition. In the *Ahīrbudhnyasaṃhitā*, one of the *Pañcarātra* texts, for example, Lakṣmī is described as the energy (*śakti*) of the Lord who is responsible for the world's creation and so on:

[...] the transcendent Brahman, [our God] Bhagavat, possesses the Śakti, which pervades Its whole being, just as the moon possesses moonlight. This Śakti runs through [all] positive and negative things, and performs all the tasks of the Lord [...] When She is perceived (*lakṣyamāṇā*) as the world, She is called Lakṣmī. (Matsubara 1994: 183–184)

Shown later in this section, Parāśara Bhaṭṭar, a disciple of Rāmānuja, adopts the terminology of *śakti* as well as the analogy of the moon and moonlight from the *Pañcarātra* tradition, in his discussion of Lakṣmī. Mitsunori Matsubara

<sup>442</sup> Trivikramapaṇḍita: *Tattvapradīpikā: sarvaṃ tadicchayaiveti sarvecchā /*

<sup>443</sup> BraSūBhā (Ma) 3.3.40: *sarvāyatanā sarvakālā sarvecchā na baddhā bandhikā saisā prakṛtir avikṛtiḥ itivatsāsrute /*

<sup>444</sup> TaSaṅ: *svatantram asvatantram ca dvididhaṃ tattvam iṣyate / svatantra bhagavān viṣṇur bhāvābhāvau dvidherat / [...]*

*cetanācetanatvena bhāvo 'pi divividho mataḥ / duḥkhasprṣṭam tadasprṣṭam iti dvedhaiva cetanam / nityāduḥkhā ramā 'nye tu sprṣṭaduḥkhāḥ samastaśaḥ /*

summarizes the identity of Lakṣmī and her role described in the *Pañcarātra* texts as follows:

According to the Saṃhitās, the supreme God is *akartṛ* and therefore cannot play an actual role in the creation of this world; creative activity is entirely entrusted to His Śakti, personified and worshipped as the goddess Lakṣmī. [...] Thus in the LakṣmīT [i.e. *Lakṣmītantra*], Brahman is *apṛthag-bhūta-śakti* (2.11, 16.24) and is sometimes compared to the waveless ocean. Viṣṇu is *śakti-mat* also like an enormous ocean, the waves of which, when agitated, correspond to His *śakti* (LT 32.32). In *Abirbudhnya* 4.75–8, Brahman consists of both God as *śaktimat* and His *śakti*, harmoniously blended in their unmanifested condition [...] (Matsubara 1994: 68–69)

The *Pañcarātra* texts propound the idea of Lakṣmī as the Lord's energy and the Lord as its possessor. This teaching regarding the oneness of Lakṣmī as quality (*dharmā/guṇa*) and Viṣṇu as its substrate (*dharmīn/guṇīn*) is a characteristic of the *Pañcarātra* tradition. Baladeva rejects the understanding of God as non-doer (*akartṛ*), as we saw in section 4.2.1. Another difference, as is the case with Madhva, is that the *Pañcarātra* texts assign the creative activities to Lakṣmī. For Baladeva, however, Lakṣmī is identical with the internal energy (*antaraṅgaśakti*), which has nothing to do with the material creation. Despite these differences one cannot help noticing the striking resemblances between the *Pañcarātra* tradition and Baladeva concerning their use of the concept of *śakti* in relation to Lakṣmī.

Yāmuna and Rāmānuja did not use the term *śakti* in relation to Lakṣmī. However, they laid the foundation for later generations to incorporate the *Pañcarātra* tradition into Śrīvaiṣṇavism:

Both Yāmuna and Rāmānuja made significant attempts to defend the *Pāñcarātra* tradition. Yāmuna wrote an entire work called *Āgamaprāmānya* defending the *Pāñcarātra* tradition while Rāmānuja supplemented it by discussing the same subject in his *Śrībhāṣya* (2:2:40–43). Both have made attempts to integrate the *Pāñcarātra* tradition into the Vedāntic tradition [...] One of the significant ways in which the *Pāñcarātra* Āgamas influenced the Śrīvaiṣṇava tradition is by their inherent emphasis on the female deity, Śrī-Lakṣmī. (Kumar 1997: 51–52)

In GoBhā 3.3.40, Baladeva cites *Vājasaneyisaṃhitā* 31.22a to start his discussion of Śrī.<sup>445</sup> In the same section he quotes ViPu 1.8.17,<sup>446</sup> which describes the all-pervading nature of Śrī. Rāmānuja also cites these two quotes in his *Vedārthasaṅgraha*, where his understanding of Lakṣmī is most clearly

<sup>445</sup> *śrīś ca te lakṣmīś ca patnyau* / 'Śrī and Lakṣmī are the two wives of yours.' Weber 1972: 858

<sup>446</sup> *nityaiva sā jagannmātā viṣṇoḥ śrīr anapāyini* /  
*yathā sarvagato viṣṇus tathāiveyaṃ dvijottama* //

'O best among the twice-borns, that Śrī, who belongs to Viṣṇu, is indeed eternal, the mother of the universe, and not changing. Just as Viṣṇu is all-pervading, so is she, in precisely the same way.'

expressed (Carman 1974: 238). These commentaries support the view that Baladeva was influenced by the Śrīvaiṣṇava tradition in his understanding of Lakṣmī.

Although Yāmuna and Rāmānuja supported the *Pañcarātra* tradition and tried to incorporate it into Śrīvaiṣṇavism, they wrote relatively little about Lakṣmī (Carman 1974: 238). It is in the works of Parāśara Bhaṭṭar that we first find a clear articulation of Lakṣmī within the Śrīvaiṣṇava tradition. In his *Viṣṇusahasranāmabhāṣya*, for example, Bhaṭṭar describes the unity of Lakṣmī and the Lord, which reflects the teachings of the *Pañcarātra* tradition:

(The Lord is the one) who bears Lakṣmī as a natural part of Himself, like the luster of a gem, the smell of a flower, the moonlight of the moon, and the sweetness of ambrosia. 'As fame cannot be separated from a famous person she (cannot be separated from Rāma).' (Bhaṭṭar 1965: 152)

As pointed out above, it is a distinct teaching of the *Pañcarātra* tradition that Lakṣmī and Viṣṇu are considered to be quality and its substrate. In the *Ahīrbudhnyasamhitā* we saw the analogy of the moon and its light. Pratap Kumar summarizes Bhaṭṭar's view of Lakṣmī in the *Viṣṇusahasranāmabhāṣya* as follows:

Bhaṭṭar affirms: 1) the universal motherhood of Śrī-Lakṣmī; 2) that she is spoken of in the Vedic literature (Śrī Sūkta, et al.); 3) that she is the consort of Lord Viṣṇu and pervades the whole universe; 4) that she is the embodiment of six auspicious qualities such as *jñāna*, *aiśvarya*, etc. referred to in the Pāñcarātra Āgamas; 5) that she is the receptacle of the Lord's compassion; 6) that she moves about always with him taking corresponding forms; 7) that she is the life-giving Śakti of the Lord and source of all Śaktis and *mantra*-s [...] (1997: 83)

There is a considerable overlap between Baladeva and Bhaṭṭar in their respective understandings of Lakṣmī. In GoBhā 3.3.39–42, Baladeva agrees with Bhaṭṭar with regard to the second point by citing YaVe 31.22a, the third point by citing ViPu. 1.8.17, the fourth point by citing ViPu 6.5.79<sup>447</sup> and by identifying these qualities of Viṣṇu with Śrī, and the seventh point by identifying Śrī with *parāśakti*. Baladeva does not emphasize the motherhood of Lakṣmī presumably because, for him, Radhā, Lakṣmī, and so on are young women (*yuvatī*) and their relationship with the Lord is conceived of as erotic (*śṛṅgāra*). Despite such differences it is clear that Baladeva is influenced by the Śrīvaiṣṇava understanding of Lakṣmī expressed by Rāmānuja and Bhaṭṭar.

<sup>447</sup> *jñānaśaktibalaiśvaryaaviryatejāmsy aśeṣataḥ /  
bhagavacchabdavācyāni vinā heyair guṇādibhiḥ //*

'Therefore He is imperishable. Knowledge, energy, might, sovereignty, heroism, splendour in unlimited states are expressed by the word *bhagavat*. [He is] devoid of any qualities and so on which can be superseded by others.'

#### 4.5.5. Conclusion

In his commentary on BraSū 3.3.39–42, Baladeva identifies the qualities of Viṣṇu with His supreme energy (*parāśakti*). Then he goes further to identify the supreme energy of the Lord with His consort Śrī. The relationship between Śrī as Viṣṇu's energy and Viṣṇu as the possessor of the energy is, therefore, considered to be the same as the relationship between quality (*guṇa*) and its substrate (*guṇin*). Baladeva, in this way, emphasizes the oneness of Śrī and Viṣṇu.

In Baladeva's identification of Śrī with the energy, and in his emphasis on the unity between Śrī and Viṣṇu, we observe the influences of the *Pañcarātra* tradition and of the Śrīvaiṣṇava tradition. These two points are taught in the *Pañcarātra* texts in general, and Parāśara Bhaṭṭar incorporates them into Śrīvaiṣṇavism.

For Baladeva, however, Lakṣmī or Śrī as the supreme energy (*parāśakti*) is the internal energy (*antaraṅgaśakti*) of the Lord. He does not associate the power of creation with Lakṣmī. This is contrary to the teaching of the *Pañcarātra* tradition, which emphasizes Lakṣmī's role as the mother of universe (*jaganmātr*). In contrast to the image of mother, Baladeva puts forward the image of Lakṣmī as a young woman and emphasizes her amorous relationship with Viṣṇu. Moreover, he identifies Rādhā as Mahālakṣmī, the highest manifestation of the internal energy. As such, she is identified with the Lord's bliss-giving energy (*hlādinīśakti*). The identification of Śrī with the internal energy of the Lord, the emphasis on the amorous relationship between the Lord and His consort, and the teaching that Rādhā is the highest goddess are the elements Baladeva inherits from his Gauḍīya predecessors such as Rūpa and Jīva. By emphasizing the ontological oneness of Rādhā and Kṛṣṇa, Baladeva attempts to provide a theological justification for the worship of the two, who are in the extramarital relationship on the level of narrative.

Among Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, and Madhva, Madhva is the only one who raises the topic of Śrī in the commentaries on BraSū 3.3.39–42. Madhva's influence on Baladeva is observed by the fact that Baladeva discusses the same topic with regard to these *sūtras*. Baladeva, however, does not share Madhva's understanding of Śrī. Although Madhva assigns Śrī a special position, he still considers her to be one of the many living entities. Madhva emphasizes her dependence on the Lord and her distinction from Him. Nowhere does Madhva identify Śrī with the energy of the Lord. These observations support my argument that Baladeva uses the commentaries of Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, and Madhva only if he finds them useful in establishing Jīva's theology.

Madhva does, however, have a significant influence on Baladeva's understanding of Śrī. Baladeva adopts the concept of *viśeṣa* to explain the relationship between Śrī as quality and Viṣṇu as the possessor of that quality. Baladeva's understanding and application of the concept are examined in detail in the following section 4.6.

#### 4.6. BALADEVA ON DIFFERENTIATING CAPACITY (VIŚEṢA)

Baladeva applies the concept of differentiating capacity in relation to Brahman and Its qualities. He argues that Brahman is both the qualities and the substrate of the qualities at the same time. Baladeva applies this concept of differentiating capacity in describing the relationship between Brahman and Its *parāśakti*. This implies that ultimately there is no distinction between Brahman and *parāśakti*.

In his commentary on BraSū 3.2.28–31,<sup>448</sup> Baladeva gives a detailed explanation of the concept of differentiating capacity. Madhva discusses the same topic with regard to the same *sūtras*, thus Madhva's influence on Baladeva is evident. Baladeva's understanding of differentiating capacity is practically the same as that of Madhva. However, Baladeva diverges from Madhva in his application of the concept. Whereas Baladeva applies the concept to explain the ultimate oneness of Śrī and Viṣṇu, nowhere does Madhva explain their relationship in terms of differentiating capacity. In other words, Baladeva borrows the concept of differentiating capacity from Madhva and uses it to explain an idea which he inherits from the *Pañcarātra* tradition, Śrīvaiṣṇavism, and Jīva.

##### 4.6.1. *Brahmasūtras* 3.2.28–30

In his commentary on BraSū 3.2.28–30, Baladeva explains that Brahman is both the qualities and the possessor of the qualities. He does so by using the analogies of snake, the sun, and time. This explanation follows Madhva's commentary. According to Baladeva, with *sūtras* 3.2.28–31 Bādarāyaṇa establishes that the qualities of Brahman are non-different from Brahman's nature.<sup>449</sup> Baladeva cites the following three Upaniṣadic passages as the object of discussion (*viśaya*):

Brahman is knowledge and bliss.<sup>450</sup>  
 He who is all-knowing and omniscient.<sup>451</sup>  
 The knower of the bliss of Brahman.<sup>452</sup>

<sup>448</sup> BraSū 3.2.28: *ubhayavyapadeśāt tv ahikuṇḍalavat //*

BraSū 3.2.29: *prakāśāśrayavad vā tejastvāt //*

BraSū 3.2.30: *pūrvavad vā //*

BraSū 3.2.31: *pratiśedhāc ca //*

<sup>449</sup> GoBhā 3.2.28: *atha svarūpād guṇānām* ([*guṇānām*] K; *guṇānām* M) *abhedah pratipādyate /*

<sup>450</sup> BrĀU 3.9.28c: *viññānam ānandaṁ brahma [...]* /

<sup>451</sup> MuU 1.1.9a: *yaḥ sarvajñaḥ sarvavit [...]* /

<sup>452</sup> TaiU 2.4.1c: *ānandaṁ brahmaṇo vidvān [...]* /



The first quote identifies Brahman with qualities. The second and the third quotes identify Brahman as the possessor of qualities. Baladeva then asks whether Brahman is (i) qualities such as knowledge and bliss or (ii) the possessor of these qualities.<sup>453</sup> According to the *prima facie* view we cannot decide since we see two types of statements.<sup>454</sup> Baladeva rejects the *prima facie* view, commenting on *sūtra* 3.2.28 *ubhayavyapadeśāt tv ahikuṇḍalavat* //:

We should consider knowledge and bliss as the attributes of Brahman, whose nature is knowledge and bliss. [This is] like a snake and its coil [*ahikuṇḍalavat*]. Just as we should consider a coil as a distinguishing mark of a snake, although the coil is its nature, in the same way [we should consider knowledge and bliss as the attributes of Brahman, although they are nothing but Brahman]. Why is this [so]? To this it is replied, starting with 'both [*ubhaya*]'. Since both are explained [*vyapadeśāt*] in the *Śruti* passages mentioned [above].<sup>455</sup>

Although a snake is nothing but a coil, still it is possible to describe a snake as the substrate, and a coil as its attribute. In the same manner, though Brahman is nothing but Its qualities, Brahman and Its qualities can be described separately as a substrate and the attributes. In the *Sūṭī* Baladeva explains that this dual nature of Brahman is possible due to Its paradoxical energy (*avicintyaśakti*).<sup>456</sup> In the context of Śrī's relation to Viṣṇu, this implies that the duality of Śrī and Viṣṇu, despite their oneness, is possible due to this paradoxical energy.

Baladeva gives two more analogies. Commenting on *sūtra* 3.2.29 *prakāśāś-rayavad vā tejastvāt* //, he explains the analogy of the sun and sunshine:

Or [*vā*] It [i.e. Brahman] may be determined like the substrate of sunshine [*prakāśāśrayavat*] since Brahman has as Its nature consciousness [*tejastvāt*]. Just like the sun, whose nature is sunshine, is [simultaneously] the substrate of sunshine, in the same manner, Hari, whose nature is knowledge, is [simultaneously] the substrate of knowledge.<sup>457</sup>

He also gives the analogy of time, commenting on *sūtra* 3.2.30 *pūrvavad vā* //:

Or [*vā*] we recognize that [although time] is one only, it is [both] that which is divided and that which divides, as in the statement 'earlier time' [*pūrvavat*]. In the same manner we should acknowledge that the object, which is knowledge and bliss, is [both] quality and the possessor of quality.<sup>458</sup>

<sup>453</sup> GoBhā 3.2.28: *tatra saṁśayaḥ, bhajānīyaṃ brahma jñānānando jñānānandi veti /*

<sup>454</sup> GoBhā 3.2.28: *dvidividhāvākyaḍṣṭer anirṇayena bhāvyam iti [ . . . ] /*

<sup>455</sup> GoBhā 3.2.28: *jñānānandasvarūpasya brahmaṇo jñānānando dharmatvena mantavyaḥ ahikuṇḍalavat / kuṇḍalātmano 'py aher yathā kuṇḍalaṃ viśeṣaṇatvena manyate tadvat / kuta etat tatrāha ubhayeti / uktaśrutiṣūbhayaḥbhidhānād ity arthaḥ /*

<sup>456</sup> *Sūṭī* 3.2.28: *avicintyatvād avicintyaśaktimattvāt tadrūpaviśeṣayogād iti yāvat /*

<sup>457</sup> GoBhā 3.2.29: *brahmaṇas tejastvāc caitanyasvarūpatvāt prakāśāśrayavad vā tasya nirṇayaḥ syāt / prakāśātmā ravir yathā prakāśāśrayo bhavaty evaṃ jñānātmā harir jñānāśraya ity arthaḥ /*

<sup>458</sup> GoBhā 3.2.30: *yathā 'pūrvāḥ kāla' ity eka evāvacchedyo 'vacchedakaś ca pratīyate tadvaj jñānānando 'rtho dharmo dharmī ([dharmī] K; dharmo M) ca pratyetavyaḥ /*

In his explanation of these three analogies, Madhva's influence on Baladeva is clear. Using the same three analogies, Śaṅkara discusses the relationship between Brahman and the living entity, and Rāmānuja the relationship between Brahman and the insentient creation (*acitprapañca*). In contrast, Madhva teaches exactly the same point as Baladeva, that is, that Brahman is both qualities and the possessor of qualities.<sup>459</sup> At the end of his commentary on BraSū 3.2.30 Madhva quotes an untraceable verse (Mesquita 2008: 136) attributed to the BraPu:

However, we conventionally speak of [Brahman, which is the substrate of bliss,] as being non-different from bliss, like [in the case of] sunshine [which was explained in the previous *sūtra*]. Or it is like time, which [although indivisible by nature] becomes divided. [In the same way Brahman has many qualities although It is one.]<sup>460</sup>

Baladeva quotes almost exactly the same verse in GoBhā 3.2.30,<sup>461</sup> attributing it also to BraPu.<sup>462</sup> This untraceable quote is not cited in the *Sandarbhās* of Jīva. This indicates that Baladeva diverges from Jīva's theology by accepting the concept of differentiating capacity. As pointed out in section 4.2.7, Baladeva usually cites Madhva's untraceable quotes only when they are first cited by Jīva.

#### 4.6.2. *Brahmasūtra* 3.2.31

In his commentary on BraSū 3.2.28–30, Baladeva virtually copies Madhva's commentary. Commenting on BraSū 3.2.31 Baladeva explains the relation

<sup>459</sup> BraSūBhā (Ma) 3.2.28: 'ānandaṁ brahmaṇo vidvān', 'athaiṣa eva parama ānandaḥ' ityubhayavyapadeśād ahikuṇḍalavad eva yuhyate / yathāhiḥ kuṇḍalī kuṇḍalaṁ ca / 'It is appropriate to state that [Brahman and Its qualities] are exactly like a snake and its coil since there are two types of teaching: "The knower of the bliss of Brahman", "Thus precisely this is the supreme bliss". [Brahman and Its qualities are] like a snake, which is the possessor of a coil and is a coil.' BraSūBhā (Ma) 3.2.29: yathādityasya prakāśatvaṁ prakāśitvaṁ ca, evaṁ vā dṛṣṭāntaḥ / tejo-rūpatvād brahmaṇaḥ // 'Or, [another] example: Just as the sun is sunshine and the possessor of sunshine, in the same way [Brahman is both the qualities and the possessor of the qualities]. This is because the nature of Brahman is light.'

BraSūBhā (Ma) 3.2.30: yathāika eva kālaḥ pūrva ity avacchedako 'vacchedyaś ca bhavati / 'Just as time, which is one only, is [simultaneously] that which divides and that which is divided, as in the statement "earlier".'

<sup>460</sup> BraSūBhā 3.2.30 (Ma): 'ānandena tv abhinnena vyavahāraḥ prakāśavat / kālavad vā yathā kālaḥ svāvacchedakatām vrajed // itibrāhme //

My translation of this verse is based on the suggestion of Dr. Hirst and Dr. Killingley.

<sup>461</sup> ānandena tv abhinnena vyavahāraḥ prakāśavat / pūrvavad vā yathā kālaḥ svāvacchedakatām vrajed // iti / Baladeva substitutes kālavad with pūrvavat.

<sup>462</sup> Sūṭī 3.2.30: ānandeneti brāhme //

between quality and substrate using the concept of differentiating capacity. This concept is taken from Madhva, and this is where Baladeva differs from Jīva most significantly.

Commenting on BraSū 3.2.31 *pratiṣedhāc ca //*, Baladeva says, 'Since the difference between the qualities and the possessor of those qualities is prohibited {*pratiṣedhāt*}, the qualities [of Brahman] are not separate from the nature [of Brahman].'<sup>463</sup> According to Baladeva, such prohibition is based on the *Śruti* texts:

This [i.e. Brahman] is to be obtained by the mind alone. Here [i.e. in Brahman], there is no diversity at all. He goes from death to death, who sees diversity as it were, in this world.<sup>464</sup>

Just as water, which has rained down in the mountains, runs in a low place, similarly, seeing the qualities [of Brahman] as separate [from Brahman], one runs after them [i.e. birth and death].<sup>465</sup>

Although it is possible to speak of Brahman and Its qualities separately, they are not ontologically distinct entities. According to Baladeva, this *appearance* of distinction is possible due to differentiating capacity:

[...] there exist two kinds of expression regarding something which is one only, like water and wave, on account of differentiating capacity [...] Differentiating capacity is something similar to distinction, which, even when there is no distinction, creates linguistic usage such as being the qualities and the possessor of such qualities, [linguistic usage] which causes [apparent] difference.<sup>466</sup>

<sup>463</sup> GoBhā 3.2.31: *guṇaguṇibhedaniṣedhāt svarūpāt guṇā na bhidyante /*

<sup>464</sup> KaU 4.11: *manasaivedam āptavyam neha nānāsti kiṃcana / mṛtyoḥ sa mṛtyum gacchati ya iha nāneva paśyati //*  
SūTī: *ya iheti / iha brahmaṇi yo nāneva paśyati svarūpasya guṇagaṇasya mitho bhedaṃ eva jānāti sa mṛtyor anantaraṃ mṛtyum āpnoti punaḥ punarjanmamaramāṇapṛavāhaṃ vindati na kadācid api vimucyate ity arthaḥ /*

<sup>465</sup> This translation is based on Baladeva's interpretation in the SūTī. Baladeva interprets *durge* 'in a narrow path' in KaU 4.14a as *nimnasthāne* 'a low place'. Also, he interprets *tān* in KaU 4.14d. as referring to *janmamṛtyūn* 'births and death', where it could refer to *dharmān* in KaU 4.14c.

KaU 4.14: *yathodakam durge vṛṣṭam parvateṣu vidhāvati /*

*evam dharmān prthak paśyaṃs tān evānu vidhāvati //*

SūTī: *yathodakam iti / parvateṣu vṛṣṭam udakam yathā durge nimnasthāne vidhāvati evam dharmān guṇān paramātmanāḥ prthag bhinnān paśyan vijānan janas tān prasiddhān janma-mṛtyūn vidhāvati vindatīty arthaḥ /*

'It is said "yathodakam". Just as water rained down in mountains runs through in a low place {*durge*}, in the same way he who sees the qualities [of Brahman]{*dharmān*} to be separate {*prthak*} from the Supreme Self experiences {*vidhāvati*} births and deaths{*tān*}, which are well known.'

<sup>466</sup> GoBhā 3.2.31: *tathā caikasyaiva dvedhā bhaṇitir ambuvicivat viśeṣād bhavati / [...]*  
*viśeṣas tu bhedaḥ pratinidhir bhedaḥ bhāve 'pi bhedaḥ kārṇasya dharmadharmibhāvāder vyavahāra-sya nirvartakaḥ /*

On the one hand, Brahman is devoid of any internal division.<sup>467</sup> On the other hand, It is said to have a number of qualities. How then is it possible for Brahman to possess many qualities without being divided? This is a crucial question for the Vaiṣṇava Vedāntins who argue that Brahman possesses attributes (*saṁviśeṣa*), rejecting the Advaita view of quality-less (*nirguṇa*) Brahman.

According to Baladeva, though a coil is nothing but a snake, and waves are nothing but water, the distinction in linguistic usage (*vyavahāra*) is possible due to the power of differentiating capacity. It is capacity in an object which causes difference between a substrate and its qualities where there is ultimately no difference. In other words, differentiating capacity causes a linguistic distinction between a substrate and its qualities without causing their ontological distinction. Due to differentiating capacity, we can talk about the qualities of Brahman and Brahman Itself separately, without rejecting their oneness. Baladeva says that this differentiating capacity is nothing but the nature (*svabhāva*) of a thing.<sup>468</sup> This means that differentiating capacity does not have an existence separate from the thing itself. This point is a significant improvement of Madhva's to the concept of inherence (*samavāya*) in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school.

Baladeva borrows the concept of differentiating capacity from Madhva. To avoid any confusion, it must be clearly understood that it is different from the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika concept of particularity, which is also called *viśeṣa*. Praśastapāda defines particularity as follows:

The ultimate particularities [i.e. *viśeṣa*] exist in the final [entities] since they differentiate their own substrate [from other substrates]. They are the causes for discriminating the ultimate differentiation, existing in each substance among eternal substances, i.e. atoms, ether, time, directions, self, and mind, which are devoid of destruction and beginning.<sup>469</sup>

In the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, particularity makes it possible to differentiate eternal substances such as atoms from each other.

In contrast, Madhva uses the concept of differentiating capacity to explain the relation between substance and attributes. In his AnuVyā 109, which is part of his commentary on BraSū 1.1.2, Madhva defines differentiating capacity as follows: "That which controls [the use of] other non-synonymous words in relation to the entity which is devoid of division is taught by the

<sup>467</sup> GoBhā 3.2.28: *na vā svagatabhedavad iti* / 'Nor is it the case that there is internal division [in Brahman].'

<sup>468</sup> GoBhā 3.2.31: *tadvyavahārah tasyaivātra tacchabdenokteḥ* / SūTī: *tasyaiva svabhāvasya eva / tacchabdena viśeṣaśabdena* /

<sup>469</sup> PaADhaSa: *anteṣu bhavā antyāḥ svāśrayaviśeṣakatvād viśeṣāḥ* / *vināśārambharahiteṣu nityadravyeṣv apvākāśakāladigātmamanassu pratidravyam ekaikaśo var-tamānāḥ atyantavyāvṛttibuddhihetavaḥ* / (1984: 321)

name differentiating capacity {*viśeṣa*}. It exists entirely in the things.<sup>470</sup> For example, when we say 'the lotus is blue', the adjective 'blue' and the noun 'lotus' are not synonyms to each other. Yet both refer to one entity. At the same time, this does not mean that a part of the entity is 'blue' and another part is 'lotus'. A blue lotus is simultaneously blue and lotus in its entirety. Predicating the adjective 'blue' does not cause any division within the lotus. The lotus can be predicated by the adjective 'blue' without losing its oneness, even though the subject 'lotus' and the predicate 'blue' do not have the same meaning. According to Madhva, this co-referentiality (*sāmānādhikaraṇya*) is possible due to the function of differentiating capacity. In the definition, Madhva says differentiating capacity exists 'entirely in the things'. In his commentary on Bhaṭṭi 11.9, Madhva further explains that differentiating capacity is the nature (*svarūpa*) of an entity and is self-subsistent.<sup>471</sup> Therefore, differentiating capacity is innate in any object, and it is not separate from the thing in which it inheres. Baladeva agrees with Madhva on these two points concerning the definition of differentiating capacity: (i) it is a capacity to enable multiple predications in one substrate without losing the unity of the substrate, and (ii) it is innate in the entity.

Madhva proposes the concept of differentiating capacity to replace the concept of inherence (*samavāya*) in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school.<sup>472</sup> The school uses the idea of inherence to explain the relation between cause and effect, between quality and substrate, and so on. Praśastapāda defines the concept as follows: 'Inherence is a connection between the located and the locus, which is established to be inseparable. It is the cause of the idea "in this place".'<sup>473</sup> In this definition, the located (*ādhārya*) refers to attributes, and the locus (*ādharā*) to their substrate. According to Praśastapāda, because of inherence we recognize that attributes are located in their substrate (*ihapratyaya*). Furthermore, these attributes and the substrate are inseparable (*ayutasiddha*). The term 'inseparable' is used here in order to distinguish inherence from conjunction (*saṃyoga*), which is another concept used to express a connection in the Vaiśeṣika system. In the case of a blue lotus, the

<sup>470</sup> *bhedahine tv aparyāyaśabdāntarānīyāmakaḥ /  
viśeṣo nāma kathitaḥ so 'sti vastuṣv aśeṣataḥ //*

<sup>471</sup> *viśeṣo 'pi svarūpaṃ sa svanirvāhaka eva ca /*

<sup>472</sup> Madhva's concept of *viśeṣa* is aimed at replacing the concept of inherence (*samavāya*) of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, not the concept of *viśeṣa* of the same school. In this regard Sarma (2003: 72) mistakenly states, '[...] the *viśeṣa* is an integral part of the Mādhva system. Without it the Mādhva realism would be indefensible. *Viśeṣa* finds its roots in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition of Philosophy. To understand how Madhvācārya modifies their version, I first summarize his predecessor's. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition, a *viśeṣa* resides between an object and an attribute.' According to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the relation between an object and an attribute is explained by *samavāya*, not by *viśeṣa*.

<sup>473</sup> PaADhaSa: *ayutasiddhānām ādhāryādhārābhūtānām yaḥ sambandha ihapratyayahetuḥ sa samavāyah /* (1984: 324)

blue color, which is the located, cannot be separated from the lotus flower, which is the locus. In the case of a pot on a table, however, the pot (the located) can be removed from its locus, that is, the table. The first is the case of inherence, the second of conjunction.

The relationships between attributes and their substrate, therefore, are inseparable according to the Vaiśeṣika system. Somewhat counterintuitively, however, the system also teaches that this category of inherence is distinct both from substrate and quality. Therefore, in explaining the substrate–attribute relation, the Vaiśeṣika system employs three categories, namely, the substrate, the attributes, and inherence, which are ontologically distinct from each other. Praśastapāda says: ‘Since we perceive the notion “in this place” with regard to the five categories, inherence is a different category than these [five categories].’<sup>474</sup> Here the five categories refer to substance (*dravya*), quality (*guṇa*), action (*karma*), generality (*sāmānya*), and particularity (*viśeṣa*). According to this explanation, attributes or qualities and their substrate are two separate entities, which are inseparably connected through the relation of inherence. It is this ontological separation between a substrate and its attributes which is rejected by the Vedāntists, starting with Śaṅkara.

In his commentary on BraSū 2.2.13 Śaṅkara rejects the Vaiśeṣika notion of inherence on account of a logical fallacy. The discussion is in the context of rejecting atomism in the Vaiśeṣika school. According to the school, all material entities are made of atoms (*paramāṇu*). When two atoms come together, they form a dyad. The Vaiśeṣika school teaches that this dyad is distinct from the two atoms, and the dyad and the atoms are connected through the relation of inherence. This dyad in turn is combined to other dyads to form a larger entity.

Śaṅkara rejects this Vaiśeṣika theory of creation by arguing that the notion of inherence leads to an infinite regress, and is therefore untenable:

Precisely in the way a dyad, which is completely distinct from two atoms, is connected to them [i.e. to the atoms] through the relation characterised by inherence, in the same way inherence too, which is completely distinct from the objects of inherence, would be connected to the objects of inherence through the relation characterised by inherence, which is different [from the initial inherence]. And therefore, we need to imagine another connection for each. Thus it would undesirably result in nothing but infinite regress.<sup>475</sup>

<sup>474</sup> PaADhaSa: [...] *samavāyasyāpi pañcasu padārtheṣv ihetipratyayadarśanāt tebhyaḥ padārthāntaratvam iti* / (1984: 326)

<sup>475</sup> BraSūBhā (Śa) 2.2.13: *yathaiva hy aṇubhyām atyantabhinnaṃ sad dvyāṇukaṃ samavāyalaṅṣaṇena saṃbandhena tābhyām saṃbadhyata evaṃ samavāyo 'pi samavāyibhyo 'tyantabhinnaḥ san samavāyalaṅṣaṇenānyenaiva saṃbandhena samavāyibhiḥ saṃbadhyetātyantabhedasāmyāt / tataś ca tasya tasyānyonyāḥ saṃbandhaḥ kalpayitavya ity anavasthaiva prasajyeta /*

The Vaiśeṣika system argues that inherence is in a different category than the objects it connects. Śaṅkara's objection is that if that were the case, the initial inherence, which connects two atoms with the dyad, would itself require another inherence, which connects the first inherence to the atoms and to the dyad. By the same logic the second inherence then would require a third inherence. In this way there is no end to this process.

Rāmānuja and Madhva follow Śaṅkara on their commentaries on BraSū 2.2.13, and reject the Vaiśeṣika concept of inherence, similarly arguing that it leads to infinite regress. This discussion on the relationship between attributes and their substrate becomes important for the Vaiṣṇava Vedāntists such as Rāmānuja and Madhva, who argue that the ultimate reality, Brahman, is positively characterized by attributes (*saviśeṣa*).

For Śaṅkara, who holds the view that Brahman is without attributes (*nirviśeṣa*), a sentence such as *satyaṃ jñānam anantaṃ brahma* ('Brahman is reality, consciousness, and is infinite') does not ascribe any attributes to Brahman.<sup>476</sup> Rather, it excludes what Brahman is not. Therefore, according to Śaṅkara, the sentence means 'Brahman is not unreal, not unconscious and without limits'.<sup>477</sup> Śaṅkara, in this way, rejects any possibility that the Upaniṣadic sentence might suggest internal division (*svagatabheda*) in Brahman.

Rāmānuja and Madhva do not approve of Śaṅkara's apophaticism. For them, the above-mentioned Upaniṣadic sentence defines Brahman by attributing three qualities to it. In fact, for them Brahman is none other than the deity Viṣṇu, who has unlimited qualities. As soon as they ascribe attributes to Brahman, however, they face the same conundrum as the Vaiśeṣika philosophers do. Are these attributes one with, or different from Brahman? In addition, they also have to deal with one of the fundamental principles of any Vedānta, according to which Brahman is without any internal division (*akhaṇḍitatva*).

Rāmānuja answers this challenge by suggesting a new concept of inseparability (*aprthaksiddhi*). Rāmānuja rejects the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika concept of inherence on the same grounds as Śaṅkara, that is, that it leads to infinite regress.<sup>478</sup> The Viśiṣṭādvaita school explains the relation between a substance and its attributes as inseparably established (*aprthaksiddha*):

According to the Viśiṣṭādvaita epistemology, a substance is inseparable from the attribute [...] The two together always coexist (*aprthak-sthiti*) and [are] also seen as integrally related (*aprthak-pratīti*). It is an inherent relation which is the very *svarūpa* of the relata (*svarūpa-sambandha*). It is not a separable category like *samavāya* over and above the relata linking the two inseparable entities, as the

<sup>476</sup> *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* 2.2.1.

<sup>477</sup> For a detailed discussion, see Hirst 2004: 145–151.

<sup>478</sup> ŚrīBhā 2.2.12.

Naiyāyikas postulate [...] *Aprthak-siddha* is a name given to two relata which are inherently and inseparably related. (Chari 2005: 62)

In Rāmānuja's system this inseparable relation between a substance and its attributes is called inseparability (*aprthaksiddhi*). Rāmānuja's concept of inseparability and Madhva's concept of differentiating capacity are both alternative explanations on the relation between a substance and its attributes. Rāmānuja and Madhva agree in rejecting the concept of *samavāya*. They also agree that the relation between a substance and its attributes is innate to the substance. However, the concept of inseparability differs from that of differentiating capacity in two ways. First, it denotes both difference and oneness between a substance and its attributes. Second, it can be applied to the relation between Brahman and the living entity, as well as to the relation between Brahman and the world:

The concept of *aprthak-siddhi* [...] accounts for both unity as well as difference. That is, wherever we find that two entities are inseparable by their nature, such as substance and attribute, soul and body and *Īśvara* and universe, we can uphold both difference and unity [...] As a substance characterised by the attribute, it is one, but as substance and attribute they are two. (Chari 2004: 51–52)

In contrast to the concept of inseparability, the concept of differentiating capacity according to Madhva denotes the *appearance* of difference between a substance and its attributes. Also, Madhva does not apply the concept of differentiating capacity to explain the relation between Brahman and the living entity, and between Brahman and the world. According to Madhva, Brahman is different from the living entity as It is from the world. Whereas the concept of inseparability applies to the three relationships, that is, (i) Brahman and Its attributes; (ii) Brahman and the living entity; (iii) Brahman and the world, the concept of differentiating capacity applies only to the first relationship.

Following Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja, Madhva criticizes the Nyāya–Vaiśeṣika view of inherence in his commentary on BraSū 2.2.13: 'Since [the Nyāya–Vaiśeṣika school] accepts the connection of inherence among cause and effect and so on, and since it [inherence] is equally separated [from the substrate], there is instability in requiring another inherence.'<sup>479</sup> Madhva's criticism too is that the Nyāya–Vaiśeṣika idea of inherence leads to a logical fault of infinite regress.

Madhva proposes the concept of differentiating capacity to overcome this problem. Differentiating capacity, according to Madhva, is the nature (*sva-rūpa*) of an entity and does not have a separate identity from the substrate.

<sup>479</sup> BraSūBhā (Ma) 2.2.13: *kāryakāraṇādīnām samavāyasambandhāṅgikārāt tasya ca bhinnatvasāmyāt samavāyāntarāpekṣāyām avasthitiḥ* /



Consequently, there is also no ontological distinction between substrate and quality though there is an appearance of difference for the sake of linguistic usage. Due to this concept of differentiating capacity Madhva is able to describe Brahman as both Its qualities and the substrate of the qualities. This concept also enables him to conceive of Brahman with multiple qualities without causing any internal division in It. This concept is one of the cornerstones of Mādhva Vedānta, and Baladeva incorporates this in his GoBhā to describe the relationship between Brahman and Its qualities.

Jīva appears to be closer to Rāmānuja than to Madhva in that he takes the view of simultaneous difference and oneness (*bhedābheda*) in relation to (i) Brahman and Its attributes; (ii) Brahman and the living entity; (iii) Brahman and the world. As discussed in section 3.4, Jīva in BhaSa 16 *Anuccheda* explores the relationship between Brahman and the living entity and between Brahman and the world using the analogy of the sun and sunrays. The living entity and the world are distinct from Brahman since they are outside Brahman. At the same time they are one with Brahman in the sense they are rooted in Brahman.

Jīva takes the view of simultaneous oneness and difference in relation to Brahman and Its attributes as well. Discussing BrĀU 3.9.28c 'Brahman is consciousness and bliss',<sup>480</sup> Jīva raises a question: 'Do these two words "consciousness" and "bliss" have the same meaning or separate meanings?'<sup>481</sup> Jīva answers his own question:

Not the first option. Since [that would result in the fault of] repeating the same. If the latter is the case, [both] the state of being consciousness and the state of being bliss [would exist] in It [Brahman] which is one only, and there would be the fault of having such internal division.<sup>482</sup>

On the one hand, the two words 'consciousness' and 'bliss' cannot have the same meaning since repetition is considered a fault, and the scriptures must be faultless. On the other hand, if the two words have separate meanings, that may imply an internal division (*svagatabheda*) within Brahman, which is supposed to be free from such a division. Both options seem problematic. After a lengthy discussion, Jīva concludes that although the two words have separate meanings, the fact they do does not imply any division within Brahman:

Even though the two words 'consciousness' and 'bliss' are ascertained to be different, it does not mean there are two natures in Brahman. Rather, one reality [i.e.

<sup>480</sup> BrĀU 3.9.28: *jāta eva na jāyate ko nv enaṃ janayet punaḥ / vijñānam ānandaṃ brahma rātir dātuḥ parāyaṇam //*

<sup>481</sup> SaSa (on BhaSa *Anuccheda* 20): *kim iha vijñānānandaśabdāv ekārthau binnārthau vā?*

<sup>482</sup> SaSa (on BhaSa *Anuccheda* 20): *nādyah, paunaruktyāt / antyaś ced vijñānatvam ānandatvañ ca tattraikasminn eveti tādṛśasvagatabhedāpattiḥ [ . . . ] /*

Brahman] is seen differently because of the peculiarity of displaying Brahman's nature. Some [see Brahman] as consciousness. Others as bliss. This is just like the mass of the moon-rays. [Some say] 'This is white' [while others say] 'This is light.'<sup>483</sup>

According to Jīva, the two attributes of Brahman 'consciousness' and 'bliss' are not synonyms. At the same time the fact that they have separate meanings does not suggest any internal division within Brahman. It is simply that the nature of the one Brahman appears differently to different people. This is just as some describe the moon-rays as white, and others describe them as light. This does not mean that one part of the rays is white and another is light, but that the same moon-rays are both white and light.

Based on the above discussion, we can deduce Jīva's view on the relation between Brahman and Its attributes. If we follow Jīva's argument, the word 'Brahman' in the BṛĀU sentence 'Brahman is consciousness and bliss' cannot have the same meaning as Its attributes 'consciousness' and 'bliss'. This would result in the fault of repetition. At the same time, Brahman as the substrate and Its attributes are not separate entities since that would go against the oneness of Brahman. Therefore, the relation between Brahman and Its attributes is simultaneous oneness and difference.

This deduction is supported by Jīva's discussion on energy and the possessor of energy he offers elsewhere in his SaSa. After citing ViPu 6.7.61,<sup>484</sup> Jīva quotes Śrīdhara's explanation on Viṣṇu's energy (*viṣṇuśakti*):

In this verse *viṣṇuśakti* means Viṣṇu's energy, which is innate, supreme, and of the nature of consciousness. It is mentioned by the names such as the highest abode, supreme Brahman, the highest truth and so on. It is the nature [of Viṣṇu] anticipating the effects, which is described by the word 'energy'. [This is so] since it is mentioned previously in the passage, 'That in which difference is rejected, which is existence only, (beyond the realm of words, and understood only through the self, that is knowledge called Brahman).'<sup>485</sup>

Jīva then gives his own explanation on the relation between Viṣṇu's energy and Viṣṇu Himself:

<sup>483</sup> SaSa (on BhaSa *Anuccheda* 27): *bhinnatvenopalabhyamānābhyām api vijñānānandaśabdābhyām na tasya dvyātmakatā, kintv ekam eva vastu svarūpaprakāśavaiśiṣṭyena bhinnatayā nirūpyate, kenāpi jñānam iti, kenāpi tv ānandam iti, yathā candracandrikāsaṃdohaḥ śuklo 'yam iti, jyotir idam iti ca /*

<sup>484</sup> *viṣṇuśaktiḥ parā proktā kṣetrajñākhyā tathāparā / avidyākarmasaṃjñānyā tṛtīyā śaktir iṣyate //*

'The energy of Viṣṇu is called the highest, and [the energy] which is called "the knower of the field" is said to be lower. [And the energy] which is called "the one whose effect is ignorance" is acknowledged as the third energy.'

<sup>485</sup> ĀPra 6.7.61: *atra viṣṇuśaktiḥ viṣṇoḥ svarūpabhūtā parā citsvarūpā śaktiḥ paramapada-parabrahmaparatattvādyākhyā proktā / 'pratyastamitabhedaṃ yat tat sattāmātram' (ViPu 6.7.53) ity atra prāguktaṃ svarūpam eva kāryonmukhaṃ śaktiśabdenoktam iti //*

ViPu 6.7.53: *pratyastamitabhedaṃ yat sattāmātram agocaram / vacasām ātmasaṃvedyaṃ taj jñānaṃ brahmasaṃjñitam //*

Therefore, [Viṣṇu's energy and Viṣṇu Himself] are distinct since it is not possible to consider [Viṣṇu's energy] as non-distinct from [Viṣṇu's] own nature. [However, they] are also not distinct since it is not possible to consider [Viṣṇu's energy] as distinct [from Viṣṇu's own nature]. Thus we accept only [simultaneous] oneness and difference [*bhedābheda*] of energy and the possessor of energy. They are paradoxical [*acintya*] as well.<sup>486</sup>

In this context Viṣṇu's energy is a synonym of His supreme energy (*parāśakti*). Jīva thus propounds the view of simultaneous oneness and difference regarding the relation between Viṣṇu and His supreme energy. He, furthermore, calls this relation paradoxical, since we cannot logically understand how oneness and difference are both possible in one relationship.

In secondary literatures, this relationship of logically paradoxical difference and non-difference is often designated as the doctrine of *acintyabhedābheda*.<sup>487</sup> Baladeva diverges from Jīva in that the concept of differentiating capacity accepts as real only oneness between quality and substrate. According to the concept, their difference is appearance only (*bhedapratinidhi*). O. B. L. Kapoor points out this difference between paradoxical difference and non-difference (*acintyabhedābheda*) and differentiating capacity (*viśeṣa*):

Mādhvācārya's [*sic*] concept of *acintya* is not so *acintya*, or inconceivable, as the *acintya* of Śrī Caitanya. Mādhvācārya's [*sic*] *acintya* is related to *viśeṣa*, which reconciles the appearance of difference with identity, while Śrī Caitanya's *acintya* reconciles real difference with real identity.

It will not be proper, in this connection, to attach much importance to the expression like '*acintya-viśeṣa-mahimā*' used by Baladeva, because he does not represent the true spirit of the philosophy of Śrī Caitanya and, in certain respects, his views are influenced by Mādhvācārya [*sic*]. (Kapoor 1976: 171)

Baladeva uses the expression 'paradoxical greatness of differentiating capacity (*acintyaviśeṣamahimā*)' in the SiRa, which is an introduction to the GoBhā.<sup>488</sup> In SiRa 1.18, Baladeva explains why it is possible to give several theories about Brahman without damaging Its oneness: 'Similarly [to how] the *Vaidūrya* gem [is perceived], wise people also accept linguistic usage with these words without a problem on account of the greatness of differentiating capacity [*viśeṣamahimā*], which is paradoxical [*acintya*].'<sup>489</sup> Baladeva's sub-commentary explains this analogy:

<sup>486</sup> SaSa (on BhaSa *Anuccheda* 18): *tasmāt svarūpād abhinnaṭvena cintayitum aśakyatvād bhedaḥ / bhinnatvena cintayitum aśakyatvād abhedaś ca pratīyate iti śaktiśaktimātor bhedābhedā evāṅgikṛtau / tau cācintyau iti //*

<sup>487</sup> See, for example, Chakravarti 1969, Chatterjee 1993, Gupta 2007, Kapoor 1976.

<sup>488</sup> Therefore it is also called the *Govindabhāṣyapīṭhaka*.

<sup>489</sup> SiRa 1.18: *tathāpi vaidūryavad acintyena viśeṣamahimnā taiḥ śabdair vyavahāro viduṣāṃ api nīrbādhah /*

Qualities such as blue and yellow, which are indeed non-different from the *Vaidūrya* gem, are at the same time designated as different [from the gem]. In the same manner, on account of differentiating capacity, we designate the qualities such as consciousness, bliss, and omniscience as different [from Brahman] though they are in fact non-different from Brahman, whose nature is existence.<sup>490</sup>

The *Vaidūrya* gem is a mythical gem, which exhibits different colors according to the various angles from which one observes it. These various colors of the gem are non-different from the gem itself. At the same time, when we say 'The *Vaidūrya* gem is blue', we make a distinction between the gem as the subject and the color blue as a predicate. This distinction for the sake of linguistic usage (*vyavahāra*) is made possible by the power of differentiating capacity. On the other hand, this distinction is appearance only. Therefore, after explaining differentiating capacity Baladeva rejects the view of simultaneous oneness and difference: 'It is not that there may be oneness and difference [between qualities and their substrate] since that would contradict with the statements of prohibition.'<sup>491</sup>

Kapoor's statement above is correct in so far as he points out the difference between the views of Jīva and of Baladeva concerning the relation between Brahman's qualities and Brahman Itself. According to Jīva, who follows Rāmānuja on this point, the difference between quality and a substrate is real. According to Baladeva, who follows Madhva on this point, this difference is appearance only. Hence Kapoor's remark: '[Baladeva] does not represent the true spirit of the philosophy of Śrī Caitanya' (Kapoor 1976: 171).

The difference between these two thinkers, however, may not be as great as Kapoor presents. Ultimately, both accept that qualities are non-different from their substrate in the sense that they are a part of the nature (*svarūpa*) of the substrate. They also accept that a subject and its predicates are not synonyms. The concern of Jīva and of Baladeva, and for that matter the concern of Rāmānuja and of Madhva, is the same. Their shared interest is to present Brahman as possessing qualities (*saṁguṇa*), and thereby to reject the Advaita view of Brahman without qualities (*nirguṇa*). To do so, however, they have to explain how one substrate can be predicated by several non-synonymous terms without such predications incurring any internal division within the substrate. The challenge, therefore, is a linguistic one, and Rāmānuja and Madhva supply slightly different answers.

In summary, the views of Rāmānuja, Madhva, Jīva, and Baladeva concerning the relationships between (i) Brahman and Its attributes; (ii) Brahman and the living entity; (iii) Brahman and *prakṛti* may be described as follows:

<sup>490</sup> Baladeva's *Ṭippanī* on SiRa 1.18: *vaidūryān nilapītādayo guṇā abhinnā eva yathā mitho bhinnā vyavahriyante tathā sadrūpād brahmaṇo vijñānānandau sārvañjyādayo guṇāś cābhinnā eva bhedena vyavahriyante viśeṣād ity arthaḥ* /

<sup>491</sup> SiRa 18: *na caivam bhedābhedau syātām niṣedhavākyaavyākopāt* /

	Rāmānuja	Madhva	Jīva	Baladeva
(i) Brahman and Its qualities	Oneness and difference ( <i>aprthaksiddhi</i> )	Oneness ( <i>viśeṣa</i> )	Oneness and difference ( <i>acintya</i> )	Oneness ( <i>viśeṣa</i> )
(ii) Brahman and the living entity	Oneness and difference ( <i>aprthaksiddhi</i> )	Difference	Oneness and difference ( <i>acintya</i> )	Oneness and difference
(iii) Brahman and <i>prakṛti</i>	Oneness and difference ( <i>aprthaksiddhi</i> )	Difference	Oneness and difference ( <i>acintya</i> )	Oneness and difference

As seen, Baladeva follows Madhva in accepting the idea of differentiating capacity when he explains the relation between Brahman and Its qualities. According to this view, the difference between Brahman and Its qualities is appearance only. Baladeva differs on this point from Rāmānuja and Jīva, who take the view of simultaneous oneness and difference (*bhedābheda*).

Baladeva, however, never uses the concept of differentiating capacity to explain the relation between Brahman and the living entity or between Brahman and *prakṛti*. Though, according to Baladeva, the living entity and *prakṛti* are the energies (*śakti*) of Brahman, and though he accepts their oneness with Brahman, he sees them at the same time as truly different from Brahman. For Baladeva, (ii) the difference between Brahman and the living entity and (iii) that between Brahman and *prakṛti* are real. Thus, Baladeva takes the view of complete oneness only in relation to (i) Brahman and Its internal qualities. Concerning the relationship between Brahman and the living entity and between Brahman and *prakṛti*, Baladeva takes the view of simultaneous oneness and difference, following Rāmānuja and Jīva. Baladeva disagrees with Madhva on this point. According to Madhva, these two relationships are explained in terms of difference (*bheda*) only.

Given these observations, Elkman's remark on Baladeva's theological position does not seem to be accurate:

Baladeva, unwilling to abandon completely the Gauḍīya doctrine that the universe and living beings represent *śaktis* of *paramātman*, and unable to accept the consequences of applying the category of *viśeṣa* to the *māyāśakti* and *jīvaśakti* of *paramātman*, resorts to a partial application of *viśeṣa* in which only the essential *śaktis* of the divine, such as being, knowledge, and bliss, are identified with him. Thus while Baladeva claims to accept the *śakti* theory of the Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavas, due to his discriminating application of *viśeṣa*, the result is an ontology equivalent to the pure dualism of Madhva and in sharp contrast to the closely related Gauḍīya doctrines of Śaktipariṇāma-vāda and Acintyabhedābheda-vāda. (Elkman 1986: 40)

According to Elkman, the fact that Baladeva applies the concept of differentiating capacity (*viśeṣa*) only to the relationship between Brahman and Its qualities implies that Baladeva's ontology is closer to Madhva's dualism than to Jīva's view of simultaneous oneness and difference. Elkman is correct in his observation that Baladeva restricts the application of differentiating capacity to the relationship between Brahman and Its qualities. However, I argue that Elkman is mistaken to hold that Baladeva's non-application of differentiating capacity to *jīvaśakti* and *māyāśakti* implies the acceptance of the 'pure dualism of Madhva'. This is because Baladeva does accept the oneness of Brahman and the world, and of Brahman and the living entity.

In the preamble to BraSū 1.1.1, Baladeva says that the living entity, *prakṛti*, time, and *karma* are all energies (*śakti*) of one Brahman. In his commentary on BraSū 1.4.26, Baladeva claims that Brahman, which is a single principle, is both the efficient cause and the material cause of the universe. Citing ViPu 6.7.61, he observes that Brahman's supreme energy (*parāśakti*) corresponds to the efficient cause; the knower-of-the-field energy (*kṣetrajñāśakti* i.e. *jīvaśakti*) to the living entity; and the ignorance-effecting energy (*avidyākarmaśakti* i.e. *māyāśakti*) to the world.

In his commentary on BraSū 2.3.41, Baladeva, following Rāmānuja, explains the oneness of the living being and Brahman in terms of the former being pervaded by the latter. In his commentary on the same *sūtra* Madhva accepts the difference between the living entity and Brahman as literal, but maintains that their oneness is metaphorical. In contrast, Baladeva claims that both distinction and oneness are to be taken literally. With regard to the same *sūtra* Baladeva explains the relation between the living being and Brahman using the analogy of sunshine and the sun. Then he again cites ViPu 6.7.61, which describes the living being as Brahman's energy. Baladeva's adaptation of the sun-sunshine analogy as well as his citation of ViPu 6.7.61 suggest that Baladeva follows Jīva's BhaSa *Anuccheda* 16, where Jīva points out that the living entity is both one with and different from Brahman.

These points mentioned indicate that Baladeva does not accept Madhva's 'pure dualism'. Instead, in agreement with Rāmānuja and Jīva, he accepts the view of simultaneous oneness and difference concerning the relation between Brahman and the living entity and between Brahman and *prakṛti*. It is also clear that Baladeva follows *śaktipariṇāmavāda* as taught by Jīva. Therefore, Elkman is mistaken to state that Baladeva's usage of the concept of *viśeṣa* leads him to the dualism of Madhva and differentiates his teachings from Jīva's.

One can, however, sympathize with Elkman for Baladeva's lack of explanation. Baladeva, on the one hand, states that the qualities of Brahman, the living entity, and *prakṛti* are all energies of Brahman. On the other hand, he applies the concept of differentiating capacity only to the relationship between Brahman and Its qualities. He does not seem to clarify why the concept is applicable to one relationship but not to other two, while all three

relationships are equally described in terms of energy (*śakti*) and the possessor of energy (*śaktimat*).

Elkman is of the opinion that Baladeva diverges from the doctrine of *acintyabheda*. Kapoor offers a similar view:

[Baladeva's] view on the doctrine of *acintya-bhedābheda*, also, does not seem to be free from this influence. For, like Mādhvācārya [*sic*], he has also not made any mention of *acintya-bhedābheda* in connection with the problem of relation between God and Jīva or the world. (Kapoor 1976: 171)

First, the fact Baladeva does not employ the precise term *acintyabheda* does not automatically imply Madhva's influence. It was observed earlier in this section that Baladeva accepts the view of simultaneous oneness and difference (*bhedābheda*), which differs significantly from Madhva's view. Second, although the term *acintyabheda* is popularly used in the secondary literature, it is not the one which Jīva himself uses frequently. In fact, the term does not occur at all in his six *Sandarbhās*. It is only in his SaSa that we find the exact term, and even there it is only used twice.<sup>492</sup> Therefore, the fact that Baladeva does not use the exact term in his GoBhā does not necessarily indicate that he disagrees with Jīva's view.

We have already confirmed Baladeva's acceptance of the doctrine of simultaneous difference and non-difference with regard to the relationship between Brahman and the living entity and between Brahman and *prakṛti*. This is in accordance with Jīva. The remaining question is whether Baladeva accepts the concept of paradoxicality (*acintya*) as taught by Jīva. I suggest he does. Analyzing Jīva's idea of paradoxicality, Gupta points out two major ways in which Jīva uses the term. The first is an epistemological usage of the term, based on the assumption that Brahman is understood only through the scriptures:

[Jīva's] derivation of *acintya* rests on an important assumption about the nature of scripture, namely, that all scriptural statements about Brahman—those affirming difference and those affirming non-difference—must be given equal weight and taken in their direct sense. Even the contradictions arising from reasoning about the nature of Brahman—that Brahman is unique yet diverse, aloof yet involved, changeless yet creative—are dependent on scripture, for it is scripture that tells us that Brahman must have all these opposing qualities. (Gupta 2007: 46)

In the scriptures we find both passages teaching difference (*bhedaśruti*) and passages teaching non-difference (*abhedaśruti*). Jīva accepts both. How these opposing views are reconciled, however, is paradoxical. As mentioned earlier

<sup>492</sup> The SaSa on PaSa *Anuccheda* 77–78.

in this section, Jīva uses the term *acintyabhedābheda* twice in his SaSa. His first usage explains this epistemological paradoxicality:

Others [i.e. the Gauḍīyas], however, accept the view of *acintyabhedābheda*. They accept non-difference since it is not possible to consider [Brahman and the world] as different. Similarly they accept difference since it is not possible to consider [Brahman and the world] as non-different. [They accept both difference and non-difference] since, according to the maxim [i.e. BraSū 2.1.11]: '[Brahman must be understood based on the scriptures] since logic {*tarka*} is inconclusive', they see many faults concerning both the view of difference and the view of non-difference.<sup>493</sup>

Baladeva agrees with Jīva that Brahman's nature is known only through the scriptures and it is paradoxical. In SiRa 1.17, Baladeva says that we cannot infer Brahman's nature based on our mundane experience because:

Reasoning {*yukti*} does not work with regard to the object, which is paradoxical {*acintya*} and supra-mundane {*alaukika*}. The supreme reality is not indeed within the realm of logic since there are the *Śruti* passages such as 'This (thought) cannot (be grasped) by logic {*tarka*}'. Rather, It [i.e. the supreme reality] is in fact understood only through the scriptures, as Lord Bādarāyaṇa says [in BraSū 2.1.27]: '[We accept Brahman as the creator of the universe] because of the scriptures. [This is so] since the scriptures are the only source [for understanding Brahman]'.<sup>494</sup>

Jīva's citation of BraSū 2.1.11 and Baladeva's citation of BraSū 2.1.27 resonate well. Both emphasize the scripture as the only means of knowing Brahman. Both reject the application of logic to Brahman since It is beyond the reach of our mundane experience. In this sense, Baladeva agrees with Jīva that Brahman's nature is paradoxical (*acintya*).

According to Gupta, the second way in which Jīva uses the term *acintya* is in relation to Brahman's paradoxical energy (*acintyaśakti*): 'Jīva Gosvāmī defines inconceivability as the condition of accomplishing what is difficult or impossible to accomplish (*durghaṭa-ghaṭatvam*), and Bhagavan's *śakti* as that which has the ability to do so' (2007: 53). Jīva confirms this use of the term as he mentions his doctrine for the second time in the SaSa: 'In our system however,

<sup>493</sup> SaSa (on PaSa *Anuccheda* 77–78): *apare tu, 'tarkāpratiṣṭhānāt' (BraSū 2.1.11) itinyāyena bhede 'py abhede 'pi nirmalyādadoṣasantatidarśanena bhinnatayā cintayitum āśakyatvād abhedam sādhayantas tadvad abhinnatayāpi cintayitum āśakyatvād bhedaṁ api sādhayanto 'cintyabhedābhedaṁ svikurvanti /*

<sup>494</sup> SiRa 1.17: *acintye 'laukike 'rthe yukter anavatārāt / paramaṁ tattvaṁ khalu tarkagocaram na bhavati 'naiṣā tarkeṇa' (KaU 2.9a) ityādiśrutibhyaḥ, kintu śrutyekagamyam eva tat, yathāha bhagavān sūtrakāraḥ 'śrutes tu śabdāmūlatvāt' (BraSū 2.1.27) //*  
KaU 2.9a: *naiṣā tarkena matir āpaneyā [ . . . ] /*



[we accept] only paradoxical difference and non-difference [*acintyabhedābheda*] since [Brahman] consists of paradoxical energy [*acintyaśakti*].<sup>495</sup>

Again, Baladeva is in agreement with Jīva. In the GoBhā, the term *acintyaśakti* or *avicintyaśakti* occurs seventeen times, which includes the KaiU passage 'I am without hand or feet, having paradoxical energy [*acintyaśakti*]'<sup>496</sup> quoted twice. The term is used to explain how it is possible for the Lord to possess contradictory qualities such as manifesting Himself in various ways though being one,<sup>497</sup> being omnipresent, and being minute and so on.<sup>498</sup> It is also used to justify why the Lord is capable of performing difficult tasks such as the creation of the world.<sup>499</sup> These usages of the terms *acintyaśakti* or *avicintyaśakti* are in agreement with Jīva's understanding that *acintyaśakti* makes the impossible possible. Thus, Baladeva accepts two ways in which Jīva uses the term *acintya*. I suggest therefore that Baladeva closely follows Jīva in his understanding of the relationship between Brahman and the living entity, and between Brahman and the world, despite the fact that Baladeva does not use the term *acintyabhedābheda*.

Although Baladeva borrows the concept of differentiating capacity from Madhva, he diverges from Madhva in his application of the concept. According to Madhva, the idea of differentiating capacity can be applied to the following five relationships: (1) between part and whole; (2) between qualities and the possessor of the qualities; (3) between energy and the possessor of energy; (4) between actions and their possessor; (5) between portion and the possessor of portion.<sup>500</sup> Baladeva is in line with Madhva in so far as he explains the relation between Brahman and Its qualities in terms of differentiating capacity. From Madhva's perspective, Baladeva is also justified in applying the same concept to explain the relationship between Brahman's energies and Brahman as the possessor of the energies.

However, Baladeva diverges from Madhva in the two points in terms of his application of the idea of differentiating capacity. First, Baladeva identifies Brahman's qualities with Its supreme energy (*parāśakti*), which includes the

<sup>495</sup> SaSa (on PaSa *Anuccheda* 77–78): *svamate tv acintyabhedābhedā evācintyaśaktimayat-vād iti* /

<sup>496</sup> KaiU 21: *apāṇipādo 'ham acintyaśakti* [ . . . ] /

<sup>497</sup> GoBhā 1.2.7: *tādṛśasyāpi tasya bhaktānugrahīṇo 'cintyaśaktiyoginas tathā tathābhivyakteḥ / ekam eva svarūpaṃ bhakteṣu nānāvidhaṃ sphurati, 'eko 'pi san bahudhā yo 'vabhāti' itiśravaṇāt* /

GoBhā 3.2.11: *hi yasmād ekam eva svarūpaṃ acintyaśaktiā yugapat sarvatrāvabhāti, 'eko 'pi sann' itiśruteḥ* /

GoBhā 3.2.13: *tathā caikasyaiva sato 'vicintyaśakter viruddhaguṇāśrayasya yugapad bahudhā-vabhāso 'pi tasmin viruddhadhīviṣayo guṇa eveti* /

<sup>498</sup> GoBhā 1.2.7: *vibhutve saty apy aṇutvādikam acintyaśaktiyogāt* /

<sup>499</sup> GoBhā 2.1.30: *tathā cāvicintyaśaktiyogāt brahmaṇaḥ kartṛtvaṃ yujyata eveti* /

<sup>500</sup> BhāTāNi 11.7.49: *avayavy avayavānām ca guṇānām guṇinas tathā / śaktiśaktimatoś caiva kriyāyās tadvatas tathā / svarūpāśmāśinoś nityābedo janārdane //*

bliss-giving energy (*hlādinīśakti*). Second, he identifies the supreme energy with Lakṣmī, and the bliss-giving energy with Rādhā. As shown in section 4.5, through these identifications Baladeva argues for the ontological oneness of Lakṣmī-Viṣṇu or Rādhā-Kṛṣṇa. The term 'the bliss-giving energy' and its identification with Rādhā are specific to the Gauḍīya tradition, and these points are not accepted by the Mādhvas.

If we remember the context of the controversies the Gauḍīyas faced in Jaipur in the eighteenth century, we can understand Baladeva's motivation for employing the Mādhva concept of differentiating capacity. Since the concept of differentiating capacity is a hallmark of Mādhva Vedānta, Baladeva's acceptance of it justifies the Gauḍīya affiliation with the Mādhvas. At the same time, by applying the concept to explain the oneness between Rādhā and Kṛṣṇa, Baladeva is able to make a strong case against the accusation that their worship is immoral. Therefore, for Baladeva the concept of differentiating capacity is one stone that can kill two birds—the issues concerning the *sampradāya* affiliation and Rādhā-Kṛṣṇa's extramarital relationship.

#### 4.6.3. Conclusion

Baladeva, like Madhva, uses the concept of differentiating capacity to explain the relation between Brahman and Its qualities. Baladeva differs from Jīva on this point. Jīva, following Rāmānuja, accepts both difference and non-difference in the relation between Brahman and Its qualities. Nonetheless, the difference between Baladeva and Jīva in this regard seems terminological rather than substantial. Both Rāmānuja and Madhva agree that Brahman and Its qualities are different and non-different at the same time. The only difference between them is that Madhva emphasizes their oneness and claims that their difference is appearance only. However this appearance of difference is real enough to make the subject–predicate relation possible. This is precisely what Rāmānuja aims to achieve when he says that the difference between a subject and its predicates is real. Therefore, practically speaking Rāmānuja's inseparability and Madhva's differentiating capacity more or less accomplish the same point.

Besides, Baladeva identifies the qualities of Brahman with Śrī, and maintains that their difference is real enough for them to have a devotional relationship. Madhva does not accept this identification of qualities with personality. This implies that the idea of difference in Baladeva's differentiating capacity is more real than in that of Madhva's, which makes Baladeva's position closer to that of Rāmānuja or Jīva.

In relation to Jīva's doctrine of *acintyabhedābheda*, Baladeva takes the view of difference and non-difference (*bhedābheda*) on the relationship between Brahman and the living entity, and between Brahman and *prakṛti*. Baladeva

follows Rāmānuja and Jīva on this point, rather than Madhva. In addition, Baladeva's use of the term *acintya* reflects Jīva's understanding of the term. Therefore, when we examine Jīva's *acintyabheda* in terms of *acintya* and *bhedābheda*, Baladeva appears to be in agreement with Jīva on both points. Given these points, Baladeva's theological divergence from Jīva in his use of the concept of a differentiating capacity does not seem to be as substantial as scholars such as Kapoor and Elkman suggest.

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An earlier version of section 4.2.2. was published as Okita 2009b.

A part of section 4.6.2. is largely based on my forthcoming article: Okita (2014).



## Conclusion

This book examined the issue of lineage in the Brahmā–Mādhva–Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇava *sampradāya*. In the South Asian context, it is the idea of *sampradāya* or lineage which guarantees the authenticity and salvific efficacy of a religious community. The authority of a particular group is often based on a claim that the divine figure revealed the original teaching, and it has been transmitted to generation after generation through a succession of teachers and disciples. Thus, at least theoretically speaking, the authority of a tradition depends on the consistency of the teaching in the line of transmission of knowledge.

Regarding the issue at hand, I traced and examined its historical background in the first chapter. The idea of the four legitimate Vaiṣṇava *sampradāyas*, which correspond to four divine figures, became popular in medieval Northern India around the fifteenth century. These divine figures were said to be Śrī, Brahmā, Rudra, and Sanaka. This meant that only four Vaiṣṇava groups could claim their authenticity based on the authority of these four divine figures. Unfortunately, by the time the followers of Caitanya developed their own theology and religious practices in the late sixteenth to the early seventeenth century, four traditions already aligned themselves with the four divine figures. Although there were varied opinions concerning which four Vaiṣṇava groups occupied the ‘seats’ (Hawley 2009), a widely accepted view based on a verse attributed to the PaPu designated as the four *sampradāyas* the groups who followed Rāmānuja, Madhva, Nimbārka, and Viṣṇu Svāmī.

Although the Gauḍīya affiliation with the Mādhvas is found in Kavi Karṇapura’s GauGaUDī, written in the late sixteenth century, the works of the Gosvāmīs such as Rūpa and Jīva do not seem to recognize such an affiliation. This Mādhva–Gauḍīya affiliation was consolidated as late as the eighteenth century, when Baladeva wrote the GoBhā. With the arrival of Govindadevajī from Vṛndāvana to Jaipur in the eighteenth century, the Gauḍīyas rose to prominence at the court of Jaisingh II. The Kachvāhās had a long-standing relationship with the Gauḍīyas, and the king was personally attracted to the tradition. However, in his public role Jaisingh II wished to promote the image of being a righteous king (*dharmarāja*). Consequently, (i) the Gauḍīyas’ ambiguous *sampradāya* affiliation, (ii) their lack of any BraSū commentary,

and (iii) the extramarital relationship between Rādhā and Kṛṣṇa proved challenging. As Burton points out, the king held several meetings to deal with these issues. Baladeva seems to have written the GoBhā afterwards, in order to solidify the authority of the Gauḍīya tradition by (i) confirming the Gauḍīya affiliation with the Mādhvas, (ii) supplying the Gauḍīya commentary on the BraSū, and (iii) providing a metaphysical justification for the worship of Rādhā–Kṛṣṇa.

In relation to the notion of *sampradāya*, however, this Gauḍīya affiliation with the Mādhvas provokes several questions, since the teachings of the Gauḍīyas differ from those of Mādhvas substantially. The authority of a *sampradāya* rests on the assumption that the content of what is taught by a guru today is the same as what he was taught by his own guru, and so on, all the way back to the divine founder. But does a guru, who teaches something substantially different from his teacher, still belong to the same *sampradāya*? What does it mean to transmit the knowledge of the tradition, and how is the identity of the tradition maintained from one generation to another?

In order to understand the nature of the Mādhva–Gauḍīya affiliation, the second chapter examined the *sampradāya* affiliation of Caitanya and of his predecessors such as Mādhavendra Purī. Therein, I made a distinction between a formal affiliation and a theological affiliation, pointing out the examples such as the formation process of the Daśanāmī order as analyzed by Clark. Applying these two categories, it was suggested that Caitanya might have been formally affiliated with the Mādhvas through Mādhavendra Purī but Caitanya's theological affiliation is unclear.

Since Caitanya did not compose any theological works, his theological affiliation cannot be determined based on his own writings. I therefore examined Jīva's theology instead, to understand the theological relationship between the Gauḍīyas and the Mādhvas. For this purpose, in the third chapter I compared the commentaries of Madhva, Vijayadhvaṇya, Śrīdhara, and Jīva on the CaŚloBhā. This comparative study made it clear how Jīva's commentary differs from the rest, theologically, exegetically, and stylistically. In comparison with Śrīdhara's commentary, Jīva's commentary is much clearer about the distinction between the Lord and the living entity. Jīva also avoids Śrīdhara's explanation of *māyā*, which echoes the teaching of Advaita Vedānta. Nonetheless, Jīva refers to Śrīdhara's commentary several times in his commentary, and claims that his commentary is in accordance with Śrīdhara's.

In comparison with the commentaries of Madhva and Vijayadhvaṇya, Jīva's commentary is significantly different. Jīva emphasizes the intimate relationship between the Lord and His devotees, identifies the living entity and the world as Brahman's energies, and teaches that Brahman is not only the efficient cause but also the material cause of the world. None of these points is shared in Mādhva Vedānta. Besides, whereas Vijayadhvaṇya faithfully explains most of the untraceable quotes cited by Madhva, Jīva does not mention any of them in his commentary on the CaŚloBhā. Information concerning the

differences between Jīva and Mādhva Vedānta can be used as effective criteria in examining Baladeva's theological position.

With the background of what was discussed in Chapters 1 through 3, the fourth chapter examined Baladeva's GoBhā in relation to the BraSū commentaries of Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, and Madhva. Since Baladeva was trained in the Mādhva tradition before his conversion to Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavism, and since he employs Mādhva concepts such as differentiating capacity in his GoBhā, scholars like De, Dimock, Elkman, and Sharma consider him to be more Mādhva than Gauḍīya. However, a comparative study of the GoBhā showed that this is not the case. His commentary on the opening verse of the GoBhā, his commentary on the first five BraSū, and his view on *prakṛti*, the living entity, and on Śrī repeatedly demonstrate that Baladeva accepts Jīva's teaching and rejects Madhva's when Jīva and Madhva theologically disagree with each other.

This, of course, does not mean that Baladeva is free from Madhva's influence. Exegetically, Madhva's influence on Baladeva is seen, for example, in GoBhā 1.1.4, 1.1.5, 2.1.23–25, and 3.2.28–31. Theologically, it is seen in Baladeva's acceptance of Madhva's untraceable citations and in his clear rejection of absolute monism. However, I argued that Baladeva accepts Madhva's teachings as long as Jīva accepts them. In general, Baladeva accepts only those untraceable quotes which Jīva cites. Also, Madhva and Jīva are in agreement with each other in terms of their clear rejection of absolute monism. A general principle, therefore, is that Baladeva accepts the non-Gauḍīya authors only if they are in agreement with Jīva.

The same principle is observed in Baladeva's relationship to Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja. For example, Baladeva uses Śaṅkara's arguments against the Mīmāṃsaka view of the Vedas in GoBhā 1.1.3. This is because Jīva agrees with Śaṅkara on this point. Similarly, Baladeva closely follows Rāmānuja in his view on *prakṛti*, the living entity, and on Śrī, since Jīva also follows Rāmānuja on these points.

A rare exception to this general principle is Baladeva's acceptance and use of differentiating capacity. Baladeva explains the relation between Brahman and Its qualities in terms of differentiating capacity, a concept which Jīva does not use. Jīva explains their relation in terms of simultaneous difference and non-difference, and in this regard he seems to be influenced by Rāmānuja's concept of inseparability. However, I argued that the difference between Madhva's concept of differentiating capacity and Rāmānuja's concept of inseparability is more terminological than substantial. Consequently, I also suggested that Baladeva's acceptance of differentiating capacity does not imply any substantial divergence from Jīva's theology. In fact, Baladeva uses differentiating capacity to explain the oneness of Rādhā and Kṛṣṇa, which is a teaching unique to Gauḍīyas such as Rūpa and Jīva. Given the political context in which Baladeva produced the GoBhā, the concept of differentiating capacity must

have been a convenient conceptual tool for him since it dealt with the challenges related to *sampradāya* affiliation and to Rādhā–Kṛṣṇa worship simultaneously. Therefore, even Baladeva's application of differentiating capacity points to his theological faithfulness to Jīva.

Finally, in relation to Jīva's concept of paradoxical difference and non-difference (*acintyabhedābheda*), scholars like Elkman and Kapoor point out Baladeva's divergence, since he does not use such a term. However, I argued that Baladeva does view the relationship between Brahman and *prakṛti* and the relationship between Brahman and the living entity in terms of difference and non-difference (*bhedābheda*). Also, it was shown that Baladeva's use of the terms *acintya* and *avicintya* is in agreement with Jīva's usage of *acintya*. Therefore, it was concluded that although Baladeva does not use the term *acintyabhedābheda*, his theology is in agreement with Jīva's.

These points suggest that Baladeva's GoBhā follows Jīva's theology in principle, and whenever Baladeva uses ideas from the Mādhva tradition, they are used to support Gauḍīya teachings. Therefore, despite Madhva's clear influence on Baladeva, I suggest that Baladeva's affiliation with the Mādhvas is formal but not theological. It may be concluded that when Baladeva establishes the Brahmā–Mādhva–Gauḍīya *sampradāya*, his theology is primarily based on Jīva's, and the Gauḍīya affiliation with the Mādhvas is formal only.

As mentioned in the Introduction, this research into the theology of the Brahmā–Mādhva–Gauḍīya *sampradāya* contributes to the following four areas of study. First, it contributes to the study of genealogy in South Asia, by showing the complexity of the idea of *sampradāya* or teacher-pupil lineage. The Gauḍīyas' relationship to the Mādhvas shows that two types of affiliation, namely formal and theological, can be exploited for various reasons. For example, establishing a formal affiliation with the Mādhvas provided the Gauḍīyas with the institutional authority which they required to maintain the prestige they gained at the court of Jaisingh II. At the same time, the acceptance of the Mādhva theological concepts such as differentiating capacity was useful for enhancing the Gauḍīyas' moral authority in relation to the worship of Rādhā and Kṛṣṇa.

Second, this research contributes to the study of South Asian intellectual history in the early modern period. In the literatures of the nineteenth-century Bengal Renaissance for example, the period of medieval to early modern is sometimes described as 'the dark age' in contrast to the 'pristine' Classical period. However, Baladeva's GoBhā testifies that deep learning in Classical Vedānta and its skillful reinterpretation were actively conducted in the eighteenth century. This means that Vedānta, like the other disciplines studied by the Sanskrit Knowledge-Systems Project, experienced a lively production of the Sanskrit literature in the early modern period.

Third, this research shows that the *Purāṇas*, especially the BhāPu and the ViPu, play a significant role in the discourse of Vedānta. Following Jīva's



theology, the important teachings in Baladeva's theology such as the intimacy of the Lord and His devotees are based on the BhāPu. Also, the other major teachings, such as the theory of three energies, are based on the ViPu. These points indicate the theological depth of the *Purāṇas*, which have received relatively little attention from Western scholars so far.

Last but not least, the current work contributes to the study of Hindu theology. Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇava Vedānta fits well into the category of theology as defined in the Introduction. First, it is theology in the sense of God-talk. The Gauḍīya authors see Kṛṣṇa as the ultimate reality, the efficient and the material cause of the world. Second, it is theology in the sense of scriptural exegesis. The early Gauḍīya authors such as Rūpa and Jīva built their theology using texts such as the Upaniṣads, the BhaGī, the BhāPu, and the ViPu. Baladeva's GoBhā was an attempt to explain this Gauḍīya theology in terms of the BraSū, a collection of aphorisms that are again seen as a revelation. Third, Baladeva's GoBhā is theology in the sense of an insider discourse. As a representative of the Gauḍīya tradition, Baladeva's task was to defend and establish its authority in the public sphere.



## APPENDIX I

### List of the *Brahmasūtras* Cited

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#### BraSū<sup>1</sup>

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1.1.1.	<i>athāto brahmajijñāsā //</i>
1.1.2.	<i>jānmādi asya yataḥ //</i>
1.1.3.	<i>śāstrayonitvāt //</i>
1.1.4.	<i>tat tu samanvayāt //</i>
1.1.5.	<i>ikṣater nāśabdam //</i>
1.4.23.	<i>prakṛtiś ca pratijñādr̥ṣṭāntānuparodhāt //</i>
1.4.24.	<i>abhidhyopadeśāc ca //</i>
1.4.25.	<i>sākṣāc cobhayāmnānāt //</i>
1.4.26.	<i>ātmakṛteḥ parināmāt //</i>
1.4.27.	<i>yoniś ca hi gīyate //</i>
2.1.11.	<i>tarkāpratiṣṭhānāt //</i>
2.1.21.	<i>itaravyapadeśād dhitākaraṇādidoṣaprasaktiḥ //</i>
2.1.22.	<i>adhikaṃ tu bhedanirdeśāt //</i>
2.1.23.	<i>aśmādivac ca tadanupapattiḥ //</i>
2.1.24.	<i>upasaṃhāradarśanān neti cen na kṣīravād dhi //</i>
2.1.25.	<i>devādivad iti loke //</i>
2.1.27.	<i>śrutes tu śabdāmūlatvāt //</i>
2.2.13.	<i>samavāyābhyupagamāc ca sāmāyānāvasthiteḥ //</i>
2.3.41.	<i>aṃśo nānāvyapadeśād anyathā cāpi dāsakitavāditvam adhiyate eke //</i>
2.3.42.	<i>mantravarjāt //</i>
2.3.43.	<i>api smaryate //</i>
3.2.28.	<i>ubhayavyapadeśāt tv ahikuṇḍalavat //</i>
3.2.29.	<i>prakāśāśrayavad vā tejastvāt //</i>
3.2.30.	<i>pūrvavad vā //</i>
3.2.31.	<i>pratiśedhāc ca //</i>
3.3.39.	<i>saiva hi satyādayaḥ //</i>
3.3.40.	<i>kāmādītaratra tatra cāyatanādibhyaḥ //</i>
3.3.41.	<i>ādarād alopaḥ //</i>
3.3.42.	<i>upasthite 'tas tadvacanāt //</i>

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<sup>1</sup> The numbering of the *sūtras* is according to the GoBhā.



## APPENDIX II

### List of the Correspondence of the *Sūtras*

GoBhā	BraSūBhā (Śa)	ŚrīBhā	BraSūBhā (Ma)
1.1.1.	1.1.1.	1.1.1.	1.1.1.
1.1.2.	1.1.2.	1.1.2.	1.1.2.
1.1.3.	1.1.3.	1.1.3.	1.1.3.
1.1.4.	1.1.4.	1.1.4.	1.1.4.
1.1.5.	1.1.5.	1.1.5.	1.1.5.
1.4.23.	1.4.23.	1.4.23.	1.4.24.
1.4.24.	1.4.24.	1.4.24.	1.4.25.
1.4.25.	1.4.25.	1.4.25.	1.4.26.
1.4.26.	1.4.26.	1.4.26, 1.4.27.	1.4.27.
1.4.27.	1.4.27.	1.4.28.	1.4.28.
2.1.11.	2.1.11.	2.1.11.	2.1.12.
2.1.21.	2.1.21.	2.1.21.	2.1.22.
2.1.22.	2.1.22.	2.1.22.	2.1.23.
2.1.23.	2.1.23.	2.1.23.	2.1.24.
2.1.24.	2.1.24.	2.1.24.	2.1.25.
2.1.25.	2.1.25.	2.1.25.	2.1.26.
2.1.27.	2.1.27.	2.1.27.	2.1.28.
2.2.13.	2.2.13.	2.2.12.	2.2.13.
2.3.41.	2.3.43.	2.3.42.	2.3.43.
2.3.42.	2.3.44.	2.3.43.	2.3.44.
2.3.43.	2.3.45.	2.3.44.	2.3.45.
3.2.28.	3.2.27.	3.2.26.	3.2.28.
3.2.29.	3.2.28.	3.2.27.	3.2.29.
3.2.30.	3.2.29.	3.2.28.	3.2.30.
3.2.31.	3.2.30.	3.2.29.	3.2.31.
3.3.39.	3.3.38.	3.3.37.	3.3.39.
3.3.40.	3.3.39.	3.3.38.	3.3.40.
3.3.41.	3.3.40.	3.3.39.	3.3.41.
3.3.42.	3.3.41.	3.3.40.	3.3.42.



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